Concept
Other Limits on Contradiction
Contradiction
Other Limits on Contradiction
Three doctrines carry most of the weight in this area. Rule 607 lets any party attack a witness's credibility, including the party that called the witness.1 The collateral evidence rule sorts extrinsic counterproof by asking whether the contradicted fact matters beyond the contradiction. Rule 403 lets the court exclude relevant counterproof when its probative value is substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasted time, or needless cumulation.2 A proponent whose offer is relevant, non-collateral, and cheap enough to survive Rule 403 balancing might expect the evidence to come in.
Two further bodies of law can change that result, and neither depends on where the contradiction falls on the collateral scale. Rule 408 regulates statements made in compromise negotiations and expressly reaches their use to impeach by contradiction, so an inconsistency the earlier sections would admit may still be forbidden. The constitutional law of exclusion decides when evidence kept out of the prosecution's case-in-chief, because the government obtained it unconstitutionally, may still be used to contradict a defendant who chooses to testify. The two point in opposite directions. The first removes a contradiction the general framework would have allowed, and the second admits evidence that another exclusionary rule kept out of the government's main case.
These limits stand apart because they protect interests outside the trial's own efficiency. Rule 403 and the collateral rule weigh what an offer adds against what it costs in time and confusion, but the two overlays apply even when the offer would be quick and probative. An exam answer on contradiction should therefore run the general framework first and then ask whether either overlay changes the outcome.
Settlement Statements
Rule 408(a) names contradiction expressly, and it names it to forbid a use. Evidence of furnishing, promising, or offering valuable consideration to compromise a disputed claim, or of accepting or promising to accept it, is not admissible on behalf of any party, and neither is conduct or a statement made during compromise negotiations about the claim. The bar applies when the evidence is offered to prove or disprove the validity or amount of the claim, and it applies equally when the evidence is offered “to impeach by a prior inconsistent statement or a contradiction.”3 One exception limits the bar on negotiation conduct and statements: it gives way when the evidence is offered in a criminal case and the negotiations related to a claim by a public office exercising regulatory, investigative, or enforcement authority.4 The Rule thus removes one source of counterproof, the parties' own bargaining, from every contradiction analysis. A negotiation statement may pass the collateral rule and survive Rule 403 and still be inadmissible to show a witness wrong.
The policy behind the bar explains its reach. Parties settle only if they can float figures, concede weak points, and describe the dispute candidly without fearing that the words will return at trial, and the law encourages compromise for that reason.5 A concession made to compromise a claim usually speaks to what happened or what the claim is worth, so at trial it will often differ from the party's sworn account. If the opponent could read that concession to the jury as an inconsistent statement, the protection against its use on liability would vanish in practice, because the jury would hear the same words under a credibility label.
The express language is recent. Before the amendment effective December 1, 2006, a majority of decisions permitted negotiation statements to be used for impeachment. Rule 408(a) was amended to rectify that, and it now prohibits the use of conduct or statements made in settlement negotiations when offered “to impeach by a prior inconsistent statement or a contradiction.”6 Decisions and study materials written before 2006 that report the majority view no longer state the law.
The same negotiation can still serve a different purpose, and Rule 408(b) says so. The court may admit compromise evidence for another purpose, such as proving a witness's bias or prejudice, negating a contention of undue delay, or proving an effort to obstruct a criminal investigation or prosecution.7 Joice v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas Railway illustrates the bias use. A plaintiff and a co-employee were hurt in the same railroad collision, the co-employee testified for the railroad, and the Missouri court held it proper to ask him on cross-examination whether the railroad had settled a claim with him. The settlement tested whether the witness felt beholden to the railroad, and it said nothing about the validity of his own claim.
The line falls between using the fact of the payment to show motive and using what the witness said in the talks to show the testimony false. Suppose the co-employee had testified that the engineer could not have known anyone was on the track, and the plaintiff wanted to show that the witness had said the opposite while negotiating with the railroad. Rule 408(a) bars that question, because it is impeachment by a prior inconsistent statement or a contradiction. Bias use is not automatic either. The court still weighs the evidence's value against the danger of unfair prejudice and of misleading the jury, and it considers whether a limiting instruction would be effective.8
Rule 408(a) bars the negotiation conduct or statement itself. A cross-examiner who wants to contradict a witness therefore needs counterproof from some source other than the settlement talks. Whether a statement falls within the Rule's protection is a preliminary question that the court decides under Rule 104(a).9
Suppressed Evidence
Criminal prosecutions raise a harder problem. Courts keep evidence out of the government's case-in-chief for several kinds of constitutional violation. A confession may be suppressed as the fruit of an illegal arrest, a question the Supreme Court first addressed in Wong Sun v. United States.11 A statement may be taken without Miranda warnings, and an object may be found in an unlawful search. The question is whether the government may then use the suppressed item to contradict a defendant who testifies.
Harris v. New York answered that question for a statement taken in violation of Miranda: the prosecution could use it to impeach the defendant's contrary trial testimony. Having voluntarily taken the stand, the defendant was obliged to speak truthfully and accurately, and the prosecution did no more than use the traditional truth-testing devices of the adversary process. Had he made the same inconsistent statements to a private person, no one could contend that the conflict could not be laid before the jury on cross-examination.12 The Court concluded that the shield provided by Miranda “cannot be perverted into a license to use perjury by way of a defense, free from the risk of confrontation with prior inconsistent utterances.”13
The idea is older than Harris. In Walder v. United States, the government met the defendant's denial of a prior seizure with evidence illegally secured, and the trial judge told the jury to consider it solely for impeaching the defendant's credibility. The Supreme Court affirmed. “[I]t is one thing to say that the Government cannot make any affirmative use of evidence unlawfully obtained,” it wrote, but “quite another to say that the defendant can turn the illegal method by which evidence in the Government's possession was obtained to his own advantage, and provide him with a shield against contradiction of his untruths.” A defendant must be free to deny all the elements of the case against him without giving the government leave to rebut with illegally secured evidence, but beyond that there is hardly justification for letting him resort to perjurious testimony in reliance on the government's disability to challenge his credibility.14 This is door opening in constitutional form, because the defendant's own testimony invites the contradiction.
Four limits confine the exception. The first concerns who testifies. Only a defendant's personal testimony at trial triggers the opportunity to use otherwise excluded evidence. In James v. Illinois, the Court, by a close 5 to 4 vote, declined to extend the exception to impeach or rebut defense testimony from witnesses other than the defendant, because such an expansion would weaken the deterrent value of the basic exclusionary requirement.15
The second limit concerns how far the contradiction may reach into cross-examination. The defendant in United States v. Havens denied on direct examination that he had been engaged in his traveling companion's smuggling. On cross-examination he was asked whether he had anything to do with the makeshift underwear pockets in which the cocaine was carried, and he said no. The prosecutor impeached that denial with material from an unlawful search of his suitcase, the cloth from which the pockets had been cut. Havens argued that the evidence did not “squarely contradict” his direct testimony, only his cross-examination testimony. A divided Supreme Court rejected the argument and refused to adopt a “flat rule” that would confine impeachment to direct-examination statements.16 The holding is that a defendant's statements made in response to proper cross-examination reasonably suggested by the direct examination are subject to otherwise proper impeachment, even by evidence that was illegally obtained and that is inadmissible on the government's direct case.17 Agnello v. United States lies on the other side of the line. The Court has read Agnello as a case in which the cross-examination had too tenuous a connection with any subject opened on direct to permit impeachment by tainted evidence.18
The third limit turns on the kind of violation. Whether suppressed evidence may impeach depends on whether its trial use is itself part of the violation that made it inadmissible.19 A Miranda violation or an unlawful search is complete before trial begins, so exclusion from the case-in-chief is a remedy chosen for deterrence, and the impeachment question reduces to the balance described above. A truly coerced confession differs, because the Fifth Amendment is violated whenever such a confession is introduced at trial, whether by way of impeachment or otherwise.20 Mincey v. Arizona accordingly held that involuntary statements cannot be used to impeach.21 A statement taken after officers skipped the warnings may therefore impeach a defendant who denies the crime, while the same words extracted by threats of violence stay out, though they would contradict him just as sharply.
The fourth limit concerns what the jury may do with the evidence. Even where impeachment is allowed, the evidence remains impeachment evidence. The jury may use it to weigh the defendant's credibility, and the government still cannot offer it as substantive evidence of guilt.22 The Supreme Court has emphasized the distinction between impeachment and substantive guilt evidence in numerous constitutional contexts.23 The impeachment must also be otherwise proper, so the suppressed evidence must truly contradict the testimony, and the court's ordinary control under Rule 403 over proof whose value is substantially outweighed by prejudice or confusion continues to apply.24