Concept
Buyer’s Cover Damages
Expectation interest (including direct, incidental, and consequential damages)
Buyer’s Cover Damages
A buyer whose seller fails to deliver can solve the problem in the market and send the seller the bill. UCC § 2-712(1) calls that move “cover”: after a breach, the buyer may cover by making in good faith and without unreasonable delay any reasonable purchase of or contract to purchase goods in substitution for those due from the seller.1 Suppose a buyer contracted for 1,000 tons of steel at $100 a ton, the seller repudiated, and the buyer bought replacement steel at $110 a ton. The buyer’s own invoice proves the loss, and the seller owes only the extra $10,000 that getting the steel elsewhere cost. A commercially reasonable cover purchase even supplies evidence of the market price, which a buyer who has not covered must introduce separately.2
Cover applies an old idea to goods: when a plaintiff can replace the performance, the cost of replacement, plus incidental and ensuing losses, puts the plaintiff where performance would have.3 The Code frames the measure as the added cost of getting substitute performance,4 and it does so in a system that treats specific enforcement as a limited and secondary remedy, available only when damages are inappropriate.5
Section 2-712 has three subsections, and the three parts of this unit follow them. Subsection (1) sets the conditions a substitute purchase must meet to count as cover. Subsection (2) prices the recovery: the cost of cover less the contract price, plus incidental or consequential damages, less expenses saved in consequence of the seller’s breach.6 Subsection (3) leaves cover optional, because the buyer’s failure to cover does not bar any other remedy.7
The same word names a second, different idea. Buying substitute goods is also a way of minimizing damages, and the two roles follow different rules: cover as a measure of damages is not mandatory, but cover as a means of minimizing damages may be required if the buyer is to recover consequential damages.8 This unit teaches the measure and returns to minimizing in its last part.
Qualifying Cover
Section 2-712(1) defines cover by listing what a substitute purchase must be. It must follow a breach within § 2-711, it must be made in good faith and without unreasonable delay, and it must be a reasonable purchase of, or contract to purchase, goods in substitution for those due from the seller.9 The conditions share a guiding principle: the buyer must act in a commercially reasonable manner.10 A purchase that fails a condition is not cover.
The breach comes first. Section 2-711 indexes the buyer’s remedies when the buyer has not accepted the goods or has justifiably revoked acceptance, and once the buyer has finally accepted, the remedies appear in § 2-714.11 Cover therefore serves the buyer who has not accepted the goods, most typically because the seller failed to deliver them.12 A buyer who has accepted goods and given notification recovers instead the loss resulting in the ordinary course of events from the seller’s breach, determined in any reasonable manner.13 Cover is the buyer’s counterpart to the seller’s resale.14
The next two conditions concern the buyer’s conduct. Good faith and promptness are separate requirements, so a buyer who acts honestly can still lose cover by waiting too long. A buyer who sits out four months hoping prices will fall, and then buys after they have risen, has probably not bought “without unreasonable delay.”15
The last condition concerns what the buyer buys. The substitute need not be identical to the contract goods; it must be a commercially reasonable one.16 The cover contract need not replicate the original’s terms either, because the buyer may buy in a single contract or a series and may vary credit and delivery terms.17 Superior or significantly different goods, however, do not qualify, and one court has explained that it is not appropriate to back into an equivalent amount by calculating the benefit to the buyer of covering with superior goods.18
A purchase that fails a condition costs the buyer the cover measure but not its claim. A buyer who elects not to cover, or whose cover is unreasonable, recovers the difference between the market price and the contract price under § 2-713.19 That section fixes the market price at the time the buyer learned of the breach.20 The buyer gives up the convenience of proving its loss with its own invoice, because it must introduce evidence of the market price itself.21
Laredo Hides Co. v. H & H Meat Products Co. shows cover in its usual setting. The buyer had contracted to sell a Mexican tannery all the hides it expected to purchase from the seller. When the seller cancelled, the buyer bought hides on the open market in substitution, so that it could meet its own contract.22
The statute speaks of a purchase, which leaves open whether a buyer covers when it supplies itself. Some courts have extended cover to a buyer that manufactures substitute goods in house: in Cives Corp. v. Callier Steel Pipe & Tube, Inc., a buyer unable to find another supplier of steel tubing recovered the difference between its in-house cost of making the tubing and the contract price.23 Inventory has divided courts too. In Dura-Wood Treating Co. v. Century Forest Industries, Inc., a buyer sued for market-contract damages, the seller argued that the buyer had covered out of inventory bought from other sellers before the breach, and the court held that inventory built up as a backup against the loss of other sources could constitute cover.24 Chronister Oil Co. v. Unocal Refining & Marketing went the other way: the Seventh Circuit held that a buyer that covered by drawing on its own gasoline inventory was not entitled to cover damages.25
The numbers in that case show why the label mattered. The buyer, Unocal, sought the difference between the 60.4-cent contract price and the 63.14-cent average cost of the inventory it drew on. Had it bought gasoline on the market, it would have paid about 55 cents, saving 5 cents a gallon because of the seller’s breach.26 An inventory-based cover claim would have produced a recovery for a buyer that the market measure shows gained from the breach.
Measuring Cover Damages
Section 2-712(2) prices a qualifying cover purchase. The buyer may recover the difference between the cost of cover and the contract price, together with incidental or consequential damages under § 2-715, but less expenses saved in consequence of the seller’s breach.28 That sentence restates the Restatement’s expectation formula in the vocabulary of sales: the cover-minus-contract difference stands for the loss in value of the performance, incidental and consequential damages for the other loss, and expenses saved for the cost avoided.29
The first term compares what the buyer actually paid for the goods with what it would have paid had the seller performed. If the contract price was $1 a unit and the buyer promptly buys like goods from another seller for $1.50, the damages are 50 cents a unit, and the buyer ends up with the goods at a net cost of $1 a unit, just as if the seller had performed.30 The contract price comes off the cover price because the breach did two things at once: it forced the buyer to pay the market for replacements, and it released the buyer from paying the breaching seller.31 The release is a benefit of the breach, and the recovery is net of it. An award of the full cover price would leave the buyer holding the goods and the contract price too.
The cover difference answers one specific risk: that replacing the performance will cost more than the seller promised. Whether the seller also guaranteed against larger losses is a separate question. A driller who promises to dig a well at a set price might be guaranteeing only that the plaintiff can get the labor without paying a higher price, or might be guaranteeing that the plaintiff’s cattle will have water; under the first promise compensation is the cost of getting the well dug by another driller, and under the second it may include the cattle.32 For goods, incidental and consequential damages, the next two terms, are where the Code answers that question.
The second term adds what the buyer spends to carry out the substitution. Incidental damages include commercially reasonable charges, expenses, or commissions in connection with effecting cover, along with any other reasonable expense incident to the delay or other breach.33 Those costs exist only because the seller broke its promise. In the anvil illustration, Acme agrees to sell Wiley 500 anvils at $700 each, and we assume Acme’s contract left delivery costs to Acme. After Acme breaches, Wiley reasonably covers at $750 each under a shipment contract and pays the $5,000 freight itself. The damages are $375,000 of cover cost less $350,000 of contract price, plus the $5,000 shipping expense: $30,000.34
Consequential damages usually add little once a buyer covers successfully, because a timely substitute leaves the buyer holding the goods it bargained for with little lost to the interruption. The statute builds that expectation into its definition, which reaches loss from requirements and needs of which the seller had reason to know “and which could not reasonably be prevented by cover or otherwise.”35 The first half of that language applies the foreseeability test of Hadley v. Baxendale, and the second half applies the mitigation principle, which is where cover does its second job.36 The cover formula, unlike the seller’s resale formula, expressly allows consequential damages.37
KGM Harvesting Co. v. Fresh Network is a cover case of the ordinary kind, in which a lettuce buyer replaced undelivered lettuce on the open market. Sun-Maid Raisin Growers v. Victor Packing Co. shows consequential loss surviving a cover that fell short: the raisin buyer could not replace all it needed, and its lost resale profits were recoverable because the seller knew the raisins were bought for resale. Courts also keep the categories apart. The shutdown of a buyer’s plant is a consequential loss, and it is a different inquiry from the profit the buyer would have made on the deal as a whole.38
The last term subtracts expenses saved in consequence of the seller’s breach.39 Expectation damages compensate the loss the buyer actually suffered, so a recovery that ignores something the breach spared the buyer pays for harm the buyer never bore.40 The contract price is the largest such saving, and freight or handling that the original contract would have imposed on the buyer is another.
The anvil illustration applies the same logic to a better substitute. Wiley could not find anvils like Acme’s and bought 500 Premium Anvils at $850 each. Assuming the court finds that purchase reasonable, the $75,000 gap between cover price and contract price shrinks by $25,000 of extra resale profit ($150 instead of $100 on each anvil), so the damages are $50,000.41 That treatment sits beside the rule that superior goods do not qualify as cover, and what holds the two together is that a buyer may not use a breach to finish better off than performance would have left it.
A price the buyer has already paid comes back separately. If the buyer has paid, it is entitled to a refund, and offsetting the full contract price is then appropriate as an avoided loss.42 The cover difference is therefore measured against the full contract price, and the refund is added to it.
The cost of cover that enters the formula is the cost of a reasonable purchase. Suppose Harmony breached a $1,500 teaching contract with Sara, and Sara hired a substitute for $1,800 although the market rate was $1,600. If Sara could reasonably have found a teacher at the market rate, her damages are $100, not $300.43 The Code reaches the same figure by another route: an unreasonable cover does not qualify, and the buyer takes the market-price difference.44
The usual slips are to report the cost of cover itself as the damages, to forget the saved-expense subtraction when the substitute deal differs in freight or terms, and to fold a prepayment into the cover difference.
Cover Is Optional
UCC § 2-712(3) closes the cover section with one sentence about the buyer who passes it by: the buyer’s failure to cover does not bar it from any other remedy.46 Subsections (1) and (2) say what a buyer may do and how to price it, and subsection (3) confirms that the choice belongs to the buyer. Cover as a measure of damages is an option the buyer may use or not as it chooses.47
A buyer has no duty to cover. If it elects not to cover, or covers unreasonably, it recovers damages measured by the difference between the market price and the contract price under § 2-713, with incidental and consequential damages, less expenses saved.48 The market price is the price at the time the buyer learned of the breach.49
Choosing between the two routes is a practical matter of cost and proof. Cover requires the buyer to spend money finding and arranging a substitute, and the buyer recovers that expense only to the extent it counts as incidental damages. The market measure requires no cover costs but demands proof of the market price, and those proof costs can exceed the proof costs of cover.50 Covering brings two advantages: the purchase is evidence of the market price, and a reasonable attempt to cover keeps consequential damages open under the mitigation principle.51 Proof is the recurring obstacle in expectation damages. Where a plaintiff cannot prove the profit it would have earned, the reliance interest is the fallback: the plaintiff recovers its expenses, which puts it as close to its expectation interest as the evidence allows.52
Declining to cover does not cost the buyer its remedy, but it can cost the buyer consequential damages. Section 2-715(2)(a) allows consequential damages only for loss “which could not reasonably be prevented by cover or otherwise,”53 and a failure to make a reasonable attempt to cover may preclude consequential damages under the principle of mitigation of losses.54 In Barry & Sewall Industrial Supply Co. v. Metal-Prep of Houston, Inc., a buyer that chose not to replace a defective infrared oven could not recover lost profits for the year it went without one. The same statute keeps the foreseeability test for such loss and requires that the buyer prove it with reasonable certainty, though not with mathematical precision.55
Two opposite misreadings cost points. One treats § 2-712(3) as a license to ignore replacement entirely, as though a buyer could leave its plant idle and bill the seller. The other treats the mitigation limit as a forfeiture of the market remedy, as though a buyer that did not cover recovers nothing. Both confuse the two jobs cover performs: as a measure of damages it is the buyer’s option, and as a way of avoiding consequential loss it must be pursued reasonably.