Concept
Levels That Are Not Hearsay
Multiple hearsay
Levels That Are Not Hearsay
Rule 805 admits hearsay within hearsay when “each part of the combined statements conforms with an exception to the rule.”1 The wording invites a mistake. Because it speaks only of exceptions, a reader may assume that every level of a chain is hearsay and needs one. Some levels are not hearsay at all. Hunting for an exception to cover them wastes effort, and when the hunt fails it can lead a student to reject a chain that is admissible.
Two kinds of level fall outside the hearsay rule. The first escapes by purpose: the proponent offers the words for some use other than proving what they assert, such as the effect they had on a listener. The second escapes by speaker: the rules define an opposing party’s own statement as not hearsay,2 and a party’s agents, speaking within the scope of the job, are treated the same way.3
The counting routine from the earlier sections does not change, because every declarant still marks a level. What changes is the first question at each level: is this statement hearsay at all? Only a level that answers yes needs an exception, and a chain still fails when a level that is hearsay has none to reach it. The subsections below take purpose, party statements, and agents in turn.
Nonhearsay Purposes
Rule 805 speaks only of exceptions, yet a level offered for a proper nonhearsay purpose needs none. When one statement in a chain is admissible under an exemption or exception and the other is offered for a proper nonhearsay purpose, Rule 805 is satisfied.4 Purpose therefore becomes the first question at each level: what does the proponent want the jury to do with these words?
McDaniel v. McDaniel shows the answer in a will contest. A witness’s testimony relayed what the propounder had said to the testator about the caveator, and the court called that statement the second level of alleged hearsay. It was not hearsay, the court held, “because it was not introduced for the truth of the matter asserted, but rather for the effect it had on the testator.”5 The caveator’s own theory made that purpose real. The caveator contended that the propounder’s statement was not true, and the evidence showed where the testator got the misinformation. A party who insists that words are false cannot be offering them as true, and the jury needed them only to see what had reached the testator’s mind. The probate court therefore did not abuse its discretion in admitting the testimony.6
Reverse the purpose and the analysis reverses with it. Had a party offered the propounder’s statement to prove what it said about the caveator, the jury would have had to believe it, and it would have needed a basis of its own. The words stay the same, and only the offer changes.
Purpose belongs to the offer and not to the document, so one sentence can be harmless in one chain and hearsay in another. A claimed nonhearsay purpose must also be genuine. If the proponent’s theory of relevance requires the jury to believe the speaker, the level is offered for its truth whatever label the proponent attaches.
A related shortcut appears when the outer statement qualifies under an exception. The hearsay rule then allows its use to prove that the included statement was made, and that may end the inquiry. Ordinarily, however, the included statement is offered to prove the truth of the facts it asserts, and then it needs a basis of its own.8
Party Statements as a Level
Rule 805 refers to an “exception,” but an opposing party’s own statement is not admitted by exception: Rule 801(d)(2) defines it as not hearsay, and Rule 801(d)(1) does the same for certain prior statements of available witnesses.10 Read literally, Rule 805, which speaks of an “exception,”11 could be taken as inapplicable when such a statement sits inside another statement that is hearsay.12 Courts have refused that reading. The technical difference between “not hearsay” and “hearsay subject to exception” cannot control the limit on multiple hearsay, and, as one court put it in United States v. Dotson, nonhearsay statements under Rule 801(d) “should be considered in analyzing a multiple hearsay statement as the equivalent of a level of the combined statements that conforms with an exception to the hearsay rule.”13 Oregon reads its counterpart the same way. In a footnote in Hansen v. Abrasive Engineering & Manufacturing, Inc., the court said that OEC 805 “should be read to embrace statements in the chain that qualify as ‘not hearsay.’”14
Commentary reaches the same destination by two routes. Admissions may be said to fall within the spirit and purpose of the multiple hearsay rule. Or, more simply, only one level of hearsay exists because an admission is not hearsay under the Federal Rules, and if the other statement satisfies an exception, no further difficulty remains.15 One court ran the Rule 805 analysis anyway, reasoning that an admission by a party-opponent “is still generally considered an exception to the prohibition against the use of hearsay evidence,” so an analysis consistent with Rule 805 “was prudent.”16 The working rule is the same on either route: credit the opponent’s statement as a conforming level, then test everything else.
The first limit is that an exempt level excuses none of the others.17 A proponent who can point to a party’s own words may be tempted to treat the whole document as admitted, and Southern Stone Co. v. Singer shows why that fails. Southern Stone offered a letter in place of testimony from its trial counsel about a conversation with Moore, and it explained that it might be improper for its trial attorney to testify.18 The court answered that Southern Stone should have engaged other trial counsel if it had reservations about putting its attorney on the stand, and that it “cannot create its own exception to the hearsay rule by failing to retain such other counsel.” Because the court perceived no other applicable exception for which Southern Stone had laid an adequate foundation, the letter was inadmissible.19 The letter was counsel’s out-of-court account, a level of its own, and nothing in Moore’s words could supply a basis for it. Had counsel testified in person, that level would never have existed.
The second limit runs in the proponent’s favor: a party’s statement can ride inside another statement that qualifies on its own.20 In People v. Chism, a footnote describes Marcia’s statement to Edwards as double hearsay, because it also included an out-of-court statement by the defendant offered for its truth. The defendant’s level was admissible as a party admission, and the court restated the governing principle: multiple hearsay is admissible provided each level falls within a hearsay exception.21 California classes a party admission as an exception where the federal rules call it not hearsay, but the level-by-level analysis comes out the same.22 A police report works the same way. When an officer records a damaging statement by a driver who later becomes a party, the statement qualifies as an admission and the report may be used to prove it was made. The officer’s lack of firsthand knowledge of whether the statement was correct is immaterial if recording that kind of information was the officer’s responsibility.23
In each of these chains a party’s own words sat inside someone else’s account. Where the outer account stood on its own footing, as with the officer’s duty to record, the chain held. Where it had none, as with Southern Stone’s letter, the chain broke despite the inner words.
A party’s statement can also sit on the outside of a chain, and the exemption then protects less than it appears to. One court acknowledged that hearsay within an admission falls outside the strict terms of Rule 805, since the admission is not hearsay. It still held that internal hearsay in a statement that comes in as an admission must be analyzed independently to see whether it would survive a hearsay objection in its own right.24 The exemption reaches the party’s own assertion and no further. That limit matters most when an agent of the party repeats what someone else said, the situation taken up next.
Agents Repeating Others
Rule 801(d)(2)(D) carries the party-statement idea into the workplace. Once agency, and the making of the statement while the relationship continues, are established, the statement is exempt from the hearsay rule so long as it relates to a matter within the scope of the agency.26 When the first speaker in a chain is such an agent and the person quoted is another agent speaking within the same kind of role, every layer is the employer’s own statement, and the proponent needs no separate exception at any level. In EEOC v. HBE Corp., an enforcement suit alleging discrimination, the court admitted testimony that the company’s chief executive did not like black employees. That “some of the statements came through multiple declarants does not matter,” the court said, because all of the declarants were agents speaking on activities within the scope of their employment.27
A different objection arose in Mahlandt v. Wild Canid Survival & Research Center, Inc. Poos pinned a note on a door and later that day told Owen Sexton that Sophie had bitten a child.28 At trial Poos told the judge he did not know how the matter had happened, and he gave the same answer when asked whether Danny had been bitten, mauled, or clawed by Sophie. Because nobody seemed to have “eyeball knowledge,” the judge excluded what Poos had told Sexton in the note.29 The reviewing court disagreed. The note was Poos’s own statement, “clearly different from the reported statement of another” of the “I was told that . . .” kind, and one whose truth he had manifested his adoption or belief in. The same was true of what he told Sexton later in the day.30 The missing firsthand knowledge did not matter. Rule 805 and Rule 403 each remain an additional basis for excluding otherwise acceptable evidence, the court explained, but neither adds an implied personal-knowledge requirement to Rule 801(d)(2)(D).31
That holding leaves the counting of layers where it was. An agent who states his own conclusion adds no second level for Rule 805 to examine, but an agent who quotes someone else does, and the person quoted must be covered in his own right. Clarke Poos did not work for the Center at all. Had Kenneth Poos quoted him in the note to Sexton, Rule 801(d)(2)(D) could not have embraced Clarke’s words. The note could have come in only on the theory that Kenneth had adopted Clarke’s view and was himself telling Sexton that Sophie bit the child.32
Agency also runs party by party. The directors’ conclusions recorded in the corporate minutes came in against the Center, because the directors were its primary officers and had authority to include their conclusions in the record. No servant or agency relationship, however, justified admitting the minutes against Poos.33 Employment alone does not carry a statement into the exemption either: the statement must relate to a matter within the scope of the agency.
Two cases show where agent chains break. In Cedeck v. Hamiltonian Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n, the court allowed that an argument for admission could have been made had Murphy told Cedeck, in effect, that she was qualified except for the fact that she was not a male. But part of Murphy’s statement repeated what someone had told him, which made it hearsay within hearsay.34 That inner part could not come in as an admission by a party-opponent “since the author of the statement is unknown,” and the court found no exception that reached it, so Rule 805 barred the statement.35 An agent chain needs a speaker who can be shown to be the employer’s agent speaking within the role, and an anonymous source cannot be shown to be anything.
Context can sometimes supply the missing identity. In a similar employment case, a plaintiff offered to testify that a branch manager told her he had been told she could not become a manager unless “she’s flatchested and wears pants,” and the reviewing court excluded the statement as hearsay within hearsay. A commentary replies that a manager who cites another as the source of policy is surely referring to someone in charge of such matters or someone in charge of seeing that they are carried out, and that either would be a bank employee speaking on a matter within the scope of his duties.36 If that is right, every layer fits the agent rule. A record that identifies the speakers as the employer’s own decision-makers can carry the whole chain, while a blank where the source should be costs the proponent the layer.
The coconspirator exemption poses a parallel question about each speaker: did the statement advance the scheme? In City of Tuscaloosa v. Harcros Chemicals, Inc., Lloyd Krysti’s statements to Barbara Krysti were not made in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy. They “merely informed” a non-conspirator that the conspiracy existed. The court found no exception for those statements and affirmed the exclusion of Barbara Krysti’s testimony.37
The two chains failed at different links. In Cedeck the second speaker was anonymous, so nothing could show that an agent had spoken at all. In Harcros the speaker was known, but his statements to an outsider furthered nothing and fit no exception. In both, the failed level had to answer for itself, because a sound link elsewhere in a chain cannot rescue a failed one.38