Concept
Requesting the Instruction
Limited admissibility
Requesting the Instruction
Rule 105 restricts evidence only when someone asks. The court must restrict admitted evidence to its proper scope and instruct the jury accordingly, but its duty runs "on timely request."1 Other-acts evidence shows what the request protects. Evidence of another crime, wrong, or act is admissible if relevant for any purpose other than showing that a person acted in accordance with character, so a jury that hears it can follow the permitted inference or slip into the forbidden one.2 The judge will confine the jury to the first only if a party asks. Once the request comes, the obligation is mandatory; until it comes, the rule imposes none.
The request belongs to the opponent, the party the evidence could hurt, and the reason lies in what an instruction does. Counsel frequently refrain from requesting one to avoid emphasizing potentially damaging evidence, or for other strategic reasons.3 An instruction names the forbidden inference aloud, in the judge's voice, and a lawyer may reasonably decide that jurors who have not yet drawn that inference are better left alone. Only the protected party knows how damaging the inference is, how likely jurors are to reach it unaided, and how the rest of the case is going. A rule that required an instruction in every case would override that judgment, and a rule that left the choice to the judge would make the judge guess at a strategy the judge cannot see.
Two questions follow. What counts as a timely request, and what happens when no one makes one? A stem that describes an unrestricted item of evidence usually asks the first before it asks whether the judge erred.
Timely Request
Rule 105 sets no deadline, so timeliness must be read from what the instruction is for. The usual practice supplies the answer: the opponent's interest is protected by a request, made at the time of the offer, that the jury consider the item only for the allowable purpose, and an objection to admission does not do that work.4 A hearsay objection that the court overrules therefore leaves the opponent with nothing further unless a request for the instruction goes with it.
The timing matters because jurors form a first impression of an item as it comes in. An instruction at that moment hands them the permitted inference before the forbidden one settles, and a later instruction has to dislodge a conclusion already drawn. Practice reflects this. The judge gives the limiting instruction when the evidence is admitted and often again when instructing the jury at the close of all the evidence, and the instruction highlights the proper purpose and cautions against misuse.5 The second instruction rides on the usual process for jury charges, in which the parties submit requested instructions before the close of the evidence.6 It repeats a limit already set; it does not replace the request made at the offer.
Once the opponent objects, the offering party takes on a duty of its own. That party must advise the court of the party or the limited purpose for which the evidence is admissible, and the opposing party is then entitled, on request, to an instruction restricting the jury's use of the evidence to that scope.7 The allocation follows from who knows what. The proponent chose to offer the item and holds the theory on which it belongs in the case, while the opponent has no reason to build the other side's justification. A judge told only that the item is relevant can give little more than a generic warning, but a judge told that the item is offered to show notice can write an instruction that names the permitted inference and fences off the rest.
Two steps happened there, and each belonged to a different side. The plaintiff, once challenged, named the purpose, which gave the court the scope it needed. The defense, at the moment of admission, asked for the fence around that scope. If either step is missing, the instruction has nothing to start from.
The word "must" carries a second lesson. A timely request removes the judge's discretion whether to instruct, so a court may not decline because the instruction seems unnecessary or unwise. California's counterpart, Evidence Code section 355, uses the same command: on request, the court "shall" restrict the evidence to its proper scope and instruct the jury accordingly.8 In Kim v. Toyota Motor Corp., the California Supreme Court said that when the party opposing admission makes a timely request, the trial court must issue an instruction explaining how the evidence may and may not be considered under the risk-benefit test.9 An opinion in People v. Humphrey reached the same result for expert testimony on battered women's syndrome: if an instruction limiting the jury's consideration of all or some of that testimony to a particular issue is requested, the instruction must be given.10 Both are state authority. In federal court, Rule 105 itself supplies the rule.
The lawyer in the first scene spoke when the letter came in, and the lawyer here spoke when the jury was about to deliberate. That difference separates a request that shapes first impressions from one that tries to repair them. The word "may" is the honest one, because the rule sets no deadline and the court has room to judge what a late request deserves. What follows when counsel never asks at all is the subject of the next section.
Waiver and Plain Error
Silence at trial usually ends the matter on appeal. Rule 105's duty begins with a request,12 and the general rule on preserving error supplies the consequence of its absence: the right to a limiting instruction is waived unless a request was made to the trial judge.13 Absent plain error, a failure to request a limiting instruction precludes raising the question on appeal.14 The consequence reaches the jury room too. When a prior inconsistent statement comes in solely to impeach and no one asks that the jury be told so, the jury may consider the statement as substantive evidence.15
The silence is often deliberate. Even an objection signals to the jury that something about the evidence is significant, so a lawyer must decide whether an objection or a request for an instruction will bring unwanted attention to the evidence, knowing that failing to ask may waive the point on appeal.16 Rule 105 resolves that dilemma by holding the lawyer to the choice. If the choice could be reopened, a party could decline the instruction, wait for the verdict, and claim error only after losing, which would buy a free second chance with the party's own tactical judgment.
In United States v. Abel, the trial court held the door open and defense counsel stayed outside. Ehle gave rebuttal testimony that the accused and another witness, Mills, belonged to the same group. The Court of Appeals read that testimony as admitted not only to show that the shared membership might lead Mills to color his testimony but also to suggest that Mills, as a member of a perjurious organization, must be lying; it held the second use impermissible and reversed.17 Respondent's counsel did not request a limiting instruction, and none was given.18 The Supreme Court found no abuse of discretion under Rule 403 in admitting the testimony on membership and tenets. It counted among the trial court's precautions an offer to give a limiting instruction and the sustaining of defense objections to questions about punishment of unfaithful members, and it concluded that those precautions ensured the admission did not unduly prejudice the respondent.19 That Rule 403 holding belongs to a later section. Here the case matters for its facts.
The waiver rule has a safety valve. A court may take notice of a plain error affecting a substantial right, even if the claim of error was not properly preserved.20 So-called plain error committed by the judge at trial is not waived and may be corrected even if it is noticed for the first time on appeal, and occasionally a judge is required to act of her own motion.21 Short of that, giving a correct instruction that no one requested is usually not error, but it is generally not required.22 When the court believes an instruction may be needed to avoid plain error, it may give one on its own initiative or first ask counsel whether one is wanted.23 The inquiry protects the record without overriding counsel's strategy, and a lawyer who answers no has made exactly the choice the rule assigns to that lawyer.
Plain error turns on how likely the omission was to do harm. When a witness is impeached with a prior conviction, an immediate cautionary instruction is appropriate, and so is a limiting instruction in the final charge, and a failure to give one more likely amounts to plain error where the prior conviction is similar.24 The likely reason is the strength of the forbidden inference. A conviction that resembles the charged crime tempts jurors to use it for something other than the witness's credibility far more than an unrelated one does, and the more tempting the misuse, the more palpable the omission.
The exam question is therefore twofold: whether anyone asked, and, if no one did, whether the risk of misuse was high enough that the judge should have acted unasked.