Concept
Mitigation in Tort
Avoidable consequences and mitigation of damages
Mitigation in Tort
The mitigation principle does not end where contract law ends. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 350(1) withholds damages for loss the injured party could have avoided without undue risk, burden or humiliation,1 and tort law reaches a parallel result after an injury under the name avoidable consequences. The so-called duty to mitigate in tort is better understood as a limit on recovery than as a duty: it denies the damages a plaintiff could have avoided by reasonable conduct after the defendant's wrong has been committed.2
The logic is causal. If a plaintiff unreasonably fails to take prescribed medicine and his injury ends up more serious than it would have been had he taken it, the enhanced injury is caused by his own failure to mitigate, not by the defendant's negligence.3 The remedy is subtraction. The plaintiff keeps the claim for the harm the defendant caused and gives up only the avoidable part. Contract law also protects the diligent: an injured party who has made reasonable but unsuccessful efforts to avoid loss is not precluded from recovery to that extent.4
Two questions organize the tort cases. The first asks what reasonable care requires of an injured person, and it arises most often in medical treatment. The second asks how avoidable consequences differs from comparative fault, the other doctrine that reduces a plaintiff's recovery because of the plaintiff's own conduct. The two can look alike because each leaves part of the plaintiff's loss uncompensated, but they use radically different schemes for apportioning responsibility, and on the same facts they can produce different dollar figures.5
Medical Treatment Cases
An injured plaintiff must exercise reasonable care to seek treatment and must follow reasonable directions from his health care provider.6 The standard illustration is a broken leg. A victim hurt in an automobile accident unreasonably fails to seek treatment, the leg becomes gangrenous and must be amputated, and he recovers damages for the broken leg but not for the results of the amputation.7
The result follows because the claim contains two harms with two causes. The collision caused the fracture. The amputation followed from the decision to leave the fracture untreated, a decision only the plaintiff controlled. Avoidable consequences works as causal apportionment, the equivalent of a finding that the plaintiff's unreasonable conduct was the sole proximate cause of one particular item of harm.8 The defendant stays solely responsible for every damage not attributable to the plaintiff's failure to mitigate,9 so if the amputation would have been necessary even with prompt treatment, nothing avoidable remains to subtract.
Whether a particular procedure counts as reasonable depends on a weighing of many factors, not on any single test.10 The factors include:
- the nature and extent of the risks the procedure presents;
- the likelihood that it will succeed;
- the alternatives to surgery;
- the state of medical knowledge;
- the pain involved in the operation;
- the degree of possible complications; and
- the money or effort the procedure requires.
Some of these measure what the procedure would cost the plaintiff, namely risk, pain, complications, and expense, and others measure what it would accomplish, namely the likelihood of success and the available alternatives. A plaintiff who unreasonably refuses surgery that a reasonable person would undergo can lose damages for both lost wages and pain and suffering.11 But the plaintiff is not required to accept great risks, undertake heroic measures, or make great personal sacrifices to reduce the defendant's liability, and in a surgery case the cost, risk, and pain all count in deciding whether surgery should reasonably be required.12 Risk does not settle the question by itself, since the mere fact that some risk is involved, even a chance of fatality, may not bar the rule's application.13
The decisions illustrate both outcomes. In Young v. American Export Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc., the plaintiff refused surgery that a doctor testified would have repaired his cartilage and allowed him to return to work, and the refusal limited his recovery.14 In Simmons v. Erie Insurance Exchange, an insured's decision to forgo surgery after an automobile accident was deemed reasonable, so the insured did not fail to mitigate.15
The reasonableness limit bites hardest when the step the defendant demands is a deeply personal choice. In wrongful pregnancy and wrongful birth claims, a defendant blamed for an unwanted pregnancy or birth may argue that the plaintiff should have minimized damages by ending the pregnancy or placing the child for adoption. Applying the principles that a plaintiff need not make great personal sacrifices for the defendant's benefit and that individual choices deserve respect, courts are unlikely to treat either step as one the plaintiff must take.16 Competing policies sit behind these cases as well: the tort system compensates proven wrongs, while society may wish parents to embrace children even when they do not meet expectations.17
Reasonableness under this doctrine may mean something different from reasonableness in deciding the defendant's negligence, and religious objections to treatment show why.18 Finding that a religious belief made it reasonable to refuse care seems to endorse the plaintiff's religion, because it rules the tenets reasonable and lets a believer recover where a person of another faith could not. Reducing damages instead explicitly brands the practice unreasonable. Because religion has constitutionally protected status, either ruling is uncomfortable for a court, and a good faith test offers a way out by asking only about the believer's sincerity, not about the reasonableness of the religion.19 Courts must take care not to endorse a particular religious view, and they must also weigh the idea that the person who makes a personal choice should be the one to pay for it.20 Where the doctrine has been challenged on constitutional grounds, the Fifth Circuit in Munn v. Algee found neither the Establishment Clause nor the Free Exercise Clause violated; see also Williams v. Bright.21
The defendant bears the burden of this defense: the tortfeasor must plead and prove failure to mitigate as an affirmative defense.22 Proving that the plaintiff skipped a step is not enough. To win any reduction, the defendant must show that some separable part of the plaintiff's injuries was caused by the plaintiff's conduct,23 which means proving how much harm the omitted step would have avoided. A defendant who shows only that the plaintiff skipped therapy, with no evidence that therapy would have reduced the injury, has given the court nothing to subtract. A doctor's testimony that surgery would have repaired the cartilage, as in Young, supplies what is missing.24
Reasonable effort also protects the plaintiff. An injured party who makes reasonable but unsuccessful efforts to avoid loss is not barred from recovery by the avoidable-loss rule,25 though any expense the plaintiff claims is recoverable as compensatory damages only if proven to result distinctly from the harm and not merely from inconvenience or annoyance.26 The subtraction in these cases targets a separable item of harm that the plaintiff's own post-injury choice produced, and that feature sets it apart from comparative fault, the subject of the next subsection.
Comparative Fault Distinguished
The contract rule removes the avoidable loss itself, dollar for dollar. Suppose a discharged employee unreasonably passes up $15,000 in comparable work and the employer proves the amount: that $15,000 comes out of her damages, because the subtraction tracks the loss and not her degree of blame.28 Tort law does the same after an injury, denying the damages the plaintiff could have avoided by reasonable conduct after the wrong,29 but tort also has a second tool for plaintiff carelessness, comparative fault, which divides damages by blame.
The two tools apportion in different ways.30 Avoidable consequences is a causal scheme. It asks which item of harm the plaintiff's unreasonable conduct caused and treats that conduct as the sole proximate cause of that item, so it operates on discrete, identifiable items of loss.31 Comparative fault is a fault scheme. The trier of fact assesses the seriousness of each party's negligence and divides damages in proportion, so a plaintiff with $100,000 in damages against a defendant found 90 percent at fault recovers $90,000.32 Both involve fault in some sense, but the response differs. Comparative negligence reduces damages in proportion to the plaintiff's fault, while avoidable consequences reduces them by the discrete items of loss that the plaintiff's fault or unreasonableness caused.33
A familiar shortcut sorts the doctrines by timing. Avoidable consequences comes into play when the plaintiff's carelessness occurs after the defendant's wrong, while contributory or comparative negligence operates when the carelessness occurs before the wrong or concurrently with it.34 The shortcut is sometimes correct, but it does not touch the essence of the difference, which lies in the different schemes for apportioning and measuring responsibility.35 Timing can also mislead in practice, because sources do not always label post-injury conduct the same way. One treatise treats a failure to follow medical advice, such as not stopping smoking so that a wound could heal, as evidence of contributory negligence,36 while another treats a failure to take prescribed medicine as a failure to mitigate.37 The better question is what the plaintiff's conduct caused and whether that harm can be isolated.
The sharpest contrast arises when the plaintiff's own choice produces the worst item in the claim. Suppose a man who has resolved never to accept a blood transfusion is negligently injured, refuses a transfusion, and dies, although a transfusion would have saved his life. A comparative fault analysis might hold him responsible for some percentage of the total fault, low or high, and would reduce the recovery for his wrongful death without barring it. The avoidable consequences rule, in contrast, bars the entire wrongful death recovery if it applies.38 The bar is that broad only because the item the refusal caused is the death itself. Modified comparative fault systems can also bar a claim, since a plaintiff whose negligence exceeds the defendant's, or in some states equals it, recovers nothing. A seriously faulty plaintiff might therefore be barred outright under modified comparative fault yet lose only the damages he aggravated under avoidable consequences.39
Seat-belt cases put the approaches side by side. The plaintiff did nothing to cause the collision but failed, beforehand, to take a precaution that would have lessened the harm, so the defense goes only to the extent of damages. At least three basic methods can apportion responsibility in such cases, and none is uniformly favorable to one party.40
The three methods produce these results:
- Avoidable consequences alone excludes the $20,000 traceable to the failure to buckle and awards $40,000.41
- Comparative fault alone applies the passenger's 10 percent to the entire $60,000 and awards $54,000.42
- A combined method holds the driver fully liable for the $40,000 and for 90 percent of the $20,000, or $18,000, and awards $58,000.43
The figures differ because each method draws a different boundary around the plaintiff's fault. Avoidable consequences treats the passenger as the sole cause of the $20,000 injury and leaves the rest alone. Comparative fault alone spreads the 10 percent across the whole $60,000, charging him $4,000 for injury a belt could never have prevented and only $2,000 for the injury it could. The combined method confines the percentage to the item his conduct influenced. It is the approach of Restatement (Third) of Torts: Apportionment of Liability § 3, under which the defendant is solely responsible for damages not attributable to the failure to mitigate and the remainder is apportioned under the comparative fault rules.44 The ranking among methods depends on the numbers. At 50 percent fault, comparative fault alone would award $30,000, less than avoidable consequences yields, and in states that bar a plaintiff whose fault equals the defendant's the claim would fail altogether.45 Some jurisdictions also extend the mitigation rule itself to precautions available before the injury, such as seat belts or safety helmets, so that the defendant is not liable for the damages attributable to the failure to use them.46
The line between the doctrines is also blurring in some places. Under modern comparative fault rules, many jurisdictions regard a plaintiff's unreasonable failure to mitigate as just another form of contributory fault, compared with the defendant's under the ordinary apportionment rules.47 The conduct remains distinguishable from contributory negligence, because it does not contribute to the accident itself but only aggravates the damages. If the defendant proves that a separable part of the injuries was caused by it, some courts refuse damages for that part, and others treat the conduct as comparative fault.48 Which approach governs depends on the jurisdiction.
Choosing between the systems is possible only when the harm can be divided. If the plaintiff suffers one harm, or several that cannot be separated, apportionment must rest on fault rather than cause, even when the plaintiff's fault comes after the defendant's negligence.49 A speeding driver who strikes a pedestrian not keeping a proper lookout leaves the pedestrian one broken leg. No part of that fracture belongs to the driver and another part to the pedestrian, yet a jury can compare their conduct and divide the damages by percentage.50 The unbuckled passenger above stands on the other side of the line only because the dashboard injury could be isolated. Had the evidence been unable to show what a belt would have prevented, the failure to buckle could have entered only through the fault percentage.
Conduct that enlarges the harm without causing the accident has long been hard to classify, and it raises the question how far a plaintiff must guard in advance against another's negligence. Should neighbors wear masks in an area polluted by a factory, or hard hats near a negligently maintained construction site? In Mahoney v. Beatman, the plaintiff drove at excessive speed and the defendant negligently crossed the median and collided with him. The speed did not contribute to the cause of the collision but did increase the plaintiff's damages, and after extensive discussion of causation the court awarded him the full amount of his damages.51 Where no statute requires protective gear such as a motorcycle helmet, the failure to use it is typically unavailable as a defense.52