Concept
Policy and Equitable Defenses
Specific performance and injunction
Policy and Equitable Defenses
Specific performance and injunctions share a feature that sets them apart from damages: Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 357 makes each of them a matter of the court’s discretion, subject to the rules stated in §§ 359 to 369.1 The earlier sections applied two groups of those rules, the adequacy of damages and the practical limits that ask whether a court can frame and police a workable order. A claimant can satisfy both and still be refused, because equity keeps its authority to withhold a decree even when the contract is valid and enforceable for damages. Courts exercise that authority in a handful of overlapping situations. The contract may be unfair on its own terms or may have been procured by unfair practices, the claimant may have acted in bad faith or with misleading or dilatory conduct, enforcement may impose a disproportionately large hardship on the defendant, or the defendant’s own rights under the contract may be impossible to secure.2
Denial of a decree for these reasons typically costs the claimant only the equitable remedy. The explanation lies in what each kind of court does. A court of law enforces rights, so a valid contract and a breach entitle the claimant to damages, while a court of equity enforces conscience and may ask whether the claimant deserves to have the court’s coercive power turned against the defendant.3 Because a decree is a personal command backed by contempt, as the opening section of this chapter explained, that question carries a weight that a money judgment never does. Most equitable defenses therefore bar only the equitable remedy and leave the claimant to the legal remedies, so a claimant whose bargain was too unfair to enforce by decree still has full legal remedies in theory.4 Equity’s traditional maxims express the same idea in short form: a claimant must do equity, must come with clean hands, and must act without undue delay.5
The considerations in this section also work as factors in a balance, and a court need not treat each one as a complete defense. A delay too short to establish laches may still count against a claimant when it is weighed with the claimant’s fault and with the hardship an order would cause, and a minor inequity may fail to bar a claimant whose side of the equities is strong.6 The court may therefore grant full relief, shape a narrower order, or withhold equitable relief altogether. Discretion of this kind is the least predictable barrier to specific performance, and the outcomes turn so heavily on the facts that the sections below sort the considerations into four recognizable categories and teach which facts move each one.7 The first category, public policy, looks past the parties’ conduct to the effect of the order itself, and it comes next.
Public Policy
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 365 supplies the first of the discretionary considerations that remain after adequacy and practicality have been satisfied: specific performance or an injunction will not be granted if the act or forbearance that would be compelled, or the use of compulsion, is contrary to public policy.10 The rule has two targets. One is the content of the decree, meaning what the defendant would be ordered to do or to refrain from doing. The other is the compulsion itself, meaning the way the court’s power would be brought to bear on the defendant. Both matter because a decree is a command of the state backed by the contempt sanction described at the start of this chapter. A court that orders what the law forbids becomes a participant in the violation, and a court that uses force against values the legal system protects turns its own authority against its own policies.
Public policy can enter a remedies problem at two different levels, and keeping them apart is the main skill this section asks of you. At the first level, a policy makes the promise itself unenforceable, so the claimant has no remedy of any kind to choose from. At the second level, the promise stays valid and supports damages, but the policy forbids the court from coercing performance of it. The policy against compelled personal servitude sits at the second level: a promisor who agrees to do personal work for another may be held liable in damages for breaking the promise, yet generally may not be ordered to do the work, so the policy limits specific performance and injunctions and leaves the damages remedy alone.11 Section 365 itself speaks only to the coercive orders, which is why the question to ask in an essay is whether the claimant loses everything or only the decree. The answer decides whether a damages claim survives.
Covenants not to compete show both levels at work, and they serve as the running illustration here. A covenant not to compete is a promise to refrain from competing with the other party for a stated time and in a stated place. The common-law rule allows restrictive covenants on the practice of a profession, business, or trade, provided they are reasonable in duration, geographic area, and scope, because the covenant protects the promisee’s legitimate competitive interests.12 The reasonableness limits follow from what the covenant takes away. A promise to stay out of a field removes the promisor’s ability to earn a living there, and the public has its own stake in open competition, so the law tolerates the restraint only as far as some real interest of the promisee requires it. Courts have also accepted that an employer’s difficulty in calculating lost customers and goodwill can amount to irreparable harm, although the employer must prove it with concrete evidence rather than conjecture.13 That finding answers the adequacy question, and the policy question remains a separate screen that the covenant must also pass.
Some states have replaced the reasonableness inquiry with a statute. California Business and Professions Code § 16600 rejects the reasonableness test and makes covenants not to compete void except in limited situations, and the policy behind it favors open competition and employee mobility.14 In Edwards v. Arthur Andersen LLP the California Supreme Court held a noncompetition restraint in an employment agreement void under that statute.15 An employer in that position who asks a court to enjoin a former employee from working for a competitor is asking the court to compel the very forbearance the legislature has declared contrary to policy, and the request fails. The covenant sits at the first level, so it supports no remedy at all, damages included, because a void term creates no enforceable obligation.
A state that keeps the reasonableness approach can reach the opposite result on a similar promise. In 7’s Enterprises, Inc. v. Rosario, a Hawaii court enjoined an ex-employee under a three-year covenant because the employer had given unique training that constituted a protectable interest and the covenant left the employee free to pursue other work.16 The covenant in that case need not have differed much from the one voided in Edwards. What changed was the jurisdiction’s policy, because the statute removes the question whether the restraint is reasonable, while the common-law approach asks it and answers yes when an interest is protectable and the restraint is tailored to it.
The concern for livelihood that shapes these covenants also appears in § 367(2), which withholds an injunction against serving another employer when the probable result would be to leave the employee without other reasonable means of making a living.17 A later section on personal service injunctions develops that limit. Other values produce the same kind of remedial limit. Speech is a source of public values and a central part of personality, and an injunction restrains speech before it occurs, which invades personhood in a way that damages after the fact do not, so the tradition is that libel is not enjoined.18 Land use supplies a further example, because the court in McKinnon v. Benedict, in refusing the plaintiffs the relief they sought, took note of a public policy disfavoring restrictions on the use of land.19
Public interest also affects who receives relief, and it can point in either direction. Equity weighs public interests whenever its power is invoked, the weight can outweigh every other consideration, and a public utility may obtain relief that others could not, or avoid orders that others could not avoid, because of the public interest.20 In Laclede Gas Co. v. Amoco Oil Co., the Eighth Circuit directed performance of a propane supply contract, treating the public interest in supplying propane to retail customers as manifest and treating the objection about long supervision as a discretionary rule that courts frequently ignore when the public interest is involved.21 In the nuisance case Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., the court declined to shut down a factory that provided badly needed jobs to the community and entered a conditional injunction that would be lifted if the factory paid permanent damages.22 The Laclede decree protected a public service by compelling it, while the Boomer order protected a community by declining to stop an operation it depended on. How courts balance hardship between the parties and harm to third parties is the subject of the next subsection.
Step four is where answers most often go wrong. A policy that blocks the decree does not always void the contract, so an answer that treats the refusal of an injunction as the end of the claimant’s case overlooks the damages that the personal service policy leaves intact. The opposite error treats every covenant not to compete as suspect, when a reasonable restraint that protects a legitimate interest raises no public policy bar.
Hardship and Third Parties
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 357(1) makes specific performance a matter of the court’s discretion, subject to the rules in §§ 359 to 369, and part of that discretion is the power to ask what an order would do to the people it reaches.25 A court may refuse a decree even when the contract is valid and the money remedy is inadequate, if specific enforcement would work a disproportionately large hardship on the defendant although the bargain was fair and honorable when made.26 The first Restatement put the ground in words that the Wisconsin Supreme Court quoted in McKinnon v. Benedict: enforcement may be refused if it “will cause unreasonable or disproportionate hardship or loss to the defendant or to third persons.”27 That sentence joins two ideas with separate reasons behind them, hardship to the party who is ordered to perform and harm to outsiders who never made the contract, and the discussion below takes them in that order.
The defendant’s side of the balance counts because of what a decree is. It is a personal command enforced by contempt, so a court issuing one is aware of the sanction that follows disobedience and is likely to be sensitive to how intrusive the order is and how hard performance will be for the defendant.28 Whichever way the court rules, someone bears some hardship, so the court compares the relative burdens and asks how the equities should allocate them.29 The plaintiff’s side of the comparison is lighter than it first appears. A refusal typically leaves the damages claim in place, so what the plaintiff loses is the margin between receiving the performance itself and receiving its value in money.30 Hardship therefore has to be disproportionate to that margin before it tips the balance, and the cases show what size of burden gets there.
How much hardship does it take to defeat a decree for land that the law presumes to be unique? In Kilarjian v. Vastola the buyers were faultless, the sellers had breached by refusing to transfer the house, and the court accepted that specific performance would ordinarily follow. The sellers’ reason for backing out was that Mrs. Vastola had developed a serious, progressive neurological condition that disabled her and made moving very difficult. The court acknowledged that the buyers were entitled to the benefit of their bargain, yet it refused the decree because evicting a severely ill and disabled woman from her home would be unjust, and it sent the case back to fix the buyers’ damages.31 The burden fell on the defendant’s person and home, it arose from circumstances that developed after the contract was made, and nothing in the bargain had put that risk on the sellers. Hardship need not be so tragic to count. In Webster Trust v. Roly, a Connecticut court declined to enforce a right of first refusal that the plaintiffs said an intra-family transfer for $100,000 had triggered, because the land was worth $340,000, a sale to the plaintiffs at the lower price would have been inequitable, and the plaintiffs could still exercise their right if the land was sold on the open market before it expired.32
Davis v. Harmony Development, LLC sits on the other side of the line. A vendor of a subdivision lot had made substantial improvements to the property, and the purchaser was a sophisticated developer that was an anchor tenant for the subdivision. The Wyoming Supreme Court upheld specific performance in the vendor’s favor, finding that the vendor would be particularly harmed without a decree and that the developer would suffer no undue hardship, since it would simply receive the property it had bargained for.33 The two cases differ in what the decree took from the defendant. Ordering the Vastolas to convey meant uprooting a disabled woman for reasons the contract never addressed, while ordering the developer to close meant handing it the very thing it had agreed to buy at the price it had agreed to pay. The first order cost the defendant something beyond the bargain, and the second cost it only what the bargain had already assigned to it.
The ordinary cost of keeping a promise falls on the Davis side of the line, and courts say so directly. In City Stores Co. v. Ammerman the defendants developing a shopping center had promised two other anchor tenants to limit the center to three major department stores, and they argued that leasing to the plaintiff would block a lease with Sears that would earn them more. The court answered that the defendants had not claimed performance would be impossible or would ruin them financially, that wanting to make more money with another tenant is no reason to deny a decree, and that the plaintiff should not suffer for limits the defendants chose to write into their other leases.34 In Giannini, the Illinois condominium case in which a buyer sued the developer’s successor, the successor argued that completing the condominium declaration would be uneconomical. The court replied that there is “no hardship in compelling the seller to do what he agreed to do when he thought it was to his advantage,” and that great or unanticipated expense does not usually excuse performance.35 The threshold is set high for a structural reason. Every promisor whose bargain has turned sour could plead expense or a better offer elsewhere, and if those pleas sufficed, the decree would disappear in exactly the cases where a promisor most wants out, leaving the buyer of an irreplaceable thing with money.
Hardship that comes from a change the bargain did not price in is a different matter. A substantial change in circumstances between signing and closing can make a decree unduly harsh, as when the zoning of a parcel changes so that the buyer’s proposed use becomes illegal.
The two buyers hold identical contracts, and the only difference lies in the source of the loss. A rezoning removes the purpose the land was bought for, while a price slip leaves the purchase intact at a lower value, which is the situation Giannini holds the defendant to.
The second half of the ground concerns people who never agreed to anything. The Restatement (Second) directs attention to the possible impact of a decree on third parties in § 364(1)(b).36 Third-party harm adds a reason that the defendant’s own hardship cannot supply, because an outsider is bound by no contract and never had the chance to price the risk of a decree into any bargain. If a seller breaches a contract to sell a house by selling it to someone else, and the second buyer acted in good faith without knowledge of the first contract, awarding specific performance to the first buyer would force the seller to breach the contract with the second buyer, and a court may decide that the harm to the second buyer outweighs the equities favoring the first.37 The limit is firmest once the sale has closed. No decree for the specific land can issue if the vendor has already conveyed it to a bona fide purchaser, meaning a buyer who paid value in good faith and without notice of the earlier contract, because the vendor no longer holds what the order would command and the purchaser has done nothing to deserve losing the property.38 The first buyer is left to damages against the seller.
Notice is what changes the result. An Illinois appellate court held in Ruddock v. First National Bank of Lake Forest that specific performance of a contract to buy a rare clock had been improperly denied where the later purchaser from the defendant took with notice of the plaintiff’s claim.39 A purchaser who knew of the earlier contract has no innocent reliance for equity to protect, which is why recording a contract for sale is often desirable, since recording gives third parties notice.40 Harm to innocent outsiders can also defeat a decree against a defendant who still holds the thing. In Craven v. TRG-Boynton Beach, Ltd., a Florida court refused a tenant specific performance of a commitment on the location of its store, because enforcing it would have required destroying five new townhouses worth $5 million, dispossessing their residents, and judicial supervision of the work.41 Ruddock and Craven separate on the quality of the outsider’s claim. The clock’s later purchaser had notice and so could not claim to be innocent, while the townhouse residents had done nothing wrong and would have lost their homes.
Step one does the real work, since the common mistake is to count the cost of performing as hardship when the bargain had already assigned that cost to the defendant. Step three is where third-party problems turn, because notice separates the purchaser a court protects from the one it does not.
Unfair Bargains and Unclean Hands
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 208 lets a court refuse to enforce a contract, enforce it without an unconscionable term, or limit the reach of such a term, when the contract or term was unconscionable at the time it was made.44 The idea began in equity. A contract that was fully enforceable in an action for damages could still be refused a decree of specific performance where, in the words the comment borrows from a leading case, “the sum total of its provisions drives too hard a bargain for a court of conscience to assist.”45
The refusal follows from what a decree is. As the opening section of this chapter explained, an order of specific performance is a personal command backed by contempt, so a court that issues one puts its own coercive power at the claimant’s disposal. Law judges enforced rights, and a valid contract that had been broken gave the claimant a right to damages, while equity judges enforced conscience and could ask whether the claimant deserved that help.46 Courts invoke that discretion in a few overlapping situations, and two of them are the subject of this section. In the first, the contract is unfair or unconscionable in its own terms or because of unfair practices in securing it. In the second, the claimant is guilty of bad faith or of unethical or misleading conduct.47 The first ground examines the bargain and the second examines the claimant, and the rest of this section takes them in that order.
Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz is the classic illustration of the first ground. The company agreed to buy, at $30 a ton, all the carrots grown on a farmer’s acreage, but the farmer had to sell the whole crop to the company while the company was not obliged to take it, and if the company did not want the carrots the farmer still needed its permission to sell them to anyone else.48 When the market price climbed to $90 a ton, the farmer sold elsewhere, and the company asked for specific performance on the theory that the Chantenay carrots were unique.49 The Third Circuit refused the decree, saying that a party who had offered and succeeded in getting an agreement as tough as this one should not come to a chancellor and ask the court’s help in enforcing its terms.50 The carrots had already cleared the adequacy screen, as the earlier discussion of substitutes explained, so the loss of the decree came entirely from the terms of the bargain.
Two features of that refusal carry over to every case in this section. The choice is all or nothing, because equity decrees the contract or declines to, and it has little room to strike the harsh clauses and enforce the rest, which sets it apart from the power § 208 gives a court to enforce a contract without an unconscionable term.51 The refusal also gives the stronger drafter a reason to write fairer terms, since a company that could count on a decree for any agreement it managed to impose would pay nothing for overreaching.52 The same logic explains why the restriction comes from equity’s own practice, expressed in its maxims, and does not depend on any rule that the contract was invalid.53
Unfairness in this sense is a narrower idea than a bad deal. The Code’s unconscionability rule, which codifies the same concern, aims at preventing oppression and unfair surprise and does not aim at disturbing the allocation of risks just because one side had superior bargaining power.54 A contract that favors the stronger party therefore does not lose its decree on that ground alone. What moves a court is a weakness in the contracting process, of the kind seen in cases about capacity or fraud, or a gross disparity in the values exchanged.55 Contract law does not inquire into the adequacy of consideration when deciding whether a contract exists, but a significant disparity can lead a court to conclude that damages adequately compensate and that a hard bargain should not be enforced by decree, and the comparison is made as of the time of contracting, not in hindsight.56 A unilateral mistake works in the same way. It does not prevent formation, yet it may lead a court to withhold a decree that would heavily burden the mistaken party, and the court’s sympathy grows when the other side induced the mistake by misrepresentation or unfair practices.57
Land cases show how lopsided terms and one-sided remedies look in practice. In McKinnon v. Benedict a landowner helped the Benedicts buy a resort with a $5,000 loan and received their promise, for 25 years, to cut no trees and make no improvements closer to his property than the existing buildings, restrictions that covered all of the most desirable part of the resort tract.58 The loan was repaid in about seven months while the restrictions stayed in place, and when the landowner sought to enjoin a trailer park, the Wisconsin Supreme Court denied relief, relying on the principle that oppressive contracts will not be enforced in equity together with a policy disfavoring restrictions on land use.59 A Minnesota farmland case supplies a different kind of one-sidedness. The sellers’ only remedy for the purchaser Hilton’s default was to keep $2,500 in earnest money, while Hilton could elect specific performance or damages if they defaulted, and Hilton could also terminate unilaterally for reasons such as an unfavorable soil test.60 The court treated that lack of mutuality of remedy as one element that would not alone make specific performance inequitable, and it weighed the element with the purchaser’s investment purpose in refusing the decree.61 Mutuality survives today as one factor in the court’s discretion, and it counts most when the contract otherwise looks like the product of a tainted bargaining process.62
A disparity in price is the most variable of these considerations, because courts weigh how large the mismatch is, how sophisticated each party was and how much bargaining power each had, and whether other remedies are adequate.63 Two cases about farms show how the weighing comes out when the process and the hindsight comparison point in different directions. In McAllister v. Schettler the court refused to award the purchaser specific performance of a contract for a 290-acre farm, because the seller, who was in her eighties, was somewhat mentally impaired, was subject to undue influence by a third party, and had not been given an explanation of the financing arrangements or of her contractual obligations.64 In Tuckwiller v. Tuckwiller, Mrs. Morrison, who had Parkinson’s disease, signed a paper promising Mrs. Tuckwiller her farm at death in exchange for lifetime care. She died about six weeks later, and the care actually given was worth perhaps one percent of the farm’s value.65 The court enforced the contract anyway, because fairness is judged prospectively. At signing, Mrs. Tuckwiller had given up a job she liked and had taken on an obligation of unknown and uncertain duration whose duties would grow heavier as the disease progressed, and Mrs. Morrison, grateful for past care and wary of impersonal institutional care, was not insisting on an exact exchange.66 Past services could not supply consideration, the court added, yet they could properly be considered in judging whether the contract was fair.67
The defect lay in different places in the two cases. In McAllister it lay in the bargaining process itself, in an impaired seller, a third party’s influence, and unexplained terms, so the decree was refused. In Tuckwiller the only complaint was a gap between value and service that appeared as events unfolded, and the court looked past the gap to the parties’ positions when they signed. A court that measured fairness by hindsight would refuse a decree to every promisee whose bargain later turned out well for the other side, which would defeat the reason people make binding promises about uncertain futures.
The second ground turns from the contract to the claimant, through the maxim that one who comes into equity must come with clean hands.68 The usual statement of the ground is a matter of conduct: a court may refuse specific enforcement when the claimant has acted in bad faith or with unethical, misleading, or dilatory conduct, so that a decree would risk serious unfairness to the defendant or would put the court in the position of lending tacit approval to the misconduct.69 Because a decree is the court’s own command, enforcing it for a claimant who gained an advantage by misleading the defendant makes the court a participant in the result. The misconduct need not be serious enough to defeat the claim at law, since equity is more vigilant than law about fraud, deception, undue influence, and concealment of material facts by the plaintiff.70
In Ingram v. Kasey’s Associates a tenant holding an option was denied specific performance because he had misled the landlord into believing he would not exercise it, and he had an ulterior motive for doing so.71 The tenant’s misconduct was part of how he handled the very option he later asked the court to enforce, and that connection is what makes the defense available. The football cases show where the line becomes contested. In New York Football Giants, Inc. v. Los Angeles Chargers Football Club, Inc., the Giants had kept their contract with Charles Flowers secret so that he could play as an amateur in the Sugar Bowl, and the Fifth Circuit held that the Giants lacked clean hands and could not enjoin Flowers from playing for the Chargers.72 The Tenth Circuit in Houston Oilers v. Neely disagreed with applying that rule to every instance in which a team signs a college player on an understanding that the contract stays secret until after a post-season game.73 Courts therefore agree that the defense exists and differ about how far it reaches.
Ingram and the Giants decision share a feature that limits the defense. The claimant’s wrong occurred in the transaction the claimant now asks the court to enforce, and the defendant was the person misled by it. The defense exists to keep the court from approving misconduct in the very matter before it and to spare the defendant a decree on a deal obtained unfairly, so wrongdoing in some other dealing does not fit its purpose. A frequent exam error is to treat any unflattering fact about the claimant as unclean hands.
Because these grounds draw on equity’s conscience and not on the contract’s validity, they bar only the equitable remedy. The legal remedy for damages remains at least theoretically available to a claimant whose hands are unclean or whose bargain was too harsh to enforce by decree, since law judges enforced rights and had no comparable discretion.74 That description of the claim carries a pleading lesson: the claimant should seek damages in the same action, because a claimant who stakes everything on the decree and loses may be barred by res judicata from suing for damages later.75 The comfort of remaining damages can be thin. In McKinnon itself no action at law had been commenced, and whether damages would have been an effective remedy for the landowner is open to doubt.76
Step two does the real work on the bargain side, because the question concerns the parties’ positions at signing and not how the exchange later played out. Step four does the same work for the claimant, since only misconduct connected to the contract being enforced supports the defense.
Laches and Delay
A court asked for specific performance or an injunction acts in its discretion under Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 357, subject to the rules in §§ 359 to 369, and one of equity’s oldest reasons for withholding a decree is that the claimant waited too long to ask for it.79 Laches is the name for that ground. It covers any unreasonable delay by the plaintiff in starting or pursuing an action under circumstances where the delay causes prejudice to the defendant.80 The doctrine grows out of the maxim that equity aids the vigilant, which sits beside the maxims about doing equity and coming with clean hands.81 Both halves of the definition must be present: the wait has to be unreasonable, and it has to have hurt the defendant. A wait that is long but harmless to the defendant supports no defense, because the doctrine exists to prevent unfairness to the defendant, and a harmless wait creates none.
Laches is easy to confuse with a statute of limitations, and the two work differently. A statute fixes a definite period, and once it runs the action can no longer be maintained. At common law, legislative limitation periods applied only to legal actions, so equity used laches as its own check on stale claims, and it never tied that check to a set number of years.82 The inquiry looks to unreasonable delay and to prejudice, and either can arise before a limitations period expires or long after it would have run.83 A claimant who files inside the statutory period can therefore still meet the defense, because the court asks how reasonable the wait was and what it cost the defendant, and a calendar answers neither question.
Prejudice is the requirement that does the real work. The passage of time may cost the defendant witnesses or other evidence that would have answered the claim.84 It may also lead the defendant to change position on the assumption that the dispute is over, and a court that then orders performance asks the defendant to carry a burden that the claimant’s silence helped create. Where the defendant’s position is unchanged and the evidence is intact, a decree costs the defendant nothing that prompt suit would not have cost, so equity has no unfairness to remedy.
Land contracts show why the surrounding market matters. In a suit to enforce a contract to sell land, a court may ask whether the land’s value has stayed stable or has been volatile. Where values swing, the plaintiff’s delay is more likely to be called unreasonable and the defendant can make a stronger claim of prejudice, so laches may run in a much shorter time than the limitations period. Where prices have been very stable, laches may run far more slowly than the statute.85 The mechanism is a matter of who carries the risk. Damages for a land buyer are normally fixed as of the date performance was due, but a decree can be demanded later, so a buyer who waits can watch comparable prices and then pick the remedy. If prices rise, the buyer demands the land, and if they fall, the buyer takes damages.86 That choice is a free option held at the seller’s expense, since the seller holds the land and bears the downside while the buyer decides. Courts may use election of remedies or laches to deny the buyer that speculative opportunity.87
The timely side of the line appears in City Stores Co. v. Ammerman. The developers of a shopping center promised a department store a lease, and when the store sued to hold them to the promise, they argued that it had failed to press its claim after they wrote in May 1964 that they considered themselves under no obligation. The court found that the store’s officers had told the developers throughout that it meant to hold them to the contract, and that the developers’ duty to tender a lease had not yet ripened, because the leases with the other major tenants that the contract made conditions had not been signed. The store therefore had no enforceable right to press in May 1964. It contacted the developers again when it learned those leases had been executed and sued in time to stop them from leasing to Sears, so the court held that it neither gave up its rights nor unnecessarily delayed asserting them.88 Delay is therefore counted from the point at which the claimant could have pressed a claim, and a claimant who keeps asserting the right gives the defendant no reason to treat the matter as closed.
The two buyers differ in what the wait did to the seller, and the number of months is not what separates them. An exam answer that bars a claimant for waiting a set period has imported a limitations statute into a doctrine that has none, and an answer that ignores a swing in land prices has missed the fact that usually makes delay prejudicial. Because laches is a ground for withholding the equitable remedy, and limitations statutes historically governed legal actions, a claimant who loses a decree to laches is not necessarily without a damages claim, which the statute of limitations then governs.89