Concept
Imminence
Assault
Imminence
Assault reaches a threat that is about to be carried out and stops short of one that will be carried out later. Section 29(1) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts states the timing requirement: to make the actor liable for an assault, the actor must put the other in apprehension of an imminent contact.1 The common law drew the same line long before. Blackstone described assault as an attempt to beat another without touching him, as when a man lifts his cane or his fist in a threatening manner or strikes and misses, and he called it an inchoate violence “amounting considerably higher than bare threats.”2
The earlier subsections asked what the plaintiff must expect, whose person the contact must reach, and how the plaintiff's courage and the defendant's apparent ability bear on that expectation. This section asks when the expected contact is due. A plaintiff who reasonably anticipates a blow without significant delay is inside the tort. A plaintiff who has only been told that harm may come at some later time is outside it, however hostile the speaker. Two questions follow: what imminent means, and how the defendant's distance and preparations affect it. Section 29(2) answers the second for an act that is only a step toward a contact still to come.3
Imminent Versus Future Contact
Imminent does not mean instantaneous, and it does not mean merely soon. Read as instantaneous, the word would excuse an attacker whose swing the plaintiff watched from several steps away. Read as soon, it would make every promise of later violence a tort. The Restatement reads it to mean that the contact will follow without significant delay. The defendant need not be within striking distance, and a pointed weapon need not be ready for instant discharge. It is enough that the defendant can reach the plaintiff almost at once, or can ready the weapon in a very short interval.4
Picture a defendant swinging an axe at a plaintiff from four feet away, then through a window, then across a room, then from the end of the street. The first position is an assault on any view, because the plaintiff must expect the blow with no significant delay. By the last, the plaintiff has time to act before any blow could land. The standard draws no mileage line between the two. The middle positions turn on how quickly the defendant could close the gap, and those close cases go to the jury, whose practical sense of what would lead a reasonable person to expect a blow at once will produce a just result in most of them.5
Imminence has three practical dimensions, and a threat that fails any one of them is not an assault:
- The threat must be immediate in time, so a statement that the speaker is going home for a rifle and will return to kill the plaintiff is not an assault.6
- The threat must be close in space, so a threat made over the telephone is not an assault.7
- The threat must be actual rather than potential, so a remark that the speaker would tear out the listener's eyes if the speaker were a violent man is not an assault.8
The three dimensions usually travel together, because a threat that is far off in time is often far off in space as well. Suppose Brandon telephones Amber, identifies himself as a professional assassin, says he expects to be in her neighborhood tomorrow, and adds that he has made a hundred similar calls and there are now a hundred dead law students. Amber is terrified, and there is still no assault, because the threatened contact is not imminent.9 Distance alone settles less than it seems to, since a defendant can close it. The next subsection follows that problem.
Three reasons support the requirement. First, until a battery is imminent, the plaintiff's worry concerns a contact that might happen later rather than one about to happen, and a person warned of later harm has time to seek help or stay away.10 Second, until the contact is about to occur, the defendant's intention, and so the blame that belongs to it, is uncertain. A threat of future violence may reflect a vague and changeable plan or mere braggadocio, and imminence strengthens the inference that the defendant means to act.11 Third, the courts could have their hands full with claims if liability reached concern over potential future batteries as well as suffering caused by an imminent threat.12 The line has a cost, because some future threats are reprehensible and genuinely unsettling. The law accepts that cost because it cannot protect everyone from everything.13
Seriousness, credibility, and an offer of escape do not cure a timing problem. Wilson shakes his fist and tells the track coach that he will see to it that the coach never walks again if Ashford runs the anchor leg of tomorrow's relay. The coach could avoid the harm by obeying, but that option would not by itself prevent an assault, since Wilson has no right to dictate the lineup. Conditional threats are taken up later in this chapter.14 The claim almost certainly fails anyway, because Wilson's words describe harm that would follow the coach's decision tomorrow and not a blow about to land.15 The conditional form and the timing are separate questions, and the second one decides this case.
Plaintiffs sometimes try to stretch imminence with surrounding circumstances, and Brower v. Ackerley shows why that usually fails. A Washington appellate court in 1997 considered a campaign of nighttime telephone calls to the home of a civic activist, in which the caller said he would find out where the plaintiff lived and beat him. The plaintiff accepted that words alone ordinarily do not make an assault, and argued that calls to his home at night suggested that the caller was stalking him. The court denied the claim because the threat was not immediate. Words together with other acts or circumstances can support an assault, but only if they put the plaintiff in reasonable apprehension of an imminent contact.16 The circumstances made the threat more menacing and more believable. They could not make a beating by a caller who had not yet found the plaintiff something about to happen.
A threat that falls short of imminence may still support recovery under a different tort, and State Rubbish Collectors Ass'n v. Siliznoff shows how. An inspector for a rubbish-collectors' association told a driver that he would be beaten up, and that his truck tires would be cut or the truck burned, unless he came to a board meeting that night and made arrangements about a disputed account. After two hours of discussion the driver agreed to pay and signed notes. He testified that he was scared, became ill, vomited, and stayed away from work for several days. The association argued that every threat concerned action in the future and that none threatened immediate harm. The California Supreme Court held that a cause of action exists when a person, without privilege, intentionally subjects another to the mental suffering that comes from serious threats to the other's physical well-being, whether or not the threats amount to a technical assault.17 Siliznoff shows the alternative to stretching imminence, which is to rest the claim on a tort that does not demand it. That tort, intentional infliction of emotional distress, has its own elements and is taught elsewhere.
When an exam stem describes a terrifying, credible, even detailed threat of violence, ask one more question before allowing the assault claim: when was the contact supposed to occur, and from where? If the answer is tomorrow, next month, or after the speaker travels to the plaintiff, the claim fails at imminence however sincere the terror and however deliberate the threat, and the stem probably points toward the emotional distress tort. If the answer is that the defendant was close enough to reach the plaintiff almost at once, the element is met without any need for the blow to be instantaneous.
Distance and Preparation
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 29(2) applies the imminence requirement to conduct that looks like preparation. An act intended by the actor as a step toward the infliction of a future contact, and recognized by the other as such, does not make the actor liable for an assault.19 The exclusion has two parts. The actor must intend the act as a step toward a contact still to come, and the plaintiff must recognize it as one. Because the second part turns on the plaintiff's reading of the situation, the exclusion falls away when the plaintiff reasonably takes the same act to signal a contact about to arrive, and the ordinary elements then decide the claim.20
The exclusion tracks the reasons for demanding imminence. Preparation is consistent with plans the defendant never carries out, and until a battery is about to happen the plaintiff's concern is a battery that might occur in the future, not one that is about to occur now.21 A threat that is only a step toward a later contact is left to other remedies. Assault waits for the moment when the plaintiff can reasonably expect the contact at once.
Holding an object that could become a weapon is the plainest form of preparation. In Penny v. State, a Georgia decision from 1901, the court said that a jury could find that holding a rock, without more, was not enough.22 A rock in the hand shows that the defendant could throw it and not that the defendant will, so the plaintiff has no basis to expect a contact about to occur. A threat changes the picture. In Castiglione v. Galpin the defendant had said he would shoot the plaintiffs if they turned off his water for nonpayment. They testified that his shotgun was aimed at them, and he claimed it stayed in his lap, and the court treated their apprehension as reasonable on either version.23 The weapon there was joined to an express threat, so the plaintiffs' expectation of being shot rested on what they saw and heard. Words and circumstances work together in the same way under § 31, taken up later in this chapter.24
The clearest way to see § 29(2) at work is to follow one defendant as the distance closes. A defendant who starts running toward the plaintiff from a hundred yards away, throwing rocks as he comes, has not committed an assault at the first stride. State v. Davis, an 1840 North Carolina decision, is cited for placing the assault at the point where the defendant is close enough that the plaintiff's apprehension of imminent contact is reasonable.25 The early strides are what § 29(2) describes, an act toward a contact that still lies ahead, and the plaintiff recognizes it as such. The later throws are different, because the plaintiff now expects to be hit without significant delay. The same defendant, the same intent, and the same rocks fall on different sides of the line depending on how the plaintiff could reasonably read the situation at each moment.
No number of feet or yards marks the point, and the no-significant-delay standard supplies none. How soon a threat ripens depends on what the defendant is doing and how fast the defendant can reach the plaintiff.26 A defendant on a motorcycle, or one holding a rock within throwing range, crosses the line sooner than one on foot with nothing in hand, and close calls remain for the jury.
Closeness does not by itself supply what the act lacks. A defendant who stands three or four feet from the plaintiff and puckers and smacks his lips in a kissing sign, without touching her or moving to do so, is within reach, and the decision cited on the point treats leering alone as not enough.27 Distance answers only half of the imminence question, because the act must also be one that leads to a contact. The opposite pattern appears where the menace is real and the range is long. Robed Klan members carrying guns rode a shrimp boat around Galveston Bay from dock to dock, frightening Vietnamese fishermen and their families, in the litigation reported as Vietnamese Fishermen's Ass'n v. Knights of the K.K.K.28 Under the imminence rule, an assault claim from such a display would have to be built plaintiff by plaintiff, since each plaintiff must show that the boat's position and the display of guns led that plaintiff reasonably to expect a contact without significant delay. General menace along the shoreline is a threat of harm that may come later.
Telephone and electronic threats are distance in its modern form. In Marczeski v. Law a federal court in Connecticut treated a threat made by telephone or over the Internet as falling short of a civil assault.29 A threatening email or website posting gives the target no way to know whether the threat is imminent or whether the sender is anywhere nearby, so the recipient cannot reasonably expect contact without significant delay. Such a message is the kind of act § 29(2) describes, a step toward a contact that lies in the future and is recognized as such. The same logic leaves outside the tort the harassment of one player's avatar by another in an online game, because virtual space cannot supply a contact that is about to reach the player's own body.30
The medium is not the test, however. A court has held that threats from a telephone user one room away can constitute assault, which fits the rule, since a plaintiff who knows the speaker is one room away can reasonably expect the speaker to arrive at once.31 What the telephone and the keyboard usually remove is the plaintiff's basis for thinking the sender is close. A plaintiff who has that basis stands where any plaintiff stands facing a nearby defendant.
Exam answers go wrong in two directions. One student sees a defendant with a weapon and a stated plan and treats the threat as complete, forgetting that holding a rock or announcing a trip for a rifle describes capacity and intention without a contact about to arrive. Another sees a defendant far away and treats distance as a fixed bar, forgetting that the same defendant commits an assault once the gap closes or the weapon is readied. Both errors come from ceasing to ask what the plaintiff could reasonably expect at that moment.