Concept
Rule 403 and Exhibits
Real, demonstrative, and experimental evidence
Rule 403 and Exhibits
An authenticated exhibit has cleared only part of the way to the jury. Authentication shows that the item is what the proponent claims it is,1 and relevance shows that it has some tendency to make a fact more or less probable,2 but neither decides whether the jury should see it. Relevant evidence is admissible unless the Constitution, a federal statute, the Federal Rules of Evidence, or other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court provide otherwise,3 and Rule 403 is one of those rules. It lets the court exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.4
Exhibits press on this rule harder than most evidence because of how they reach the jury. A witness who describes a wound speaks through a person whose perception and candor the opponent can test, while a photograph of the wound lets jurors perceive it for themselves, whether or not any witness vouches for what it shows.5 That immediacy gives real evidence and illustrative aids their convincing power, and it also creates a potential for the jury to overvalue them, a risk that Rule 403 labels misleading the jury or confusing the issues.6 Gruesome pictures can stir emotion, a smooth animation can seem more certain than the assumptions inside it, and a dozen similar photographs can add little to the first. Each pressure matches a danger on the Rule 403 list.
The test comes first below, because it fixes how the weighing works and how much deference the judge's choice receives. The later sections then apply it to prejudicial exhibits, to misleading and confusing ones, to the effect of stipulations and other available proof, and to limiting instructions, which often let a court admit an exhibit it might otherwise exclude.
The Balancing Test
Four features shape every ruling under Rule 403: the rule reaches only relevant evidence, tilts toward admission, entrusts the decision to the trial judge, and places the burden on the party seeking exclusion.
The rule begins where Rule 401 ends. Irrelevant evidence is inadmissible, and relevant evidence is admissible unless the Constitution, a statute, or a rule provides otherwise,7 so the balance matters only for an item that already has some tendency to prove a fact of consequence. Because that threshold is low, much marginal or risky material clears it, and the law needs a second question: whether the evidence is worth what it costs.8 Rule 403 asks that question of almost all proffered evidence, and even evidence that is admissible by some other route usually must pass through it as well.9 A few rules vary the standard. Rule 609, for example, sets up a different balancing test for the evidence it governs.10
The Constitution does not guarantee a right to introduce all relevant evidence. In Montana v. Egelhoff the Supreme Court called that proposition indefensible, because an accused has no unfettered right to offer evidence that is inadmissible under standard rules of evidence.11 Rule 403 fits most naturally in jury trials, where the evidence rules assume that lay jurors are less able than a judge to separate the probative from the unreliable or inflammatory, and no rule reflects that assumption more clearly.12
The word substantially tilts the rule toward admission. Picture a set of scales: when probative value and danger weigh the same, the evidence comes in, and when the danger edges ahead by only a little, it still comes in; only a heavy tip toward the danger justifies exclusion.13 The standard also rises with the evidence, because the greater the probative value, the greater the danger must be, so evidence with significant probative value is rarely excluded.14 Courts describe exclusion under the rule as an extraordinary remedy and use it sparingly.15
The word may leaves the decision to the trial judge. The test is necessarily inexact, because it depends on the law, the facts, and the evidence in each case, so the judge has considerable discretion in applying it.16 The same item can fare differently from one case to the next: it may become cumulative of earlier proof, the proponent may have less prejudicial evidence for the same point, or the issue may matter more in one case than another, and the trial judge is best situated to see those changes as the case unfolds.17 Appellate courts review for abuse of discretion and rarely reject a ruling that an exhibit's legitimate value exceeds its risk of unfair prejudice, even when that value is slight.18 Review is meaningful only when the record shows the judge's reasons, and some appellate courts treat a failure to state them as an abuse of discretion in itself.19
United States v. Abel shows a judge using that discretion to shape an admission instead of choosing between all and nothing. The prosecution offered testimony that a defense witness and the defendant belonged to the same prison gang, which bore on the witness's bias. The trial court ordered that the gang's name not be used, offered a limiting instruction, and sustained defense objections to questions about the punishment of unfaithful members. Those precautions did not prevent all prejudice, the Supreme Court said, but they ensured that the highly probative evidence did not unduly prejudice the defendant, and it found no abuse of discretion.20
The party who objects carries the burden of showing that a listed danger substantially outweighs probative value.21 A judge who finds a ground for exclusion should tell counsel which one applies, so that counsel can try to cure the problem, for example by narrowing the exhibit.22
The weighing starts with probative value, and measuring it differs from asking whether an item is relevant. Relevance asks only whether the item has any tendency to affect a fact of consequence, and it is not a matter of degree; probative value is the degree to which the item affects the likelihood of that fact, and it depends on the evidence's logical force and the context in which it is offered.23 Courts look to four features of the evidence:24
- the importance of the fact of consequence in the context of the litigation;
- the strength and length of the chain of inferences that links the evidence to that fact;
- the availability of alternative means of proof; and
- whether the fact is actually disputed.
The same passage adds the potential effectiveness of a limiting instruction, which the last section of this unit takes up.
The second feature does much of the work for exhibits, because a long chain of inferences can be weak even when each link is reasonable. Suppose the prosecution in an arson case offers evidence that the defendant and the victim were competitors who learned of the same business opportunity. That evidence supports the fact of consequence, that the defendant burned the victim's factory, only through further inferences: that the defendant wanted the business, that he had a motive to eliminate the competition, and that he was willing to act on that motive. If those three steps are assigned probabilities of 70, 80, and 60 percent, and the first link is treated as certain, the combined probability is about 34 percent.25 Each step is fairly strong, yet the chain is weak. The evidence remains relevant, because Rule 401 asks for any tendency, but its probative value is low, and when either the value of the evidence or the importance of the fact is slight, exclusion becomes more likely.26
The other features depend on the setting, because every exhibit enters a case that already holds other proof. When ten witnesses saw the same undisputed event, the first few establish it, and each later witness adds almost nothing while consuming the same trial time, so the court may exclude the rest as needlessly cumulative.27 When the point is contested, as when a defendant denies that he was at the scene, the same witnesses go to the central dispute and their testimony is not needless. The word needlessly marks the line: parties may reinforce a crucial fact with more than one item of proof, and the rule reaches only repetition that serves no purpose.28
When the judge measures probative value, the judge must assume that the trier of fact will believe the evidence.29 A judge who discounted an alibi because the judge doubted the witness would be deciding credibility, a question that belongs to the jury.
Unfair surprise is not among the dangers Rule 403 lists. When a party complains that an exhibit was produced too late to answer, the fitting responses are discovery sanctions or a continuance, and exclusion for surprise is not available under the rule.30 Time to prepare cures surprise without depriving the jury of evidence that may be accurate and important.
Real exhibits often sit at the strong end of the probative scale. Judges customarily treat real evidence as highly probative,31 and an object offered as substantive evidence tells the jury something about a fact of consequence just by being perceived.32 When the fact is important in the litigation and the tangible evidence is highly probative, exclusion should occur only in the most unusual circumstances; if seeing is believing, the jury should be permitted to see.33 The immediacy that makes exhibits persuasive also risks overvaluation, but no flat rule makes that risk a ground for exclusion, and each exhibit receives the weighing the rule describes.34
Unfair Prejudice and Gruesome Exhibits
Rule 403 lists unfair prejudice first among its dangers, and the modifier unfair carries most of the meaning. In Old Chief v. United States the Supreme Court quoted the Advisory Committee's definition: unfair prejudice means “an undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one.”37 The Court named propensity reasoning as one improper basis: a juror generalizes a defendant's earlier bad act into bad character and treats that character as raising the odds that he committed the act now charged.38
Harm to the opponent's case cannot be the test. Effective evidence damages the party it is offered against, so the prejudice that justifies exclusion takes a narrower meaning: a tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, such as bias, sympathy, hatred, contempt, retribution, or horror.39 An improper basis also includes the jury's use of evidence for a purpose for which it was not admitted, despite a limiting instruction.40 In Old Chief, eyewitness testimony that the defendant had a gun would have hurt him badly, yet it would not have been unfairly prejudicial, because it hurt only by making the charged possession more probable; the record of his prior conviction, by contrast, risked being put to a use outside the legitimate purpose for which it was offered.41
The line falls between persuasion by proof and persuasion by reaction. A juror who dislikes a defendant because the evidence convinces her that he made the threat charged is reacting to what happened. A juror who dislikes him for something that would repel her whether or not it had any connection to the crime is reacting to something else.42 Even a real tendency toward the improper does not require exclusion by itself, because the danger must substantially outweigh probative value, and the degree of likely prejudice counts in that comparison.43
Unfair prejudice takes two forms, and an objection is stronger when it names the one it invokes. The first is inferential error: the jury treats evidence as probative of a fact it does not prove. Photographs of an injured plaintiff offer the standard example, because jurors often assume that the extent of an injury is probative of the defendant's negligence even though the injury may have come from another cause, such as the plaintiff's own carelessness.44 The second, nullification prejudice, arises when the evidence might incline the jury to disregard the law.45
Gruesome exhibits put the definition to its hardest test. Photographs and displays of wounds can produce pity, horror, revulsion, or contempt, and when the danger of such a response substantially outweighs the exhibit's probative value, exclusion is appropriate.46 The common error is to infer that a shocking exhibit must therefore be excluded. In criminal prosecutions, relevant photographs are generally admitted despite their gruesomeness when they tend to prove the existence of a crime, the cause of death, the number and location of the wounds, the manner in which they were inflicted, the force used, willfulness, or identity, and by their nature the more gruesome the crime, the more gruesome the photographs that come in.47 The horror comes from the very facts the jury must decide. A picture that devastates the defense is prejudicial in the ordinary sense, but it is not unfairly so as long as it lets the jury determine rationally how the crime was committed.48 As the Ninth Circuit put it in Rivers v. United States, “[i]f the mere gruesomeness of the evidence were ground for its exclusion, then it would have to be said that the more gruesome the crime, the greater the difficulty of the prosecution in proving its case.”49
The norm of admission reaches beyond photographs. Judges have upheld the admission of even gruesome objects that played a part in the litigated events.50 The display of a physical injury is usually the most probative evidence of a fact of consequence, so courts allow it even when the injury is shocking and even when its existence is not disputed, and withhold it from the jury only in the most unusual circumstances.51 Caution is warranted when the injured person is asked to perform acts or is manipulated by a physician, which raises problems of feigning, difficulty in cross-examination, and an undue emotional response to manifestations of pain.52 A defendant's offer to stipulate to the nature of the wounds also rarely keeps photographs out, because appellate courts typically hold that a stipulation cannot fully convey the harm inflicted, so the photographs keep probative value that exceeds their emotional effect.53
Gruesomeness goes too far when the exhibit proves nothing in dispute. State v. Chapple involved four color photographs admitted with the testimony of the investigating officer and the medical examiner: the victim's burned body, face, and skull; the bullet's entry wound; the charred skull with a flap of bone cut away and a pencil pointing to the bullet in the brain; and the brain as the bullet was removed.54 The defendant argued on appeal that the pictures were gruesome and inflammatory.55 The photographs illustrated points the defense did not contest and had offered to stipulate, and the Arizona Supreme Court held that admitting them was an abuse of discretion.56
Read Chapple as a picture of a clear failure, not as a rule against gruesome photographs. Trial judges are rarely reversed on this ground, gruesome photographs often survive Rule 403 balancing and are routinely admitted in homicide cases, and the Arizona court asked whether probative worth outweighs prejudicial impact when Rule 403 asks whether it is substantially outweighed. The decision remains valuable because defendants convicted in homicide cases regularly appeal on this ground, and because it shows that a stipulation, or the absence of dispute, does not automatically exclude evidence but does affect the balance.57
Gruesomeness that the crime did not produce receives less tolerance. When a photograph's shocking quality comes from autopsy or emergency-room procedures, the photograph may be excluded because its probative value is relatively slight.58 Horror that belongs to the crime is part of what the jury must decide; horror added by a pathologist's incisions asks jurors to react to something the defendant did not do, and the wounds themselves can usually be shown without it. Even when photographs come in, courts can limit the number and nature of gruesome pictures of murder victims, so an objector can win a narrower selection even when the objection to the whole set fails.59 The same objection arises in civil cases, where Rule 403 has been invoked to exclude gruesome photographs in tort cases tried to a jury.60
The photographs in Chapple and in the stabbing trial are equally disturbing, and the difference lies in the dispute. In Chapple the photographs spoke only to points no one contested, which left nothing on the probative side of the scale. In the stabbing trial they speak to the force used, which the defense contests.
Misleading and Confusing Exhibits
Misleading the jury and confusing the issues name two different failures. A jury is misled when it evaluates an item's probative value incorrectly, usually by overvaluing it, for a reason other than the emotional reaction that marks unfair prejudice. A jury is confused when side questions multiply until it loses sight of the main one.63 The difference matters because the cures differ: a disclosed flaw can correct a miscalibrated jury, but a side dispute that has swallowed the trial cannot be cured by a warning.
Exhibits invite both objections for the same reason they are useful. Their immediacy creates a potential for overvaluing,64 and film or computer-generated images convey an impression of objective reality, so courts treat them as misleading when their contents do not correspond closely enough to the actual conditions and context of the events at trial.65
The overvaluing sense of misleading can be understood as a comparison. A judge asks, roughly and with some subjectivity, what probability a wholly rational fact-finder would assign with the exhibit and what probability the real jury is likely to assign. Exclusion makes sense only when it brings the jury's judgment closer to the rational figure, and because weighing evidence is the jury's job, the gap must be fairly large before the judge intervenes.66 A lie-detector result is the standard example, since jurors tend to overvalue it even when its significance is fully explained. A map, model, or chart that varies substantially from the fact it illustrates can mislead in the same way, and so can the sheer amount of time spent on a question, which may persuade jurors that the issue is more important than it is.67
A single data point can miscalibrate jurors too. Suppose a defendant concedes that the accident the plaintiff describes is possible, and the plaintiff offers evidence that one other person was hurt the same way. That incident has only a small bearing on whether the plaintiff's claim is true, but jurors may reason that because something happened once, it was highly likely to have happened again, and the defendant faces the risk that they will give it too much weight.68
The labels overlap in practice. Courts and commentators often call evidence “prejudicial” when they exclude it out of distrust of jurors, and “misleading” and “confusion of the issues” are terms also used for the same worry.69 An objection that names the mechanism, however, points to the cure more precisely than one that says only “prejudice.”
Models, diagrams, and similar aids show the misleading danger in its plainest form. Whether a particular aid will help the trier or will instead confuse or mislead it is commonly left to the trial court's sound discretion, and the question is how far the aid helps jurors understand testimony.70 In Roland v. Langlois, a carnival-ride injury case, the plaintiffs complained that a life-size model of part of the fence around the ride was not completely accurate. The Seventh Circuit upheld its admission because demonstrative evidence need not be completely accurate and the trial court had admitted it on the express condition that the jury be alerted to the perceived inaccuracies.71
Bowoto v. Chevron Corp. came out the other way on a three-dimensional model of a barge. The model let a viewer stand at a chosen spot on the deck to judge what a witness could have seen. Aerial photographs taken near the time of the incident showed large objects cluttering the deck, while the model showed a clean deck, and the court excluded use of the model to show a witness's viewpoint because a tool that places jurors on the deck makes a strong impression and needed to be as accurate as possible.72 What separates the two decisions is where the error sits and whether the jury can correct for it. In Roland the imperfections were known, and the condition that jurors be told of them let the jury discount the model. In Bowoto the error lay in the very feature the exhibit existed to demonstrate, since clutter decides what a person on the deck could see, and a polished image invites jurors to trust the vantage point it shows. Bowoto does not demand exactitude; a digital presentation need not track the underlying facts perfectly.73
Posed photographs and reconstructions carry a similar risk. Nobody perceived the staged scene as the event, so the picture shows what someone arranged while carrying the look of a record. A posed still, film, or videotape that reconstructs an event is sometimes admitted but is regarded with disfavor, because the trier may give it disproportionate emphasis.74 Even an unposed photograph can fail when the scene has changed. Explained changes usually leave a photograph usable, but because a photograph makes it hard to separate illustration from assertion, a change can leave it so confusing or misleading that exclusion is required.75
Computer animations sit on a spectrum, and the position on it controls the danger. An animation that only illustrates testimony is admissible on a foundation of sufficient similarity, subject to Rule 403. An animation that goes beyond illustration by building in experimental elements, sometimes called a simulation, raises added concerns about similarity to the real event and about the reliability of the theory it uses.76 A simulation is the work product of many out-of-court actors, whose factual sources, scientific formulae, assumptions, and program design all affect its reliability, and those sources can be tested through witnesses and through the rules governing expert opinion.77 The misleading danger is concealment: the assumptions disappear into smooth motion on the screen, and jurors who watch vehicles cross it may take the motion as a record of what happened.
Confusion of the issues works through diversion. When one side offers an exhibit whose accuracy or conditions the other can answer only by raising new disputes, the trial fills with questions about the exhibit, new witnesses are needed to explain it, and the jury may lose sight of the kernel of the controversy.78
The policy is sharpest for illustrative aids. An aid has no probative value of its own and serves only to help the jury understand testimony or other evidence, so the only thing on the benefit side of the scale is how much it improves comprehension.79 When a model or animation distorts, that benefit shrinks, and nothing else remains to outweigh the danger. Rule 107, which governs illustrative aids, asks this question directly by weighing the aid's usefulness in assisting comprehension against dangers that largely track the Rule 403 list.80 Because the judge sees the exhibit alongside the testimony, the choices run beyond admitting or excluding: the judge may require the proponent to point out the aid's limits, as the Roland court did, and the next section's neighbor, limiting instructions, offers a further alternative.
Stipulations and Alternative Proof
Rule 403 weighs probative value against danger, but it does not say how to measure probative value when the opponent offers to concede the point an exhibit would prove. Old Chief supplies the answer: the Rule 403 probative value of an item, as distinct from its Rule 401 relevance, may be calculated by comparing evidentiary alternatives.82 The comparison belongs at the Rule 403 stage because a concession does not make evidence irrelevant. The Advisory Committee's note to Rule 401 says the fact need not be in dispute, and it directs that rulings on conceded points rest on considerations such as waste of time and undue prejudice, not on any requirement that evidence go only to disputed matters.83 An exhibit is therefore worth less when equally good proof of the same point is available, and the danger it carries weighs relatively more. The same opinion also protected a party's freedom to choose its own proof, and the tension between those two principles produces most of the doctrine in this section.
The Court described two ways a judge might run the balance. Under the first, an item is an island: the judge estimates its own probative value and its own risk of unfair prejudice and looks at nothing else. Under the second, the judge also considers the evidentiary context, and when the item raises a danger of unfair prejudice, the judge evaluates the value and danger of any actually available substitutes. If a substitute has substantially the same or greater probative value and a lower danger of unfair prejudice, the judge may discount the value of the item first offered and exclude it if that discounted value is substantially outweighed by the risk.84 The Court adopted the second approach, for a reason that appears once the proponent's incentives are considered. Under the island approach, a party who knew that the worst result of an objection was a ruling to use a substitute could choose the most inflammatory proof every time and fall back whenever the court objected, so the rule would recognize the danger of unfair prejudice and then leave its control to the party facing the temptation.85 The Advisory Committee's note to Rule 403 points the same way by listing the availability of other means of proof as an appropriate factor when a court considers exclusion for unfair prejudice.86
A discount is all the comparison produces. Two items that go to the same point do not require the judge to admit only one of them.87 The Court called it familiar and standard that a party may prove its case with evidence of its own choosing, and that a criminal defendant may not stipulate or admit his way out of the full evidentiary force of the case as the government presents it.88 The same good sense protects any litigant against an opponent's offer to stipulate the evidence away.89 Three grounds support the general rule, and each explains why a stipulation is a poor substitute for the evidence it would replace:
- Evidence usually proves more than one point at once, so a concession on one point leaves the others in play, as when an account of a shooting that establishes capacity and causation also shows the shooter's motive and intent.90
- A concrete narrative gains momentum as its pieces come together, which sustains jurors' willingness to draw the inferences an honest verdict requires and helps them appreciate the moral foundation of the law they are applying.91
- Jurors arrive expecting to hear evidence, so a party forced to substitute an announcement of the facts leaves unexplained gaps and invites a negative inference about what was withheld.92
The practical result is that a proponent's choice of proof generally survives a Rule 403 objection when a defendant tries to swap an admission for evidence that tells a coherent account of what happened.93
Old Chief itself shows where that general rule gives way. The defendant was charged with possessing a firearm as a convicted felon, the pending charges included a related assault, and the prior conviction the government wanted to prove was for assault.94 He offered to admit his status as a felon. Because the statute barred any felon from possessing a firearm, the admission was just as probative as the judgment on that element, and the name of the prior offense added no detail that the admission left uncovered.95 The name did carry a risk. Where a prior conviction was for a gun crime or one similar to other pending charges, the risk of unfair prejudice is especially obvious, and Old Chief sensibly worried that his prior assault conviction would take on added weight from the related assault charge.96 The storytelling grounds had no purchase, because a status that rests on a judgment rendered independently of the events now charged can be proved by admission without leaving a gap in the account of the later crime.97 With the admission available, the minimized probative value of the conviction was substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice, and the Court held that admitting the record was an abuse of discretion.98
The holding is narrow and tied to proof of a legal status. The Court said that even under the comparison approach, a defendant's Rule 403 objection offering to concede a point generally cannot prevail over the government's choice to offer evidence showing guilt and all the circumstances surrounding the offense.99 Outside the status setting, many trial judges refuse a stipulation, for example when other-crimes evidence is offered to prove intent and the defendant concedes that whoever committed the crime had the requisite intent, although judicial philosophy on that issue varies greatly.100
The difference between that trial and Old Chief is coverage. In Old Chief the judgment was offered for a single purpose, proof of status, and the admission matched it entirely. The teller's testimony serves a purpose the concession does not reach, so no discount applies to that purpose and the general right to choose proof controls. An offer to stipulate that does not cover all purposes for which the evidence is relevant will not support exclusion.101
Exhibits follow the same logic, because the alternatives to an exhibit are usually witnesses and stipulations, and the exhibit's added value depends on what they leave out. When a point is undisputed, the proponent's need to prove it with an inflammatory exhibit shrinks, and the exhibit's probative value shrinks with that need. That is the lesson of Chapple: a stipulation or an undisputed fact acts on the balance and does not act as an automatic bar, because both lessen the proponent's need for the exhibit and tip the weighing toward exclusion while leaving the exhibit relevant.102
The photographs in Chapple and the room photograph here may be equally disturbing, and what separates them is whether the stipulation covers what the exhibit proves. A substitute lowers an item's value only to the extent that it is equally probative of the same point, which the felon-status admission was and which a stipulation about wounds usually is not. Defendants charged with violent crimes routinely offer to stipulate to the nature of a victim's injuries, and prosecutors are usually allowed to show photographs of them anyway, because a stipulation cannot fully convey the harm inflicted and the photographs keep probative value beyond the concession.103 The prejudice analysis from the last section still applies to such photographs, but the stipulation alone does not end it.
Limiting Instructions
Much of the evidence at a trial is proper for one use and improper for another, and Rule 105 supplies the court's standard response. When evidence is admissible against one party or for one purpose but not against another party or for another purpose, the court, on timely request, must restrict the evidence to its proper scope and instruct the jury accordingly.106 That instruction is the usual alternative to the exclusion Rule 403 permits when probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger such as unfair prejudice or misleading the jury.107 The two tools work differently: Rule 403 removes the exhibit from the case, while Rule 105 admits it and fences off the forbidden inference. Courts prefer the fence in most cases for a practical reason. More often than not, evidence with unwanted spillover is admitted and the objector must content himself with a limiting instruction, because little proof would be admissible if its relevance or impact had to match its competency exactly.108
Exhibits generate spillover constantly, since a physical object carries every inference its existence supports. A pistol taken from a defendant at arrest and shown to resemble the robbery weapon implies that the defendant was the robber, and it may also imply that he is a dangerous person given to carrying guns. The first inference is the legitimate one; the second is a character inference the jury should not draw, and an instruction to use the pistol only on identity reduces the chance that it will. Civil cases follow the same pattern. When a manufacturer disputes that a safer design was feasible, evidence that it later changed the product may come in on feasibility, with an instruction to consider the change for that purpose only and not for the forbidden purposes.109 The balancing test applies to evidence admitted against fewer than all parties or for a limited purpose, such as its effect on a witness's credibility.110 The device has a boundary, however. An instruction can protect only a legitimate use, so the closet of unrelated rifles in the earlier robbery example, which proved nothing about the offense and only portrayed the defendant as dangerous, leaves no proper purpose for an instruction to preserve and is a candidate for exclusion instead.
Rule 105 leaves the decision to the party the evidence threatens, and that allocation shapes how the rule works. A judge must give the instruction only if the party to be protected requests one, because a party may fear that an instruction designed to protect it will focus the jury on the very misuse it hopes the jury never considered.111 The proponent carries a duty of its own: on objection, the offering party must tell the court the party or the limited purpose for which the evidence is admissible.112
The availability of an instruction also enters the Rule 403 balance, so a request is not the end of the analysis. Rule 403 weighs probative value against the danger that remains after the court's safeguards have done their work. The Advisory Committee's note says that before excluding evidence, the judge should consider whether a jury instruction might be effective in reducing unfair prejudice,113 and the potential harm from misuse must be weighed against the instruction's potential effectiveness. If, after that adjustment, probative value is still substantially outweighed, the evidence is not admitted.114 The Supreme Court has counted Rule 105 as one of several protections against unfair prejudice from similar-acts evidence, and a reviewing court found it significant that a trial judge gave extensive instructions confining other-offense evidence to the issue of unlawful intent.115
Whether jurors actually follow such instructions is open to doubt, and judges have said so in strong terms. Justice Jackson called the assumption that instructions can overcome prejudicial effects “unmitigated fiction,” and the Fifth Circuit said that one cannot unring a bell and that if you throw a skunk into the jury box, you cannot instruct the jury not to smell it. The Supreme Court, by contrast, has expressed faith in the ability of juries to sort out discrete issues under proper instructions.116 The system cannot work unless jurors are presumed to honor the limit, and in the ordinary case that presumption carries the day. The inquiry into probable effectiveness keeps the presumption honest by asking the judge to notice the cases in which it is too strained to rely on.
Where misuse would be both devastating and hard to resist, the instruction fails as a cure. In Bruton v. United States the Supreme Court held that a nontestifying codefendant's out-of-court statement implicating the accused could not go to the jury with an instruction to use it only against the codefendant, because the risk that jurors would use it against the accused despite the instruction was too great.117 Departures of that kind are rare, and when the risk of prejudice is less severe, the common practice is to admit evidence for a limited purpose or against fewer than all parties and to instruct the jury accordingly.118 Abel is the usual run of case. The gang evidence was highly probative of the witness's bias, and the leftover risk, that jurors would convict for the company the defendant kept, was one that the narrowed testimony and a measured instruction could hold within tolerable limits.119 Bruton presented the opposite situation: the codefendant's statement named the accused directly, so the harmful use and the permitted use could not be separated, and the instruction asked jurors to forget what they had just heard.
Illustrative aids carry their own version of the instruction. A conclusion-laden summary can blur the line between an illustrative aid and a summary admitted as evidence, and courts resolve the tension by giving explicit limiting instructions that such summaries are not themselves evidence and may not be relied on by the jury as substantive proof.120 The same line shows up in the jury room. Substantive exhibits usually go with the jury to deliberate, while an illustrative aid, under Rule 107, is not evidence and goes there only with the parties' consent or on a court order for good cause.121