Concept
Privilege Versus Confidentiality
Physician/psychotherapist-patient
Privilege Versus Confidentiality
A privilege answers one narrow question: what can a court compel a witness to say? Jaffee recognized that a patient’s confidential communications with a psychotherapist or licensed social worker, made in the course of diagnosis or treatment, are protected from compelled disclosure. A patient’s secrets can also leak where no court is listening, and a separate body of ethical, tort, and regulatory rules governs those leaks. This section separates the privilege from the ethical duty of confidentiality, shows how an out-of-court disclosure can create civil liability even without a privilege, and ends by asking whom the therapist’s duties protect.
Privilege and Ethical Duty
Privilege and ethical duty both protect what clients and patients tell professionals, but they differ in scope and in strength. The ethical duty covers all information about a client, including administrative information as well as communications during therapy. A privilege covers only confidential communications made in the course of the professional relationship.1 The boundary is not perfectly fixed, because a number of courts hold that the patient’s name is privileged.2
In court, the two protections part ways. In a legal proceeding, privileged communications receive greater protection from disclosure than information covered only by the ethical duty. A subpoena overrides the ethical duty but not a privilege. When a professional testifies, a question that requires disclosure of ethically protected information must therefore be answered, while a question that would reveal privileged information need not be.3
The distinction is old. The common law knew no privilege for confidences imparted to a physician, and when a physician asked Lord Mansfield whether he had to disclose professional confidences, the Chief Justice drew the line clearly. A surgeon who voluntarily revealed those secrets would be guilty of a breach of honor and of great indiscretion, but giving the same information in a court of justice, as the law of the land required, would never be imputed to him as any indiscretion.4 The ethical wrong lies in volunteering the secret, and a court’s command excuses it. A privilege supplies what Mansfield’s common law lacked, which is a way for the witness to decline to answer.
Because a privilege withholds information from the court, its justification matters. The utilitarian justification assumes that the prospect of disclosure in court shapes what patients tell their physicians, and many have questioned it: a patient consulting a physician is thinking about the illness or injury and the prospects for cure, with little thought for the remote chance that the condition will someday be disclosed in court.5 More recent analyses accept that weakness but defend the privilege on humanitarian grounds, as a private enclave in which the patient can make informed, independent choices among medical options.6
Classify each disclosure by who demands it and where. A friend’s curiosity at dinner engages only the ethical duty. A deposition question about therapy communications engages the privilege. A deposition question about information outside the privilege, such as unprivileged administrative details, meets only the ethical duty, and a subpoena overrides that duty.
Liability for Out-of-Court Disclosure
A physician who discloses a patient’s confidences outside court can be sued for it. In Alberts v. Devine, the Massachusetts high court held that a duty of confidentiality arises from the physician-patient relationship and that a violation of that duty, resulting in damages, gives rise to a cause of action sounding in tort against the physician.8 The court drew on authority that the relationship “contemplates an additional duty springing from but extraneous to the contract,” breach of which is actionable as a tort, and it noted that the relationship has both fiduciary and contractual aspects.9 The duty’s source is the relationship itself, which is why a patient’s claim does not turn on whether the jurisdiction has a physician-patient privilege.
The policy behind the duty is stated bluntly in a passage quoted in this line of cases. The benefits to the physician-patient relationship from denying the physician any right to “promiscuously disclose such information are self-evident,” while “it is impossible to conceive of any countervailing benefits which would arise by according a physician the right to gossip about a patient’s health.”10
Courts reach liability by different routes. Jurisdictions that recognize the duty have relied on invasion of privacy, breach of implied contract, medical malpractice, and breach of a fiduciary duty or a duty of confidentiality.11 The most common basis is the special fiduciary relationship between health care providers and their patients.12 In Byrne v. Avery Center for Obstetrics and Gynecology, P.C., the court concluded that recognizing a cause of action for breach of the duty of confidentiality by disclosure of medical information is not barred by § 52-146o or by HIPAA, and that public policy, as viewed in a majority of other jurisdictions that have addressed the issue, supports recognizing it.13 Because the theories vary, the law of the forum decides whether a claim exists and on what basis.
Licensing law adds a regulatory sanction. Many state licensure laws treat a breach of patient confidence as unprofessional conduct that can lead to discipline or license revocation. They vary on whether the violation must be intentional or a merely negligent disclosure will suffice, and they generally acknowledge that other provisions of law may create exceptions.14
Federal privacy regulation sits on top of these state rules without replacing them. The HIPAA privacy rule governs individually identifiable personal health information maintained by “covered entities,” a group that includes insurers and institutional providers, not just physicians. Those entities must adopt internal procedures to protect the information, keep records showing they have notified patients of their privacy policies, and train employees in privacy procedures.15 These are institutional compliance duties, not an evidentiary privilege, and they do not displace state claims. Byrne held that HIPAA does not bar a state-law cause of action.16 Other courts have continued to allow such claims after HIPAA’s enactment, on the premise that they complement HIPAA by enhancing the penalties for its violation and thereby encouraging compliance.17
The duty is not absolute. One court noted both a “public interest” and a “private interest of the patient” exception to the privilege. In McIntosh v. Milano, the court discussed a “duty to warn” third parties as an exception to the general rule of confidentiality, and it observed that the Principles of Medical Ethics recognize that the obligation of confidentiality is not absolute.18
The word “disclosure” also names a duty that runs the other way. In informed-consent law, about half of the states apply a “professional” standard, under which the physician must disclose what a reasonably competent physician would share in comparable circumstances; as in malpractice cases, the law defers to medical practice.19 That duty governs what the physician tells the patient, while the duty of confidentiality governs what the physician tells everyone else.
Duty Runs to the Patient
A therapist’s duty of care runs to the patient, and Doe v. McKay shows what happens when a nonpatient tries to turn treatment of someone else into a claim. Applying the rule of Kirk, the Illinois Supreme Court held that the therapist owed a duty of care to her patient only, not to nonpatient third parties.21 Approving the claim would have exposed therapists and other counselors to suit by any nonpatient adversely affected by personal decisions a patient was perceived to have made in response to counseling.22
The court gave two reasons. The first is divided loyalty. A duty to third parties would force therapists to answer competing demands and to weigh the effects of treatment choices on nonpatients, giving them an incentive to compromise treatment because of threatened liability, which is fundamentally inconsistent with their obligation to the patient. As one court has noted, “doctors should be free to recommend a course of treatment and act on the patient’s response to the recommendation free from the possibility that someone other than the patient might complain in the future.”23 The second reason is the strong public interest in maintaining the confidentiality of therapist-patient communications. The court said that this interest and the problem of divided loyalties together argue strongly against imposing on therapists a duty of care toward nonpatients.24
The holding reaches only the nonpatient. The plaintiff in McKay had also alleged that he was himself a patient of the defendant, and those counts remained pending in the circuit court and were not at issue on appeal.25 The line therefore falls between a person owed a duty because he is the patient and a person who is merely affected by someone else’s treatment. McKay also leaves a neighboring problem untouched. Harm said to flow from a patient’s decisions in response to counseling differs from a patient’s threat of violence against an identified victim, which the dangerous-patient discussion above treats as its own exception.