Concept
What the Actor Must Intend
Threshold: act, volition, and intent
What the Actor Must Intend
The Restatement (Second) of Torts defines intent by what the actor wants or expects from the act: the actor “desires to cause consequences of his act,” or believes that “the consequences are substantially certain to result from it.”1 The preceding section worked out those two routes to intent. The definition itself never says which consequences the desire or belief must concern, and the answer decides whether a defendant who aimed at something small can be held for something large.
Each intentional tort answers that question by naming the invasion that makes up the wrong. In battery the invasion is contact with the plaintiff’s person;2 in trespass to land it is entry onto the plaintiff’s land.3 Intent is measured against that invasion, not against whatever injury follows. A person who shoves a stranger to make a point has intended the contact whether or not the stranger’s hip breaks, and the shover answers for the hip.
Three steps follow. The first sets out the Restatement’s words for the invaded interest, for loss, and for physical impairment, so that the analysis can say exactly which of them an intent must reach. The second shows what happens when intent reaches only the invasion: the actor answers for every injury that results. The third takes up a division among courts over battery, where some require the actor to intend only the contact and others also require intent that the contact be harmful or offensive.
Injury, Harm, and Physical Harm
The Restatement uses three easily confused words in distinct, technical senses. “Injury” denotes “the invasion of any legally protected interest of another.”4 The word names what the defendant did to an interest the law protects, such as a person’s bodily integrity or an owner’s exclusive possession of land, and it says nothing about whether the plaintiff lost anything. A person is injured the moment an unauthorized contact occurs, and a landowner the moment an unauthorized entrant crosses the boundary. Ordinary speech, by contrast, pictures an injury as a wound.
“Harm” names the loss. It denotes “the existence of loss or detriment in fact of any kind to a person resulting from any cause.”5 Harm is a question of fact: the medical bill, the pain, the cracked windowpane. Because it may result from any cause, it can exist where no one has invaded anything, as when a storm strips a roof. The reverse also holds, since an invasion can occur with no loss at all.
“Physical harm” narrows harm to one kind. It denotes “the physical impairment of the human body, or of land or chattels,”6 so a fractured wrist, a scorched lawn, and a dented bicycle all qualify. When the harm is to the person, the Restatement defines it broadly (§ 15): any physical impairment of the body’s condition, such as a cut, a bruise, or a burn, however slight and even if beneficial; illness; and physical pain, but not emotional pain.7 Physical harm is thus one species of harm, and harm may follow an injury or occur without one.
This vocabulary fixes what intent must reach. Section 8A speaks of the actor’s desire or belief about “the consequences” of the act, and read against the three definitions, the consequence in question is the invasion of the protected interest: the contact in battery8 and the entry in trespass.9 The harm that may follow is another matter.
The law places intent there because of what these torts protect. Bodily integrity and exclusive possession matter apart from any loss, so an actor who deliberately crosses the line commits the wrong whether or not anything breaks. If liability required intended or proven harm, an intentional entry that cost the owner nothing would go unanswered. Trespass avoids that result: under § 158 the unauthorized entrant is liable “irrespective of whether he thereby causes harm to any legally protected interest of the other,” which lets a court award at least nominal damages to vindicate the owner’s right to sole possession.10 Intentional torts generally work the same way. The plaintiff’s prima facie case needs only proof of an intentional invasion of a protected interest. Unlike a negligence plaintiff, the plaintiff need not prove actual damages, and nominal damages are available if no harm, tangible or intangible, can be shown.11
An exam stem that stresses that “no damage resulted” or that the defendant “meant no harm” describes harm, and harm is not what the intent question asks about. The question is which invasion the defendant desired or knew to be substantially certain to occur, and whether the facts show it.
Intent Need Not Reach the Injury
Intent is usually defined as the desire to cause certain immediate consequences, and when the immediate consequence is the injury itself the question is easy: one who points a loaded gun at another and pulls the trigger surely intends that the bullet will strike and injure.13 The harder cases involve an actor who aimed at less. Section 8A says the actor must intend “the consequences” of the act, and the language is a bit confusing on the point. The consequence it refers to is the harmful or offensive contact itself, not the injuries that result from it.14 An actor who intends that contact therefore answers for the injuries that follow, even when they exceed what the actor intended or could have foreseen.15
Brutus committed a battery, and the battery was complete the moment Cassius tripped. Brutus acted with the purpose to trip him, which is surely an offensive contact, and he succeeded in causing it. From that point the law holds Brutus liable for all the consequences of the battery. Cassius might have suffered no injury, or more than Brutus expected, or less; if the contact itself is a battery, Brutus is liable for the resulting harm, whatever its extent.16
Lambertson v. United States applies the rule. An inspector in a meatpacking plant ran up behind a worker, jumped on his back, and pulled the worker’s hat over his eyes. The worker stumbled forward, struck his face on some meat hooks, and was seriously injured. The inspector was horsing around, and nothing suggested he meant the worker to hit the hooks or suffer serious injury. The court nonetheless held that he battered the worker when he intentionally jumped on his back, because a reasonable person in the worker’s position would find that contact offensive, and it held him liable for the facial injuries that followed.17 The analysis runs in two steps. The first asks whether the contact the defendant intended was itself harmful or offensive; the second asks what damages that tort produced. Intent matters at the first step and drops out at the second.
Courts apply the rule even when the injury far exceeds anything a reasonable person would anticipate. A six-year-old boy who shoved a four-year-old girl answered for her broken elbow, and a defendant who pushed the plaintiff with a finger and said “Go home, old man” answered for a detached retina.18 Nor does the rule belong to battery alone. In Baker v. Shymkiv, a trespass to land led to an argument with the owner, who suffered a fatal heart attack during it, and the trespasser was held liable for the death as a consequence of the intentional tort.19
The rule sets intentional torts apart from negligence. Negligence limits liability to the foreseeable consequences of the defendant’s act, but courts hold the intentional tortfeasor liable for all the ensuing consequences, foreseeable or otherwise, because intentional torts are deemed more culpable.20 Two further reasons support the harsher rule. Batteries invade another’s right of personal security, and one purpose of intentional tort law is to deter such unauthorized contacts from the outset; imposing the cost of every resulting injury on the actor serves that purpose. And intentional torts are eminently avoidable, because they require a deliberate choice to invade another’s rights, and the actor need only refrain. When the actor fails to refrain, the law puts even the unintended damages on the actor and not on the innocent victim.21
The first step can fail, and a hug shows how. Romeo greets Juliet with a hug. Given their relationship, he had no reason to believe she would find it offensive, so the contact he intended was neither harmful nor offensive. Juliet slips on the slippery footing, falls, and is hurt. Romeo did not act with the purpose of making her fall, or with substantial certainty that she would. He may be liable in negligence for hugging her where the footing was slippery, but he committed no battery.22 The rule about unintended harm applies only “if the contact itself is a battery,” and Romeo’s hug was not.
On an exam, a stem that stresses how strange or severe the plaintiff’s injury was has not yet answered the intent question. Start with the contact: did the defendant intend a harmful or offensive contact, and did it occur? If so, the injury’s unintended severity enlarges the damages and does not defeat the claim.
Single or Dual Intent
Courts disagree about what a battery defendant must intend. Under the single-intent standard the actor must intend only the contact with the plaintiff’s person. The Third Restatement takes that position.24 On this view the intent required for battery is the intent to cause contact with the person of another, and the actor need not intend harm or offense.25 Under the dual-intent standard the actor must intend two things: the contact, and that the contact be harmful or offensive.26 Both standards reach intent by the same two routes, purpose or substantial certainty,27 and differ only in what the purpose or certainty must concern.
The single-intent standard keeps the requirement of a harmful or offensive contact, but it tests that requirement against the facts and not against the actor’s mind. The contact must actually turn out to be harmful or offensive, even if the defendant did not intend it to be.28 Romeo’s welcome hug therefore fails as a battery under either standard: he intended nothing harmful or offensive, and the hug was in fact neither.29
In most cases the choice makes no difference, because defendants have both intents: the person who throws a punch means the contact and means it to hurt. The standards part company only for the indifferent or oblivious defendant, who meant a contact and nothing harmful or offensive by it. That defendant is liable under the single-intent standard and not liable under the dual-intent standard.30
Casebook notes press the point with touchings that cause no bodily damage. One asks whether a man commits a battery when he grabs another’s coat front and demands satisfaction for an insult, when he spits in another’s face, or when he forcibly removes another’s hat.31 Each defendant plainly meant the touching, so under the single-intent standard the remaining question is whether the contact was offensive in fact.
White v. University of Idaho shows the single-intent standard at work. A professor touched a student’s back to demonstrate a piano technique, meaning neither harm nor offense, and the court still treated the claim as one for battery.
Wagner v. State shows how widely courts hold the standard. The Utah Supreme Court concluded that the plain language of the Restatement, its comments, Prosser and Keeton’s explanation of intent, and the majority of case law, in Utah and elsewhere, compelled it to agree with the State that only intent to make contact is necessary.32 So long as the defendant intended the contact and Mrs. Wagner had not consented to it, expressly or by implication, the defendant committed a battery. Because battery is a tort for which the State has retained immunity, the court affirmed dismissal for failure to state a claim.33
On an exam, a stem that describes a defendant who meant to touch and meant nothing by it signals the split. Identify the standard the jurisdiction uses, apply purpose and substantial certainty to the object that standard names, and confirm that the contact was in fact harmful or offensive. If the stem names no jurisdiction, give the result under each standard; the outcomes differ only for the defendant who meant the touching and nothing more.