Concept
Cross-Examining the Accused
Scope of examination
Cross-Examining the Accused
A defendant who testifies is a witness like any other under Rule 611(b): cross-examination should not go beyond the subject matter of the direct and matters affecting credibility, though the court may allow additional matters as if on direct.1 The defendant also holds the privilege against self-incrimination, and the rule does not say how much of it he surrenders by taking the stand.2 Two questions therefore run side by side. The scope rule decides which questions the cross-examiner may ask; the waiver decides which questions the government may make the defendant answer over an invocation of the privilege. A question can pass the first test and fail the second. This unit takes the waiver first, then shows how an accused can shrink his cross by shrinking his direct, and ends with the jurisdictions that allow wider cross and the constitutional limit that stands behind every version.
The Waiver Principle
“It is an inveterate principle that a defendant who takes the stand waives his fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination at least to the extent of cross-examination relevant to issues raised by his testimony.” So the Fifth Circuit wrote in United States v. Beechum, and the words “at least” make that statement a floor, not a ceiling.3 Beechum applied the floor and went no further. The court found the cross-examination before it “well within the scope of matters that a defendant is deemed to waive,” and it declined to decide whether a defendant waives the privilege to the full scope of cross the Federal Rules permit.4
Brown v. United States supplies the reason for the floor. An accused may weigh the advantage of the privilege against the advantage of telling his own story and vouching for himself as a witness, and he may decline to testify. One who elects to testify cannot claim immunity from cross-examination on matters he has himself put in dispute, because the privilege would then become “a positive invitation to mutilate the truth a party offers to tell.”5 The privilege guards against compelled disclosure, and an accused who volunteers testimony on a subject is no longer compelled to disclose on that subject.6
The same decision supplies the limit. The accused, it said, “determines the areas of disclosure and therefore of inquiry,” and so fixes the breadth of his own waiver.7 Fitzpatrick v. United States marks the edge: a defendant who testified to an alibi could be cross-examined about his whereabouts, but going “farther” would have been “a clear case of the defendant being compelled to furnish original evidence against himself.”8 Each half of the principle has its own reason. The waiver covers what the accused opened because its purpose is to prevent one-sided testimony. It ends where his testimony ends because, beyond that point, the government would be using his decision to speak on one subject as a lever to extract evidence on another.
The Supreme Court’s language is not uniform. Brown and Fitzpatrick tie the waiver to matters related to the direct, but Johnson v. United States said that in testifying the accused waives his privilege “as to all other relevant facts.”9 The cases leave the outer edge of the waiver uncertain, and Rule 611(b) does not fill the gap. Beechum quoted the Advisory Committee’s note that the rule “does not purport to determine the extent to which an accused who elects to testify thereby waives his privilege against self-incrimination,” and it observed that the rule gives the trial judge wide latitude to allow cross-examination on issues collateral to the direct.10 The court then said it need not decide whether cross-examination purely collateral to the subject matter of the direct falls outside the waiver.11
Narrowing the Direct
An ordinary scope objection delays a question without killing it. The blocked cross-examiner can recall the witness later, when she puts on her own stage of the evidence.13 For a criminal accused that remedy fails. In most jurisdictions that follow the restrictive practice, the accused can permanently preclude the prosecution from questioning him about facts outside the scope of his direct, and there is authority that a prosecutor who could not reach an issue during the defense case may not recall the accused in rebuttal to ask about it.14
Defense counsel can plan around that structure. The accused may narrow his direct to a single aspect of the case, such as age, sanity, or alibi, and then invoke the jurisdiction’s scope rule when the cross strays. Counsel may even announce at the start of the direct that she will question the accused “only” about the chosen topic, so that she stands in a better position to urge scope objections later.15 Critics have attacked this application of the restrictive practice to the accused, but their criticism has not persuaded courts to exempt the prosecution’s cross-examination of the accused from the restriction.16
Narrowing has a cost. A direct limited to an alibi puts less of the accused’s account before the jury, and every further issue he opens enlarges what the cross may reach. The boundary of the direct also matters for another reason: evidence previously suppressed may be employed to impeach testimony elicited on cross-examination within the scope of the accused’s direct examination.17 A dissent in United States v. Havens warned that impeachment of a testifying accused can also buttress the affirmative elements of the prosecution’s case, so that almost any time an accused takes the stand the prosecution gains a chance to enhance its case in chief. The dissent doubted that limiting instructions give the defendant significant protection.18 The breadth of the direct therefore matters twice: it helps set how far the cross may go, and it bears on how much of the accused’s testimony the prosecution can meet with impeachment evidence.
Wider Cross and Constitutional Limits
In a wide-open jurisdiction the accused cannot shelter behind a narrow direct, and he will not escape a searching inquiry on the whole case.20 Some rules reach that result by singling out the accused. One provides that “[a]n accused who testifies on a non-preliminary matter may be cross-examined on any matter relevant to any issue in the action.”21 For him, testifying on the merits means exposure to cross-examination on the case as a whole. Under that rule the burglary defendant above, who confined his direct to an alibi, would still face the question about his loans, because motive is relevant to an issue in the action. The question must still be relevant, but it need not grow out of the direct.
The word “non-preliminary” matters. The same rule withholds the court’s discretion to allow additional inquiry when the accused testifies on a preliminary matter, so the judge may not use that discretion to widen the cross of an accused who testified only on such a matter.22
Evidence rules are not the only source of limits. A Vermont decision based its holding on the right to testify in Article 10 of the Vermont Constitution, while recognizing that impeaching a testifying defendant with suppressed evidence also implicates Article 10’s privilege against self-incrimination. The court created a limited exception to an earlier decision.23 The Havens dissent added that even the federal limits in Rule 611 need not be adopted by the states, which are generally free to fashion their own rules of evidence.24
Behind every version of the rule stands the constitutional question. Some judicial language suggests that under the Fifth Amendment the accused’s waiver extends only to questions about matters mentioned on direct. If that position prevails, federal constitutional limits on waiver would partly control state practice and could render wide-open cross-examination of criminal defendants unconstitutional, and perhaps even liberal variations of the restrictive rules.25 Beechum left the point open, declining to decide whether cross wholly collateral to the subject matter of the direct falls outside the waiver.26 In federal court the second sentence of Rule 611(b) lets the judge allow additional matters as if on direct, but that discretion enlarges what the evidence rules permit and leaves unsettled what the accused can be made to answer.27 An answer on this subject should therefore treat the waiver as partly constitutional and partly unresolved, and should not declare a wide-open rule valid or invalid.
Sorting the Objection
The first step does the sorting, since the same question about debts is excluded in a restrictive forum and allowed under a rule like the one quoted above. A common slip is to answer by citing Rule 611(b) alone, although the rule leaves the extent of the waiver to case law and the Constitution.