Concept
Difficulty of Proving Loss
Liquidated Damages or Penalty
Difficulty of Proving Loss
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 356(1) tests a stipulated sum against the anticipated or actual loss “and the difficulties of proof of loss,” and UCC § 2-718(1) repeats that phrase before adding a third consideration, “the inconvenience or nonfeasibility of otherwise obtaining an adequate remedy.”1 The anticipated-or-actual-loss factor, treated in the preceding section, compares the sum with the harm. These two considerations ask something different. Difficulty of proof tells a court how closely the sum must track the loss, and the availability of other remedies tells it whether a stipulated sum was needed at all.
Both operate as inputs to one reasonableness judgment, not as separate hurdles.2 Difficulty of proof comes first, as a sliding scale; the Code’s added factor about other remedies follows.
A Sliding Scale of Latitude
The harder a loss is to prove, the easier it is to show that the amount fixed is reasonable.3 Courts turn that principle into a variable standard of accuracy. Where damages are hard to assess after a breach, as when profits are hard to estimate, a clause may be reasonable even though it seems to miss the actual loss by a relatively large margin. Where damages are easy to calculate, as when cover price and contract price are readily ascertainable in the market, the clause may need to come relatively close to the actual or anticipated loss.4
The scale looks paradoxical at first, because the harder a loss is to prove, the harder it must be to make any reasonable advance estimate of it.5 Courts resolve the tension by treating the two considerations as flexible and balancing them against each other, not as rigid, co-equal requirements. The more uncertain and speculative the damages, the less rigorously a court examines the reliability of the pre-estimate; where damages would be relatively mechanical and routine, the parties are held to a stricter standard.6 The reasoning behind the balance is simple. A speculative loss is the very reason a clause is useful, so demanding a precise forecast would defeat its purpose. A mechanical loss can be computed from known figures, so a sum that strays from them cannot be excused as forecasting error.
Harms that resist measurement sit at the permissive end. A wrongfully discharged employee may suffer subjective injuries, such as harm to reputation, that are difficult to prove or calculate, and a new business contracting for construction may face lost profits from delay that are speculative.7 A school’s contract making parents liable for a full year’s tuition when a student withdrew was upheld as a reasonable pre-estimate of the school’s likely harm, because its budgeting by student count made the tuition lost from any one withdrawal very difficult to estimate in advance.8 A covenant not to compete ancillary to the sale of a business is the classic case, since actual damages are hardest to prove there and a clause is most useful and most likely to be upheld.9
The latitude has conditions. The parties need a reasonable basis for the figure, such as market conditions, industry custom, prior dealings, or other risk factors, and with one the clause will typically be upheld under principles of freedom of contract.10 The court then accepts or rejects the clause as a whole, because the measure of damages under a liquidated clause is basically an “all or nothing” proposition.11
Property with an active market sits at the strict end. Substitutionary damages there are usually quite easy to prove, so a court examines more rigorously how the parties arrived at the figure.12
The same dollar figure thus passes in one setting and fails in the other, because the measurability of the loss sets how far the figure may stray from it.
Difficulty of proof was once a gate. Traditionally, courts stated that damages must be uncertain as a prerequisite to upholding a clause.13 The traditional two-part test asks both whether the stipulated amount bears a reasonable relationship to the anticipated or actual loss and whether damages are difficult to determine.14 Most jurisdictions now reject that strict requirement and treat difficulty of proof as one factor, probably a secondary one.15 The UCC and the Restatement speak of “the difficulties of proof of loss,” not of uncertainty. Clauses have frequently been upheld although actual damages were readily calculable, though few cases turn on the point and whether the wording changed prior law is uncertain.16 The older view survives in places. The Restatement does not say a clause is impermissible when proof of actual damages is easy, but it makes the sum hard to justify in that case; and some courts treat difficulty of proving actual loss as a precondition, while others say flatly that if damages are ascertainable when the contract is made, any specified-damages clause is a penalty.17
“Difficulty” also covers more than one kind of trouble. Professor Macneil isolated five kinds of uncertainty: difficulty of producing proof of damages after the breach; difficulty of determining what damages the breach caused; difficulty of ascertaining what damages were contemplated when the contract was made; absence of any standardized measure of damages for the breach; and difficulty of forecasting, at formation, all the damages that any possible breach might cause.18 Some of these look to the time of breach and others to formation, which leads to the question of timing.
The scale also depends on when difficulty is measured, because a loss that looked uncertain at signing can be easy to prove by trial. The traditional test looks to the time of contracting and asks whether damages were then difficult to determine.19 The Restatement’s text looks instead to the “anticipated or actual loss,”20 and its racetrack illustration decides the question by the loss that actually occurred. Acme agrees to build a grandstand for Benson’s racetrack by April 1, with liquidated damages of $1,000 per day of delay, and finishes on April 10. Benson, however, was delayed a month in getting permission to operate the track, so Acme’s delay cost it nothing. Because Benson’s loss is not difficult to prove, the clause is unenforceable on grounds of public policy.21 The Federal Circuit in Monsanto Co. v. McFarling likewise measured difficulty when the breach was discovered.
The choice of moment can decide a case. A court that measures at formation credits the uncertainty that existed when the parties signed. A court that measures at breach credits only the difficulty that remains when the loss is actually to be proved. Name the moment the governing authority uses, and where the facts do not say, give the result under both.
Inconvenience of Other Remedies
UCC § 2-718(1) lists three considerations for the reasonableness of a stipulated sum: the anticipated or actual harm, the difficulties of proof of loss, and “the inconvenience or nonfeasibility of otherwise obtaining an adequate remedy.”23 The first two measure the sum against the loss. The third looks past the loss to the injured party’s other options, such as injunctive relief or restitution, and asks how practical those routes would have been without the clause.24
The factor cuts in two directions. Where the ordinary remedies are impractical, a stipulated sum may be the only route to real compensation, so the clause earns more deference. Where an adequate remedy was readily available and the plaintiff prefers the clause anyway, the choice suggests that the sum is excessive. That inference weakens when the other remedies pose difficulties, and a court may weigh those difficulties in deciding whether the clause is valid.25
Both scenes turn on one question: could the injured party have obtained the ordinary remedy without real difficulty? When it could, as with the press, electing the clause invites the question why damages would be preferable to performance, and the only satisfying answer is that the sum exceeds what performance was worth. When it could not, as with the seat shells, the election tells the court nothing suspicious, because the plaintiff had no better route.
A clause cannot cure the problem by declaring itself the plaintiff’s exclusive remedy. The declaration is what removes the other remedies, so relying on their absence assumes the clause’s validity. The argument is somewhat circular and may not prevail.26
The concerns behind this factor also sit uneasily with the growing willingness of courts to let parties fix their own remedies, even at a figure that exceeds by a reasonable margin the damages a court would award.27 A plaintiff’s preference for the clause is therefore best treated as one point on the scale, weighed with the harm and the difficulty of proof, and not as a verdict.
The Restatement omits the factor, viewing it as already expressed in the difficulty-of-proof language and as redundant, because a party unable to prove its loss has little chance of obtaining an adequate remedy.28 Few opinions construe § 2-718(1), so the Restatement’s commentary and examples often fill the gap.29 The Code’s wording still points a court toward remedies other than damages. In a goods case, raise the factor when the facts show a buyer with no practical alternative or a plaintiff who passed up an easy one. Outside the Code, the analysis tracks § 356(1) and runs on its two factors.