Concept
Losing-Contract Offset
Reliance interest
Losing-Contract Offset
Every reliance claim carries a check against overcompensation. After granting damages for expenditures made in preparation for performance or in performance, Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 349 subtracts “any loss that the party in breach can prove with reasonable certainty the injured party would have suffered had the contract been performed.”1 The earlier subsections sorted the outlays that reliance reimburses. The offset asks a different question: where would the plaintiff have ended up had the deal run its course? The reliance claim is therefore a starting figure, and evidence about the performance that never took place can pull it down.
Three questions follow. What does the reduction do to the arithmetic of an award? Which party must produce the evidence for it? And what role does the contract price play? The offset returns at the end of the chapter as a step in computing the final award.
Bad-Bargain Reduction
Reliance measures from the world in which the promise was never made.2 A plaintiff whose deal would have lost money was headed, had the contract run its course, to a position below that starting point. Full reimbursement of outlays would leave such a plaintiff better off than performance would have, and the breach would reward a bargain that was going to lose. The offset closes that gap: if full performance would have resulted in a net loss, the plaintiff cannot escape the bad bargain by falling back on the reliance interest.3
Agam v. Gavra states the limit as a second check on reliance awards, alongside the breaching party’s right to show that claimed expenditures were unnecessary. The breaching party may also reduce the recovery by as much as it can show the plaintiff would have lost had the contract been performed.4 Agam leaves causation in place. The plaintiff must still show that the value of its expenditures was lost as a result of the breach, a requirement that returns among the ordinary limits on reliance below.5 A round-number example shows how the subtraction works.
The loss subtracted is the net result of the whole performance, including costs the plaintiff had not yet incurred when the breach came, because § 349 looks to what would have happened had the contract been performed. The subtraction also explains why a reliance award in a losing contract cannot exceed expectation. Some authorities therefore treat reliance not as a separate interest but as an effort to approximate expectation when expectation cannot be proved directly.6 Where the contract would have been profitable, nothing is subtracted, and reliance stops short of expectation by the amount of the lost profit.
The offset also answers the objection that reliance damages make the defendant the guarantor of whatever the plaintiff chose to spend. In Wartzman v. Hightower Productions, Ltd., the defendants raised that objection against a venture whose success depended on selling stock, and the court replied that § 349 itself lets the breaching party prove what the injured party would have lost.7 The court rested the allocation on the Second Circuit’s reasoning in L. Albert & Son v. Armstrong Rubber Co.: the promisee may recover its outlay in preparation for performance, “subject to the privilege of the promisor to reduce it by as much as he can show that the promisee would have lost if the contract had been performed.”8 The privilege belongs to the defendant, who must claim it and support it with evidence.
Defendants sometimes do. In Home Depot USA, Inc. v. Cytec Industries, Inc., the seller of real property used expert testimony to prove that, even without a breach, the buyer’s projected development could not have been completed and earned enough revenue to recoup the buyer’s reliance costs.9 The trial court in St. Lawrence Factory Stores v. Ogdensburg Bridge and Port Authority likewise denied reliance recovery after the defendant showed that the plaintiff could not have recouped its expenditures even without the breach.10 A defendant who offers only a suggestion that the venture might have failed has offered conjecture, and the clause credits only proof.
The offset belongs to the reliance measure because reliance counts the plaintiff’s loss; restitution and disgorgement focus on the defendant’s gain instead.11 A plaintiff with a deal going badly therefore cannot treat reliance as a safe harbor. The analysis asks whether the defendant has proved, with reasonable certainty, what performance would have cost the plaintiff, and the award falls by exactly that amount.
Burden of Proof
Section 349 writes the allocation into its text: the loss comes off the award only if “the party in breach can prove” it.13 The plaintiff need not disprove a losing contract, and the court does not compute one unprompted. A contested reliance claim therefore divides into two halves, one for each side.
Agam describes the plaintiff’s half. The nonbreaching party must show that the expenses it submits were incurred in reliance on the contract, while the breaching party may prove, in diminution of that amount, any losses the nonbreaching party would have incurred on full performance.14 The plaintiff thus proves its outlays and the breach’s role in wasting them, and proves nothing about what performance would have yielded. The omission is deliberate. A plaintiff who cannot establish profit with reasonable certainty still makes a complete case for reliance, and the defendant can defeat or diminish the recovery by showing that the expectancy would fall below the outlay.15
Two reasons support putting the burden of proving the loss on the breaching party, and they answer different questions. The first concerns the starting assumption. Performance ordinarily leaves both parties ahead of what each gives up, or contracting would soon end, so it is reasonable to presume that the plaintiff’s earnings from performance would at least have covered its reliance expenditures. The Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment § 38, comment a, frames that presumption as rebuttable.16 This break-even presumption supports reimbursing outlays at all, and a rebuttable presumption needs someone assigned to rebut it: the party who says the deal was a loser.
The second reason concerns who bears the risk of the unknown. What performance would have been worth is often very hard to learn, and it is “a common expedient, and a just one” to put the peril of the answer on the party whose wrong made the question relevant. L. Albert gave that reasoning, and both Wartzman and Agam quote it.17 Once the breach cut performance short, the later costs and receipts that would have shown whether the deal gained or lost never came into being. Fairness places the onerous burden of proving what would have been on the party at fault.18
The allocation also avoids a trap. A ceiling at an expectancy that the plaintiff had to prove would eliminate reliance damages in the very case that needs them, the case where the expectancy is too uncertain to establish.19 Placing the burden on the breaching party is the compromise: reliance stays available without expectancy evidence, and the expectancy still caps the award whenever the defendant can prove it. The Restatement follows this compromise.20
Shifting this burden leaves another where it was. The court in Agam rejected the suggestion that requiring the breaching party to prove what performance would have cost eliminates the requirement that the breach caused the plaintiff’s damages. For reliance damages, the value of the expenditures must have been lost as a result of the breach.21 The two burdens address different questions. The defendant’s burden concerns a performance that never happened and asks what it would have produced. The plaintiff’s causation showing concerns events that did happen and asks whether the breach is what stranded the money. A plaintiff whose outlays were already wasted before the breach, for reasons unconnected to the defendant, has not lost their value because of the breach, and the break-even presumption does not change that.
Steps three and four carry the weight in a contested case, and the decisions show that the burden can be carried.22 In St. Lawrence Factory Stores v. Ogdensburg Bridge and Port Authority, the plaintiff first won a ruling that it could go to trial on reliance damages and then lost at trial. The defendant needed to show only, with reasonable certainty, that the plaintiff could not have recouped its expenditures even without the breach, and the appellate court upheld the denial.23 Home Depot, described above, turned on expert testimony.24 Wartzman ended the other way, and the available evidence explains why. The venture there depended on selling stock, and no one could say whether that would have succeeded. The same uncertainty that kept the plaintiff from proving profit made it hard for the defendant to prove a loss, so the plaintiff kept its costs.25
The decisions have not worked out how the allocation operates when two or more measures of expectancy are available.26 The defendant’s proof of loss is aimed at one measure of what performance would have yielded, and the cases do not say what follows when another measure would give a different answer. An answer that meets those facts should identify the measure at which the defendant’s evidence is directed and acknowledge that the authorities leave the point open. The usual exam error is to make the plaintiff prove that the contract would have been profitable, or to treat the shifted burden as relieving the plaintiff of causation. The plaintiff proves the outlays and the breach’s role in wasting them, and the breaching party proves the loss.
Contract Price Ceiling
Section 349 ties its reduction to the loss the breaching party proves and says nothing about the contract price.28 The first Restatement took a flatter approach. As quoted in a court opinion, it barred recovery of reliance expenditures “in excess of the full contract price promised by the defendant,” allowed expenditures in preparation only if they could fairly be regarded as part of the cost of performance in estimating profit and loss, and required deduction of installments of the price already received and of the value of materials on hand that would have been consumed in completion.29 The price-ceiling question thus has three parts: what the old cap was meant to accomplish, why critics found it too blunt, and how the § 349 offset now does the work.
A cap at the price rests on a sensible picture of a deal. A plaintiff who spends money to carry out its own promises expects the price in return, and a plaintiff who spent more than the price was heading for a loss. Reimbursing the excess in full would put the injured party in a better position than full performance would have.30 The standard criticism accepts that logic for one kind of outlay and rejects it for the other. The costs of performing the plaintiff’s own promises, the essential reliance of the earlier subsections, are what the price is supposed to repay, so essential reliance above the price signals a losing contract. The price should not, however, limit collateral (or incidental) reliance, the outlays in related transactions, because the price was never meant to repay them.31
The pavilion shows where the work is done under § 349. Comparing $12,000 with $10,000 tells a court only that the job probably lost money; the amount of the loss is what the offset subtracts.32 The offset also reaches losing contracts that a price ceiling would pass. Suppose a builder has spent $6,000 on a $10,000 job with $5,000 still to spend. The claim is under the price, so a ceiling would trim nothing, yet full performance would have cost $11,000 and lost $1,000. A defendant who proves it brings the award down to $5,000, the price less the cost the builder is spared. The offset measures the loss itself, so it catches the losing contracts a ceiling misses and removes exactly the amount of the loss in those it does catch. The price of that precision is evidence: a ceiling required no proof from anyone, while the offset operates only when the breaching party carries the burden described above. The contract price is therefore best treated as a warning sign. Essential reliance above the price tells a court to look for a losing contract and tells the defendant where to aim its proof.
The collateral half of the distinction produces a different result, which is why a reliance claim that exceeds the price cannot simply be cut back to it. In Maine Rubber International v. Environmental Management Group, Inc., the plaintiff paid $1,900 for an environmental assessment of a prospective business site. The defendant falsely reported the property free of problems, governments later found environmental hazards, and the plaintiff lost more than $211,000 in wasted expenditures when its move to the site was aborted.33 The court held those amounts recoverable as reasonably foreseeable reliance damages even though their total greatly exceeded the contract price.34 The excess did not signal a losing contract. The plaintiff’s own side of the bargain was paying $1,900, and the moving costs were outlays in a separate transaction that the report was meant to protect. A ceiling at $1,900 would have limited the defendant’s liability for a false report to the price of the report and left a foreseeable harm uncompensated.
What stands between collateral reliance and unlimited liability is the ordinary set of limits rather than the price. The Restatement indicates that foreseeability, causation, certainty, and mitigation apply to reliance damages as they do to expectation damages.35 Where the expectancy that caps a reliance claim is itself a consequential-damages measure such as lost profits, the ceiling comes from the rules that limit consequential damages, chiefly what the parties contemplated.36 The contract price supplies no separate ceiling for collateral outlays.
Wartzman v. Hightower Productions, Ltd. raises the price question on its own facts. The report of the case does not state what the defendants charged for their legal services, but it indicates that a securities specialist would have cost no more than $15,000, so the fee was evidently far below the $170,000 awarded.37 Whether that gap should bear on the availability of reliance damages depends on what the $170,000 compensated. To the extent it reimbursed spending on the venture the legal work was meant to support, the essential-collateral distinction suggests that the small fee does not itself cap the claim. The lawyers’ protection against an unlimited award lay in the § 349 offset, which let them reduce the recovery by any loss they could prove with reasonable certainty the plaintiffs would have suffered on performance.38
The usual exam error is to cut any reliance claim larger than the price down to the price, or to award the whole claim without asking what it consists of. A builder’s $12,000 on a $10,000 job turns on proof of the loss, while a $211,000 relocation loss behind a $1,900 report turns on foreseeability. The foreseeability and causation questions in step four return as independent limits on every reliance claim in the next section.