Concept
Recurring Consequential Losses
UCC buyer's consequential damages
Recurring Consequential Losses
Section 2-715(2)(a) makes a seller answer for “any loss resulting from general or particular requirements and needs of which the seller at the time of contracting had reason to know and which could not reasonably be prevented by cover or otherwise.”1 The clause rests on the rule of Hadley v. Baxendale: a loss that would not flow naturally from the breach in the great multitude of cases is recoverable only if special circumstances were communicated to or known by the seller.2 The Code adds limits of its own. A buyer cannot recover what it could have prevented by cover or otherwise, and a clause excluding consequential damages can defeat the claim altogether.3
Four kinds of loss keep returning to the courts in claims under section 2-715, and each strains a different requirement. A buyer's liability to its own customers tests whether the seller could see the downstream use of its goods. A claim for lost goodwill tests proof, because the loss depends on the later choices of many customers. Injury to person or property runs under subsection (b), which has its own causal test and no notice requirement. A claim for the buyer's attorney's fees raises a threshold question: whether the item belongs in either category of damages at all. (Lost resale profits and lost production appeared earlier, as examples of general needs.)
Classification comes first, and the conditions follow. A loss that flows from the ordinary course of events is direct damages even though it may also meet the “reason to know” language of subsection (2)(a), so that language alone does not make a loss consequential.4 What makes a loss consequential is that it arises outside the immediate buyer-seller transaction, usually from the buyer's dealings with third parties, as a proximate result of a breach that the seller could reasonably foresee at contracting.5 The buyer must then clear the unpreventability condition: inability to cover after a prompt and reasonable effort is a prerequisite to recovering lost profits and similar consequential losses.6 All of these claims seek money. A buyer that has paid for identified goods may instead recover the goods themselves under section 2-502, if it stands ready to tender any unpaid balance, but that remedy lies outside this section.7 The first loss, liability to the buyer's own customers, shows most plainly why consequential damages sit outside the immediate sale.
Liability to Third Parties
A buyer that resells goods, or builds them into a product of its own, may end up refunding customers, settling their claims, or paying to replace what they bought. Those payments are consequential damages because they arise outside the immediate sale. They stem from the buyer's dealings with third parties and reach the buyer only through those dealings.8 The label sends the claim through section 2-715(2)(a) and keeps it out of incidental damages, which cover handling expenses such as transporting, storing, or reselling rejected goods.9
The seller's notice carries unusual weight here, because strangers produce the loss. A defective component harms the buyer's customer first, the customer looks to the buyer, and the buyer looks to the seller; at each link the amount turns on facts the seller never saw. The reason-to-know requirement protects the seller's choices. A seller that knew its goods were headed downstream could price the exposure, insure against it, or ask for a contractual limit, while a seller that did not know had priced only a failed sale.
Garlock Sealing Techs., LLC v. NAK Sealing Techs. Corp. shows the claim in its simplest form. Garlock paid Rockwell a settlement to resolve a dispute over defects in brown viton seals that Mao Shun had produced, and the trial court awarded Garlock consequential damages against Mao Shun. Two features of the result teach more than the facts do. First, the court did not award the whole settlement. It awarded $1,678,267, the percentage of Garlock's actual payment that corresponded to the part of Rockwell's damages whose recovery was highly probable and sufficiently established at trial, and it drew its figures from the testimony and documents of Garlock's accounting expert.10 A settlement with a customer thus evidences the buyer's loss without fixing it, and the buyer must still show how much of what it paid reflected damage the customer could have proved. Second, Mao Shun's appeal failed on burden: it did not show that substantial evidence was lacking for the finding of reasonable foreseeability, so the award stood under subsection (2)(a).11
The same chain appears in Hendricks & Associates v. Daewoo Corp., with a resale contract at the top. Champion received striped garments that Hendricks had bought from Daewoo, found them defective, and issued debit memoranda against Hendricks's account to recover its payments and inspection costs, which allegedly totaled $213,486.61. When the memoranda issued, though, Hendricks's records showed that Champion owed it only $21,614.73, and nothing showed that Hendricks was ever held accountable for the remaining $191,871.88.12 The jury awarded $21,614.73 for the memoranda, and the court of appeals held that the district court correctly denied a new trial on that award.13 A customer's demand therefore measures the buyer's loss only to the extent the buyer actually bears it.
Dakota Grain Co., Inc. v. Ehrmantrout asks what a buyer must prove when its customers' claims arise from one use of goods that can be put to several. A grain elevator that bought wheat from Ehrmantrout intended to resell it as seed, settled with four farmers, and sought the settlement from Ehrmantrout. The trial court awarded the Elevator $11,332.51 as consequential damages, 51 percent of the total damages the Elevator incurred in that settlement.14 The North Dakota Supreme Court remanded, because the trial court's statements conflicted on whether Ehrmantrout knew or should have known, when he made the contract, that the Elevator meant to resell his wheat as seed. The trial court had said that some evidence showed such knowledge but that it was not enough to prove personal knowledge by a preponderance, and that comparative negligence had already “penalized” the Elevator for its inability to prove it.15 The supreme court called that question the key element in deciding whether consequential damages were appropriate and sent the case back for clarified findings.16
The order of the inquiries matters. Apportionment of fault becomes an issue only if the trial court finds that the seller knew or had reason to know of the seed use, and without that finding no consequential damages should be awarded.17 Fault reduces an award once notice exists, and it cannot substitute for notice the buyer failed to prove. When notice is found, the buyer's own lapses do reduce the award. The trial court charged the Elevator with 49 percent of the consequential damages for failing to take reasonable measures to mitigate, noting that the Elevator did no testing of any kind on the wheat delivered on May 9, and it treated that allocation as a finding of fact that an appellate court will not disturb unless it is convinced the trial court made a mistake.18 A reseller that passes goods along untested lets the defect reach its customers when a simple test could have stopped the loss.
Notice can also fail outright. In Landmark Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler Credit Corp., a buyer of a Wash Pac car-wash unit sold at auction claimed the cost of hiring someone to wash cars by hand. When the auction took place, the buyer was already leasing a Wash Pac unit from another company, and it had no contact with the seller before or at the auction. The court held that the trial court could reasonably conclude that this cost was not a loss from needs the seller had reason to know of when it made the sale, so the buyer did not carry its burden.19
Goodwill and Future Business
Lost goodwill, the customer loyalty that brings repeat business, and lost future business, the specific orders a buyer would have received, are consequential damages in principle, because a run of defective goods can damage the buyer's standing with the customers who buy from it. They are also hard to win. A lost resale profit can be read off a resale contract, but a lost account reflects a customer's own decision, and customers leave for many reasons. The buyer must therefore establish three things at once: that the seller had reason to know at contracting that defective goods would cost it these customers, that the breach caused them to leave, and that the lost profit can be fixed with reasonable certainty. Notice is often the easiest of the three. Claims more often fail on cause or amount.
Courts have long treated goodwill as the paradigm of a loss too speculative to award. In Traynor v. Walters, a buyer unable to perform its contracts to supply New York florists during the Christmas season of 1967 sought the future profits it lost through damaged goodwill, and the court called damages of that nature “entirely too speculative for reasonable calculation” and awarded none.21 Crook Motor Co. v. Goolsby said the same in general terms: loss of goodwill “is generally too speculative to be allowed,” and the plaintiff's proof would not have supported such an award in any event.22
A firm contract changes the analysis. In a dispute over goods that were to be resold to a Russian buyer, the court reasoned that damages cannot rest on conjecture, but that the reasonable prospect of damages shown by a firm contract should not be defeated by conjecture either; the plaintiff's burden is a “fair degree of certainty,” not mathematical certainty.23 The buyer there could point to a specific contract. A buyer claiming goodwill can point only to customers who might have kept buying.
Hendricks shows a buyer winning on notice and losing ground on amount. Champion's purchasing manager testified that the first two shipments of striped garments arrived with oil and grease stains, open seams, running colors, uneven stripes, and large holes, and that wash tests on the third shipment exposed latent defects that opened the seams by the fifth washing.24 Daewoo had also made garments for Champion on two earlier occasions at Hendricks's request, and it had seen Champion react sharply to small departures from the specifications. On that record, a rational jury could find that Daewoo had reason to know at contracting that further defective garments would probably damage Hendricks's relationship with Champion, even to the point of ending it. The amount was harder. Massachusetts law required Hendricks to prove its prospective profits with a fair degree of certainty, and the court concluded that Hendricks had done so only as to a portion of the $375,000 consequential award; Hendricks's figures came from a report of its income from Champion in fiscal years 1983 through 1985 and its tax returns.25 Notice asks what the seller should have anticipated when it contracted, and the history of the relationship can answer that. Certainty asks whether the evidence supports a specific figure for orders never placed, and only a record of what the relationship produced can answer that.
A buyer that cannot connect its lost accounts to the defects loses even when the seller behaved badly. In Hangzhou Silk Import & Export Corp. v. P.C.B. International Industries, Inc., a start-up apparel company bought garments of its own design from a Chinese manufacturer, received defective shipments, and sought damages for harm to its reputation and goodwill. It lost that claim because it did not show that the defects caused its accounts to cancel and offered no testimony or communications from the former customers. The seller's fraud in presenting another company's plant as its own did not fill the gap, because it said nothing about why any customer left.
Some courts accept that a buyer can prove injury to goodwill in appropriate cases. In Consolidated Data Terminals v. Applied Digital Data Systems, Inc., applying New York's version of the Code, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that a seller that knew its buyer distributed computer equipment had reason to know that poor-quality terminals would cost the buyer goodwill, because customers would blame the distributor. The court upheld $15,000 for the extra costs and lost profits caused by the service calls the terminals required, but reversed an award of $111,842.50 in estimated profits on future sales over the three years the distributorship was expected to run. Notice did not carry the projection. The award that survived was the one tied to costs the buyer had actually incurred.
Injury to Person or Property
Subsection (b) of section 2-715(2) supplies the second head of consequential damages: “injury to person or property proximately resulting from any breach of warranty.”27 The harm differs in kind from the economic loss in subsection (a). Lost resale profits and idle production exist only because of what the buyer was doing with the goods, while a burned hand or a scorched wall is something the goods themselves did. The Code's text tracks that difference. The reason-to-know and cover-or-otherwise clauses sit in subsection (a), and subsection (b) contains neither.28 Damages for injury to person or property are therefore not subject to the foreseeability test.29
The reason for the difference lies in what each loss depends on. A seller cannot see a buyer's contracts and production schedules unless someone tells it, so subsection (a) asks what notice the seller had when it set its price. Physical harm has a different source. A seller of heaters or boots knows that a defective product can burn or injure the person using it, and it can price and insure against that risk because the danger lies in the product and not in any particular buyer's plans. Subsection (b) therefore drops the notice question and keeps two requirements: a breach of warranty, express or implied, and proximate cause. The buyer must still prove the amount with reasonable certainty, though not with mathematical precision.30
Proximate cause is the working limit, and it has two parts, cause in fact and foreseeability. The buyer must show that the injury would not have happened without the defect, and the seller may argue that some later event was so unlikely a result of the defect that it broke the chain. Foreseeability thus survives inside this head, but it asks whether harm of this general kind was a probable result of the defect. It does not ask what the seller knew about this buyer's needs. Garlock claimed in the alternative that its award was proper under subsection (b), and the question whether superseding-cause analysis applies in a contract warranty setting also surfaced. The court decided neither, because Mao Shun had not shown that substantial evidence failed to support the finding of reasonable foreseeability, and that sustained the award under subsection (a).31
Bodily injury from a product is often associated with tort law, but Article 2 makes it a contract remedy. In Badilla v. Wal-Mart Stores East Inc., a buyer alleged that his boots failed to conform to the warranties the defendants made and that the failure caused severe, painful, and permanent mental and physical injury, lost earnings, and medical expenses. The New Mexico Supreme Court held that the right he asserted was a contract-based right to consequential damages for nonconforming goods, so his claim lay in contract and was governed by the Code's limitations provision, section 2-725. The court confirmed that incidental and consequential damages, including damages for personal injuries, may be recovered under section 2-714(3).32 Who may sue the seller for such injuries is a separate question this reading does not take up.
The buyer's own conduct can narrow this head even though subsection (b) never mentions it. Proximate cause is the vehicle. A buyer who saw the danger repeatedly and kept using the product invites the argument that its own choice, and not the breach, produced the loss. Jurisdictions differ on whether such a lapse defeats the claim or only reduces it. The North Dakota trial court in Dakota Grain, for example, reduced a reseller's consequential damages by 49 percent for failing to take reasonable measures, and the supreme court treated that allocation as a finding of fact.33
Litigation Costs
Section 2-715 lists the add-ons to a buyer's direct damages, and neither subsection mentions the cost of suing the seller. Subsection (1) covers handling expenses such as inspection, transportation, and the care of goods after a breach, along with cover expenses, and subsection (2) covers the losses discussed above.35 A buyer who has hired a lawyer to enforce its claim sometimes asks the court to treat the fees as one of these items anyway, and the courts refuse. Each party to litigation bears its own attorney's fees absent statutory authority, agreement, or rule to the contrary.36 The buyer in Landmark claimed its attorney's fees and costs as incidental and consequential damages under Kentucky's version of section 2-715, and the court held that Kentucky law does not permit that recovery, following a Kentucky Court of Appeals decision, Nick's Auto Sales, Inc. v. Radcliff Auto Sales, Inc.37
The reason lies in what the fees are. Fees for suing the seller come from the buyer's own decision to enforce its remedy, so they are a cost of collecting damages and not a loss the breach inflicted. If the catchall in subsection (1) reached them, one general phrase would reverse the default rule in every warranty suit without the conditions that fee statutes attach. In Indiana Glass Co. v. Indiana Michigan Power Co., whose contract made no provision for fees, the buyer pointed to that catchall. The court answered that the commentary ties incidental damages to handling rightfully rejected goods and to effecting cover, and that attorney's fees were clearly not contemplated.
A fee statute can supply the missing authority, so a buyer's argument must be tested against statutes as well as the Code. In Holden Machinery v. Sundance Tractor & Mower (In re Fried Group), a bankruptcy court first awarded a buyer $2,688.50 in attorney's fees as consequential damages under Georgia's section 2-715(2) and then vacated the award on reconsideration. No written contract provided for fees, and Georgia's litigation-expense statute allows them only when the plaintiff has specifically pleaded for them and the defendant acted in bad faith, was stubbornly litigious, or caused unnecessary trouble and expense, a showing no one had made. The court added that no published Georgia case had awarded fees for a wholesale buyer's prosecution of its own warranty action.
The line falls between the cost of suing and the cost of dealing with what the breach left behind. When a train derailment ruined cargo, a court held that the cost of surveying the damage was incidental and not consequential. Survey expenses are inspection expenses that flow directly from the ordinary course of events after the breach, and they resemble cover costs because they are incurred to mitigate damages.38 Expenses of inspecting, mitigating, and replacing belong to the breach. Fees for prosecuting the claim belong to the lawsuit.
A narrow exception concerns a suit the buyer did not choose to bring. As Holden describes it, the Georgia Court of Appeals in Alterman Foods, Inc. v. G.C.C. Beverages, Inc. allowed a buyer to recover the expenses of defending a third party's suit when the litigation resulted from an incident caused by the same defective merchandise. The court reasoned that a seller knows the buyer will resell to the general public and that litigation inherently follows a mishap caused by defective goods. That reasoning tracks the reason-to-know condition and the third-party liability discussed above, because the defense cost reaches the buyer through its dealings with its own customers. Holden distinguished Alterman because the Holden buyer sought fees for prosecuting its own claim and not for defending a separate action brought by a third party. The exception rests on one state's decision, and the court that described it declined to extend it to a buyer's own suit.