Concept
The Marriage Requirement
Spousal immunity
The Marriage Requirement
The privilege against adverse spousal testimony protects a marriage, so a court asked to honor it must first find one. The premise is old. Lord Coke wrote in 1628 that a wife could not be produced for or against her husband, a disqualification that sprang from two medieval canons: an accused could not testify in his own behalf, and husband and wife were one, with the husband that one.1 Both canons are long abandoned. The rule survives as a privilege rather than an absolute disqualification,2 and in federal court the testifying spouse alone may exercise it.3
Three questions about the marriage follow. When must it exist? On the day the testimony is demanded, whenever the events occurred.4 Does it matter that the events the witness describes predate the wedding? Under the majority view, it does not.5 And what if the accused married the witness to keep the witness off the stand? A court convinced that the marriage is a sham may declare the privilege inapplicable.6
Marriage at Time of Testimony
The privilege lasts only as long as the marriage does. In United States v. Porter, the witness, Jones, was divorced from the defendant, Porter, by the time of trial. Defense counsel’s objection was somewhat amorphous, but the court read it as invoking both the adverse spousal testimony privilege and the confidential marital communications privilege, and it analyzed the two separately.7
The first claim failed. The court held that the adverse spousal testimony privilege may not be asserted after the marriage has terminated and that only the testifying spouse may exercise it. Jones and Porter were divorced, and Jones had not elected to exercise the privilege, so her testimony was properly admitted.8
Two separate rules produced that result. The timing rule left Jones with nothing to assert once the marriage ended. The allocation rule from Trammel would have defeated Porter’s objection even if the marriage had survived, because the privilege belongs to the testifying spouse and not to the defendant.9 The timing rule matters most when the former spouse is reluctant, since a divorced witness who would rather stay silent has no privilege to claim.
The clock runs to the day of testimony because of what the privilege protects. The Porter court described the testimonial privilege as forward-looking: it concerns the particular marriage at hand and protects against the impact of the testimony on that marriage.10 Testimony cannot strain a marriage that ended before trial, so compelling a former spouse harms nothing the privilege exists to preserve. For the same reason, the date of the events adds nothing. The spouses must be married when the testimony is sought, whether or not they were married when the events occurred.11 Most courts therefore treat the privilege as beginning when the marriage is created and ending when the marriage terminates, as by divorce.12
The confidential communications privilege runs on a different clock. Its purpose is broader and more abstract: to ensure that spouses generally, before any involvement in crime or trial, feel free to share their deepest feelings without fear of exposure in court.13 It therefore asks whether the spouses were married when they communicated, and it survives divorce and, in some jurisdictions, death.14 On this point the testimonial privilege is the narrower of the two. It applies only if the spouses are married when the testimony is sought, while the confidences privilege is usually said to protect the interval of the marriage forever, blocking post-dissolution testimony about private communications made during the marriage.15
A marriage must also be valid when the privilege is invoked. In People v. Catlin, the court denied the privilege because the murder defendant’s second marriage was bigamous.16 A ceremony and a shared household do not suffice when the marriage is bigamous.
A harder question arises from Trammel’s comments about a relationship “in disrepair.” Should a court inquire broadly into the health of the marriage and deny protection when the marriage seems “on the rocks”? The Eighth Circuit’s decisions point in different directions. In United States v. Brown, the court overruled a privilege claim where the wife had been with the defendant for only two weeks and had not seen him for eight months, reasoning that it was difficult to see how the privilege’s values could be served. In United States v. Lilley, the court declined an invitation to condition the testimonial privilege on a “judicial determination that the marriage is a happy or successful one.”17
The safer statement of the rule is that the law requires a valid marriage, not a healthy one. That fits Trammel’s allocation: a witness-spouse who invokes the privilege has declared the marriage worth protecting, and a judge who pronounced it dead would override the one person whose judgment the rule trusts.
Premarital Events
Suppose the witness-spouse’s knowledge dates from before the wedding: a confession the defendant made while the couple lived together, or an act the witness saw before they married. Under the majority view the privilege still applies. It protects against disclosure of all adverse information, and the only timing question is whether the couple is married when the testimony is demanded.19
The reason lies in where the harm falls. The privilege spares a marriage the strain of one spouse taking the stand against the other, and that strain falls on the marriage that exists when the testimony is demanded.20 A witness who saw the defendant commit an offense a week before the wedding stands at trial exactly where a witness who saw it a week after stands, since either would accuse a present spouse.
The two marital privileges come apart most clearly on premarital facts. The communications privilege protects only communications made during the marriage, while the testimonial privilege protects against disclosure of all adverse information if the parties are married when the testimony is demanded.21 An illustration shows both at work. Two weeks before his arrest, Henry confided in Anne the details of how he and a friend were making and selling “meth.” After the arrest he pleaded with her to marry him, and they wed in a civil ceremony held near the cell where he awaited trial. Two months later, on the eve of trial, Anne told the prosecutor she would testify against Henry. When she was called, Henry’s lawyer objected under both privileges.22
The communications objection fails, because that privilege covers only communications made during the marriage and Henry’s confession preceded the wedding.23 The testimonial privilege is the one that matters. The couple was married when Anne was called, so the privilege exists, and Anne is its holder. If she refused to testify, she could properly invoke it, and the joint participant exception that some courts recognize would not apply, because she took no part in Henry’s illegal activity.24 If she chose to testify, Henry could not stop her. His jailhouse wedding gave him no control, because the choice belonged to Anne.
A scattering of federal decisions takes the opposite position and refuses to recognize the adverse-testimony privilege when the acts or conduct under interrogation predated the marriage.25 The leading minority case is United States v. Clark, a Seventh Circuit decision from 1983. A later Seventh Circuit decision, United States v. Lofton, adopted the majority view.26 Clark came after Trammel and followed the circuit’s earlier decision in Van Drunen, and like Van Drunen it also rested on the point that the facts about which the spouse’s testimony was sought predated the marriage.27 Clark thus rests on more than one ground.
The minority rule answers a real worry. An accused who knows that a witness holds damaging knowledge might marry that witness shortly before trial, hoping to turn a compellable witness into one who cannot be forced to speak. A rule keyed to the date of the conduct removes the temptation, since a wedding that follows the conduct can never shield testimony about it.28 The cost is that the rule defeats the privilege’s own purpose, because it pits against each other spouses who are lawfully married, perhaps for many years, at the time of trial.29
The majority has a second answer, and it comes from Trammel itself. By placing the privilege in the hands of the witness-spouse, Trammel dampened the incentive for a sham marriage, because a prospective criminal defendant has no guarantee that a sham spouse can be kept off the stand.30 The wedding helps only if the new spouse chooses to claim the privilege, and the defendant cannot compel that choice.
Sham Marriages
The privilege protects a marriage, so a court asked to honor it may ask whether the marriage is real. The Supreme Court did so in Lutwak v. United States, a war-brides case in which the defendants and aliens married abroad without intending to live together as spouses; the “sham, phony, empty ceremony” rendered the testimonial privilege unavailable.32 The Ninth Circuit reached the same result in United States v. Saniti, holding that where the marriage was a sham, the defendant’s wife could testify against him.33
The problem arises when the accused marries the potential witness just before trial or just before the expected testimony, and the holder then claims the privilege. A trial judge who is convinced that the marriage is a ruse or sham can declare the privilege inapplicable.34
A ruse defeats the privilege because of what the privilege protects. The rule spares an existing marriage the strain of one spouse accusing the other in open court, so its force depends on there being a marriage to strain. Parties who went through a ceremony with no plan to build a shared life have no marital harmony that testimony could damage, and the privilege would serve only to remove a witness the factfinder would otherwise hear.
But timing alone does not make a marriage a sham. In San Fratello v. United States, the Fifth Circuit held that a defendant’s marrying the witness after the crime and shortly before trial did not entitle the prosecutor to call the spouse. In United States v. Davis, a federal district court refused to find a sham where the defendant married the witness shortly after her statement to the FBI and his indictment, because the evidence showed a committed long-term relationship.35 The artificial nature of a marriage is often hard to discern, as in a reported case where the newlyweds had lived together for two years before judicial proceedings began and then married.36
Lutwak and Davis involve weddings that invited suspicion, and they come out in opposite directions. What separates them is the substance behind the ceremony. The Lutwak parties never meant to live as spouses, while the Davis couple had a committed relationship, and a wedding that formalizes such a relationship does not become a ruse because an indictment or a trial date happens to be near. The genuine-marriage inquiry also answers the sham worry without the cost the minority rule on premarital events imposes: it leaves the privilege in place for couples who are really married and removes it only where no marriage exists in substance.
A hurried wedding raises a second question, separate from whether the privilege applies. An exam problem set in the fictional State of Franklin, State of Franklin v. Hale, shows how the two come apart. It teaches by analysis and carries no weight as precedent. On June 20, 2017, Bobby Trumbull was shot at the Starwood Apartments. That day Detective Denise Lee interviewed Sarah Reed, a resident of the complex, who said she had looked up from her balcony and seen Hale arguing with another man in the courtyard, heard a gunshot, and watched Hale run away.37 Reed and Hale had dated for about seven months years earlier, split, and gotten back together in March 2017. Hale proposed on July 25, 2017, and the two married a month later, on August 25.38
When the prosecution called Reed, Hale’s lawyer asked the court to excuse the jury and asserted the spousal privilege under § 9-707 of the Franklin Statutes. Franklin law let Hale himself assert it, a point that contrasts with the federal allocation to the witness-spouse. The court respected the marriage as valid under Franklin law, allowed Hale to assert the spousal testimonial privilege, and ruled that Reed could not be compelled to testify. It then asked whether Hale intended to wrongfully cause, and in fact did wrongfully cause, Reed’s unavailability as a witness. It overruled the defense’s objection and admitted her statement.39
The ruling looks inconsistent only if two questions are run together. Whether the privilege applies asks whether a valid marriage exists, and the court found one. Whether the earlier statement comes in asks why the defendant married. Under Rule 804(a)(1), a witness is unavailable if the court rules that a privilege exempts the witness from testifying about the subject matter of the statement, so Hale’s successful assertion made Reed unavailable. Rule 804(b)(6) then admits the out-of-court statement of an unavailable witness whose unavailability was caused by the wrongdoing of the party opposing the statement. The party must have acted with the intent of causing the unavailability, though that need not be the only purpose for the party’s actions.40 Because the rule operates on the defendant’s purpose, it works even when the marriage is valid and the privilege was properly honored.
The standard for the wrongdoing element comes from State v. Preston: “A court’s finding of wrongful causation must be rooted in facts establishing that a significant motivation for the defendant’s entering into the marriage was to prevent [the] spouse from testifying.”41 A wedding between offense and trial proves nothing by itself, and the court in Hale looked to three facts. Hale and Reed were dating but not engaged at the time of the shooting, so, unlike in Preston, there was no pre-existing intent to marry at the time of the offense, and the timing suggested that a significant motivation for the marriage was to prevent Reed from testifying. Hale had also told Reed he wanted to marry her quickly, before the trial started, and that it would be hard for them to stay together if she testified against him. Reed was not sure he would leave her, but she hoped she would not have to find out.42
Two errors recur on this material. One is declaring a marriage a sham because it followed the crime, which ignores the weight courts give to a genuine relationship. The other is assuming that honoring the privilege leaves the prosecution no way to use what the witness said, which overlooks that wrongful procurement reaches the earlier statement even when the privilege itself is respected. Where the couple already meant to marry before the offense, as the Hale court said of Preston, timing gives less support to an inference that the wedding was meant to silence the spouse. Where the wedding was hurried and the defendant tied the couple’s future to the witness’s silence, as in Hale, the privilege may stand while the earlier statement comes in.