Concept
Excuses Under Rule 1004
Requirement of original
Excuses Under Rule 1004
Rule 1004 lists four conditions, and a proponent who meets any one of them may prove the content of a writing, recording, or photograph without producing the original.1 The rule opens a door that Rules 1002 and 1003 keep shut. With neither an original nor a duplicate in hand, the proponent would have only a witness's memory of the wording, and the original-writing requirement exists to keep that memory from standing in for the document. Rule 1004 changes the result when the proponent can explain the original's absence: a witness may then testify to the contents without producing an original or a duplicate.2
The excuses follow from the purpose of the requirement, which is to secure the best obtainable evidence of a document's contents, not to compel the original at all hazards. An original may be unavailable for many practical reasons, and the requirement should yield when it is.3 The excuses also serve the rule's ancillary purpose of guarding against fraud, because proof that the original is missing through no bad faith dispels the inference that the proponent is withholding it by design.4 Four conditions put that logic into practice. Other evidence of content is admissible if all the originals are lost or destroyed, and not by the proponent acting in bad faith;5 if an original cannot be obtained by any available judicial process;6 if the party against whom the original would be offered had control of it, was put on notice by pleadings or otherwise that it would be a subject of proof, and failed to produce it;7 or if the item is not closely related to a controlling issue.8 The first three explain the missing original in terms that do not count against the proponent: it is gone without the proponent's bad faith, the law's process cannot reach it, or the opponent who held it was warned and kept it back. The fourth asks a different question, namely whether the item matters enough to the case to justify demanding it.
United States v. Marcantoni shows how a proponent must fit a missing item into these conditions. An officer, Brodesser, recited the serial numbers on two bills in place of the bills themselves, and the court counted what the government had failed to establish. It had not shown the bills lost or destroyed; the record did not establish that the defendants were given notice that the bills' contents would be a subject of proof, and no process directed them to produce the bills; and the government could not claim that the bills were unrelated to a controlling issue.9 Even so, the Fifth Circuit held that the original-writing rule applied, treated the officer's testimony as secondary evidence, and excused production because the bills were either unavailable or withheld by the defendant.10
The case also shows what a proponent must do whenever an item is missing: tell the story of what became of the original and who held it, and match that story to one of the four conditions. Each condition has its own elements and its own kind of proof, so the sections below take them in the rule's order, beginning with loss or destruction, where the question of the proponent's good faith first arises.
Originals Lost or Destroyed
Rule 1004(a) admits other evidence of content when all the originals are lost or destroyed and the proponent did not lose or destroy them in bad faith.11 The rule has three working parts. First, all the originals must be gone: an executed counterpart or an accurate printout that survives is itself an original, so a proponent who can still reach one has no excuse under this provision. Second, the proponent must prove the loss. Third, the proponent cannot rely on a loss that the proponent caused in bad faith.
Each part answers a separate worry. The scope requirement keeps the excuse from applying while a usable original exists. The proof requirement keeps it honest: only the proponent knows what became of the paper, and a bare assertion of loss would let any proponent who preferred to recite a document's terms claim that it had vanished. The bad-faith limit protects the fraud concern behind the whole requirement, because the excuse works only when a blameless loss dispels the inference that the proponent is withholding the original by design.12
The judge, not the jury, decides whether the originals are lost, because proof of loss or destruction is a preliminary determination under Rule 104(a).13 The proof ordinarily consists of testimony in open court either that a diligent search failed to locate the document or that the witness knows of its destruction. Under Rule 104(a) the rules of evidence, except those on privilege, do not apply to the preliminary question, so deposition testimony and affidavits are acceptable in appropriate cases.14
Whether a search was diligent depends on what is reasonable under the circumstances.15 The importance of the document and the time since it was last seen bear on how much searching must precede an inference of loss, and the only general requirement is that all reasonable avenues of search be explored to the extent that reasonable diligence would dictate.16 A party need not search every possible place, for the search might then be interminable, but must search every place where there is a reasonable possibility that the document might be found.17
In Sylvania Electric Products v. Flanagan, the missing items were the foundation of the claim. The plaintiff billed the defendant $25,267.50 for trucking on a job, and every figure rested on daily tally sheets made at the site that recorded the number of trucks and the hours each worked.18 In place of the sheets he offered a summary of their data, photostats of invoices from other truckers, and copies of his own bills. Asked whether he had the sheets, he answered that he knew he had some at home but was not sure he had them all, and the trial court suggested that he bring in what he had.19
The appellate court held the showing of unavailability insufficient. The record left the plaintiff never called on to explain the absence of his records, his search, if any, or why he had not preserved them although he knew from the beginning that there was a dispute.20 Because the missing sheets were the very foundation of the claim, the court required stricter proof than it would for writings involved only collaterally, and the plaintiff did not supply it.21 A satisfactory explanation of a loss without bad faith would have opened the door to secondary evidence, and the trial court, deciding the question under Rule 104(a), would not have been bound by the rules of evidence.22 The plaintiff failed at the second step, proof of loss, so the court never reached the question of bad faith.
Seiler v. Lucasfilm, Ltd. shows the bad-faith limit at work. After a seven-day hearing, the district court found that Seiler lost or destroyed his originals in bad faith: he testified falsely, purposefully destroyed or withheld the originals, and fabricated and misrepresented the nature of his reconstructions. Because of that finding, no secondary evidence, including his reconstructions made after The Empire Strikes Back, was admissible, and the court granted summary judgment to Lucas.23 The court of appeals held the finding amply supported by the record.24
The appellate opinion also explains why the limit matters. The requirement protects against faulty memory, and Seiler's reconstructions were made four to seven years after the alleged originals, so his memory of specifications and dimensions may have dimmed significantly; reconstructions made after the film's release may also have been tainted, even unintentionally, by exposure to it.25 The same opinion settles who decides. The condition of fact Seiler had to prove was that the originals were not lost or destroyed in bad faith, and had he proved it, the reconstructions would have been admissible and their accuracy a question for the jury; the trial judge therefore properly held a hearing to decide admissibility.26 That allocation matches Rule 1008, under which the court ordinarily determines whether the proponent has met the factual conditions for admitting other evidence of content.27
A proponent who proves a blameless loss gets the testimony in. The later section on secondary evidence uses United States v. Standing Soldier, in which oral testimony about a lost note was allowed, to show that once an excuse applies the rule recognizes no degrees of secondary evidence.28
Destruction by the proponent is not automatically bad faith. A proponent who destroyed the original bears the burden of proving that the destruction was accidental or in good faith, and negligent destruction, or destruction in the ordinary course of business, can rebut the inference of fraud.29 Bad faith by the party, or by another person at the party's instigation, bars the party from introducing secondary evidence, and voluntary destruction must be proved not to have been of fraudulent design.30 Records are often destroyed in the ordinary course of business, and showing a business practice should usually suffice to establish the absence of bad faith.31 That showing fails once litigation has begun and the party knows that documents may be sought, because a party in litigation must abandon routine document destruction.32
Once the excuse is established, the proponent may prove content with any evidence that is otherwise admissible, including circumstantial evidence. In a dispute over whether a recorded deed had correctly transcribed a lost 1942 original, one court refused to bar all proof except the recorded version. It held that the lost-original excuse of Rule 1004, not the Rule 1005 provision on recorded documents, governed, and that evidence of a routine practice was admissible in lieu of the original if otherwise admissible.33 The accuracy of that evidence then goes to the jury.
Originals Not Obtainable
Rule 1004(b) supplies a second excuse: other evidence of content is admissible when an original cannot be obtained by any available judicial process.35 Here the original exists, but the court cannot compel anyone to hand it over. The holder is usually a stranger to the suit, such as a bank, a former business partner, or a witness who has left the jurisdiction, so the question is how far the court's power reaches that person.
The requirement seeks the best obtainable evidence, not production at all hazards, so a stranger's refusal or disappearance should not cost the proponent proof of what the document said.36 The word available keeps the excuse from swallowing the rule: where process would reach the holder, the original is missing only because the proponent did not use that process.
If the holder is within the geographic limits of the trial court's subpoena power, the safest course is a subpoena duces tecum, a writ served on the holder summoning him to bring the document to court at trial.37 Whether a writing is beyond reach depends on the applicable process statutes or rules, which usually extend farther in criminal cases than in civil, and the process typically used against a third-party holder is the subpoena duces tecum.38 The question is therefore concrete: where is the holder, and what compulsion does this court have over that place? A common error treats any original held by a non-party as unobtainable, when the excuse depends on whether process can reach the holder.
In both hypotheticals the original sits with a stranger to the suit, and the fact that moves the answer is whether process reaches the holder: the architect can be served and the roommate cannot. Even the second proponent carries a burden, because the court ordinarily decides whether the proponent has met the factual conditions for admitting other evidence of content,39 and the judge can decide only on facts about the holder's location and the unavailability of process. An opposing party who holds the original falls under Rule 1004(c) instead. That provision excuses production when the opponent had control, was put on notice, and failed to produce, and it does not ask the proponent to show an inability to obtain the original by process.40 A party answers to notice; a stranger answers only to an order. The next section takes up the opponent's control and notice.
Two refinements appear in the materials but not in the text of Rule 1004(b). Some decisions excuse the proponent from serving a subpoena when the possessor is privileged not to produce the document.41 Commentary also asks whether extreme difficulty or impracticality in producing a writing, such as a billboard or a tombstone, could justify other evidence of content.42 An exam answer should rest on the text and treat both as secondary arguments.
A harder problem arises when the proponent can obtain a duplicate through discovery but not the original. The literal language of the rule excuses a party on a showing that the original is unobtainable, which points toward admitting any other evidence of content. A competing reading would require a party who can get a duplicate through discovery to prove contents by offering that duplicate.43 The logic of the second reading is easy to see, since a duplicate delivers the document's actual wording to the factfinder while a witness's recollection brings back the memory risk that the whole requirement exists to control. Text and logic pull apart, so treat the question as unsettled and state both readings. A proponent who holds an accurate duplicate avoids the dispute altogether, because a duplicate is admissible to the same extent as the original unless a genuine question is raised about the original's authenticity or the circumstances make it unfair to admit the duplicate.44 The term duplicate reaches photocopies, electronic re-recordings, chemical reproductions, and other reliable means of making accurate copies, and the drafters admitted duplicates because most reproductions are accurate.45
Step three does the real work. It separates a holder the court can compel from one it cannot, and a proponent who skips it cannot honestly say that process was unavailable.
Opponent's Control and Notice
Rule 1004(c) supplies the third excuse, and it turns on what the opponent did with the paper, not on what became of it. Other evidence of content is admissible when the party against whom the original would be offered had control of it, was at that time put on notice, by pleadings or otherwise, that it would be a subject of proof at the trial or hearing, and fails to produce it at the trial or hearing.47 The original still exists and sits with the opponent, so neither proof of loss nor a search for available process has any work to do. What remains is fairness between the sides: the holder was told the paper would be needed and let trial arrive without it.
The holder had a choice. An opponent who has the original and knows it will be proved can settle what it says by carrying it into court. By keeping it back, the opponent has declined that opportunity, and the proponent's account of the contents comes in instead.48 Each condition guards one side of that arrangement. Control matters because only the holder can make the choice. Notice matters because the choice must be informed, since without it the holder could be caught at trial with a document that the other side suddenly proves from memory; the rule's wording ties the notice to the period of control, because a party who has already parted with the paper cannot choose to produce it. Failure to produce is the act that shows the choice was made. The consequence is limited: the opponent's silence admits other evidence of content, and that evidence must still persuade the factfinder of what the original said.
Notice does the work that compulsion does in the preceding excuse. A complaint that recites the terms of a written agreement and says the defendant holds it is a standard form of notice, and because the rule says “by pleadings or otherwise,” any communication that tells the opponent the original will be proved can serve.49 The rule asks for control, notice, and a failure to produce; it does not ask the proponent to show that a subpoena or other effort to obtain the original failed.50 The contrast with the preceding excuse explains why. A party to the suit is already before the court and bears the consequence of silence, while a stranger holding the paper answers only to an order. The stranger's case therefore turns on whether process can reach the holder, and the party's case turns on whether the party was told.
The record on notice in Marcantoni was thin. The court observed that it was not established that the defendants were served notice that the bills' contents would be a subject of proof, and that no process was directed to them to produce the bills in court.51 Tidewater read the allegation in a complaint; the Marcantoni defendants, on that record, were neither told nor ordered to do anything, so they had no occasion to choose between producing the bills and accepting testimony about them. The Fifth Circuit nonetheless excused production because the bills were either unavailable or withheld by the defendant.52 Whatever one makes of that result, the text of subsection (c) still requires control, notice, and a failure to produce.
A bar-exam stem that says only that the opponent kept a lease in a desk drawer, and then has the proponent testify to the lease's terms, is asking whether anyone told the opponent the lease would be proved. Control and an empty-handed opponent at trial are two conditions out of three, and an answer that skips notice because the opponent surely knew misses the third. When notice is missing, the proponent must look to another part of Rule 1004, and a proponent with time before trial can usually close the gap by giving the notice.
Collateral Matters
Rule 1004(d) supplies the last excuse, and it asks a different question from the other three. An original is not required, and other evidence of content is admissible, when the writing, recording, or photograph “is not closely related to a controlling issue.”54 The first three excuses explain why the proponent lacks the original. Subsection (d) asks for no explanation. It rests on how little the item matters, so the proponent may prove content through other evidence because the exact terms are unlikely to affect the outcome, whether or not the original is within reach.
Writings, recordings, and photographs sometimes enter a case only incidentally, and their significance is merely that an item of that kind exists or existed. Rule 1002 still reaches such an item when its content is being proved, but the precise terms are unlikely to become a center of controversy. The exception takes this shape because of what the requirement buys. It secures accuracy about exact wording, a benefit worth the cost of producing the original only when something turns on the wording. That reasoning follows the policy justifications McCormick summarizes for preferring the original writing.55 If a small misstatement of an item's terms could not change the result, locating the original, serving process for it, or proving its loss would add cost and teach the factfinder nothing.
Consider a witness who explains how he knows the date of an accident: the next morning he read a newspaper account of it and noted the date. His testimony refers to a writing, but the lawsuit concerns the accident, and the newspaper's wording plays no part in it. Demanding the paper would send the proponent searching for a document whose text nobody needs.
Because the phrase “closely related to a controlling issue” resists precise definition, courts guide the inquiry with three factors, and the judge decides the question as a preliminary matter:56
- The centrality of the item to the principal issues of the litigation.
- The complexity of the relevant features of the item.
- The existence of a genuine dispute about the item's contents.
Each factor measures one danger that the original-writing rule addresses. Centrality measures the stakes: an error about the terms of a peripheral item cannot move the verdict, while an error about the item on which the case is built can decide it. Complexity measures the memory risk, because a witness can reliably recall a date, a name, or three letters but cannot be trusted to recite paragraphs of text. A genuine dispute measures whether the original has any work to do: when both sides agree on what the item says, the original would only confirm what nobody contests, and when they disagree, only the item itself can settle the question. A judge may also ask how wide a margin for error the point allows. A point that survives a wide range of possible wordings leaves room for a witness's imperfect recollection, but a point that depends on one exact phrase or number does not. No single factor controls, and a judge may find an item collateral on one factor while hesitating on another.
In United States v. Duffy, witnesses testified that a white shirt found in a suitcase bore a laundry mark reading D-U-F, and the defendant demanded that the government produce the shirt.57 The earlier discussion of inscribed chattels asks whether a marked object is a writing at all; the collateral exception asks a separate question about an item that is a writing. Applied to the shirt, the factors point toward admission. A three-letter mark is simple enough for a witness to recall accurately, and unless the charge turns on that particular shirt, the exact lettering is not what the case is about.
At the other end sits Seiler, discussed above. His claim rested on his own works, and the court worried that reconstructions made years later could not preserve the specifications and dimensions of the lost originals.58 The comparison with the shirt shows which facts move the answer: a short mark on one item in a larger case can be proved by testimony, while a detailed work on which the whole claim depends cannot.
The exception is easy to overuse because it asks nothing about the original. An answer that calls an item collateral merely because it is inconvenient to obtain, or because the witness is confident of his memory, skips the question the rule asks, which is how closely the item relates to a controlling issue. A contract sued upon, a will in a probate contest, and the defamatory letter in a libel action are the reverse of collateral, because the case is built on their exact words. The analysis also comes late in the sequence. The first question is whether content is being proved at all, since the rule itself applies only to proof of the contents of a writing,59 and Rule 1004(d) assumes that the requirement applies and then excuses the original for an item of little consequence.