Concept
Harmful or Offensive Contact
Battery
Harmful or Offensive Contact
Intent supplies half of a battery. The other half is a contact of the right kind, and the Restatement (Second) of Torts states the two halves together: the actor must act intending to cause a harmful or offensive contact with the person of the other or a third person, or an imminent apprehension of such a contact,1 and a harmful contact (§13(b)) or an offensive contact (§18(1)(b)) with the person of the other must directly or indirectly result.2 The earlier sections covered the intent half. This one covers the result half.
The two halves must fit together. A driver who looks away from the road and gets in an accident acts voluntarily and causes a contact, but she does not act with purpose or substantial certainty that a harmful or offensive contact will result. Her act may be negligent, yet it is not an intentional tort.3
The result half needs a filter because people touch one another deliberately all the time. It would make little sense to let Jones sue every subway passenger who jostles her at rush hour; that contact is an accepted fact of city life. Courts separate such accepted contacts from actionable batteries by requiring that the defendant intend to cause a harmful or offensive contact.4
The filter works in three steps. Harmful contact is defined by what a touch does to the body, and its threshold is low. Offensive contact is defined by dignity and judged objectively. Two further features, which surprise many students, follow from what the tort protects: the plaintiff need not have been aware of the contact, and need not prove actual loss. Battery reflects the basic right to have one’s body left alone, and the contact itself invades that right.5
Harmful Contact
Harm has its own definition, and it is broader than the word suggests. Under §15, bodily harm is any physical impairment of the condition of another’s body, or physical pain or illness.6 The definition names three things a contact can do: impair the body’s condition, cause pain, or cause illness. Each describes the plaintiff’s physical state, so the harmful branch asks what the touch did to the body. How the plaintiff felt about being touched belongs to the offensive branch.
The threshold is low. Harmful suggests broken arms and black eyes, but a great deal less will do.7 A cut, a bruise, or a burn counts however slight, as do illness and physical pain; emotional pain does not. Even an impairment that turns out to be beneficial qualifies.8
Horton v. Suzuki shows how modest the injury can be. Horton’s instructor struck him on the cheek after karate class had been dismissed. The blow cut the inside of his mouth, the cut became infected, and his medical expenses came to $1,500. The court found a battery and awarded $7,500 in compensatory damages, $1,500 for medical expenses and $6,000 for pain and suffering, and held the total in conformity with awards in battery cases involving minimal injuries.9
Two features make the low threshold workable. A plaintiff must show only that the body was impaired or pained, however slightly. And damages follow the injury: a minor harm brings little recovery, perhaps only nominal damages, yet the court still vindicates the plaintiff’s right to physical autonomy.10 The low threshold therefore keeps deliberate invasions of the body actionable at every level of harm without producing large liability for small ones.
At the other end of the scale, Trapp grabbed Miller’s phone on purpose and with such force that he dislocated her shoulder. The resulting contact was both offensive and harmful. It was enough that Trapp intended the contact with Miller, whether or not he meant the contact to be harmful or offensive.11 Because a person’s body includes objects closely connected to it, such as one held in the hand, grabbing a phone can be contact with the person; a later section develops that point.12
Injury alone does not make a battery, and the snowball shows why. A joker who throws a snowball at a tree acts voluntarily, but if a pedestrian unexpectedly steps into its path, the joker lacked purpose or substantial certainty that a harmful or offensive contact would result. The act may be negligent; it is not an intentional tort.13 Trapp, by contrast, intended the very contact that caused the harm.
A contact can be actionable without being harmful, and Fisher v. Carrousel Motor Hotel, Inc. is the standard example. Fisher was embarrassed when a plate was taken from his hand and he was told he could not be served because he was African American, and the court held that an offensive contact occurred.14 His injury was to his dignity and feelings. Section 15 counts physical pain but not emotional pain,15 so the harmful branch did not apply, the offensive branch carried the claim, and the court allowed damages for his mental suffering even though he had no physical injury.16
Two opposite errors follow from missing this line. One treats humiliation or fright as bodily harm and so mislabels the branch. The other assumes that a plaintiff with no physical injury has no claim, which ignores the offensive branch.
Offensive Contact
A plaintiff who suffers no bodily harm can still be battered, because the Restatement’s second kind of result is an offensive contact with the person of the other.18 Section 19 defines it: a bodily contact is offensive if it offends a reasonable sense of personal dignity.19 The harmful branch asks what a touch does to the body; this branch asks what it does to the person’s dignity. Battery protects both interests. It reflects the basic right to have one’s body left alone, and it also deters minor but offensive contacts that can precipitate breaches of the peace.20
The standard is objective. An actor is not liable for a contact that society regards as acceptable, even when the victim turns out to be hypersensitive and is truly offended. And an actor who makes a contact a reasonable person would find offensive cannot defend by saying she meant no offense or did not realize the victim would be offended.21 Put another way, offensive contact is contact that a person of ordinary sensibilities would not consent to, and the question is whether that person would consent, not whether the particular victim would.22
The reason is that an actor must be able to judge a contact before she makes it. Suppose Smith goes around slapping backs at an office party. Jones may find it obnoxious, but Cimino may be flattered. If offensiveness depended on each plaintiff’s private reaction, Smith could not know whether her conduct was tortious until she saw the response. An objective definition lets her make that judgment in advance.23
Ordinary contacts therefore fall outside the tort. If Smith taps Jones on the shoulder to tell her she dropped a glove, Smith may reasonably expect that the touch is acceptable to Jones, as it would be to most of us.24 A tap on the shoulder to get someone’s attention is a common example of a touch that is not offensive.25
The facts of Wallace v. Rosen put that example to work. During a fire drill, Rosen told Wallace, “you’ve got to get moving because this is a fire drill.” Wallace testified that Rosen pushed her and that she slipped and fell down the stairs. Rosen denied pushing her but admitted touching her back. The trial court refused Wallace’s requested instruction on civil battery, the jury found for IPS and Rosen on the negligence count, and Wallace appealed.26 The two accounts mark the line the objective test draws. If a factfinder credits Rosen, the contact was a touch to get someone moving, the kind the shoulder tap illustrates. If it credits Wallace, the contact was a push.
Courts have found offensive touching in conduct far from the shoulder tap: taking hold of a man’s coat to demand satisfaction for an insult, spitting in his face, forcibly removing his hat, attempting to search his pockets, touching a woman’s private parts, and a stranger’s touching a woman on the buttocks.27 The spitting case, Alcorn v. Mitchell, explains why the law treats such touches as torts. The court called the act one of the greatest indignity, highly provocative of retaliation by force, and said the law should afford substantial protection against such outrages through liberal damages, so that the public tranquillity may be preserved by saving the necessity of resort to personal violence as the only means of redress.28 Offensive acts are particularly likely to provoke retaliation, which is why a battery suit both deters them and gives the person affronted a civilized alternative to retaliation.29
The dignity at stake extends beyond the skin. In Fisher v. Carrousel Motor Hotel, Inc., a customer was embarrassed when a plate was taken from his hand and he was told he could not be served because he was African American, and the court held that an offensive contact occurred.30 The result fits the rule that a person’s body includes things in contact or closely connected with it, such as clothing or an object held in the hand, so that a contact with them can be a contact with the person.31
Courts weigh the nature of the contact. Grabbing a plate from someone while making racial insults is more offensive than closing a door on him, and smoke blown in someone’s face is more offensive than a door closing that was characterized as rude and abrupt.32 In Gordon, the court read Fisher to mean that the offensive nature of the contact, not its extent, makes the contact actionable.33
Wishnatsky marks the opposite boundary. The plaintiff there opened a door and entered an office without knocking, and when the defendant closed the door, the plaintiff was pushed into the hallway. The court found no offensive contact because the plaintiff was unduly sensitive and a reasonable person would not have been offended.34
Prior dealings change what a reasonable person would find offensive. Suppose Burgess and Munoz routinely engage in horseplay at work, including backslapping, arm locks, and bear hugs. A stranger would undoubtedly find such contacts offensive, but Burgess and Munoz expect them from each other, and Burgess would be justified, given their previous interactions, in inferring that Munoz will not find them offensive. The same contacts would offend the reasonable sense of personal dignity of a new employee.35
Offensiveness and consent are two views of one question. A person of ordinary sensibilities would not consent to the unwanted kiss or the grope on a crowded bus, which is why those contacts are standard examples of the offensive.36 Consent also works in the other direction. Even when a contact is harmful or aggressive, the plaintiff must still prove he did not consent, so a man who agrees to box a former heavyweight champion for one round as part of a casino act cannot later sue for the blows.37 Consent has limits too. Horton may have consented to a certain amount of harmful or offensive contact during karate instruction, but nothing in the record showed he consented to being struck on the cheek by his instructor after class was dismissed.38 What counts as consent needs its own discussion.
A related puzzle is whether a plaintiff’s own objection can turn an otherwise ordinary contact into an offensive one; see Richmond v. Fiske and Kumar v. Gate Gourmet Inc. The objective standard is where an answer should start.
Awareness and Damages
The elements of battery ask what contact resulted from the defendant’s act. They do not ask what the plaintiff noticed, and they do not ask how much the plaintiff lost. Section 13(b) requires that a harmful contact directly or indirectly result, §18(1)(b) requires the same of an offensive contact, and §19 measures offense by a reasonable sense of personal dignity.45 Two consequences follow: a plaintiff can be battered without knowing it, and a plaintiff can win without proving a measurable loss.
The tort is the contact, so the plaintiff need not have been aware of it when it happened.46 Battery protects the right to have one’s body left alone, and an unpermitted contact invades that right at the moment it occurs, whether or not the plaintiff registers it. An awareness requirement would also leave least protected the people most exposed to unnoticed touching: the sleeping, the sedated, and the unconscious. A surgeon who unnecessarily touches patients in inappropriate places while they are under anesthesia commits a battery against each one, and a patient who never realizes it can still recover.47
The same principle governs an operation performed without consent. A court deciding whether such an operation was a battery stated the rule this way: any unauthorized touching of a person’s body that is not privileged is a battery in a civil action, and proof of wrongful intent or negligence is unnecessary when the contact itself is unlawful, although the absence of malice may be considered in assessing damages.48 The intent the tort requires is intent to cause the contact, as the earlier sections showed, and not an evil motive. Whether a particular operation was privileged is a separate question.
Offensiveness is measured at the time of the contact. The objective test exists so that an actor can judge a contact before making it, and judging offense in hindsight would turn every welcome contact into a potential tort whenever a relationship soured.49 A kiss on a sleeping cheek shows the point in both directions.
Damages follow the same logic. A plaintiff who proves the contact has proved the tort, and the size of the harm governs only the size of the recovery. A minor harm yields little, or only nominal damages, but the court still vindicates the plaintiff’s right to physical autonomy.50 Where the contact does cause loss, compensatory damages are available. In Horton the court awarded $1,500 for medical expenses and $6,000 for pain and suffering, and it noted that punitive damages are also available in civil assault and battery cases, although the trial court there denied them and the denial was not appealed.51
For an offensive contact that leaves no physical mark, Fisher supplies the rule. Damages for mental suffering are recoverable in a case of willful battery without a showing of physical injury, because the basis of the action is the unpermitted and intentional invasion of the plaintiff’s person and not the actual harm done to the body.52 The court had earlier refused to adopt a free-standing tort of intentional interference with peace of mind, but that refusal did not matter, since recovery for mental suffering remains available when an assault and battery is proved.53 The battery is the cause of action, and the mental suffering measures what the battery cost.
On an exam, find the battery and note that nominal damages are available. Do not conclude that no tort occurred because the plaintiff’s loss was small or because the plaintiff never knew of the contact.