Concept
Motive and Mistake
Threshold: act, volition, and intent
Motive and Mistake
Defendants facing an intentional-tort claim reach for two explanations more often than any others. One is that the defendant meant well. The other is that the defendant thought the act was permitted, because the land, the object, or the situation seemed to be the defendant's own. Neither explanation touches the definition of intent. In the Restatement (Second) of Torts, “intent” means that the actor desires to cause the consequences of the act or believes that those consequences are substantially certain to result from it.1 The test asks what the actor sought or knew would follow. It does not ask why the actor wanted the result, and it does not ask whether the actor was right to think the act allowed.
This section takes the two explanations in turn. A reason for acting is motive, and motive leaves intent in place. A mistake about one's right to act leaves intent in place as well. Only a mistake that strips the actor of purpose or knowledge of the consequence itself defeats intent.
Motive Is Not Intent
Intent is the desire to cause certain immediate consequences; motive is what makes the actor want them. Revenge, protest, punishment, theft, self-defense, and even a wish to be of help are motives.2 The person who throws a rock with great force against a glass window intends that it will break, and the person who points a loaded gun and pulls the trigger intends that the bullet will strike and injure. Why either acted is a separate question, and its answer cannot change what either intended.
Two reasons keep a good motive from negating intent. The first is the interest the tort protects. Battery guards individuals against unwanted intrusions on physical security, so an actor who knows that another rejects a contact cannot defend it by calling the contact beneficial; the actor's knowledge governs, even where others would tolerate the contact.3 The second is proof. Direct evidence of what the actor intended is rarely available, and after the fact a defendant may claim to have had the best of intentions. Courts therefore infer intent from the defendant's conduct in context, and they may infer that the defendant intended the natural and probable consequences of acts done with awareness of the surrounding circumstances.4 A rule that excused good motives would replace that inquiry with the defendant's own account of the defendant's virtue.
The surgeon who operates without the patient's consent shows the rule at its sharpest, because the surgeon's aim is to help. Even so, it is no defense that the defendant intended only a joke or a compliment, or even to render assistance, and surgery performed without the patient's consent may be a battery.5 See Mohr v. Williams.
Clayton v. New Dreamland Roller Skating Rink, Inc. adds an express refusal to the helpful motive. A rink employee tried to set the plaintiff's broken arm against her protests. He was only trying to help, but she had told him that she found the contact unwelcome, so he knew it was unwelcome, and that knowledge met the intent requirement for battery.6 His wish to help explains why he wanted the contact. It says nothing about whether he knew the contact was unwelcome, and he did.
The same rule governs a practical joke in assault. Zachary's acts were meant as a joke, and Amanda did experience apprehension, so he is liable. What matters is whether Zachary acted with a purpose to scare Amanda or with knowledge to a substantial certainty that his acts would scare her; malice or ill will is not required.7 Do not read the crime into the tort. Criminal assault was historically defined as an attempt to commit a battery,8 and the crime has not always been equated with the tort.9
Older case problems test the point with contacts of every temper. One defendant takes hold of the plaintiff's coat and announces that he seeks satisfaction for an insult; another spits in the plaintiff's face; another forcibly removes the plaintiff's hat.10 Before asking about anger, jest, or insult, ask what contact the actor meant to make.
Hostility cannot stand in for intent either. A driver who looks away from the road and hits the plaintiff, or a joker who throws a snowball at a tree and strikes a pedestrian who unexpectedly steps into its path, each acts voluntarily. Neither acts with purpose or substantial certainty that a harmful or offensive contact will result, and each may be merely negligent if the actor failed to exercise due care.11 Give either actor a grudge against the victim and the classification does not change, because intent turns on desire or substantial certainty and not on ill will.
Motive points the wrong way in both halves of the pair. An exam stem that stresses a defendant who meant well, or one who bore a grudge, is describing motive, and neither description answers whether the defendant desired the contact or knew it was substantially certain to follow.
Motive still matters to the lawsuit, though not to intent. To establish the prima facie case, the plaintiff need show only the defendant's conduct, the invasion of a legally protected interest, and the requisite intent. Motive enters afterward, where it may aggravate, mitigate, or excuse the wrong: malice may permit punitive damages, and self-defense may be a complete defense to liability.12
A past exam problem previews the handoff. A falling flower pot strikes Alou, who lies groaning in a street closed to everything but emergency traffic and cries, “Don’t touch me!” Sanchez, thinking a fire truck rushing down the street might hit Alou, grabs him by the arm and drags him toward the curb; the truck, it turns out, was coming to help Alou.13 Sanchez acted to help, yet he made the contact after Alou had refused it, so his helpful motive cannot defeat intent. Whether the danger Sanchez perceived excuses the contact is a separate question about justification, and it arises only after intent is established.14
Mistake Is No Defense
The Restatement's definition measures the actor's relation to the consequence that defines the tort: the contact in battery, the entry in trespass to land, the interference with the thing in trespass to chattels.16 It does not ask whether the actor was right about the surrounding facts, such as who owns the land or whether the actor had a right to be there. Two kinds of mistake therefore have opposite effects. A mistake about right or ownership leaves intent in place. A mistake that strips the actor of purpose or knowledge of the consequence itself removes it.
Trespass to land produces the first kind most often. Suppose Ramone wanders into the woods behind her house, believing she is still on her own land, and drifts across the line into Wang's woods. She is a trespasser even though she did not know it and did not “intend” to be one. She did intend to walk where she walked, and her intentional walking caused an intrusion on her neighbor's land. She may be morally innocent, but tort law makes her bear the risk of her imperfect understanding of the boundaries of her lot.17 The result is the same whether she believed the land was her own or some other land where she was entitled to be. For a business defendant, compare Serota v. M & M Utilities, Inc.
The rule is the same for personal property. The intent required is merely to act on the chattel, so no wrongful motive is necessary, and a good-faith but mistaken belief that the defendant owns the chattel, or is otherwise privileged to deal with it, is no excuse.18 Horton, who took a hat while mistaken about the character of his act, is a tortfeasor though he had no malicious intent. He meant to assert dominion over the hat, and he did so by taking it; tort law places the consequence of his mistake on him.19 Whether such an interference amounts to conversion or only to trespass to chattels is a separate question. The Second Restatement draws no single bright line and instead lists factors, including the extent and duration of the actor's dominion or control.20
The mistake that does defeat intent goes to the consequence itself. Peterson, a zookeeper, closes the tiger cage and goes to bed, not realizing that Stanley is still inside feeding the tigers. Peterson meant to close the door, but he did not close it for the purpose of confining Stanley, and he was not substantially certain that it would confine anyone. He has not committed false imprisonment, and any remedy lies in negligence.21 Compare Peterson with Ramone. Ramone was wrong about who owned the ground, a fact that has no bearing on whether she was entering it. Peterson was wrong about whether anyone was in the cage, which is the very fact that decides whether closing the door confines a person.
One mistake is harder to sort: the actor who genuinely believes that a touching will be welcome. Offensiveness is judged by an objective test, whether the contact would offend a reasonable person in the victim's circumstances. The puzzle is how Romeo, who believed the new girl in school would welcome his hug, can be said to have intended an offensive contact and not merely to have caused one.22 The answer depends on what intent must reach, the question taken up in the earlier discussion of single and dual intent. An actor who knows that another rejects contacts that others would tolerate is judged by that knowledge and not by the objective standard.23 The cases in this section involve a different mistake.
An exam stem that stresses the defendant's honest belief that the land, the hat, or the animal was the defendant's own describes a mistake about entitlement, and the intent element is met. A stem in which the defendant had no idea that the plaintiff was in the cage, behind the door, or in the path describes a mistake about the consequence, and the analysis ends at intent.