Concept
The Person and Connected Objects
Battery
The Person and Connected Objects
A battery requires an offensive contact with the person of the other, directly or indirectly, and the person reaches past the skin.1 The Restatement adds that a bodily contact is offensive when it offends a reasonable sense of personal dignity.2 Neither rule says where the person ends. The comment to §18, which the Texas Supreme Court applied in Fisher v. Carrousel Motor Hotel, Inc., supplies the answer: unpermitted and intentional contact with anything so connected with the body as to be customarily regarded as part of the person is actionable as an offensive contact with the person. Clothing, a cane, and anything directly grasped by the hand are so intimately connected with the body that they are universally regarded as part of it.3
Fisher, a NASA mathematician, was in the buffet line at a one-day meeting in the Brass Ring Club of Houston's Carrousel Motor Hotel when the club's manager, Flynn, snatched the plate from his hand and shouted that he, a Black man, could not be served there.4 Flynn never touched Fisher's body, and Fisher did not claim to have feared injury. He testified instead that the act, in front of his associates, left him highly embarrassed and hurt.5 The jury awarded damages for the humiliation, but the trial court entered judgment for the defendants, and the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed on the ground that no assault had occurred: there was no physical contact and no evidence of fear or apprehension of contact.6
The Texas Supreme Court rejected that reasoning because it ran two torts together. Assault concerns apprehension of a contact, and Fisher had none. But a battery can exist without an assault, and actual physical contact with the body is unnecessary so long as the defendant touches clothing or an object closely identified with the body.7 Flynn's forceful dispossession of the plate in an offensive manner was therefore a battery. The court built that holding on earlier decisions that refused to confine battery to the skin. In Morgan v. Loyacomo, a store manager who suspected a customer of shoplifting forcibly seized a package from under her arm and opened it, and the Mississippi court held that knocking or snatching anything from a plaintiff's hand, or touching anything connected with the person, in a rude or insolent manner is enough.8 In S.H. Kress & Co. v. Brashier, also cited in Fisher, the defendant snatched a book from the plaintiff's hand, dispossessing her and causing humiliation and indignity, and was held to have committed an assault or trespass upon the person.9 Each formulation still requires that the contact be made in a rude or offensive manner, so a touch to a held object must offend a reasonable sense of dignity under the objective test.10
Both halves of the rule have a reason behind them. The tort reaches connected objects because of what battery protects: the right to have one's body left alone by others and, secondarily, the deterrence of minor offensive contacts that can precipitate breaches of the peace.11 A plate wrenched from a diner's hand before a room of colleagues delivers the same insult as a shove, and the diner feels it as aimed at himself. For the same reason, Fisher could recover for mental suffering without physical injury, because the action rests on the unpermitted and intentional invasion of the person and not on harm to the body.12 Limiting the extension to objects customarily regarded as part of the person keeps the rule workable. If everything the plaintiff owned counted as the person, battery would swallow the torts that protect property, and a defendant could not tell in advance which contacts were safe.
Courts have applied the same reasoning to a range of held, worn, and ridden objects. Striking a cane, as in Respublica v. De Longchamps, is the classic example. The decisions collected with it include Clark v. Downing (striking the horse the plaintiff was riding), Fisher (grabbing at the plaintiff's plate), and Reynolds v. MacFarlane (taking a ten-dollar bill loosely held by the plaintiff employee).13 Clothing belongs on the same list, so pulling a person's coat lapels or knocking off a hat qualifies when the contact is offensive.14 In each of these cases the object was held, worn, or ridden at the moment of contact, and that tie to the body is what makes the contact a contact with the person.
A February 2016 performance test builds a parallel problem on Fisher. In the test file's Franklin Supreme Court decision, Polk v. Eugene, Polk, a physician at a one-day medical conference at the Hills Club, was about to be served at a buffet luncheon when Eugene, a club member, snatched the plate from his hand and shouted that Polk could not be served because of his race.15 Polk was not touched and did not fear injury, but he was highly embarrassed before his associates, and the jury awarded compensatory and punitive damages.16 The Franklin Court of Appeal reversed because no physical contact occurred. The Supreme Court held that actual contact with the body is unnecessary so long as the defendant touches clothing or an object closely identified with the body.17 Its authority was Riley v. Adams, in which the defendant waited until a young woman had walked several blocks from the store, ran up, took her bag from her by force, searched it, and held the articles up to public view. The court there treated snatching anything from a plaintiff's hand, or touching anything connected with the person, in an offensive manner as an offensive touching.18
Polk tracks Fisher almost step for step, and the difference is the jurisdiction. Fisher is Texas law resting on Morgan and S.H. Kress, while Polk is the controlling Franklin precedent resting on Riley, so an answer built from the test file cites Polk and Riley. The point sheet applies that authority to Trapp, who grabbed Miller's phone from her hand with enough force to dislocate her shoulder. It treats the contact as offensive because Trapp made unpermitted and intentional contact with a phone so connected to Miller's body, being in her hand, as to be regarded as part of her person.19 The dislocation also makes the contact harmful, a point the earlier subsection on harmful contact developed, but the phone alone would have carried the offensive-contact branch.
The extension stops where the object is only loosely associated with the person. If Lopez kicks the fender of Chu's vintage Mustang, the contact requirement is probably not met, even if Chu is sitting in the back seat.20 A Washington appellate court reached a similar result in Childress v. Boeing Aerospace Operations, Inc., holding that a plaintiff's claim that a security guard struck the hood of his car during an argument about illegal parking did not state a cause of action for battery.21 A car belongs to its owner and may matter a great deal to that owner, but ownership does not decide the question. The question is whether people ordinarily regard the object as part of the person. A vehicle, unlike a plate in the hand or a coat on the shoulders, is not regarded that way even when its owner is inside it. The test is customary regard: the closer and more intimately an object is held or worn, the stronger the claim, and the farther it sits from the hand and body, the more the grievance resembles damage to property.
An answer to a problem of this kind should not stop at the observation that the defendant never touched the plaintiff's body. It should identify what the plaintiff was holding or wearing, ask whether the defendant's contact with it was intentional and offensive, and argue from how closely the object is connected with the body and how it is customarily regarded. A plate, a phone, a cane, a coat, or a hat held or worn at the moment of contact makes that argument easy, while an object the plaintiff merely owns makes it hard.