Concept
Title VII Presumption Cases
Effect of civil presumptions (Rule 301)
Title VII Presumption Cases
Courts normally act only when parties ask them to and prove their case, so litigants must carry burdens or lose, and the allocation of those burdens is among the slipperiest subjects in procedure and evidence.1 Title VII disparate-treatment litigation shows Rule 301 making that allocation on a single set of facts. In a civil case, unless a federal statute or the rules provide otherwise, the party against whom a presumption is directed must produce evidence to rebut it, and the burden of persuasion stays with the party who had it originally.2 The Supreme Court applied that rule to the presumption that a plaintiff's prima facie case creates under McDonnell Douglas. In St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, the Court held that the presumption shifts the burden of production to the defendant, while the “ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff.” In that respect, the Court said, the presumption operates like all presumptions, as Rule 301 describes them.3
The Prima Facie Case as Basic Fact
The prima facie case is the basic fact, and unlawful discrimination is the presumed fact. Under the McDonnell Douglas scheme, establishing the prima facie case “in effect creates a presumption that the employer unlawfully discriminated against the employee.”4 The Court spelled out what that means in Rule 301 terms: to establish a presumption is to say that a finding of the predicate fact produces “a required conclusion in the absence of explanation.”5 Whether a preponderance of the evidence establishes the prima facie facts is a question for the factfinder whenever reasonable minds could differ about it, and the factfinder resolves it as it would any disputed basic fact.6
When the Employer Says Nothing
An employer that offers no explanation loses as a matter of law once the prima facie facts are beyond rational dispute. Because a presumption yields a required conclusion in the absence of explanation, the court at the close of the defendant's case asks whether any issue of fact remains for the factfinder.7 None remains when any rational person would have to find the facts of the prima facie case and the employer has introduced no evidence that, taken as true, would permit the conclusion that it acted for a nondiscriminatory reason. The plaintiff then wins as a matter of law, and the unrebutted presumption described earlier in this chapter has its full effect.8
When the Employer Answers
An employer meets its burden of production with evidence, not with proof that persuades. The question is whether the employer has introduced evidence that, taken as true, would permit the conclusion that it had a nondiscriminatory reason, and that determination involves no credibility assessment, because it necessarily precedes the credibility-assessment stage.9 The rule follows from Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, which held that to rebut the presumption the defendant “need not persuade the court that it was actually motivated by the proffered reasons.”10 A judge who weighed the employer's believability at this stage would turn a burden of production into a burden of persuasion, and Rule 301 does not allow that.
Once the employer produces such evidence, the presumption has done its work. “If the defendant carries this burden of production, the presumption raised by the prima facie case is rebutted” and “drops from the case.”11 The presumption, having forced the defendant to come forward with some response, simply drops out of the picture, which is the bursting bubble described earlier in this chapter.12
What remains is an ordinary trial of the ultimate question. Through her own case and through cross-examination of the employer's witnesses, the plaintiff has a full and fair opportunity to show that the proffered reason was not the true reason, and she keeps the ultimate burden of persuading the factfinder that the employer intentionally discriminated.13 The McDonnell Douglas framework, with its presumptions and burdens, is no longer relevant, and the factfinder decides whether the plaintiff has proved intentional discrimination.14
When the Factfinder Rejects the Employer's Reasons
The last question is what follows when the factfinder disbelieves the employer's explanation. The court of appeals in Hicks held that rejection of the employer's proffered reasons compels judgment for the plaintiff. The Supreme Court disagreed, because that holding disregards the fundamental principle of Rule 301 that a presumption does not shift the burden of proof and ignores the plaintiff's ultimate burden of persuasion.15 Disbelief of the employer's reasons, particularly when accompanied by a suspicion of mendacity, may together with the elements of the prima facie case suffice to show intentional discrimination. Rejection of the reasons therefore permits the factfinder to infer discrimination, and no additional proof is required, but the inference is permitted rather than compelled.16
The logic is easy to trace. A rule that compelled judgment would make the employer lose every time it failed to persuade the factfinder of its stated reason, which would put persuasion on the employer when Rule 301 leaves it with the plaintiff. Instead, the prima facie facts stay in the record with their natural force, and disbelief adds to it. That is the residual inference described in the last section.
Rule 301 governs “unless a federal statute or these rules provide otherwise,” and the final section of this chapter takes up presumptions that do shift persuasion. For Title VII disparate-treatment claims, the Court describes the McDonnell Douglas presumption as operating like all presumptions under Rule 301. It requires production from the employer, and persuasion stays with the plaintiff.17