Concept
Market-Price Damages
Aggrieved buyer's remedies when the seller breaches
Market-Price Damages
Section 2-711(1)(b) gives the buyer a second route to damages after nondelivery, repudiation, rightful rejection, or justifiable revocation: the buyer may “recover damages for non-delivery as provided in this Article (Section 2-713).”1 Paragraph (1)(a) offers cover and the damages that follow it, and the “or” that closes that paragraph makes the two routes alternatives for the same breach.2 Cover rests on a replacement purchase the buyer actually made. The market-price remedy rests on a comparison a court makes between the contract price and what goods of that kind sold for in the market, so the buyer need not have bought anything.3
The remedy is simple to state and awkward to apply. Four questions organize what follows. What goes into the formula, and how is the market identified? When is the market price read if the seller repudiated before delivery was due, a point on which courts divide? How does the remedy fit with cover once the buyer has bought substitutes? And may a buyer that did not cover collect a differential larger than the gain performance would have given it? Each answer builds on the one before.
The Contract-Market Formula
Section 2-713(1) sets the damages for nondelivery or repudiation at “the difference between the market price at the time when the buyer learned of the breach and the contract price together with any incidental and consequential damages provided in this Article (Section 2–715), but less expenses saved in the consequence of the seller’s breach.”4 Subsection (2) adds the place: market price “is to be determined as of the place for tender or, in cases of rejection after arrival or revocation of acceptance, as of the place of arrival.”5 Three variables therefore decide the case: a market price, the time at which it is read, and the place at which it is read.
Beside the cover formula, the market formula changes a single term. In shorthand it reads Mkt − KP + ID + CD − ES.6
- Cover (§ 2-712): cost of cover − contract price + incidental damages + consequential damages − expenses saved.
- Market (§ 2-713): market price − contract price + incidental damages + consequential damages − expenses saved.
Everything after the first term works as it does under cover: the contract price comes off in full, incidental and consequential damages are added, and any expense the breach spared the buyer is subtracted. The first term is where the remedies part. Cover takes its figure from a purchase the buyer actually made, and the market formula takes it from a price prevailing in a market, whether or not the buyer bought anything there. In Egerer v. CSR West, LLC the Washington court therefore called § 2-713 damages “hypothetical cover,” a complete alternative to cover that applies only when and to the extent that the buyer does not cover.7 The Code’s comments supply the yardstick: the market in which the buyer would have obtained cover had it sought that relief, measured by the price of goods of the same kind in the same branch of trade.8 The trial court in Egerer limited the buyer to the difference between the contract price and the price at which replacement material could have been obtained at the time of the breach.9
Because the formula compares two prices, it never asks what the buyer would have earned or saved by using the goods. The buyer therefore need not prove its own resale margins or production losses to collect the base amount. The same feature detaches the award from the buyer’s actual loss. The differential can be large even though the breach saved the buyer money, as when a middleman buyer’s resale markets dry up after the breach, and the buyer’s lost profit from resale or use can exceed the differential.10 Courts have recognized that, absent pure accident, the formula does not produce an award that reflects the buyer’s actual loss, and the windfall subsection below returns to that gap.11
The differential also coexists with a refund of the price. In Gawlick v. American Builders Supply, Inc. the nondelivery damages were the difference between the purchase price and the market value of the vehicle with clear title, and that figure, combined with the purchase price, made up the award.12 A later section takes up how remedies combine.
The place rule can be applied at once. The time rule is simple enough when the seller never delivers on the due date, but an early repudiation gives “learned of the breach” at least three plausible meanings, which the next subsection works through.13
The arrival rule fits the yardstick behind the formula. Goods rejected after arrival have already come to rest at the buyer’s location, and the market there is the one in which the buyer would shop for a replacement. Where tender occurs when a carrier is involved is a live question: it is unclear whether tender happens when the goods are handed to the carrier or only when the carrier delivers them to the buyer.14
A buyer that rejects and holds the goods has a protection the market formula does not supply. Upon rightful rejection or justifiable revocation of acceptance, the buyer has a security interest in the goods in its possession or control for payments made on the price and for reasonable expenses of inspection, receipt, transportation, care, and custody. If the seller fails to deliver or repudiates, the buyer has no goods in hand to secure a refund.15 That interest secures sums paid and expenses, and the market differential is measured separately under § 2-713.
Proof of the market price is where buyers most often lose. Section 2-713(1) is expressly subject to the Code’s rules on proof of market price in § 2-723,16 and the reported cases are fair warnings that every lawyer should be ready with expert opinion or other acceptable evidence of the market price on the relevant dates.17 The contract price comes from the contract. The market price is an outside fact the buyer must establish for a particular time and place, and without it the formula yields no number. In Burgess the buyer tried to prove the market price of combines with pages from a published guide of average values for that type of machine. The court rejected the proof because the actual value depended on the condition of the individual machine and on its location, and the buyer offered no competent evidence on either.18
The Code relaxes the burden when the exact price is out of reach. Section 2-723(2) lets a court use the price prevailing within a reasonable time before or after the time described, or at another place that would serve as a reasonable substitute in commercial judgment or under usage of trade, with allowance for the cost of transporting the goods.19 A substitute price must still describe the right goods. A problem that hands the buyer a price-guide average, or a quotation from the wrong month or the wrong city, tests exactly this point: the question is whether the evidence reaches the right goods, time, and place, or can be defended as a reasonable substitute under § 2-723.
Timing After Repudiation
Section 2-713(1) measures the differential at “the time when the buyer learned of the breach.”22 When the seller simply fails to deliver on the due date, the buyer learns of the breach as that date passes, and the answer is plain. An advance repudiation breaks that simplicity. The buyer then knows of the refusal long before performance is due, § 2-610 lets the buyer treat the repudiation as an immediate breach or await performance for a commercially reasonable time, and the Code does not say which date fixes the market price.23
The phrase supports at least three readings:
- The time the buyer learns of the repudiation.
- The time the buyer learns of the repudiation plus a commercially reasonable time thereafter.
- The time at which the seller’s actual performance was due under the contract.24
The choice changes the answer only if the market moves between the repudiation and the delivery date, and it matters most when prices rise, because each later date then produces a larger differential.
Courts have staked out positions all along that line. At the repudiation end, courts reason from cover. A buyer may cover at any time after the breach and recover the difference between the cost of cover and the contract price, so the court in First National Bank of Chicago v. Jefferson Mortgage Co. found it inconsistent to make a non-covering buyer compute damages by the time of performance instead of the time of breach. Such a rule would force the buyer to speculate on the wisdom of covering, and positive law should not encourage that speculation.25 The reading has a cost. Where courts take “learned of the breach” to mean “learned of the repudiation,” the buyer may have to accept a date that is not the date named in the contract and that lies wholly within the breacher’s control, or it may be pushed to cover before performance is due.26
A grain buyer who argued for a longer wait lost. The buyer claimed that § 2-610 let him await performance for a commercially reasonable time, but the court held that, given the seller’s unequivocal repudiation, that time expired when the first notice of nonperformance arrived. It limited him to nondelivery damages measured by the grain’s market value on the date of repudiation.27 A commentator finds the reasoning problematic even while granting the seller’s apparent opportunism. The explicit option of waiting a commercially reasonable time seems to give the buyer some period after the repudiation, long enough perhaps to judge whether prices will rise or fall, and if prices fell within that period and the buyer covered, the breaching seller would have been better off.28
The middle reading came out of a rising market. In Cosden Oil & Chemical Co. v. Karl O. Helm Aktiengesellschaft the polystyrene market was steadily rising in early 1979, and on February 6 the supplier told its buyer that it was cancelling three orders because two plants were down and it lacked product to fill them.29 The supplier argued for the date the buyer learned of the repudiation, and the buyer argued for the last day for delivery. The court rejected both views and held that the district court correctly measured damages at a commercially reasonable point after the supplier announced the cancellations.30 The reasoning draws on the way two Code periods overlap. The buyer’s right to await performance for a commercially reasonable time and the requirement that cover come without unreasonable delay are distinct concepts, but the periods often coincide, since the buyer can investigate cover possibilities while it awaits performance.31 A measure struck at the end of that investigation fits the Code’s own yardstick, the market in which the buyer would have obtained cover.
At the other end, authority favoring the performance date says that damages “normally should be measured from the time when performance is due and not from the time when the buyer learns of repudiation.”32 The wheat dispute in Cargill, Inc. v. Stafford shows how many dates one repudiation puts in play. The trial court awarded $27,300 plus interest, the difference between wheat prices on July 31 and on September 6, the day the buyer acted on the seller’s statement that he would not perform. It gave no reason for choosing September 6, and the last day for performance was September 30.33 One commentator reasons that the right date follows the remedy sought: the time and place for performance for the market measure, the time of any actual cover for cover damages, and the time the buyer should have covered for consequential damages.34
Each reading answers a different worry. The repudiation date prevents speculation but hands the seller control of the measuring date.35 The performance date honors the contract’s own date, at the price of tying a non-covering buyer’s damages to a market that has not yet happened.36 The middle date lets the buyer investigate cover while it waits and then closes the wait, a limit the grain court enforced strictly and its critic thought too strict.37 A buyer who actually covers avoids the problem, because the cover price then supplies the measure, a relationship taken up next.
Cover Versus Market
Section 2-711(1) gives the buyer two damages routes and joins them with “or”: the buyer may cover and recover under § 2-712, or recover damages for nondelivery under § 2-713.40 The comment to § 2-713 calls its remedy “completely alternative to cover” and says it “applies only when and to the extent that the buyer has not covered.”41 The two halves of that rule are easy to blur. The buyer is free to decide whether to cover at all. A buyer who has covered is held to the cover measure.
The first half preserves the buyer’s freedom not to cover. The comment to § 2-712 says the buyer “is always free to choose between cover and damages for non-delivery under the next section.”42 The freedom does not erase the general rule that an injured promisee cannot recover damages for losses it could have avoided with reasonable effort after the breach became known.43 But the seller carries the burden on that point. In Turner v. NJN Cotton Co. the court stated that the defendant must prove the buyer’s lack of diligence and the amount by which the damages grew because of it.44 A seller who merely points out that substitutes could have been bought has proved neither.
The second half follows from what the two measures are for. The Idaho court described cover and market damages as alternative remedies intended to place the buyer in the same position, and it endorsed the view that the market remedy “ideally should yield the same recovery as the cover remedy of Section 2-712, because the cover price is simply another way of conclusively stating what the market price is.”45 If the Code’s goal is to put the buyer in the position it would have occupied without the breach, and § 2-712 reaches that goal while § 2-713 reaches it only by coincidence, a covering buyer has little claim to the second measure, and there is no room for punitive damages.46 An Illinois appellate court applied that logic when a defendant argued that § 2-713 supplied the formula even though the aggrieved party had covered after a repudiation. The court rejected the argument: § 2-713 applies where the party has not covered, and § 2-712(2), the cost of cover minus the contract price, governs where the party has.47
One textual wrinkle deserves attention. Read alone, the comment to § 2-712 could be taken to let even a covering buyer pick whichever measure pays more. One source reads the comment as referring to the buyer’s decision whether to undertake cover at all, and not as permission for a buyer who has covered to choose between the sections afterward, while conceding that the comment leaves the broader reading open.48
The comment’s phrase “to the extent” means the line can run through a single contract. A buyer that replaces only part of the shortfall measures that part by cover, and the part left unreplaced remains open to the market formula.49
Because the measure follows what the buyer did, many cases turn on whether a purchase was cover at all. If the facts prove that the buyer covered, § 2-712 applies; if they do not, § 2-713 applies; and the burden of proof rests with the seller.50 In H-W-H Cattle Co. v. Schroeder the seller argued that the buyer had elected cover and thereby limited its damages. The Eighth Circuit disagreed. The buyer ran an order-buying operation, and on the testimony about that operation, any cattle its agent bought in Dodge City were not substitutes for the cattle the seller failed to deliver.51 The buyer therefore stayed free to claim under § 2-713, although, as the next subsection shows, its recovery was still limited to avoid a windfall.
A buyer-remedies problem accordingly asks two questions in order: did the buyer buy goods in substitution for those due, and what did it pay? A purchase that qualifies fixes the measure at the cost of cover minus the contract price, plus incidental and consequential damages, minus expenses saved, and an argument that the market was higher on the day of breach adds nothing. A buyer that never bought substitutes, or whose purchases served other needs, uses § 2-713 and must prove the market price.
Windfall Limits on Market Damages
A buyer that does not cover collects the market differential under § 2-713 whatever the goods would have been worth to it,54 and the formula reads a market price on a date after the contract was made. The result tracks the buyer’s actual loss only by accident.55 The mismatch is widest for a middleman that holds a forward contract: if it has already promised the goods onward at a fixed price, the differential can dwarf the profit performance would have given it.56 Courts divide over whether the differential may be cut down to the buyer’s actual expectation.
Allied Canners & Packers, Inc. v. Victor Packing Co. shows how wide the gap can grow. Allied held a forward contract to resell the raisins to Shoei, and the court held that Allied was a buyer for Code purposes, so the buyer’s remedies applied to it.57 The price of raisins in that case went from 30 cents a pound to 87 cents.58 Victor apparently conceded liability of $4,462.52, the 4 percent commission Allied had expected to realize on the resales, while Allied argued for $150,281.25, the contract-market differential.59 The California intermediate appellate court limited Allied to its anticipated commission, as the Eighth Circuit had done for a cattle buyer in H-W-H Cattle Co. v. Schroeder, where the commissions were also less than the differential.60 Allied’s gain from performance was a commission on the resales, so a differential driven by the rise in raisin prices would have paid it for a gain that performance never promised.
H-W-H reached the same result with cattle. The buyer was an order-buyer, and the seller failed to deliver 603 head. The district court awarded the remaining $15,075 of the buyer’s down payment and $1,371.83 for the buyer’s lost commission on the undelivered cattle.61 On appeal the Eighth Circuit approved that limit. A court may look through the form of a transaction to its substance when necessary to fulfill the parties’ expectations, and holding the buyer to its expectancy interest avoided a windfall of some $62,000.62
The other side applies the formula as written. In TexPar Energy, Inc. v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc. the court applied § 2-713 to a buyer that resold. It reasoned that the remedy discourages sellers from repudiating as the market rises, or from gambling that the buyer’s damages will be small should the market drop, and that it promotes uniformity and predictability by fixing damages on the date of the breach instead of leaving them to the later movements of the market.63 The court also cited Tongish v. Thomas for the rule of construction that where § 1-106 and § 2-713 cannot be harmonized on the facts, § 2-713 prevails as the more specific statute.64
Each line guards against a different windfall. H-W-H and Allied Canners protect against a windfall to the buyer, who would otherwise collect more than performance would have given it. TexPar protects against a windfall to the seller, who would otherwise owe little and keep the benefit of a rising market. A later California court noted that the Allied Canners limit prevented a windfall to the buyer at the cost of providing one to the seller, a result it called “curious if the intent of contract damages is to effectuate the expectations of the parties.” The same court assumed the Allied Canners result would have differed had Victor been found “a deliberately breaching seller,” in which case a court might look to what the seller gained by breaching instead of to what the buyer would have received on resale.65
The Code’s seller-side measures show that its drafters did not treat the ordinary price-based measure as always adequate. A seller may recover lost profit on the contract with the breaching buyer, plus reasonable overhead, if the ordinary measure under § 2-708(1) is “inadequate to put the seller in as good a position as performance.”66 Both buyer-side positions likewise argue from expectation, and courts elsewhere show the same wariness about turning a hoped-for result into a promised one; compare the skepticism toward treating a physician’s optimistic statements as a contract for a specific outcome.67
A fact pattern raises this issue when a non-covering buyer holds a resale contract at a fixed price and the market has risen since contracting. State the § 2-713 formula, note that the differential exceeds what performance would have yielded the buyer, and present both positions with their reasons: the expectation limit of H-W-H and Allied Canners, and the straight application of § 2-713 in TexPar. Because courts divide, treat neither position as the settled rule. A fixed resale margin and no cover point toward a limit, while a seller who stands to profit from a rising market, or who breached deliberately, points toward the full differential. A buyer who actually covered never reaches the question, because cover damages under § 2-712 already measure what the replacement cost.