Concept
Preventable by Cover or Otherwise
UCC buyer's consequential damages
Preventable by Cover or Otherwise
Section 2-715(2)(a) closes with a second condition on the buyer's consequential damages: the loss must be one “which could not reasonably be prevented by cover or otherwise.”1 The reason-to-know condition looks back to contracting and asks what the seller understood about the buyer's needs. This condition looks forward from the breach and asks what the buyer did, or could have done, to stop the loss. A buyer who lets a preventable loss grow bears it.
The condition sits in subsection (a), which governs economic loss such as lost profits, and that loss must pass both the foreseeability test and the mitigation principle.2 Because the Code allows consequential damages only as it specifically provides, a buyer must satisfy each condition in turn.3 The statute's three features (the buyer's needs, the seller's reason to know, and unpreventability) do not by themselves mark off consequential loss, since direct damages can satisfy them too.4
The Code never uses the word mitigation, but “cover or otherwise” carries the common-law doctrine of that name. Those principles apply to Article 2 and surface throughout its remedies provisions. An aggrieved buyer or seller must act reasonably, in good faith, and within a reasonable time in making a substitute transaction. Section 2-715 bars consequential damages that cover or other steps could have prevented. And a seller owes parallel duties when it decides whether to finish specially ordered goods or to resell.5 The Code balances buyers' and sellers' remedies even-handedly, so the duty runs in both directions.6
A failure to prevent loss costs the buyer only the loss it could have prevented. The buyer keeps whatever it could not have avoided by good faith and reasonable conduct.7 The allocation tracks who can act. After a breach the buyer knows its own operations, customers, and options, and the seller usually cannot shop, repair, or reschedule on the buyer's behalf. The four subsections below take the condition in turn: cover, other reasonable steps, the limits on what a buyer must do, and the burden of proof.
Cover as Mitigation
Cover is a buyer's good-faith purchase of substitute goods, and the statute names it first because it stops a loss at its source. A buyer who substitutes promptly confines its loss to direct damages, the substitute price less the contract price, and avoids whatever harm the breach might have done to other transactions it had planned.8 The rule for consequential damages follows from that. A buyer recovers lost profits only to the extent cover could not have avoided them, and inability to cover after a prompt and reasonable effort is a prerequisite to recovery.9 The Code does not compel cover. It withholds consequential damages from the buyer who skips a substitute purchase that would reasonably have prevented the loss.
A buyer who cannot cover keeps its claim. When a buyer covers only in part, it recovers the net cost of cover (the cover price less the contract price, plus expenses), together with any consequential damages, less the expenses the breach saved it.10 A buyer that searches promptly and reasonably and finds nothing could not have prevented its loss by any step, and the Code leaves that loss with the seller who breached.
To count as cover, a purchase must be made in good faith and without unreasonable delay, and the substitute need only be commercially reasonable, not identical.11 In-house cover is contested. One court let a buyer that could not locate another supplier of steel tubing recover the difference between its own manufacturing cost and the contract price, while the Seventh Circuit has criticized courts that allow “self-cover” because a buyer cannot make a “purchase” from itself.12
Dura-Wood Treating Co. v. Century Forest Industries, Inc. shows in-house cover falling short of the condition. After Century Forest refused to deliver cross-ties, Dura-Wood covered by making the ties in its own facilities, and the district court awarded $42,000 for the profits Dura-Wood lost because those facilities could not make ties for new customers.13 Lost profits of that kind are consequential damages, recoverable only if they could not reasonably have been prevented by cover or otherwise.14 The Fifth Circuit reversed the award. Making the ties in-house looked cheaper than buying them, but it tied up the plant, and a purchase elsewhere would have left the plant free for the new work. A different form of cover would have prevented the loss, so Century Forest did not owe for the buyer's choice of method.
A substitute drawn from the buyer's own stock raises the same problem. One ammonia buyer made up for its lost production by dipping into its own inventory. Because the ammonia was fungible, each unit it used was a unit it no longer had to sell. The jury multiplied the smaller number of units by the profit on each, and the court approved the result: the award put the buyer where it would have stood but for the breach.15 The substitute had not prevented the loss of profit. It had only moved it.
Cover must also come promptly. A buyer who learns of a repudiation may await performance for a commercially reasonable time, but if its damages were fixed at the moment it learned of the repudiation, waiting would expose it to post-repudiation market shifts.16 A buyer who waits an unreasonable time to cover should not recover the profits on its resale contracts as consequential damages, because the rule on awaiting performance after repudiation is a specific application of sections 2-712 and 2-715.17 In a rising market the arithmetic is plain. Each day of delay raises the price of substitutes and moves the buyer's resale commitments closer to their deadlines. Prompt cover would have capped the loss at the price difference.
Other Reasonable Steps
The words “or otherwise” widen the buyer's duty beyond the substitute purchase. Cover under section 2-712 serves a buyer whose seller failed to deliver or whose goods it rightfully rejected, and it does not reach a buyer who has accepted the goods. In Lewis v. Mobil Oil Corp. the court reasoned from that point that the question for such a buyer is whether its damage could otherwise have been reasonably prevented. It took the test from Williston: damages the plaintiff might have avoided “with reasonable effort without undue risk, expense, or humiliation” are either not caused by the defendant's wrong or need not have been, and so are not charged to the defendant.19
Those reasonable steps include repair and replacement. In Federal Signal Corp. v. Safety Factors, Inc. the buyer had made repairs and had supplied its rental customers with working alternates, and its evidence showed the repairs were reasonable. The seller offered no evidence that the products were similar enough to make cover reasonable or that the repair and replacement expenses were unreasonable.20 Repair and replacement thus count as mitigating steps, and their reasonableness decides whether they satisfy the statute.
These steps share a logic. After a buyer learns its goods are failing, what it loses next depends on what it does next, and only the buyer can repair the equipment, stop using it, or order a replacement. A loss that a reasonable step would have prevented is, in Williston's words, one the defendant's wrong did not cause or one the plaintiff need not have suffered.21 The Code therefore leaves that loss with the party who could have stopped it.
Barry & Sewall Industrial Supply Co. v. Metal-Prep of Houston, Inc. shows the principle applied to equipment the buyer knew was inadequate. Metal-Prep sought profits it lost because its oven could not fill all its orders. The district court found that its gross profit had climbed from $345,923 in 1980 to $1,314,329 in 1984, that its debt-to-equity ratio had fallen significantly by 1984, and that financing for a new oven would have been obtainable.22 Those findings put an affordable remedy within the buyer's reach. The profits lost while it waited were avoidable, and the appeals court refused to charge them to the seller.
Lewis stands on the other side of the line. The plaintiff ran a mill on oil supplied by Mobil. Neither he nor the dealer who sold it knew its chemical composition or the exact requirements of his equipment, and he relied on Mobil to supply the right oil. He even changed the brand of pump in case the problem was mechanical. The cause came to light only when a Mobil engineer visited the mill and changed the recommended oil.23 Mobil argued that he should have called in an independent expert. The court agreed that doing so might have been desirable and would probably have saved both sides expense, but it declined to reduce the damages as a matter of law. A buyer's duty to use diligence is ordinarily a jury question, diligence means the care of a reasonably careful person under the circumstances, and the jury had found that the plaintiff acted reasonably.24 What separates the two cases is knowledge and means. Metal-Prep could finance a replacement, while the mill owner did not yet know what needed replacing.
A buyer that passes goods along without testing them can lose part of its recovery. A grain elevator that did no testing of the wheat delivered to it was found 49 percent responsible for the consequential damages, because it had failed to take reasonable measures to reduce its losses, and the trial court deducted that share from its award. An allocation of fault of that kind is a finding of fact that an appellate court will not overturn unless it is convinced the trial court made a mistake.25
On a given set of facts, three questions come in order. What did the buyer know about the failing goods or its inadequate capacity, and when? What feasible step was open: repair, stopping use, testing, replacement? Would a reasonable buyer in that position have taken it? A buyer that knew of the problem and let an affordable remedy sit loses the loss that remedy would have prevented. A buyer diligently searching for the cause keeps its claim. Reasonableness is judged on the facts, and diligence is ordinarily for the jury.26
Limits on the Duty
The adverb “reasonably” marks the outer edge of the buyer's duty. The buyer's response is judged from its position when the breach occurred, not by hindsight, and the question is not whether another response would have worked better or whether the chosen one failed or worsened the harm.28 The buyer need not take unduly burdensome or risky action, explore every conceivable possibility, or try methods that reasonably appear futile, and a reduction in recovery requires some fault, meaning conduct that deviated from rationality or fairness.29 Williston states the same limit in terms of the effort demanded: the buyer need only avoid damages that reasonable effort could avoid without “undue risk, expense, or humiliation.”30 A hindsight test would make the buyer a guarantor of success, because some other step always looks wiser once the result is known.
A reasonable effort that fails therefore does not defeat recovery. The mill owner in Lewis switched pumps because the trouble might have been mechanical, and neither he nor his dealer knew the oil's composition or his equipment's exact requirements. His efforts missed the cause, yet they were the efforts a reasonable buyer in his position would have made.31 Because the buyer is judged on what it knew at the time, a buyer who acts while a defect remains uncertain is ordinarily not at fault merely because the defect later proves real.32
Cost most often decides where the line falls. In Simeone v. First Bank National Ass'n the bank argued that a collector's consequential damages should be cut because he could have bought his lost cars and parts back from a later purchaser for over $1,000,000. The court upheld the jury's rejection of that argument. Requiring the collector to spend almost $700,000 more than the contract obligated him to pay was unreasonable, and the bank never showed that he had the resources. A buyer is likewise excused from mitigating when its financial condition will not allow the steps.33 A step's physical availability does not make it reasonable. The price of the step, weighed against the loss it would prevent and the buyer's means, enters the calculation.
The substitute a buyer must accept is a comparable one. Employment law states the same limit. A wrongfully discharged employee's recovery drops by what the employee earned or with reasonable effort might have earned elsewhere, but the employer must show that the other job was comparable or substantially similar, and the employee's rejection of a different or inferior job does not count against recovery.34 Article 2 reaches the same place in the sale of goods: a covering buyer need not purchase identical goods, only commercially reasonable substitutes.35
The duty applies in full when the step costs nothing. In Irmscher Suppliers, Inc. v. Schuler insects had infiltrated a family's home through its screens, and the Indiana Court of Appeals agreed that a family in that position will foreseeably spend time and energy killing them and cleaning up. But the sellers had offered, as early as March 2004, to replace the Rol screens with flat screens at no cost, and the buyers did not accept. A short period of insect-killing while looking for a solution was reasonable, the court held, but seven years was not. The trial court abused its discretion in awarding all seven years, and the award fell to $3,612, the share of the claim attributable to the three years before the offer. Accepting a free replacement carries no risk, burden, or strain on the buyer's means, so none of the limits applied, and the loss after the offer traced to the buyers' own choice. The buyers kept the loss they could not have avoided, because a failure to mitigate lowers recovery only by the amount the buyer's own conduct added.36
Reasonable efforts cost money, and a buyer may prove what they cost. One buyer of non-conforming trees established $280 in additional expenses the delivery forced on it: $100 to rent a storage and sales lot, $60 for a night watchman, and $120 for added labor in selling the rejected trees.37
Between the million-dollar repurchase and the free screens lies the ground where reasonableness does the work. The court weighs the step's cost and risk against the loss it would prevent and against what the buyer can afford. A buyer who picks a reasonable step that fails still recovers.
Burden of Proof
Section 2-715(2)(a) does not say who must prove that a loss could or could not reasonably have been prevented, and courts have filled the silence differently.39 Washington's Supreme Court, in Federal Signal, held that the mitigation efforts referred to in section 2-715 are the common-law doctrine of mitigation and that mitigation is an affirmative defense on which the seller bears the burdens of pleading, production, and persuasion.40 Other decisions speak of inability to cover after a prompt and reasonable effort as a prerequisite to the buyer's recovery of consequential damages,41 language that sounds like part of the buyer's own case. The choice matters because the Code allows consequential damages only as it specifically provides42 and because the party who carries the burden loses on a silent record. Check which rule the governing jurisdiction follows.
Washington built its holding on three supports. They were the Code's aim of uniformity, the comments to section 2-715, and the logical appeal of the majority view, and together they persuaded the court that section 2-715(2)(a) codifies common-law mitigation.43 The court also quoted the point that “[i]t is entirely possible for the injured party to bear the burden of proving the extent of consequential damages while the breaching party has the duty of proving those items which limit the award of consequential damages.”44 The common-law source points the same way. In the employment setting, the employer must affirmatively prove what the discharged employee earned or could have earned elsewhere.45 As a practical matter, the seller who says a step was available can name it and offer evidence of its cost and feasibility.
The word “burden” covers three separate duties: pleading, producing evidence, and persuading. The first two together make up the burden of production.46 Federal Signal puts all three on the seller, and the seller there met none of them. It waived the issue, and the buyer's evidence stood unanswered. That evidence showed its repairs were reasonable and its rental customers had working alternates, while the seller offered no evidence that the products were similar enough to make cover reasonable or the repair and replacement expenses unreasonable. The court reversed the trial court's conclusion on mitigation.47
None of this relieves the buyer of its own proof. The buyer must establish the existence and extent of the damages the breach caused, though only a reasonable basis for ascertaining them is required,48 and the standard is reasonable certainty, not mathematical precision.49 The buyer must also show that the loss resulted from needs the seller had reason to know of at contracting. A buyer that was already leasing a car-wash unit from another company, and had no contact with the seller before or at the auction where it bought a Wash Pac Unit, could not show that the seller knew of its need to hire someone to wash cars by hand. It failed on that burden.50
A careful buyer documents its search for substitutes and its repair efforts whichever rule applies, because those records answer a defense in one jurisdiction and supply an element in the other. A careful seller pleads mitigation and builds a record on it, because where the issue is a defense, an unpleaded issue is waived.