Concept
The Self-Incrimination Privilege
Other privileges
The Self-Incrimination Privilege
Rule 501 makes the common law, as interpreted by United States courts in the light of reason and experience, the default source of privilege in federal court. That default yields when the United States Constitution, a federal statute, or a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court provides otherwise.1 The Constitution heads that list, and the privilege against self-incrimination comes from it. Its source is the Fifth Amendment, not a judge's weighing of reason and experience.
Hoffman v. United States anchors most of the doctrine that follows. There the Court defined incriminating testimony as testimony that would tie the witness to the commission of a crime or furnish a lead to evidence that could do so, and it added that the testimony need not itself establish guilt. The same decision confines the privilege to the risk of criminal liability, so a witness cannot invoke it merely to avoid civil liability.
The constitutional source changes the question a court asks. A court asked to recognize a common-law privilege must be persuaded that reason and experience justify it. A court asked to honor the Fifth Amendment privilege has no such choice to make, because the Constitution has already made it. The inquiry turns instead to the guarantee's reach: who may claim it, what evidence it covers, what compulsion triggers it, and what danger the claimant must face.
The privilege also runs along two branches, and every problem must be placed on one of them. Picture a defendant who declines to take the stand at his own criminal trial, and a bystander subpoenaed to testify about the crime with which he is charged. The first claims the accused's branch; the second claims the witness's branch, which protects a person called to testify who fears that an answer will expose him to prosecution. The two differ in what the claimant may refuse to do and in how the claim must be made, so an analysis that has not identified the branch is not yet complete.
The first subsection below takes up the Fifth Amendment's text and the reach the Supreme Court has given it. The later subsections then cover the holder of the privilege, the evidence it protects, the definition of incrimination taken from Hoffman, and the limits on the privilege. They go on to show how the privilege is claimed and lost, then turn to immunity, comment on its exercise, and documents.
Constitutional Source and Reach
The Fifth Amendment provides that no person “shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.”2 That clause is the source of the privilege, and its constitutional status changes how a court treats a claim of it. Rule 501 sends a privilege claim to the common law, applied in light of reason and experience, unless the United States Constitution, a federal statute, or rules prescribed by the Supreme Court provide otherwise.3 The Fifth Amendment is the Constitution providing otherwise. A court that honors a self-incrimination claim therefore applies the constitutional guarantee itself, and it does not ask whether reason and experience justify recognizing a new privilege.
The guarantee has a long history. After 1641, the common law courts began to apply to their own procedure some of the restrictions on the oath that had been urged for the ecclesiastical courts, and by 1700 extracting an answer in any procedure in matters of criminality or forfeiture was improper.4 Miranda v. Arizona observed how long it took to establish the privilege and how fervently it was defended. The Court identified perhaps the critical event as the 1637 trial of John Lilburn, a vocal anti-Stuart Leveller who was made to take the Star Chamber Oath, which would have bound him to answer every question put to him on any subject.5
That history left behind a privilege founded, in the Court’s words, on a complex of values, and three of them recur in the rules that follow.6
- The accusatorial principle holds that a government seeking to punish an individual must produce the evidence against him by its own independent labors, not by “the cruel, simple expedient of compelling it from his own mouth.”7 Our system of government rests on an accusatorial foundation, not an inquisitorial one.8
- The cruel trilemma is the choice among incriminating oneself, lying, and remaining silent and facing contempt, and each path ends in jail. A fingerprint presents no such choice because it cannot be true or false, which is why the privilege protects testimonial conduct.9
- Dignity and privacy rest on the respect a government, state or federal, owes the dignity and integrity of its citizens, including a “right to a private enclave where he may lead a private life.”10 The text protects a “person,” which here means an individual and not a corporation or partnership.11
Read for its words alone, the clause reaches a defendant forced to testify at his own criminal trial, and it was originally intended only to prevent a return to the hated practice of compelling a person, in a criminal proceeding directed at him, to swear against himself.12 Interpretation has extended it to protect a witness as well as the defendant, in all methods of interrogation before a court, grand jury, or coroner’s inquest and in investigations by a legislative body or administrative official.13 The Supreme Court has stated that the privilege “is not ordinarily dependent upon the nature of the proceeding in which the testimony is sought or is to be used.” It “applies alike to civil and criminal proceedings, wherever the answer might tend to subject to criminal responsibility him who gives it,” and it “protects a mere witness as fully as it does one who is also a party defendant.”14 Any proceeding or inquiry, civil or criminal, falls within the privilege when official compulsion is used to coerce an individual to answer questions that could be a link in a chain of evidence leading to criminal prosecution or criminal liability.15
The privilege follows the danger, not the forum. The Self-Incrimination Clause, on one reading, “is a substantive constraint on the conduct of the government, not merely an evidentiary rule governing the work of the courts,” and it protects an individual from being forced to give answers demanded by an official “in any context where the answers might give rise to criminal liability in the future.”16 The Supreme Court as a whole has not accepted Justice Thomas’s narrower view in Chavez v. Martinez, which treats the protection of anyone other than the accused in an actual criminal case as only “prophylactic.” The dispute may have little practical significance, but a court that sees only a prophylactic privilege may develop and apply it less rigorously.17 For organizing a problem, one line is useful: the accused is the person whose compelled testimonial conduct may immediately contribute to a judicial finding of guilt. Every other claimant invokes the privilege of a witness, not the status of an accused.18
The privilege also reaches beyond formal proceedings. Miranda saw an intimate connection between the privilege and police custodial questioning.19 The Fifth Amendment privilege probably applies to any situation in which a person might engage in testimonial self-incriminating conduct, although the protection it gives someone dealing with a law enforcement officer out of court may differ from the protection it gives a witness before a legislative committee.20
The privilege has a limit, and the Court has stated it. The privilege is fulfilled only when a person is guaranteed the right “to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will.”21 It protects a free choice and does not forbid choosing to speak.
The two scenes share a risk of criminal exposure and differ in one fact: an official proceeding presses the civil witness to answer, and nothing presses the man at the station. Compulsion triggers the privilege, and the setting only determines how compulsion is likely to arise. A later subsection develops the compulsion requirement.
The privilege binds the states as well as the federal government.22 In Malloy v. Hogan, decided in 1964, the Supreme Court applied it to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court relied on the proposition that the American system of criminal prosecution is accusatorial and that governments, state and federal, are “constitutionally compelled to establish guilt by evidence independently and freely secured, and may not by coercion prove a charge against an accused out of his own mouth.”23 The Court also rejected as “incongruous” the argument that a witness in a state proceeding should meet a less stringent standard than a witness in a federal one: “the same standards … must determine whether an accused’s silence in either a federal or state proceeding is justified.”24 Because the privilege is constitutional, a witness who invokes it in a federal civil case does not depend on federal common law or on state privilege law to supply it. The Constitution supplies it.25
State constitutions sometimes use different words. The Fifth Amendment protects against being “compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself,” while some state provisions say that no person may be “compelled to give evidence against himself.” That wording suggests state protection might be broader, but it is difficult to regard the difference in language as necessarily controlling.26
A Personal Privilege
The Fifth Amendment provides that no person “shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.”28 The clause is called the privilege against self-incrimination because it constitutionalized the English common law’s evidentiary privilege against compelled self-incrimination, and the Court has read it in light of that history.29 Rule 501 makes the common-law default give way to the Constitution, a federal statute, or a Supreme Court rule.30 The self-incrimination privilege rests on the first of those, so a court asks what the constitutional text and its history require and does not ask whether reason and experience would support the claim. Two words in the clause, person and himself, decide who may invoke it.
The word himself makes the privilege personal: only the person at risk of incrimination can rely on it.31 A witness cannot refuse to answer because the answer would incriminate someone else. A lawyer called before a grand jury cannot withhold answers on the ground that they would incriminate a client, and a criminal defendant cannot invoke the privilege of witnesses, codefendants, accomplices, or co-conspirators.32 Nor, generally, can the defendant complain that the self-incrimination rights of such persons were violated in the litigation process. The grand jury setting makes the point concrete, because the privilege may be invoked outside a criminal trial, but only by the witness whose own answers create the risk.33
The limit tracks the harm the clause targets. The privilege rests on the premise that our system of government is accusatorial, not inquisitorial, and it spares a person the “cruel trilemma” of incriminating himself, lying, or staying silent and facing contempt.34 Only a witness whose own truthful answer would expose him to prosecution faces that choice. A witness questioned about another person’s crime may dislike answering, but the truthful answer does not make the witness the source of the witness’s own conviction.
In United States v. Nobles, the Court applied the same principle to a defendant who tried to keep the prosecution from obtaining a report prepared by the defense investigator. The privilege belongs to the person being compelled, and neither the defendant nor the investigator, who faced no incrimination of his own, had one to assert.35
A lawyer may still invoke a client’s privilege, but only as the client’s voice. The decision whether to invoke belongs to the client and not the lawyer, so a trial judge who has reasonable doubt about the lawyer’s authority may require proof of the client’s authorization.36 A lawyer who is called as a witness about the client’s affairs speaks in the lawyer’s own right and has nothing to assert about the client’s exposure.
The word person sets a second limit, this one on the kinds of parties who can hold the privilege at all. Other constitutional provisions use person to cover business entities as well as individuals, but the self-incrimination clause means individuals, so corporations and partnerships have no privilege.37 It has long been established that corporations and unions cannot invoke it either, as in Hale v. Henkel.38 In Bellis v. United States, the Court applied the rule to a partnership. Two reasons support drawing the line there. The trilemma confronts a human being who must accuse himself, and an organization is not in that position. The practical reason is that evidence of an organization’s wrongdoing is usually found in its official records, and the Court has reasoned that “[w]ere the cloak of the privilege to be thrown around these impersonal records and documents, effective enforcement of many federal and state laws would be impossible.”39
The line follows the party’s form. An individual who does business in his own name is still an individual, and the entity limit reaches corporations and partnerships, not him.40 Consider a convenience-store owner who is suspected of running a bookmaking operation on the side and is served with a subpoena for the betting records. The owner is a person under the clause, but qualifying does not win the claim. The records were created without government compulsion, and the contents of preexisting records are generally unprotected.41 The owner can resist only the act of production, and only if producing the records would itself communicate incriminating facts, such as that the records exist, that the owner possesses them, and that they are genuine. If the government instead found the records in a lawful search, it could use their contents.42 The later section on documents develops that analysis. What matters here is the threshold: the owner can raise the claim at all because the owner is an individual.
The person who holds an entity’s records stands in a different position. A corporate officer or employee who is subpoenaed for corporate records cannot refuse on the ground that they would incriminate him. The subpoena runs to the corporation, the individual who produces the records acts as the corporation’s agent, and because the corporation has no privilege, its records must be turned over.43 Braswell v. United States follows this reasoning in holding that a custodian cannot resist producing corporate records on the ground that producing them would incriminate the custodian personally.
The store owner and the controller both hold records that could lead to their own prosecution, and the outcomes differ because the owner holds the records as an individual while the controller holds them for an entity. The privilege stays with the individual witnesses even when the entity pays for their silence. If every knowledgeable witness invokes the privilege and the entity cannot establish its claim as a plaintiff or present its defense as a defendant, the entity may seek a stay or a protective order that persuades the witnesses to testify. If that relief is unavailable, the entity simply bears the consequences.44
Because the holder decides whether to claim a privilege, the holder’s own timely claim matters. The spousal privilege shows this: a witness-spouse should claim it before being sworn, the court may treat it as waived if she does not, and it is clearly waived once she begins to testify.45
Testimonial Evidence Only
The Fifth Amendment provides that no person “shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself,” and the limit on the privilege lies in the word witness.47 A witness communicates. The privilege therefore protects a person from being forced to make compelled communicative, testimonial statements; it does not keep the person's body from being used as evidence.48
A claim of privilege must satisfy three requirements: the communication must be testimonial, incriminating, and compelled, and an individual, not an entity, must assert it.49 This unit takes up the testimonial requirement, and the next subsections take up compulsion and incrimination. The paradigm of compulsion is the subpoena ad testificandum, an order to appear and testify under oath, with an unjustified refusal punishable as contempt.50 The plain case of the privilege is therefore an order to speak.
The reason for the testimonial limit lies in what the privilege guards against. Our system of government rests on an accusatorial and not an inquisitorial foundation, and it is thought unseemly to place a person in the “cruel trilemma” of incriminating himself, lying, or staying silent and facing contempt.51 Every branch of that trilemma assumes the person is being asked to assert something that could be true or false. A fingerprint cannot be true or false, so compelling one raises no trilemma.52 A question such as “Were you at the bank?” restores the trilemma at once. A truthful answer incriminates, a false answer is perjury, and silence invites contempt.
United States v. Wade applied this reasoning to a pretrial identification. The Court had no doubt that compelling an accused merely to exhibit his person to a prosecution witness before trial involves no compulsion to give evidence having testimonial significance. It is compulsion to exhibit physical characteristics, “not compulsion to disclose any knowledge he might have.”53 The Court put the exhibition in the same category as compelling Schmerber v. California's blood sample or compelling Holt to wear a blouse, and it treated compelling Wade to speak in the same way.54 Blood and other bodily fluids, fingerprints, lineup participation, and the wearing of particular clothing all fall outside the privilege.55
The working definition explains why these cases come out as they do. An act is testimonial if it explicitly or implicitly relates a factual assertion or discloses information. Compelled action is testimonial only if it is sought as an indication of the subject's intentional expression of his knowledge or belief about factual matters.56 The test therefore asks what an act communicates and does not ask which part of the body performs it. Physical activity can be testimonial, and the vast majority of verbal statements will be, because few statements, oral or written, fail to convey information or assert facts.57 The government may compel an act even when it hopes to learn the subject's thoughts from it. The privilege is implicated only when the compulsion causes the subject to act in a way the subject intends as a disclosure of his perception of, or belief about, factual matters.58
The natural question is whether the evidence will hurt the suspect, and that question misleads under this requirement. A suspect may be compelled to cooperate in the extraction of a blood sample even though the sample would suggest guilt, because the sample expresses no knowledge or belief of the suspect.59 How damaging the evidence is does not decide whether the privilege applies. What matters is what the compelled act communicates. Damage to the suspect belongs to the separate incrimination requirement.
The same distinction governs speech compelled for identification. A suspect may be made to speak so that witnesses can hear the voice, and may be made to provide a handwriting sample, so long as what is compelled is not a statement that is an incriminating assertion.60 The handwriting rule has a qualification. Some lower courts have reasoned that a sample taken by dictation can become testimonial, because the examiner can pose spelling questions that the exemplar answers and can gauge the writer's education and vocabulary.61
Documents show the line from another angle. The Fifth Amendment does not protect the contents of documents that were prepared without compulsion, so the remaining question is whether the act of producing them communicates something incriminating. Production does communicate something, but in most cases the communication is not incriminating and so is not protected.62 Whether compelled production of documents or other items involves compelled testimonial activity is a specialized problem, and the last subsection of this chapter takes it up.63
The Compulsion Requirement
The Fifth Amendment provides that no person "shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself," and the operative word is compelled.65 Miranda v. Arizona frames the same point as a matter of choice: the privilege is fulfilled only when a person is guaranteed the right "to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will."66 A claimant must therefore establish compulsion to provide testimonial evidence that tends to incriminate.67 Earlier subsections covered whose privilege it is and what counts as testimonial, and later ones take up incrimination. This one asks whether anyone pressed the speaker. Because Rule 501 gives way to the Constitution, that question is answered by constitutional law rather than by common-law reason and experience.68
The privilege reaches only compelled statements because of the kind of justice system it protects. An accusatory system demands that a government seeking to punish an individual produce the evidence against him by its own independent labors, rather than by the cruel, simple expedient of compelling it from his own mouth.69 A statement the speaker chose to make involves no such expedient. Miranda drew that conclusion directly. Volunteered statements of any kind are not barred by the Fifth Amendment, and police need not stop a person who walks into a station, or telephones the police, to offer a confession. Any statement given freely and voluntarily, without compelling influences, is admissible.70 The need for compulsion also explains the holdings that the privilege does not protect the contents of self-incriminatory documents from compelled production, a topic the later subsection on documents develops.71
A suspect held at a police station stands at the opposite pole. His words there may be no more incriminating than the boast on the recording, but the setting is different, and the setting is what Miranda addressed. The prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation unless it demonstrates procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege. Custodial interrogation means questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of freedom of action in any significant way.72
That holding required the Court to drop a requirement. Under the earlier approach the privilege demanded legal compulsion, and police questioning fell outside it because officers have no legal authority to force answers. Miranda rejected the requirement that the compulsion be legal and held the privilege implicated in out-of-court custodial interrogation, reasoning that coverage of such activity was necessary to avoid rendering the privilege at trial a mere empty formality.73 Without adequate warning and the right to counsel, all the careful safeguards around testimony would become empty formalities in a procedure where the most compelling possible evidence of guilt, a confession, had already been obtained at the unsupervised pleasure of the police.74 The Court treated the setting itself as compulsion. An individual swept from familiar surroundings into police custody, surrounded by antagonistic forces, cannot be otherwise than under compulsion to speak, and the pressure in an isolated police station may exceed that in courts or other official investigations, where impartial observers often guard against intimidation or trickery.75 In place of an assertion, the Court required warnings. Before any questioning the person must be told of the right to remain silent, that any statement may be used as evidence, and of the right to an attorney, retained or appointed. The person may waive those rights only voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently, and if the person indicates in any manner and at any stage that he wishes to consult an attorney before speaking, there can be no questioning.76
The Miranda presumption is the exception in Fifth Amendment law. Elsewhere the individual must show actual, rather than presumed, compulsion, and the government need take no proactive step, such as giving warnings, to make sure the individual knows of the right to refuse to answer.77 Custody triggers the presumption: when an individual is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of freedom in any significant way and is subjected to questioning, the privilege is jeopardized.78 General on-the-scene questioning about the facts surrounding a crime, and other general questioning of citizens in the fact-finding process, is unaffected, because the compelling atmosphere inherent in in-custody interrogation is not necessarily present.79 The same questions put to the same person can therefore be on-the-scene inquiry on the sidewalk and custodial interrogation after arrest and removal to the station, and only the second jeopardizes the privilege.
Protection for silence follows the same line. Exercise of the privilege may not be penalized, so the prosecution may not use at trial the fact that a defendant stood mute or claimed the privilege in the face of accusation. Salinas v. Texas marks the exception. A suspect who was not in custody and had received no Miranda warnings responded to police questioning by simply standing mute, and the silence could be admitted as evidence of guilt, because the general rule is that a person is required to assert the privilege in order to benefit from it.80
That general rule governs witnesses who are called by subpoena or a similar demand. Compulsion exists in that setting only if the witness asserted a right to refuse to disclose self-incriminating information and the refusal was overridden.81 The privilege is not self-executing and may not be relied upon unless it is invoked in a timely manner.82 In Garner v. United States a taxpayer put incriminating admissions on a return instead of refusing to provide the information on the basis of the privilege, and the admissions could not later be called compelled.83 Some descriptions call this a waiver, but it is better understood as a missing element, since the failure to assert is a substantive bar to the claim of compulsion.84 The same result followed in United States v. Wong. A grand jury witness gave false testimony and argued, when charged with perjury, that she had testified only because she misunderstood the warnings and believed the law required her to answer. The testimony could still support the charge because she had not asserted the privilege.85
The assertion requirement makes sense in the subpoena setting for two reasons. A subpoenaed witness holds only an option of refusal, because the privilege creates no prohibition against inquiry, and a grand jury, with legal authority to compel testimony and a duty to shield against arbitrary accusations, has a right to be certain that the target's own testimony might not explain away the evidence against him.86 An assertion also gives the judge something to act on. The test looks to substance, and it asks whether the witness made reliance on the privilege clear enough to alert the judge to the need for whatever inquiry is necessary to decide whether the reliance was appropriate.87
The assertion requirement gives way in two settings. A person undergoing custodial interrogation need not invoke anything, because the privilege is violated if officers fail to warn the person and obtain an effective waiver before questioning. The accused at a jury trial likewise need take no affirmative step, because the privilege is violated if the jury's attention is called to the failure to testify, even though the accused did nothing to invoke it. In both settings the privilege is truly a right to remain silent or completely passive.88 The later subsection on the accused develops the trial setting.
Step two usually decides the exam problem. The presumption attaches only when custody and interrogation are both present, and a fact pattern that supplies only one of them leaves the claimant to show actual compulsion.
The Link-in-the-Chain Standard
A privilege that covered only confessions would protect almost nothing, because prosecutors build cases from small facts that point toward larger ones. The Supreme Court recognized as much in Hoffman v. United States, a grand jury case: the privilege reaches answers that would in themselves support a conviction and also answers that would furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute the witness.90 A link is a fact that proves little alone but that an investigator can join to other facts, such as an admission that the witness knows a particular person or was at a particular place. The Court has put the same idea in terms of use: a disclosure is protected when it could be used in a criminal prosecution or could lead to other evidence that might be so used.91 A prosecutor can convict as surely from a lead as from a confession, so a privilege limited to direct admissions would let the questioner collect every stepping stone and leave the witness protected only at the last one. The Court accordingly reads the guarantee liberally, in favor of the right it secures.92
Hoffman makes two separate statements about how a court handles a claim of privilege, and each answers a different question. One says what the witness must show to have the claim sustained. The other says what the court must find before it may reject the claim. The first asks little of the witness; the second asks a great deal of the court.
The first statement sets the witness's burden, and the burden is light. To sustain the claim, it need only be evident from the implications of the question, in the setting in which it is asked, that a responsive answer, or an explanation of why the question cannot be answered, might be dangerous because injurious disclosure could result.93 Three features of that test matter. It looks to the setting, so the same words can be harmless in one proceeding and dangerous in another. It asks whether disclosure might be dangerous, so possibility suffices. And it covers an explanation of why the question cannot be answered, so the witness need not say why silence is needed when saying so would itself reveal something. The test is lenient by design. A witness required to prove the hazard as a claim is usually proved in court would have to surrender the very protection the privilege guarantees.94
The identical question asked in a routine deposition over a lease dispute would carry no such implication, and that difference is what the setting requirement means in practice.
A light burden does not make the witness the judge of the claim. The court itself must decide whether refusing to answer is justifiable under the privilege, because any other rule would subordinate the effective operation of the judicial system to the desires of witnesses.95 In making that decision, the trial judge is governed as much by a personal perception of the peculiarities of the case as by the facts actually in evidence, so the nature of the investigation and the witness's connection to it bear on the ruling.96
The second statement limits the court's power to reject a claim. A court may overrule the claim only if it is “perfectly clear, from a careful consideration of all the circumstances in the case, that the witness is mistaken and the answer cannot possibly have such tendency to incriminate.”97 The words cannot possibly set the bar. The burden therefore does not rest on the person asserting the privilege to establish that its requirements exist; it rests, and heavily, on the party who wants the court to deny the claim and force an answer.98 In the grand jury setting, a claim of the privilege will rarely be rejected.99
Some courts state the practical consequence directly. Whether a disclosure is incriminating turns on the possibility of its use to prosecute, not the likelihood; if the court finds a possibility of future prosecution to which the disclosure would contribute, the inquiry ends, and the court should not try to estimate how likely a prosecution is.100
The judge in that scene never found the witness probably endangered. She found only that she could not rule the danger out, and under the second statement that is enough.
The standard has a floor, and the clearest example is a question that carries almost no risk. In Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court, no witness was involved at all: police detained a man on reasonable suspicion, and he refused to identify himself as a stop-and-identify law required.101 The Court identified a person's name as one class of questions most unlikely to pose a “real and appreciable fear” of incrimination.102 The privilege applies only if the person reasonably believed the disclosure could be used in a criminal prosecution or could lead to other evidence that might be so used, and a reasonable person cannot have a reasonable apprehension that a name will be incriminating, at least without any support.103 The result applies a limit that Hoffman itself draws: protection is confined to instances where the witness has reasonable cause to apprehend danger from a direct answer.104
The questions that cause trouble are those that look innocent on their face, such as “Do you know John Bergoti?” Lower courts differ about who must say what when one of them meets a claim of privilege.105 One reading holds that the claim must be sustained unless it is perfectly clear that the answer cannot possibly incriminate, so the party seeking the testimony carries both the burden of producing information and the burden of persuading the judge that the risk is absent. Other courts read Hoffman as sometimes imposing on the witness some obligation to support the claim.106 One treatise takes the middle ground. The witness never has to persuade the judge that the answer would incriminate. But when the question, in light of the evidence and other proper information, is one the judge could reasonably regard as presenting no more than an imaginary and unsubstantial risk, the witness must put into the record a basis for doubting that conclusion, whether by evidence, logical argument, or persuasion. Idaho courts say such a witness “must sketch a plausible scenario” under which the answer would be incriminating.107 Even on this view, the witness supplies a plausible scenario and not the incriminating facts themselves, since demanding the facts would defeat the privilege.108
Claiming innocence forfeits nothing. In Ohio v. Reiner the Court wrote that it has never held the privilege unavailable to those who claim innocence, and that one of the Fifth Amendment's basic functions is to protect innocent men who might otherwise be ensnared by ambiguous circumstances.109 The link-in-the-chain logic explains why. A witness who denies guilt may still have to acknowledge facts, such as presence at the scene of the crime, that are themselves incriminating.110 The question is what a truthful answer could connect, and the witness's belief in his own innocence does not answer it. The facts of Hoffman itself show these ideas at work on a real record, and the next section takes them up.
Hoffman Applied
A question that looks harmless on a transcript can become dangerous once a court knows where it was asked. Hoffman v. United States shows how. The Court held that a grand jury witness's refusal to say what he did for a living, or when he last saw a man he had known for twenty years, had to be judged in the setting of the investigation.112 It held that a witness need not prove his danger the way a claim is ordinarily proved in court.113 And it held that facts showing the danger must be considered even when they reach the court only after a contempt order.114 The earlier subsections stated the link-in-the-chain standard in the abstract. This one retraces the case in the order it unfolded, because the grand jury room, the contempt order, and the supplemental record each teach a separate point about how a claim of privilege is judged.
A special federal grand jury convened in Philadelphia in September 1950 to investigate frauds on the federal government, including violations of the customs, narcotics, and internal revenue liquor laws, the White Slave Traffic Act, perjury, bribery, and conspiracy to commit those offenses.115 Hoffman, subpoenaed as a witness, was examined on October 3. Asked what he did now and whether he had done the same thing since the first of the year, he refused to answer. He conceded that he had known William Weisberg for about twenty years and had heard in court that a subpoena had issued for him, but he would not say when he had last seen Weisberg, whether he had seen or telephoned him that week, or where Weisberg was.116 It was stipulated that he declined on the ground that his answers might tend to incriminate him of a federal offense.117
The government challenged the claim in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The district court found no real and substantial danger of incrimination and ordered Hoffman back to the grand jury to answer. Hoffman announced in open court that he would not obey, and the court adjudged him in criminal contempt and sentenced him to five months in prison.118 On the record as the court of appeals later described it, Hoffman had simply refused to answer and had given the judge no facts explaining why.119
While his appeal was pending, Hoffman filed a petition for reconsideration of bail supported by an affidavit, and the petition went into the court of appeals as a supplemental record.120 The affidavit stated that the grand jury's charge covered the gamut of federal crimes. It said he had been publicly charged with being a known underworld character and a racketeer with a twenty-year police record that included a narcotics sentence. It said he had been photographed, while waiting to testify, with the head of the Philadelphia office of the Bureau of Narcotics, and that he had been questioned about the whereabouts of a witness for whom the prosecutor sought a bench warrant. Newspaper clippings reporting those facts were attached.121
The court of appeals refused to consider that material and upheld the contempt order. It conceded that the data “would rather clearly be adequate to establish circumstantially the likelihood that appellant’s assertion of fear of incrimination was not mere contumacy,” meaning stubborn defiance of the court. Yet it held that the information “was not before the court when it found appellant in contempt, and therefore cannot be considered now.”122 On the business questions the majority added that Hoffman had given the judge nothing that would allow an intelligent ruling, since he “simply refused to say anything and gave no facts to show why he refused to say anything.”123 That criticism asks the witness to do what the privilege excuses. A witness cannot be required to prove the hazard as a claim is usually established in court, because the proof would make him surrender the very protection the privilege exists to guarantee. It is enough that the danger be evident from the implications of the question in the setting in which it is asked.124 The setting stands in for the proof: the judge reads the danger from the question and its surroundings instead of waiting for the witness to explain it.
The Supreme Court began with what the district judge already knew. He had impaneled the grand jury himself and had told it that the inquiry would run through all crimes covered by federal statute.125 Subpoenas had issued for some twenty witnesses, but only eleven had been served, and the prosecutor said he was having trouble finding some big shots. Several witnesses called before Hoffman had refused to answer until the court ordered them to. The prosecutor had asked for bench warrants for eight of the nine who failed to appear on the first day, Weisberg among them. Hoffman had admitted knowing Weisberg for about twenty years, and his own counsel had told the court that it had been broadly published that he had a police record.126 All of it was already part of the proceedings before the district judge. It was the setting in which the questions were asked, and the Court held that the judge should have weighed it in deciding whether silence was justified.127
The business questions show the first way the setting did its work. Asked alone, “What do you do now?” invites an answer as ordinary as a job title. Asked of a man with a publicized police record, before a grand jury investigating rackets, the same question reaches into a field where, as the Court observed, the chief occupation of some people involves evasion of federal criminal laws. A truthful answer might have disclosed that Hoffman was engaged in proscribed activity.128 A court judging such a claim reads the circumstances and imagines the worst of the witness's possible answers, asking whether any of them carries a real and appreciable possibility of supplying a link in the chain of evidence.129 Hoffman could not be required to say which answer he feared, because saying so would have disclosed it.
The Weisberg questions show the second way. The government may ask grand jury witnesses where an unlocated witness can be found, and the Court acknowledged that the answers to such questions are ordinarily harmless if not fruitless.130 Here the questions went further. Of the seven questions about Weisberg, three were answered. Three of the rest were designed to draw out Hoffman's contacts and connection with the fugitive, and the last asked where Weisberg was at that moment. An affirmative answer to the contact questions would have established dealings between the two men during the crucial period when Weisberg was eluding the grand jury. The last question might well have called for disclosure that Weisberg was hiding on Hoffman's premises or with his assistance. Each answer could have forged a link in a chain of facts imperiling Hoffman with conviction of a federal crime.131
In that setting it was not “perfectly clear, from a careful consideration of all the circumstances in the case,” that Hoffman was mistaken and that the answers could not possibly tend to incriminate him, so the privilege was sustained.132 The test does not ask whether Hoffman was probably in danger. It asks whether the danger can be excluded, and on this record it could not.
The same opinion marks where the privilege would not reach. A routine question about where an unserved witness can be found draws no sustainable claim when nothing ties the person answering to the fugitive, because the answer is then the kind the Court called harmless if not fruitless.133
The custodian's question and Hoffman's last question are nearly the same, and the setting separates them. Hoffman's answers could have shown contact with a fugitive during the period the grand jury was hunting for him, and Hoffman already carried a publicized police record. The custodian's answer could show only an address.
The supplemental record buttressed the Court's conclusion. It showed a twenty-year police record and public labeling as an underworld character and racketeer. It showed that the Senate Crime Investigating Committee had placed Hoffman's name on a list of known gangsters from the Philadelphia area, and that Philadelphia police officials had called him “the king of the shore rackets who lives by the gun.” It showed a narcotics sentence and a newspaper photograph of him with the head of the local narcotics bureau, taken while he waited to testify.134 The record mattered for a procedural reason as well as an evidentiary one. The petition, though captioned as a request to reconsider bail, was in substance an application to vacate the contempt order on constitutional grounds, filed only two weeks after that order. It therefore called on the committing court's power to discharge a contemnor for good cause, a power courts should be ready to use when important constitutional objections are renewed.135 The ends of justice require discharge of a contemnor whenever facts appear sufficient to sustain the claim of privilege, so the court of appeals should have considered the supplemental record.136
The logic of that rule is simple. A contempt sentence punishes a refusal to testify, and if the refusal was constitutionally protected, the sentence punishes the exercise of a right. A rule confining review to the transcript would jail a witness for failing to explain a danger he could not be made to explain without surrendering the protection, while the facts proving the danger sat in the local newspapers.
The Court acknowledged that its result may add to the burden on enforcement officials. It answered that any other conclusion would seriously compromise an important constitutional liberty, because the evils of compulsory self-disclosure outweigh the difficulties the privilege creates in detecting and prosecuting crime.137 It also pointed to the route around the privilege: Congress may obtain unrestricted examination of witnesses by providing complete immunity, a route taken up later in this chapter.138 Justice Reed dissented.139
A problem built on this case supplies its facts the way the case did: a description of the investigation, something about the witness's reputation or record, and a question that looks innocent standing alone. The analysis reads those facts together and asks what each truthful answer could connect, instead of judging the question in isolation. A claim should be rejected only when the danger can be excluded entirely, and a witness jailed for contempt can still bring forward facts that support the claim.
Criminal Liability Only
Hoffman v. United States describes the privilege in the vocabulary of criminal law and nothing else: it reaches answers that would themselves support a conviction under a federal criminal statute, and answers that would furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute the claimant for a federal crime.141 Everything in that definition turns on the danger of prosecution, so the first question on any claim is what the witness actually fears. Earlier subsections asked who may claim the privilege, whether the evidence is testimonial, and whether it is compelled. This one asks what counts as incrimination, and the answer has four parts: the harm must be criminal, it must be the witness's own, it must be real and appreciable, and it must arise under the law of an American sovereign. Because Rule 501 leaves privilege to the common law only where the Constitution is silent, these limits belong to the Fifth Amendment itself and do not depend on a judge's weighing of reason and experience.142
The first limit is that the feared harm must be criminal. The privilege protects its holder only against the risk of legal criminal liability, and it offers nothing against the disgrace and practical exclusion from society that disclosure may bring when the disclosed matter could not give rise to criminal liability.143 The Supreme Court drew the same line in Ullmann v. United States: content is incriminating only as it relates to criminal liability, and civil disabilities and social stigma, no matter how severe, are not sufficient.144 The privilege matters only when compelled testimony carries the potential of later being used against the witness as a defendant in a criminal case.145 A damages judgment, a lost job, and a ruined reputation involve no criminal case, so none of them supports a claim.
The same deposition can contain a question that does support a claim. Suppose the examiner asks whether the agreement was backdated to hide an overdue payment from a lender. A truthful yes might admit a fraud offense or lead investigators to records that would prove one, so the answer could furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute.146 The test looks to the later use the answer could be put to, not to the civil label on the proceeding,147 so the witness may refuse the second question and must answer the first. The privilege covers the criminal exposure in the second question and none of the civil exposure in the first.
The second limit is personal: the incriminating character of an answer must relate to the witness's own criminal liability, not to the liability of others, as the Court held in Rogers v. United States.148 A witness asked about a friend's crime may be reluctant to answer, but reluctance born of loyalty is not incrimination, because the answer exposes the friend and leaves the witness untouched. The limit restates the privilege's personal character from the witness's side: the witness holds the privilege, and holds it only against the witness's own prosecution.
The third limit concerns degree: the danger must be “real and appreciable,” not “imaginary and unsubstantial,” in the words of Brown v. Walker.149 The phrase sounds severe, but it screens out very little. The witness need not prove the hazard, because proof would force the witness to surrender the very protection the privilege exists to give. It is enough that the implications of the question, in the setting in which it is asked, show that a responsive answer, or an explanation of why it cannot be answered, might be dangerous because injurious disclosure could result.150 The court, not the witness, makes that call, since an assertion of the privilege is not conclusive, yet a grand jury claim rejected for want of a real danger is a rare event.151 Courts have sustained claims even where criminal liability would rest on prohibitions of sexual activity seldom and perhaps never enforced.152 On an exam, this element takes one sentence: show how the answer could connect the witness to a crime.
The fourth limit asks whose criminal law counts. For many years American courts held that the privilege protected a witness only against incrimination under the laws of the sovereign compelling the testimony, so a witness in a federal proceeding who had been granted immunity against federal prosecution could not refuse to answer on the ground that the answers might incriminate under the laws of a state or a foreign nation.153 Murphy v. Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor rejected that separate-sovereign rule as between the states and the federal government.154 Murphy and several others were subpoenaed to testify before the Waterfront Commission about a work stoppage at certain New Jersey piers. They received immunity under New York and New Jersey law but invoked the privilege because their answers might incriminate them under federal law.155 The Court held that the privilege protects either a state or a federal witness against incrimination under either state or federal law, and it expressly overruled United States v. Murdock, which had allowed the federal government to compel testimony that might incriminate under state law.156
The Court's reason was the whipsaw. Because the federal and state governments cooperate closely, a witness protected against only the government that compels the answer could be forced to speak in one forum and then watch the other government use the words, which would defeat the purposes of the privilege.157 Murphy did not make such testimony unobtainable. The Murphy witnesses could be compelled to testify because the federal government was barred from making any incriminating use of their testimony or its fruits.158 The implication is that a witness can be compelled to speak so long as the other sovereign may make no use of what is said.159 A federal witness who fears only state prosecution may therefore claim the privilege, and the claim fails once the testimony and its fruits are shielded from use by the other government. Immunity, taken up below, supplies that shield.
A foreign prosecution produces the opposite result. In United States v. Balsys, the Court reasoned that the words “any criminal case” in the Fifth Amendment reach only prosecutions in jurisdictions subject to that Amendment, the federal government and the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, and do not reach foreign nations.160 A fear of prosecution abroad therefore supports no claim. The contrast with Murphy lies in a single fact: the other government in Murphy answers to the Fifth Amendment, and a foreign nation does not. That difference governs the right to refuse to testify. A statement actually compelled, whether by a domestic or a foreign source, is a separate matter, because the Self-Incrimination Clause bars the use and derivative use of compelled testimony against its maker in an American criminal case.161
Step one does most of the work on exam facts, because a stem will usually offer a vivid harm, such as a ruinous judgment or a public scandal, that has no connection to any prosecution.
When the Risk Disappears
The privilege against self-incrimination guards against one thing: the risk of criminal liability. It does not guard against disgrace or the practical exile from society that disclosure may bring, and once the law removes the criminal risk, no privilege remains.165 A witness whose danger has passed must answer.
Most privileges protect a relationship or a privacy interest and exist to encourage the free flow of information within a protected circle. The self-incrimination privilege stands apart from that group.166 Its footing is the Fifth Amendment's refusal to put a person in the “cruel trilemma”: incriminate oneself, lie, or stay silent and face contempt, and each path ends in jail.167 Where an answer cannot lead to punishment, the trilemma never arises, and a refusal would withhold evidence while shielding the witness from nothing.
Four events end the danger as to a particular offense, because each precludes prosecution and conviction for it:168
- The limitations period for the offense has expired.169
- The offense has been pardoned.170
- The witness has been acquitted of the offense under inquiry.171
- The government has granted the witness immunity from prosecution. The Immunity subsection below takes up its scope.172
Each event ends the danger only for the offense it covers. A witness acquitted of burglary can be compelled to describe the burglary. A question whose answer would also tie the witness to a later sale of the stolen goods revives the danger, because the acquittal never reached that crime, and the privilege still attaches where testimony risks incrimination for some other offense.173 The privilege fails only when the answer risks no offense that remains open to prosecution.
The witness loses the claim because two things hold at once: the offense is time-barred, and the question leads nowhere else. Change either fact and the danger returns.
A final conviction ends the privilege by a similar route. The ordinary rule is that a convicted person no longer has the privilege as to that crime, because testimony about it can no longer incriminate the witness. The rule assumes the conviction is final, so that double jeopardy bars reprosecution for the offense.174
Finality is the qualifier. A defendant whose appeal is pending, or still available, may win a reversal and a retrial, and anything said now could be used against the defendant then. Many jurisdictions therefore do not treat a conviction as eliminating incrimination while appellate review remains open.175 Courts generally hold that the convicted defendant keeps the privilege until the appeal is exhausted or the time to appeal expires, because the risk of reversal and retrial is not so remote as to be negligible.176
The arson defendant and the time-barred witness are both asked about a completed offense. What separates them is whether any prosecution for that offense can still go forward. The pending appeal keeps one possible.
A collateral attack raises a harder question. A conviction may be beyond direct appeal and yet open to a later challenge that, if it succeeded, would lead to retrial. The better solution treats that possibility as part of the question whether the facts present a “real and appreciable” danger of incrimination. Without some specific showing that the attack is likely to succeed, a final conviction removes the risk and the privilege with it. Most courts go further and treat finality as removing the risk without qualification.177
Malloy v. Hogan marks the limit of the conviction rule. Had the questions there related only to the offense of the earlier conviction, with no potential for suggesting ongoing criminality and no bearing beyond that offense, rejecting the claim of privilege could very well have been sustained.178 The questions were not so confined. The conviction had removed the risk as to the old offense, but the answers reached toward continuing criminality.
A court that wants to compel an answer on the strength of a conviction must also meet the standard from Hoffman. It may reject the claim only if it is “perfectly clear, from a careful consideration of all the circumstances in the case, that the witness is mistaken and the answer cannot possibly have such tendency to incriminate.” Two features of a conviction often keep a judge from that certainty. The conviction may not be final, and because both state and federal governments can prosecute the same criminal activity, incrimination under the other jurisdiction's law may remain possible.179
Step three is where exam facts usually hide the issue. A stem recites an old conviction or an expired limitations period, then asks about the witness's associates, employer, or recent dealings, and the answer to that question may link the witness to something the old event never reached.
The Accused at Trial
The Fifth Amendment privilege reaches a federal courtroom as constitutional law. Rule 501 sends privilege claims to the common law, read in light of reason and experience, unless the Constitution, a federal statute, or a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court provides otherwise,181 and the Fifth Amendment is such a provision: no person “shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” The command binds the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.182 Those words describe the criminal defendant most naturally, and the privilege is strongest in the hands of the person on trial. The earlier subsections treated the claimant as a witness who must show, question by question, that an answer would furnish a link in the chain of proof. The accused begins with broader protection and pays an additional price for choosing to speak. This subsection takes up the protection first and then the price.
The accused may stay off the witness stand altogether. The defendant need not even appear as a witness, because the right protects more than the answers to particular questions: it protects the defendant from being placed in a position where those questions can be put under oath.183 The criminal defendant has an “absolute right not to testify” at trial.184 Whether anyone may comment on the silence is a separate question, taken up in a later subsection.
That absolute right also excuses the accused from the procedure every other witness must follow. Other witnesses must invoke the privilege so that the court can assess the incriminating nature of each answer, the reasons for invoking, and the need for immunity. For the defendant, an express invocation “would serve no purpose; neither a showing that his testimony would not be self-incriminating nor a grant of immunity could force him to speak.”185 A practical concern explains why the choice deserves protection. Wilson v. United States recognizes that an honest defendant may be too timid or nervous to explain suspicious-looking transactions, and that the resulting confusion and embarrassment can increase rather than remove the prejudice against the defendant.186
A defendant who chooses to testify gives up much of that protection. The testimony begins as any witness’s does, with direct examination by the party presenting the witness,187 and the privilege shrinks by the very act of testifying. A witness who is not the accused loses the privilege only by testifying to incriminating facts. The accused suffers the reduction merely by testifying, whatever the content of the testimony.188 The Court took up this reduction in Brown v. United States.189 In practical terms, the accused who testifies is exposed to cross-examination under the rules that govern cross-examination generally and is deemed to have waived the privilege for every question within the scope of permissible cross.190
How much the defendant gives up depends on what the direct examination put in play. In most jurisdictions the scope of cross-examination is determined by the witness’s testimony on direct, so the accused may be questioned about any matter relevant to that testimony.191 The usual test asks whether the question is “reasonably related to the subject matter of his direct examination,” and at a minimum the defendant may be questioned about all facts relevant to the matters testified to on direct.192 A minority of jurisdictions do not limit cross-examination to the matters raised on direct. There the waiver is correspondingly broader and reaches any question that elicits facts relevant to the case.193
The waiver follows the subject the defendant opened and goes no wider than permissible cross-examination.194 A defendant who testifies solely on collateral or preliminary matters, such as the appointment of counsel or competency, does not completely waive the privilege at trial.195 Decisions such as Fitzpatrick v. United States and Johnson v. United States are cited on how far the waiver reaches, and the reasonably-related formulation above states the usual measure.196
Testifying also puts the defendant’s credibility in issue, which opens the door to searching cross-examination aimed at showing that the testimony should not be believed.197 In every jurisdiction a testifying defendant waives the privilege for questions relevant to impeachment.198 Rule 608(b) draws one line inside that waiver. Its closing sentence provides: “By testifying on another matter, a witness does not waive any privilege against self-incrimination for testimony that relates only to the witness’s character for truthfulness.”199 The stakes are real, because admitting a prior bad act could supply evidence of guilt in a later prosecution.200 The specific-act inquiry is collateral, so the cross-examiner must take whatever answer the witness gives, and prior convictions are a separate route to impeachment under Rule 609.201 Courts generally enforce the carve-out for criminal defendants: a defendant does not lose the privilege for criminal misconduct that is relevant only because it tends to show a lack of credibility.202
The forgery question is protected only because its sole relevance is credibility. A defendant who neglects to claim the privilege loses it as to that answer, and the cross-examiner may then use the answer freely in assessing credibility.203 Two opposite errors are common on exam facts. The first treats testifying as a waiver of everything, which cannot explain why the forgery question is protected. The second treats the privilege as surviving every question that touches credibility, which cannot explain why a prior act that is relevant for another purpose, such as contradicting the defendant’s own testimony, is unprotected.204
The waiver is confined to testimony in the criminal case itself. Disclosures made before trial or out of court, as to law enforcement officers, do not impair the defendant’s protection at trial, and testimony at a hearing before or during trial on an issue other than guilt leaves that protection unaffected.205 The limit makes sense once the reason for the price is clear: a defendant who testifies at trial selectively puts matters related to the offense into issue and risks misleading the court about them. A defendant who speaks in a colloquy with the court puts nothing selectively into issue, so admissions made there, even under oath, do not carry the effect of testimony at a contested trial.206
Silence at trial does not settle every demand for evidence from the accused. A subpoena for records raises a different question: whether the act of producing them is itself communicative. Production can affirm that the records exist, that the defendant possesses them, and that they are genuine, and when it does the privilege attaches, although the contents of the documents remain unprotected.207 The later subsection on documents takes up that analysis.
The next subsection turns to the ordinary witness, and the contrast frames everything above. A witness who is not the accused must invoke the privilege so that the court can assess whether an answer is incriminating, why it is claimed, and whether immunity is needed,208 and that witness loses the privilege only by testifying to incriminating facts.209 The accused cannot be placed on the stand at all, and pays for speaking by losing protection across the matters the testimony opened.210
Steps three and four do most of the work on exam facts. A stem usually has the defendant testify on one subject and then has the prosecutor ask about a second, and the answer depends on whether the second question touches the direct or only the defendant’s honesty.
The Ordinary Witness
A witness who is not the accused holds a much narrower privilege than the accused does. For persons who are not defendants in a criminal prosecution, the privilege gives only a right to decline to respond to certain inquiries; it gives no right to be free from every question designed to draw out a self-incriminating answer.212 The Supreme Court has sometimes referred offhandedly to a witness's “privilege of silence,” but the phrase misleads. The witness has no absolute right to remain silent, only a right to refuse to answer questions that would incriminate.213
The privilege therefore works question by question. A witness has no right to refuse to appear or to be sworn, and ordinarily must submit to a series of questions and assert the privilege in response to each one.214 Only the defendant at trial may invoke the privilege by simply refusing to testify. The prosecution cannot insist that the defendant take the stand and invoke the privilege as particular questions arise, but a person subpoenaed to testify in a judicial or administrative proceeding cannot refuse to be sworn.215
Courts justify this requirement by the limited protection the privilege gives a witness in this setting and by the need to accommodate other interests. Parties have an obvious interest in producing relevant testimony, and society has an important interest in resolving litigation accurately and efficiently.216 A claim made as each question is asked also serves the court. It alerts the court and the parties to inquire into the basis for the claim while the facts are fresh and can most accurately be developed, and it identifies the nature of the possible incriminating risks that must be investigated.217
The trial judge, not the witness, decides whether the claim is justified.218 The decision is sometimes hard. Usually the question is whether the demanded response, if given, would be incriminating. Sometimes it plainly would, because the question on its face calls for an incriminating answer. The difficulties arise with facially innocent questions, such as “Do you know John Bergoti?”219 Hoffman v. United States supplies the standard. The privilege reaches not only answers that would themselves support a conviction but any statement that would furnish a “link in the chain of evidence” for a prosecution. An admission of being at the scene of a crime when it occurred may be privileged even if the statement denies committing or participating in the crime. A court may deny the claim only if it is perfectly clear, from all the circumstances, that the answer cannot possibly have even a tendency to incriminate. The witness does not carry the burden of proving that the privilege applies; a very high burden rests on the party who wants the claim overruled and an answer forced.220 One of the Fifth Amendment's basic functions, the Court has said, is to protect innocent people who might otherwise be ensnared by ambiguous circumstances.221 A witness's statement that an answer would incriminate thus opens the judge's inquiry; it does not end it.
The claim in that scene attached to one question in one setting, which is why the witness could answer the first questions and refuse the third. A witness who announces in advance that the privilege will be claimed to everything does not escape the process. In Carter, a witness had admitted that she herself shot the victim, her attorney told the judge that she intended to exercise her privilege, and she confirmed that intention to the judge without being under oath. The trial judge accepted this as a blanket invocation, and that was error. The judge had to consider how the witness would respond to particular questions, whether some or all of the answers would be incriminating, and whether the defense might be entitled to answers to some relevant questions even though the witness could refuse others.222
Calling a witness who is known to be about to claim the privilege raises a different problem for the prosecutor. In Namet v. United States, the prosecutor had been told by defense counsel that the witnesses would claim the privilege, and reasonably believed they held nonprivileged evidence that would corroborate the government's case. The Court held that he was not obliged “to accept at face value every asserted claim of the privilege, no matter how frivolous.” It suggested that reversible error could arise in two situations. One is where the prosecutor, in calling the witness, made “a conscious and flagrant attempt to build [the prosecution's] case out of inferences arising from the use of the testimonial privilege.” The other is where the facts strongly suggest that inferences from the witness's refusal added “critical weight to the prosecution's case” in a form not subject to cross-examination, and so prejudiced the defense. The circumstances that show bad faith will often suggest likely prejudice as well.223
The same question-by-question sequence governs the grand jury, even for a target, meaning a person the grand jury is investigating as a likely defendant. The grand jury has legal authority, through a judicial subpoena, to compel testimony. Because it has an obligation to shield against arbitrary accusations, it has a right to be certain that the target's own testimony might not explain away the evidence against the target. The privilege before a grand jury therefore establishes only a witness's “option of refusal” and creates no “prohibition against inquiry.”224 A prospective defendant may accordingly be required to assert the privilege in the presence of the grand jurors. She may have a right to be told that she need not incriminate herself, but she is not entitled to the full warnings required for custodial interrogation under Miranda.225 The Court has held that full Miranda warnings are not required for a grand jury witness and that the witness need not be warned that he is a target, though careful prosecutors usually warn the witness that questions may incriminate and that the witness may consult a lawyer.226 Federal prosecutors are directed to tell known targets of their status, although the Constitution does not compel it. A subpoenaed target who gives advance notice of an intent to claim the privilege “ordinarily should be excused from testifying,” but the grand jury and the prosecutor can jointly insist on appearance when the importance of the testimony and the possible inapplicability of the privilege justify it.227
A witness can lose the privilege in two ways, and neither requires a waiver in any formal sense. The first is failing to claim it. The privilege “is not self-executing” and may not be relied upon unless invoked in a timely manner. A taxpayer who makes incriminating admissions on a tax form, rather than refusing to provide the information on the basis of the privilege, cannot later argue that the admissions were compelled.228 In United States v. Wong, a grand jury witness gave false testimony and later said she testified only because she misunderstood the self-incrimination warnings and believed the law required her to testify. The Court held that the testimony could still ground a perjury charge.229
The second is giving incriminating testimony on a subject. A witness who does so relinquishes the privilege in that proceeding as to further testimony on that subject. Under Rogers v. United States, a witness cannot disclose a basic incriminating fact and then claim the privilege as to “details,” because that would “open the way to distortion of facts by permitting a witness to select any stopping point in her testimony.” Rogers is sometimes described as a trap for the witness who fails to assert the privilege even to seemingly “innocuous questions.” The Court, however, saw the follow-up questions the witness refused as only minimally increasing the “danger of prosecution” beyond what her earlier answer to an obviously incriminating question had already created.230
The two bookkeepers differ in whether an incriminating answer came before the refusal. The relinquishment operates in the proceeding where the testimony was given and as to the subject that testimony opened.
Because the privilege must be invoked, one might expect a witness to be told about it. A witness at risk of losing the privilege by testifying to self-incriminating facts generally has no right to be warned of the privilege and its potential loss. A trial judge who sees that the questioning raises the risk of self-incrimination nonetheless has substantial discretion. The judge may stop the questioning briefly to warn the witness that she may decline to give self-incriminating answers and to make sure she has a clear opportunity to assert that desire, and may suggest that she consult an attorney. The judge may also go further by stopping the trial temporarily so the witness can consult an attorney, and may even appoint one.231
Immunity
The privilege against self-incrimination guards a witness against being prosecuted on the strength of the witness's own words, so the government can obtain the testimony by removing that danger. A prosecutor facing a valid privilege claim can still get the testimony by granting the witness immunity from prosecution.233 Justice Brandeis made the point for the Court in McCarthy v. Arndstein in 1924: if Congress concludes that full disclosure by witnesses “is of greater importance than the possibility of punishing them for some crime in the past,” it can “confer the power of unrestricted examination by providing complete immunity.”234
Most privileges are built to encourage the free flow of information within a protected circle, and the self-incrimination privilege stands apart from that framework.235 It protects a person only from being compelled to be a witness against himself at a criminal proceeding. When the compelled statements cannot be used against the witness at a later criminal trial, the privilege has not been violated, even though a prosecution follows.236 Earlier rulings rest on the same logic. The privilege was held inapplicable where compelled testimony would concern only an offense for which the witness had been pardoned or the limitations period had run, and it does not apply once the witness has been granted immunity from prosecution.237 In each situation the witness was assured against prosecution, and no danger remained for the privilege to guard against. A witness who still refuses after a valid grant has no constitutional ground for silence and may be held in contempt. The federal immunity statute itself leaves a prosecution for failing to comply with the order outside the protection it gives.238
Immunity comes in two forms, and they differ in how much the government gives up. Transactional immunity is the more protective: it bars prosecution for the transaction the witness is compelled to describe.239 Use and derivative-use immunity forbids both the direct use of the compelled disclosures and their indirect use as leads or otherwise to obtain other evidence, so every item of evidence at a later prosecution must be completely independent of what the witness was compelled to say.240 The witness can therefore still be prosecuted for the same events if the case rests wholly on separate evidence. The Court has upheld both forms, so either one can compel testimony.241
The law moved from the broader form to the narrower one in four steps. In Counselman v. Hitchcock (1892), the Court held that a promise of mere use immunity does not overcome the privilege. In Brown v. Walker (1896), a sharply divided Court held that the government could preclude reliance on the privilege by granting transactional immunity. It found that result consistent with the purposes of the Fifth Amendment, citing the English practice of “indemnity” against prosecution, adopted soon after the privilege became firmly established and followed in the colonies.242 The third step, Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, first upheld immunity narrower than the traditional transactional grant. Murphy held that the privilege extends to incrimination under both federal and state law, so a state grant had to protect the witness against both kinds of prosecution. Transactional immunity could not do that, because Congress can preempt state prosecutions but a state cannot prohibit a federal one. The Court held it enough that neither the testimony nor its fruits could be used against the witness in any criminal prosecution, and it exercised its supervisory power to bar the federal government from using state-immunized testimony or its fruits in federal courts.243 Congress then replaced transactional immunity in the federal provision with a bar on use and derivative use in both federal and state prosecutions. In Kastigar v. United States, a divided Court upheld that provision and discounted the broad language in Counselman that had suggested transactional immunity was required.244
Kastigar approved the narrower grant because the statute's “total prohibition on use” provides a comprehensive safeguard. It bars use of the compelled testimony as an “investigatory lead,” and it bars use of any evidence obtained by focusing the investigation on the witness as a result of his compelled disclosures.245 The derivative-use half of the formula does the real work. As the earlier discussion of the link-in-the-chain standard showed, the privilege reaches answers that lead investigators to other evidence. A grant that kept out the testimony but left investigators free to follow its leads would protect less than the privilege does, and that gap is why a promise of mere use immunity fails.246
Because derivative use is forbidden, the protection is worth only as much as the means of enforcing it, and Kastigar placed the enforcement burden on the prosecution. Once a defendant shows having testified under a grant of immunity, the government must prove affirmatively that the evidence it proposes to use derives from a legitimate source wholly independent of the compelled testimony. A bare denial of taint is not enough.247 The allocation makes practical sense, because prosecutors can document where each item of evidence came from and a witness cannot see inside the investigation. The Court called the result “very substantial protection, commensurate with that resulting from invoking the privilege itself.” A pretrial “Kastigar hearing” may be necessary to determine whether the government has met its burden.248
Immunity buys truthful testimony, and the protection stops at lying. The federal provision excludes from its bar a prosecution for perjury, for giving a false statement, or for failing to comply with the order.249 Truthful immunized testimony is therefore safe from use, while false immunized testimony is a fresh offense that the grant never covered.
A grant also reaches beyond the sovereign that issues it. Murphy held that a state grant must protect the witness against federal prosecution as well, and it secured that protection by forbidding the federal government to use state-immunized testimony or its fruits in federal courts. The federal provision runs the other way by its own terms, barring use and derivative use in federal and state prosecutions alike.250
Step two does most of the work on exam facts, because a stem will often describe a statute or promise that protects the witness only against introduction of the testimony itself, and that grant cannot replace the privilege. A stem that says the witness was “given immunity” and later prosecuted is not describing an error, since use and derivative-use immunity permits prosecution on independent evidence.
Comment and Adverse Inference
The right to stay off the witness stand would protect little if a prosecutor could ask jurors to treat the silence as an admission. Griffin v. California held that the Fifth Amendment forbids this: California's rule allowing comment on the accused's failure to testify violated the Fifth Amendment.252 The Court saw the rule as, in substance, a rule of evidence that lets the State tender the accused's silence to the jury. No formal offer of proof is made, but "the prosecutor's comment and the court's acquiescence are the equivalent of an offer of evidence and its acceptance."253 The protection is constitutional, so the common-law default in Rule 501 yields to it and no weighing of reason and experience takes place.254
The holding rests on the Constitution and not on a statute. In a federal trial the same comment would already have been reversible error under Wilson v. United States, but Wilson rested on an Act of Congress, 18 U.S.C. § 3481, and not on the Fifth Amendment. The Griffin Court called that fact "the beginning, not the end" of its inquiry, because the question remained whether the comment rule violated the Fifth Amendment, statute or not.255 The Court also pointed out that its decision was no innovation. In Adamson v. California the same question about California's practice had been presented. Four dissenters would have held that the Fifth Amendment barred the practice, and Justice Frankfurter, writing separately, agreed that comment on an accused's failure to take the stand is forbidden in federal prosecutions.256
The rule matters because of what it keeps out of the jury room. The Court has read the privilege to mean that the government cannot require a defendant to take the stand and cannot invite a jury to draw adverse inferences from a refusal to testify.257 The rule against inferring guilt from a defendant's rightful silence has become "an essential feature of our legal system." It reminds everyone at trial that the question is whether the government has carried its burden of proof while respecting the defendant's individual rights.258
The prohibition covers any explicit, or "direct," invitation to the jury to treat the defendant's failure to testify as tending to prove guilt, whether it comes from the trial judge, the prosecutor, or counsel for a codefendant. Arguments and instructions that serve other primary purposes are often held permissible, even though they may also draw the jury's attention to the silence.259 Lower courts therefore read an ambiguous remark in context. It violates Griffin only if the prosecutor manifestly intended it as a comment on the defendant's silence, or if its character was such that a jury would naturally and necessarily take it that way. A clear violation occurred when a prosecutor stood in front of the defendant, gestured toward her, and demanded in a loud voice, "Just tell us where you were. That's all we are asking, Noura!"260
The same rule applies to the judge's instructions. Griffin reserved the question whether an accused can require an instruction that the silence must be disregarded.261 Carter v. Kentucky later answered it in the defendant's favor, and the rule entitles a party, upon request, to an instruction that no inference may be drawn.262 The instruction must be requested because a defendant may not want it, feeling that there is more to lose than to gain when attention is called to the matter. The rule is not entirely clear on whether or when a judge may give the instruction anyway.263
Indirect references are harder. Even where Griffin applies, a prosecutor may still describe the government's proof as "uncontradicted," despite the indirect possibility that the jury will think of the defendant's silence, so long as that inference is not so strong as to be the natural and necessary result.264 Courts have given conflicting answers about whether calling the state's case "unrefuted" or "uncontradicted" is an impermissible comment. A remark that alludes to the defendant's silence is more likely to be accepted if the prosecutor was responding to arguments the defense made. Even a remark that violates Griffin is often found to be harmless error on appeal.265
The two arguments differ in who could have answered the point. The burglary prosecutor describes a gap that cross-examination or other witnesses could have filled, so the argument comments on the evidence. The embezzlement prosecutor describes a gap that only the defendant could fill, so the argument comments on the defendant.
Griffin protects the defendant's choice to stay off the stand at the trial itself, and silence that came earlier is treated differently.266 Under Jenkins v. Anderson, Raffel permits a testifying defendant to be cross-examined about prior out-of-court silence even if that silence is, as a general matter, protected, and Jenkins left open whether it is in fact protected. Impeaching a testifying defendant with an earlier in-court reliance on the privilege, or with out-of-court invocations of it, is clearly permissible as a matter of privilege law.267 Silence after Miranda warnings is handled differently under Doyle v. Ohio, which bars the prosecution from using it to impeach.268
Beyond the criminal trial, Griffin has little direct force. It applies directly only in criminal cases, only to the defendant's self-incrimination privilege, and only to one branch of that privilege, the right to stay off the stand as opposed to the right to refuse particular questions. Comment in the many other settings is left to other law, which is mixed, except that an adverse inference is usually allowable only where it makes some factual sense. That requirement can lead to different treatment depending on whether the invoker is a party or not.269
In civil litigation the Fifth Amendment does not forbid drawing adverse inferences against a party who invokes the privilege during the case. An adverse inference is a conclusion the factfinder may draw against a party from that party's refusal to supply evidence. Allowing it "accommodates the right not to be a witness against oneself while permitting civil litigation to proceed." Part of the reason is that the party against whom the privilege is invoked in a civil case cannot avoid the impact of the invocation by granting immunity, while at least one party in a criminal case can.270 In Baxter v. Palmigiano, a 7 to 2 majority held that prison authorities in a disciplinary proceeding could consider an inmate's invocation as tending to show the alleged infraction. No majority formed in McKune v. Lile on how to evaluate a convicted inmate's claim that worse conditions of confinement, imposed because he relied on the privilege, impermissibly burdened it.271
The civil inference has limits. Remedies for a party's invocation should aim at repairing the disadvantage the opponent suffers and should not punish the exercise of the privilege. Dismissal or a default judgment would ordinarily be viewed as punishment, but either may be justified in extreme cases, as where the invocation results in a wholesale denial of discovery.272 A separate situation arises when a party or witness persists in an unlawful claim of privilege after the court has overruled it and ordered testimony. Courts commonly require the privilege to be asserted in front of the jury in that situation, and they may permit an adverse inference or even authorize one by instruction.273
The criminal defendant and the civil party invoke the same constitutional privilege, and the results differ because the settings differ. The criminal defendant is shielded from comment because the government must carry its burden without using his silence. The civil party is shielded from compulsion but not from the ordinary evidentiary effect of refusing to answer.
Documents and Production
A claim that a subpoena for records violates the privilege against self-incrimination is a constitutional claim, and Rule 501 treats it as one by listing the Constitution first among the sources that displace the common-law default.275 The court therefore does not weigh reason and experience to decide whether a privilege deserves recognition. It applies the Fifth Amendment itself, which provides that no person “shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself” and which binds federal and state governments alike.276 Records complicate the analysis because a subpoena for documents demands a thing rather than an answer. The solution is to ask separately about the two things the government may be taking: the contents of the papers and the act of handing them over. The contents are ordinarily unprotected, and the act is protected only in a narrower set of cases. The rest of this section explains what moves a production from one side of that line to the other.
Papers a person wrote voluntarily fall outside the privilege, because no compulsion attended their creation and the bare act of producing them is usually not a communicative act.277 A ledger of illegal bets shows the point. It can plainly expose its keeper to prosecution, so the incrimination element is met, but the compulsion element fails: the government did not make the keeper write the entries, and the Fifth Amendment does not protect the contents of documents prepared without compulsion.278 The ledger is also usable if investigators find it in a lawful search.279 The rule fits the clause. The cruel trilemma arises when the government forces a person to speak, and a ledger written long ago was never extracted from its author by official pressure.280
The act of producing papers is a different matter, and the privilege can reach it. A person who hands over an item in response to a subpoena may represent that items matching the description exist, that the person possesses or controls them, and that the items produced fit the subpoena's description, and each of those representations is a testimonial communication.281 The papers can therefore be unprotected while the handing-over is not, because the government learns facts that come from the producer's own knowledge. Whether the privilege applies depends on whether those communications carry a real and appreciable risk of incrimination.282 Under the link-in-the-chain standard discussed earlier, a communication carries that risk if it would tie the person to a crime or furnish a lead to evidence that could, even though it would not establish guilt on its own. The protection is not limited to paper. Compelled production of recordings, and a court's order of protection requiring a person who possibly held a pistol illegally to “[s]urrender any and all firearms owned or possessed,” have both been held to violate the privilege.283
United States v. Hubbell shows how much testimony an act of production can contain. The witness had received immunity, and the government argued that the immunity did not bar its derivative use of the documents he produced, because its possession of them was “the fruit only of a simple physical act—the act of producing the documents.”284 The Court rejected that argument. Identifying the hundreds of documents that answered the subpoena's requests required the witness to make extensive use of “the contents of his own mind,” so the production was testimonial and the immunity precluded the derivative use.285 A key can be surrendered without knowing anything. Sorting hundreds of documents into those that answer a request cannot.
Not every testimonial act of production is protected, because the privilege applies only when the act's communications carry a real and appreciable risk of incrimination, and that risk disappears when the government can already establish what production would concede.286 Suppose the government can show, independently of the act, that the documents exist, that the person has them, and that they are what they purport to be. Producing them then tells the government nothing it lacks, and courts call such facts foregone conclusions. The authenticity showing illustrates the burden: the government must be able to establish, independent of the act of production, that the documents are what they purport to be, as when handwriting experts can show that the witness wrote them.287 The same reasoning covers existence and possession. After Hubbell, the government must also negate the possibility that, by selecting and assembling documents, the witness will tacitly supply information that helps the government authenticate them later.288
Fisher v. United States and United States v. Doe show that the incrimination requirement is a separate hurdle from testimony. The subpoenaed party must establish both that the communicative aspects of production amount to testimony and that the testimony would meet the traditional standard of potential incrimination.289 In Fisher the claim failed on the second ground. After indicating that the act of production there would not be testimonial, the Court concluded that the claim failed in any event, because the taxpayer had not shown that the communicative aspects of production posed a “realistic threat of incrimination,” and it examined implicit authentication separately from implicit acknowledgment of existence and possession.290 The two cases differ in setting. Doe was a grand jury investigation in which the government sought to establish through the documents that the subpoenaed party was connected to the businesses that created the records, while Fisher arose in a standard IRS investigation in which the taxpayer raised no more than a blanket claim of potential incrimination.291 The Court's statement that it was unprepared to find a realistic threat “at this juncture” arguably reflects that difference and suggests that a much more particularized showing is needed in a setting without obvious criminal overtones.292
The privilege protects Pat's act of production and not the records' contents. The records could expose Pat to criminal liability, but no one compelled Pat to prepare them, so their contents are unprotected. Handing them over, however, would affirm that they exist, that Pat has them, and that they are genuine in the sense that they match the subpoena's description, and nothing in the government's file establishes any of that, because the customers say nothing about the records. The privilege therefore attaches to the act, and the government cannot compel Pat to produce the records. Their contents remain available if the government finds them in a lawful search.293
Both sets of papers could incriminate their keepers, and the contents of both are unprotected. The difference lies in what the government knew on the day each subpoena issued. Against the broker it already held existence, possession, and authenticity, so production would concede nothing. Against Pat it held none of the three, so production would supply all of them. An answer that withholds records because they are damaging confuses the contents with the act, and an answer that treats documents as unprotected because their contents are unprotected overlooks the act. The question that decides the claim is what the government can already prove without the producer's help.
The privilege gives way entirely for one category of records. When the government requires records to be kept for regulatory purposes, the privilege yields if the records are regularly maintained and have a “public aspect,” meaning they serve a public interest and thus resemble public documents.294 This is the required-records exception, and a record qualifies only when all three elements are present: a regulatory requirement that it be kept, regular maintenance, and a public aspect.
Step five does most of the work on exam facts, because a stem usually signals what the government already knows, whether through a detailed informant statement or through nothing more than a customer's rumor. Timing can also decide a privilege claim elsewhere in this chapter. The spousal privilege, for example, should be claimed before the witness-spouse is sworn, and it is clearly waived once the spouse begins to testify.295