Concept
Judge's Role and Foundation
Statement under the belief of imminent death
Judge's Role and Foundation
A dying declaration must clear two hurdles before a jury hears it, and the text of Rule 804(b)(2) names only one of them. The first is that the Rule's conditions actually exist: the declarant must have spoken “while believing the declarant’s death to be imminent,” must have spoken “about its cause or circumstances,” and must be unavailable as a witness.1 The second is a foundation the Rule never mentions, namely that the declarant knew what the statement asserts. The first hurdle raises a question of procedure, who finds the facts, and Rule 104(a) answers it. The second raises a question of substance, what the declarant must have perceived, and the personal-knowledge requirement answers it.
Preliminary Facts for the Judge
Each condition in Rule 804(b)(2) describes a fact that exists apart from the words offered. A witness who repeats the declarant’s words supplies the words, but the words alone do not prove that the speaker expected to die or was speaking about the cause of the death.2 Someone must find those facts before the testimony reaches the jury, and Rule 104(a) assigns the task: “The court must decide any preliminary question about whether a witness is qualified, a privilege exists, or evidence is admissible.”3 The treatise applies that rule to this exception directly. Whether the exception’s requirements are satisfied, including whether the declarant believed himself in extremis when the statement was made, is for the court.4 The judge decides by a preponderance of the evidence, which means the proponent must persuade the judge that each fact is more likely true than not, the standard the Supreme Court applied to admissibility requirements in Bourjaily v. United States.5
The reason for giving the belief question to the judge becomes clear from the alternative. A jury could hear the statement and be told to disregard it unless the jurors find that the declarant expected to die. That instruction asks jurors to put aside a victim’s accusation of the defendant after they have heard it, which is at odds with common sense, whereas some preliminary questions ask nothing of the jury that common sense forbids and can safely go to jurors.6 The problem is sharper here because the declarant’s own words are among the best proof of what the declarant believed, so a jury deciding the question would be weighing the very statement it might be told to ignore.7 Assigning the question to the judge has a cost, because it involves the court in fact-finding, which is normally left to the jury. It also has a large advantage: the judge is far more likely to be willing and able to enforce the evidence rules, and enforcing them is the judge’s job.8
The judge may consider the challenged statement itself in deciding whether the exception applies, even though the statement may turn out to be inadmissible hearsay. The reasoning has an aspect of circularity, but Rule 104(a) accepts it, because the rules of evidence do not limit what the judge may consider in deciding a preliminary question so long as no privilege is involved.9 The last sentence of the Rule says the same thing: in deciding the question, the court is “not bound by evidence rules, except those on privilege.”10 Suppose the prosecution offers a victim’s last words, “Defendant killed me,” and the defense contests whether the victim thought death was near. A written police report that the judge has already ruled inadmissible says that shortly after the accusation the victim told officers, “I’m fine. I’m too tough to die.” The judge may read the report in deciding the belief question even though the jury will never see it, and a finding that the victim expected to live defeats the exception.11 The belief may also be shown by the declarant’s own statements or by circumstantial evidence, such as the nature of the wounds, statements made in the declarant’s presence, or a physician’s opinion.12
Preliminary facts that serve as links in relevance follow a different procedure, and the contrast shows why the dying-declaration conditions go to the judge. In a murder prosecution, the first witness, the police officer who searched the defendant’s home, testifies that he found a machete under the defendant’s bed. Defense counsel objects that no evidence yet shows the victim was killed with a machete.13 The machete matters only if it is tied to the killing, so the objection raises a question of conditional relevance under Rule 104(b), and the jury can decide that link because nothing about the question asks jurors to act against common sense.14 The judge’s role is limited to asking whether the evidence is sufficient to support a finding of the link, which is a minimal standard. In answering, the judge may count only admissible evidence, because the jury is permitted to hear only admissible evidence.15 The officer’s admissible testimony describing the wounds on the victim’s body could support the link, while a coroner’s statement to the officer could not if it would be inadmissible hearsay.16
The common-law tradition answered the belief question differently, and modern practice has departed from it. Older authority sent the question to the jury, which was instructed to consider the statement only if it found the belief present, and Freihage v. United States is an example of that line. The early English report is itself ambiguous on the point. As the Supreme Court recounted in Giles v. California, depending on the account one credits, the court in Woodcock case either instructed the jury to consider the statements only if the declarant was “in fact under the apprehension of death” or determined for itself that she was “quietly resigned and submitting to her fate” and admitted her statements.17 Modern cases go the other way. In Commonwealth v. Cooley, a Pennsylvania court held that the question is one of law, not within the province of the jury, and refused to tell the jury to assess for itself whether the decedent believed he was about to die. That result fits Rule 104(a), because the question whether the declarant knew he was dying affects admissibility rather than relevancy.18 A student who sends the belief question to the jury, or who limits the judge to admissible evidence when deciding it, is reasoning from the abandoned practice or from the wrong subdivision.
Personal Knowledge and Opinion
Rule 804(b)(2) says what the declarant must have believed and what the declarant must have talked about, and it says nothing about how the declarant came to know the facts asserted.21 The silence does not excuse the requirement. To be admitted under an exception in Rule 803, 804, or 807, the declarant of the out-of-court statement must be shown to have personal knowledge of the matter related, and that knowledge may appear from the statement itself or be inferred from the circumstances.22 Only a party-opponent’s admission is exempt from the showing.23 The hearsay exception therefore answers the hearsay objection and leaves the knowledge objection to be decided on its own terms.
The belief of imminent death cannot stand in for knowledge because it guards against only one danger. The exception finds its guarantee of trustworthiness in the assumption that the belief substantially curtails the possibility of falsification.24 That assumption speaks to sincerity. It does nothing for perception, memory, or narration, and a declarant who guessed at the facts before the injury may guess just as readily after it. Hence the foundation may also require evidence that the declarant had adequate mental and physical capacity after the injury to perceive, record and recollect, and narrate the cause or circumstances of the death. Any adequate means of communication, including words or signs, will suffice so long as the indication is positive and definite.25 The Supreme Court’s opinion in Shepard v. United States states the governing principle: the declaration is kept out if the setting of the occasion satisfies the judge that the speaker is giving expression to suspicion or conjecture and not to known facts, and to let it in, the inference must be permissible that there was knowledge or the opportunity for knowledge as to the acts declared.26
Shepard also shows the problem arising on its facts, although the Court did not decide it. The declarant there appears to have been speculating about her condition (poisoned) and about the culprit (Dr. Shepard), and a hearsay declarant’s statement is generally inadmissible for lack of personal knowledge unless, from all the surrounding circumstances, a reasonable trier could conclude that the declarant had personal knowledge.27 The Court itself rested on a different ground: the failure to make out the imminence of death and the abandonment of hope relieved it of deciding whether it was a legitimate inference that there was opportunity for knowledge. It conceded that the difficulty lies less in the governing principle than in applying it to varying and equivocal conditions.28
Courts applying the requirement have not always reached the same result on equivocal facts. In a 1919 decision, the court excluded a dying statement that certain people hired the assailant, for lack of knowledge. In Soles v. State (Fla. 1929), by contrast, the court admitted a statement by a declarant shot in the back of the head identifying the defendant as his assailant, without discussing personal knowledge.29 The pairing is a reminder that a court will not always raise the knowledge question on its own, so counsel who doubts the basis for a deathbed accusation should say so.
The form of a dying statement matters far less than its basis. The Court in Shepard observed that “He murdered me” does not cease to be competent as a dying declaration because the statement of the act also contains an appraisal of the crime. It added that one does not hold the dying to the niceties of speech demanded of a witness on the stand, and that what is decisive is something deeper and more fundamental than any difference of form.30 A person with little breath and no time to organize an account will naturally compress events into a verdict, and a rule demanding a step-by-step narrative would exclude the words a dying person is most likely to speak. The same approach governs opinion. Statements in the form of an opinion are admissible, as in State v. Lewis,31 but a lay opinion under Rule 701 must rest on facts the declarant personally perceived.32 A dying person’s conclusion qualifies when it summarizes what the person saw or heard and fails when it fills a gap with suspicion.
Two opposite instincts lose points here. The first treats a sincere deathbed accusation as admissible because the declarant believed death was near, which skips the knowledge question and confuses the motive to tell the truth with the ability to know it. The second rejects “He murdered me” as a bare conclusion, which mistakes compression for conjecture and looks at the form of the words when the basis for them is what counts.