Concept
Consequences of the Ruling
Liquidated Damages or Penalty
Consequences of the Ruling
A court's ruling on a stipulated sum ends in one of two outcomes, and each outcome opens its own set of questions. Under Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 356(1) and UCC § 2-718(1), a sum that is reasonable in light of the loss and the difficulty of proving it stands as valid liquidated damages. A term fixing unreasonably large damages is unenforceable on grounds of public policy under the Restatement and void as a penalty under the Code.1 The earlier sections supplied the tests that sort clauses into these two groups. This section follows each group past the ruling.
A valid clause fixes the recovery, but the statutes do not say how far that effect reaches. Two questions follow. First, must the injured party still have tried to hold its loss down? Ordinary damages shrink by any loss that reasonable effort could have avoided, while the clause substitutes the parties' own figure for that calculation. Second, is the stipulated sum the only remedy, or may the injured party choose other relief, such as an order compelling performance? Both questions ask how far the substitution reaches, and each turns on the clause's wording and on the reason courts enforce such clauses at all. The first two subsections take them in turn.
A clause that fails presents the opposite problem. Each text makes the offending term itself unenforceable, so the contract survives and the injured party keeps its claim for the breach.2 With the clause gone, nothing fixes the amount. The injured party must prove actual damages under the ordinary rules of causation, certainty, foreseeability, and avoidable loss, the very burdens the clause was written to remove. A drafter who overreaches thus loses the saving in proof that made liquidation attractive, and may collect less than a defensible figure would have yielded. The last subsection develops that outcome.
Mitigation and Valid Clauses
Neither Restatement § 356(1) nor UCC § 2-718(1) says whether a promisee who collects a valid stipulated sum must have tried to hold its loss down.3 The silence matters because mitigation is the ordinary rule that cuts an award by any loss the injured party could have avoided through reasonable effort. A defendant who may invoke it pays less than the agreed sum whenever the plaintiff replaced what the breach took away. The great majority of courts hold that the injured party need not have mitigated. Barrie School v. Patch states that answer most directly: the Maryland Court of Appeals asked whether a non-breaching party has a duty to mitigate when the contract contains a valid liquidated damages clause, and held that it has none.4
The majority's reason lies in what each device does. Mitigation belongs to the process of calculating actual damages, because a court deciding what a breach really cost must ask what the plaintiff did, or could reasonably have done, to avoid part of the loss. A liquidated damages clause is the remedy the parties chose in place of that calculation. Once a court finds the sum reasonable, the sum replaces any determination of actual loss, and the questions that feed such a determination, including whether the plaintiff tried to mitigate, no longer arise.5 Crediting the defendant with the plaintiff's savings would also put back on the docket every fact the clause was meant to keep off it: the substitute transaction, its earnings, the reasonableness of the plaintiff's efforts, and what better efforts might have produced. The parties would litigate the amount of loss after all. The bargain binds in both directions. A plaintiff whose loss turns out larger cannot collect more than the stipulated sum, so a defendant whose plaintiff lost less cannot pay less. Each side bought the same thing, the right to know the number in advance, and each accepted the risk that hindsight would make the number look wrong.
Barrie School shows the rule at its most uncomfortable. The parents enrolled their daughter under an agreement that made a full year's tuition payable as liquidated damages if they withdrew after May 31, 2004, and they withdrew after that date.6 The school later filled the daughter's place with another student, and the parents argued that the replacement tuition should come off what they owed. The court rejected the argument. The forecast of harm was reasonable when the parties contracted, so it did not matter that actual damages came in below the prediction, and the valid clause fixed the damages without any duty to mitigate.7
Wassenaar v. Panos applies the same rule to employment. Donald Wassenaar was hired as general manager of the Towne Hotel under a three-year contract providing that if the hotel ended the contract early, it would be responsible for fulfilling the entire financial obligation for the full three years.8 The hotel discharged him 21 months before the term expired, and after a spell without work he took a job at another Milwaukee-area hotel and stayed there at least until trial.9 The Wisconsin Supreme Court held the clause a valid liquidated damages provision, and because it was valid, the doctrine of mitigation did not apply in fixing the award, so his later earnings did not reduce it.10 The hotel complained of a windfall: Wassenaar would collect 21 months of salary from the hotel while also earning 18 months of salary from his new employer.11 The court answered that recalculating liquidated damages to credit the breaching party with what the employee earned or could have earned is antithetical to the policies favoring such clauses.12
Post-breach earnings keep one legitimate use, and the line between that use and the forbidden one is a line between stages of the case. A defendant attacking the clause may offer evidence of the plaintiff's actual loss, including what the plaintiff earned elsewhere, to show that the stipulated sum is out of proportion to the harm and therefore unreasonable.13 The hotel in Wassenaar never made that showing. The record held no evidence of the manager's new salary, and after the trial court excluded the evidence in reliance on its pretrial ruling on mitigation, the hotel made no offer of proof of what the testimony would have been. It never carried its burden of showing that actual damages were disproportionate to the stipulated sum.14 Once a court finds the clause reasonable, proof of what the plaintiff earned or might have earned is no longer relevant and does not reduce the recovery.15 The same evidence therefore counts toward validity and carries no weight once validity is settled.
A minority view treats liquidation and mitigation as distinct concepts. The judge who dissented in Barrie School saw no exception to the general duty to mitigate simply because the parties agreed on a fixed sum in advance, and criticized the majority for ignoring that the school suffered little or no loss because it admitted a student to take the child's place.16 On that view, a clause giving the school a full year's tuition for a seat it refilled overcompensates the school. The clause is invalid for that reason, and the school must prove its actual damages and mitigate them where the circumstances make that appropriate.17 The dissent also invoked the purpose of the duty, stated in Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 350, comment a, which is to encourage the injured party to attempt to avoid loss.18 A few other decisions lean the same way. Southern Building Services, Inc. v. City of Ft. Smith affirmed the denial of liquidated damages when the plaintiff failed to mitigate after the breach, and Howard Sales Co. v. Bradley observed that when the circumstances of a contract and its breach lend themselves to mitigation, a liquidated damages clause is difficult to sustain.19 The arguments for a duty to mitigate rest on efficiency, good faith, and the avoidance of penalties and double recovery, but they remain the minority position. An answer should state the majority rule first and then flag the contrary view.20
When the clause fails, the same facts lead to the opposite result, and the majority rule offers no shelter. A stipulated sum held to be an unreasonably large penalty falls away, and the injured party must prove actual damages under the ordinary rules, which include the duty to avoid losses that reasonable effort could prevent.21 Courts apply the avoidable-consequences rule firmly in that setting. In Rockingham County v. Luten Bridge Co., a contractor that kept building a bridge after the county told it to stop recovered its anticipated profit and its losses up to the breach but was denied compensation for expenditures made afterward.22 Employment cases follow the same ordinary rule: without a clause, a discharged employee must use ordinary care and reasonable efforts to find comparable work, and the employer is credited with what the employee earns or might have earned.23
Exclusivity and Specific Performance
Restatement § 356(1) and UCC § 2-718(1) let the parties liquidate damages at a reasonable amount, but neither text says what else the injured party may pursue once a valid clause exists.25 A clause is exclusive when it is the injured party's only relief, so that any claim for actual damages, or for specific performance (a court order compelling the promisor to carry out the contract itself), is barred. A valid clause displaces mitigation. Whether it displaces every other remedy depends on what the contract says.
The prevailing view is that a valid liquidated damages clause is the sole remedy only when the contract contains express language showing a clear intent to exclude all other remedies, and some courts begin from a presumption against exclusivity.26 Unless the contract unequivocally says otherwise, the non-breaching party may choose between the stipulated sum and other remedies at law or in equity.27 Rubinstein v. Rubinstein, a New York decision, is cited for the express-language requirement. A federal district court in Virginia applied the presumption against exclusivity in Chesapeake Square Hotel, LLC v. Logan's Roadhouse, Inc., and a federal district court in Massachusetts held in North American Consolidated, Inc. v. Kopka that a vendor's claim for specific performance was not precluded by a liquidated damages provision.28 A contrary view, illustrated by the North Dakota decision in Fisher v. Schmeling, treated the clause in a land purchase agreement as the vendor's exclusive remedy.29
The express-language requirement rests on what a liquidated damages clause actually says. The clause records an agreement on the sum of money that stands in for the loss from breach, and an agreement about money does not by itself reveal whether the plaintiff also gave up the right to demand the performance. A plaintiff may value the performance for its own sake, as when the subject is a particular parcel of land, and may have written the clause as a fallback in case performance cannot be had. Reading the clause as a surrender of other remedies would take away relief that nobody mentioned. The rule therefore places the burden of clarity on the party who wants exclusivity, who can meet it with a single sentence of drafting.
A second limit applies even when the clause is not exclusive: ordinary principles of contract damages preclude double recovery of the liquidated amount and compensatory damages.30 The stipulated sum is the parties' price for the loss from breach, and collecting it alongside another remedy for the same loss would pay for that loss twice.
Specific performance adds its own wrinkle. Equity grants it only when damages are an inadequate remedy at law, and where a liquidated damages clause is present, the clause becomes the focus of that inquiry.31 A price on breach does not prove that money is enough, because a party may provide for liquidated damages at formation and still want the unique thing. The clause and the demand for performance can therefore coexist. A valid clause precludes specific performance only if it states a deposit or stipulated sum as the sole remedy, declares that its payment ends the parties' obligations, or was meant to give the promisor an option to buy out of the contract at the stipulated price, which is the alternative-performance structure examined earlier.32
The court reads the wording of each party's obligations separately. A clause that limits the liability of one party does not necessarily limit the liability of the other, so a land buyer whose only exposure is loss of the earnest money deposit may still seek specific performance against the seller unless the agreement limits the seller's liability too.33 The clause is a term about what one side owes on its own breach, and extending it to the other side's breach would add a limit the text does not state. The breaches a clause covers matter in the same way. A per-day delay clause in a construction contract illustrates the point: a contractor who abandons the work after the completion date has been held liable for the specified delay payments from that date until a reasonable time for finishing the job, while the clause may not apply to a contractor who abandons the project before the completion date.34 A clause confined to delay, by its own terms, cannot be the exclusive remedy for a different breach.
Courts applying these principles to land contracts have not reached a single answer. One decision, Allen v. Smith, held that a liquidated damages clause will not bar an action for specific performance in a real estate contract, while another, O'Shield v. Lakeside Bank, held that the clause did preclude specific performance, resting on the clear intent of the parties.35 The second ground is the variable the prevailing rule makes decisive, so the two results can be read as differing over how readily a court finds that intent. Even where specific performance remains available, courts will not allow the non-breaching party to receive both the liquidated damages and specific performance if the result would be overcompensation.36 A vendor who has retained the deposit as liquidated damages has made its election and cannot also obtain actual damages or specific performance.37
This question differs from the one raised by a clause that reserves actual damages in addition to the stipulated sum. When a contract reserves the right to more, the sum is a floor and not an estimate of the loss, so the clause itself is attacked as a penalty. Here the clause is conceded to be reasonable and the contract is silent, so validity is settled and the only issue is what the plaintiff may elect.
When the Clause Fails
Restatement § 356(1) and UCC § 2-718(1) aim the consequence of a failed clause at the term itself. A term fixing unreasonably large liquidated damages is unenforceable on grounds of public policy as a penalty under the Restatement, and it is void as a penalty under the Code.39 Neither sentence voids the contract, cancels the breach, or strips the promisee of its claim, so the agreement survives with one term struck out and the injured party keeps its right to recover for the breach. That result follows from what the public policy targets. The objection is to a sum that punishes, while the breach and the injury it caused remain real, and a rule that erased the whole claim would send a wronged promisee away with nothing because of a clause that overreached.
With the clause gone, nothing fixes the amount of recovery, and the claim returns to the ordinary route. An injured party whose liquidated damages clause is held invalid may still prove its actual compensatory damages, and the standard requirements of causation, entitlement, and measurement govern that proof.40 Four filters do most of the work, and each is a point where the claim can shrink:
- Causation limits the award to loss that the breach produced, so a loss traceable to a market downturn or to the promisee's own conduct drops out.
- Reasonable certainty requires the claimant to prove the amount of the loss, and the burden of that proof rests on the claimant.41
- Foreseeability confines recovery to loss that arises naturally from the breach or that both parties could reasonably have supposed, when they contracted, to be its probable result.42
- Mitigation reduces the award by any loss that the injured party could have avoided through reasonable effort.43
Those filters are the burdens a liquidated damages clause exists to remove, so a plaintiff whose clause fails loses the shortcut along with the sum. The stipulated figure no longer sets the recovery. The plaintiff's proof sets it, and that proof can land well below what the clause promised.
Lake River Corp. v. Carborundum Co. shows the consequence in real numbers. Lake River bagged product for Carborundum under a three-year contract in which Carborundum guaranteed a minimum of 22,500 tons. Carborundum shipped and paid for only 12,000 tons, and Lake River billed $241,000, the contract price for bagging the missing 10,500 tons.44 Carborundum defended on the ground that the contract formula imposed a penalty under Illinois law, and the Seventh Circuit agreed: the formula paid the full price for work Lake River never had to do, and so ignored the labor and materials it saved. The holding stopped there. Lake River remained entitled to its common law damages, $241,000 minus the cost avoided, with the trial court to fix the figure on remand.45 The recovery therefore fell below the formula's figure by the expense Lake River saved by never bagging the tonnage. Had the formula been valid, Lake River would have collected the whole $241,000 without proving any saved cost, and its failure turned a bill into a trial on the figure.
Land sales show the same consequence in a setting students meet often. When a court finds an earnest money clause unreasonable, the seller must prove actual damages and refund any excess earnest money to the purchaser.46 The measure of that loss is the difference between the market price and the contract price at the time of breach, which may be less than the sum the clause stipulated.47 The earlier sections on earnest money and on the buyer's restitution rights under the UCC describe this same consequence in their own settings.
The duty to mitigate shows how much turns on the ruling about validity. In Barrie School v. Patch the majority enforced a clause making a full year's tuition payable when parents withdrew after May 31, 2004, and held that a school with a valid clause has no duty to mitigate.48 The dissent would have found the school's recovery excessive in retrospect and would have held the clause invalid. It drew the consequence described in this section: the school would prove its actual damages as in any breach of contract action and would have to mitigate where the circumstances make that appropriate.49 The same facts thus either shut the door on mitigation or open it, depending on whether the clause survives.
The order of proof matters as well. In Wasserman's Inc. v. Township of Middletown, a lease let the tenant collect twenty-five percent of its average gross receipts, or $290,310.18, if the township cancelled. The New Jersey Supreme Court questioned a figure built on gross receipts, which do not account for ordinary expenses or for expenses attributable to the breach, and it placed the burdens of production and persuasion on the township, the party attacking a presumptively reasonable clause.50 The tax returns in the record showed a net profit of $3,649 in 1985 and $414 in 1986 and a loss of $323 in 1987. To the extent such returns reflect actual profit or loss, the court said, they demonstrate the unreasonableness of damages exceeding $290,000 that were calculated on gross receipts.51 The burden of showing a penalty thus falls on the challenger first. If the challenger succeeds, the burden of proving loss falls on the plaintiff.52
The texts prescribe unenforceability and not a reduction to some reasonable figure, and the choice has a reason in the incentives it sets. If a court trimmed an overreaching sum to the largest amount it could justify, a drafter would risk nothing by setting the figure high, because the worst result would be a court-approved reasonable sum with none of the proof burden attached. Striking the clause leaves the drafter in the position of a party who wrote no clause. The promisee who overreaches loses the proof-saving benefit it wanted, while the promisee who estimates honestly keeps it. The plaintiff is still compensated for the loss the breach caused, and a plaintiff who cannot prove much loss recovers little, which is the price of the overreach. The usual exam error is to label a clause a penalty and stop, as though the label ended the claim, when the answer must go on to say what the plaintiff can prove. Whether the result is too harsh belongs to the debate taken up in the closing section, where Judge Posner's view in Lake River will recur: he wrote that the arguments against penalty clauses, such as the added risk to the breacher's other creditors and the added risk of bankruptcy, are no better than makeweights, because little effort is made to prevent businessmen from assuming risks.53