Concept
Consent and Privilege
False imprisonment
Consent and Privilege
False imprisonment sits with assault and intentional infliction of emotional distress among the intentional torts to the person.1 The Restatement (Second) of Torts defines it by three requirements: the actor intends to confine another, the actor's act results in a confinement, and the other is conscious of the confinement or harmed by it.2 The earlier sections of this chapter worked through each of them. A plaintiff who proves all three has shown that someone was held on purpose, which is a serious charge but not yet a judgment, because the law excuses some intentional confinements.
Those excuses come in two kinds. Under the first, the plaintiff consented to the restraint. Under the second, the law creates a privilege without regard to consent, because the defendant's conduct serves some important and overriding social value even though it harms the plaintiff.3 A passenger who agreed to a ride, a merchant who holds a suspected thief for a quick check, and an officer with a warrant have each confined someone intentionally, and each may point to a fact that turns the confinement from wrongful to justified.
Where these questions fall in a lawsuit depends on the jurisdiction. New York's formulation in Parvi v. City of Kingston lists lack of consent and the absence of privilege among four elements the plaintiff must show.4 The more common treatment makes privilege an affirmative defense that the defendant must plead and prove, so that once the plaintiff shows an intentional confinement, the burden shifts to the defendant to prove legal justification.5
Mistake needs its own warning. A defendant's good-faith belief that the confinement is justified is no defense, and a mistake of identity is no excuse.6 Some privileges, however, are defined by the defendant's reasonable belief about a fact, and they protect the defendant even when the belief later proves wrong.7 The merchant's privilege is the leading example. This section takes up consent first, then the merchant's privilege, and then arrest and the other legal justifications.
Consent and Its Limits
Valid consent defeats a claim for false imprisonment. A person who agrees to enter a three-week drug treatment program cannot sue because the program kept him for three weeks, and a store clerk who agrees to stay in the security office to discuss a claimed theft cannot sue for the stay.8 Each plaintiff received the restraint he chose, so nothing was taken against his will.
Consent has limits, and most disputes about it turn on one of two questions: whether there was true consent, as opposed to coercion, and whether the defendant exceeded the scope of the consent freely given.9 Scope comes first. The clerk may have consented to a brief detention but not to five hours, and the drug user may have consented to three weeks of treatment but not to five months.10 Agreement to one restraint is not agreement to a longer or different one, because consent is the plaintiff's decision about a particular restraint and the defendant cannot stretch it.
Consent can also run out, and when it does, the defendant owes release. In Noguchi v. Nakamura, a woman who had told her boyfriend she no longer wanted to see him agreed to ride with him only to the store and back. When they returned to her parents' house and she opened the car door, he suddenly drove off, which made it dangerous for her to leave the moving car. The court recognized that the driver had a duty to let her out if her limited consent had expired.11 That duty matters because an actor who must release another, or supply a means of escape, and refuses with the intent to confine has committed a sufficient act of confinement.12 Expired consent can therefore supply the act itself and does more than remove the defense.
The same two questions arise in a haunted-house problem. Noah slams the door on Kristy in a small room that has only one door and no doorknob, and he refuses her demand, “Let me out!”13 Whether Kristy is confined without consent depends on what she agreed to when she entered and on whether her demand ended that agreement in a way Noah had to respect.
The second question is whether the plaintiff's yes was a choice at all. A threat, the seizure of property, or an assertion of authority can overcome a person's will without any touching, and a plaintiff who yields to one stays or goes along. If that yielding counted as consent, every confinement by pressure would end with a plaintiff who did what the defendant demanded, and the defense would swallow the tort. The law therefore separates agreement from submission under duress: submission under duress makes consent ineffective to bar an action for false imprisonment.14 A customer who walks to the store office after security guards confiscate her purse goes under duress, not by choice.15 So does a plaintiff whose belongings are in the hands of a defendant who says he will leave with them unless she comes along. Whether she was coerced is a question of fact.16
Parvi v. City of Kingston applies the same principle to police. Parvi told the officers he had no place to go, and the court said that left him one alternative, arrest, which was hardly the stuff of which consent is formed, particularly because he was, to a degree for the jury to measure, under the influence of alcohol. The court also weighed the refusal of the men's request to be released at a place they chose, and testimony that one officer alone picked the place they were taken, a place the police had used before for others who were being “run out of town” because they showed signs of intoxication.17
Apparent agreement can be coerced too. In Meints v. Huntington, a mob had assaulted the plaintiff's son, and the Eighth Circuit held that the defendants' words and acts coerced the plaintiff's apparent consent to go along.
Scope and coercion decide most consent disputes. The privileges the law supplies without regard to consent come next, beginning with the merchant's.
Shopkeeper's Privilege
Detention of a suspected shoplifter is a recurring false imprisonment problem, and the Restatement answers it with a specific privilege. One who reasonably believes that another has tortiously taken a chattel upon his premises, or has failed to make due cash payment for a chattel purchased or service rendered there, is privileged, without arresting the other, to detain him on the premises for the time necessary for a reasonable investigation of the facts.19 The privilege is not limited to police or security officers; a store manager or a clerk may exercise it.20
The privilege exists because shoplifting puts the merchant in a dilemma. If the merchant has the suspect arrested, he may be liable for false imprisonment when no theft occurred or a jury fails to convict, but if he does nothing and lets the suspect walk out, the merchandise and all hope of proof disappear.21 Shoplifting costs merchants hundreds of millions of dollars a year, which the public pays, and a short detention lets the merchant learn the facts before choosing between those two bad options.22
Courts reached this result indirectly at first. Where the defendant acted in good faith, they struggled to deny liability, often by finding that the plaintiff had consented to stay or by creating a special privilege to detain on the premises without arrest. Most states have since enacted statutes that give the shopkeeper a limited privilege to detain such persons for a reasonable time to investigate.23 A typical statute provides:
A merchant may detain a person for a reasonable time for the purpose of conducting an investigation in a reasonable manner whenever the merchant has probable cause to believe the person to be detained is attempting to unlawfully take or has unlawfully taken merchandise from the merchant's premises.24
The scope of the privilege varies from state to state, and two variables matter most. The first is force: the Restatement allows reasonable force short of bodily harm, preceded by a request to stay when practicable, and a privilege that allowed no force at all might give the merchant little real benefit. The second is what counts as “reasonable grounds” or “probable cause” to detain a shopper, and whether the court or the jury decides.25 As with other privileges, the merchant carries the burden: once the plaintiff shows an intentional confinement, the defendant must prove the justification.26
The privilege has two halves. One is a justification, the merchant's reasonable belief that goods were taken or not paid for. The other is a set of limits on time, place, and manner that keep the detention an investigation. The next subsections take them in that order.
Reasonable Belief
The merchant's belief must rest on something a reasonable person would treat as a sign of theft, and a sincere hunch is not enough.27 That fits the rule that a good-faith belief in one's own justification is no defense.28 Coblyn v. Kennedy's, Inc. puts the question in a concrete setting: an employee grabbed the arm of an elderly man who was wearing an ascot he had bought elsewhere and told him to see the manager, and the privilege depended on whether the employee had reasonable grounds to think the man had taken anything.
Courts measure reasonableness objectively. In Moore v. Pay'N Save Corp., a Washington court borrowed probable-cause reasoning from criminal cases to decide whether the grounds were reasonable.29 An objective test gives the privilege content. Without it, a merchant could justify any detention by announcing a suspicion afterward.
Visible facts can supply reasonable grounds. In a standard problem, a customer named Li leaves with jeans that still carry their security tags. Because the tags remained on the jeans, store staff had reasonable cause to believe Li had taken them without paying, and they probably had a sufficient basis to detain her for a reasonable period to investigate. The reasonable length depends on the facts of each case, but 20 minutes is probably reasonable to resolve most shoplifting disputes.30
Reasonable belief is not the same as correct belief. The privilege is framed around what the merchant reasonably believes, and privileges of that kind protect a defendant whose belief later proves mistaken.31 The merchant's dilemma would return if suspicion had to be proved right before the investigation could begin. That is a different question from the intent element, where a good-faith belief that the confinement is justified is no defense; the privilege protects only a belief that is reasonable.32
Time, Place, and Manner
The privilege lasts “for the time necessary for a reasonable investigation,” and it covers detention “on the premises.”33 When the investigation is finished or the suspicion is dispelled, the privilege ends. In Turner v. Hudson Salvage, Inc., a Mississippi court found it unreasonable for a second employee to detain a customer after a first employee had questioned her and decided she had not stolen shoes.34
Reasonableness is often a jury question. In Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Freeman, the Fourth Circuit reversed a verdict for the plaintiff because the trial court's instruction was too narrow, and it directed that the instruction submit the reasonableness of the detention to the jury along with the facts that would constitute reasonable grounds. In the Bonkowski case, the jury's task came in two steps: first, whether the merchant's agent reasonably believed the plaintiff had unlawfully taken goods held for sale, and second, if so, whether the investigation that followed was reasonable under all the circumstances. If the defendant did not come within the privilege, the jury could find a false arrest.35
The Restatement's wording also separates a detention from an arrest: the merchant may detain “without arresting the other.”36 Force raises the hardest manner question. The Restatement would allow reasonable force short of bodily harm, but states differ on whether any force is permitted.37
Who May Invoke It
The Restatement speaks of a taking of a chattel “upon his premises” and of a failure to pay for goods or services “rendered there,” so the privilege belongs to the merchant, and the typical statute likewise speaks of the merchant's premises.38 It is not confined to police or security officers, and a store manager or a clerk may use it. A shopper who watches a stranger slip a scarf into a handbag, follows her, grabs her arm, and orders her back has no premises or merchandise of her own at stake, and she falls outside the privilege however sound her suspicion.
The second and fourth steps decide most disputes. Two mistakes recur. One treats the plaintiff's innocence as proof that the privilege never existed, which ignores the rule on reasonable belief. The other treats any suspicion as enough, which ignores that the belief must be reasonable and that the privilege lasts only as long as the investigation does.
Arrest and Other Justifications
Arrest is the justification most people think of first. The Restatement treats custody under an asserted legal authority as a means of confinement, so a person who is arrested has been confined.40 Whether that confinement is also a tort depends on whether the asserted authority was real. In many circumstances the law privileges an arrest made on a warrant or on reasonable suspicion that the person committed a crime, and where the privilege does not apply, the arrest is actionable false imprisonment, which courts often call false arrest.41 The burden is the defendant's: once the plaintiff shows an intentional confinement, the defendant must prove the legal justification.42
The full privilege to arrest is too intricate for this section. The Second Restatement devotes some 34 sections to it, distinguishing arrests by private persons from arrests by police officers, arrests with warrants from arrests without, and arrests for felonies from arrests for lesser offenses, all against a background of constitutional guarantees and statutory variation.43 Two propositions are enough here. A false arrest claim will not lie when the officer has a valid warrant or probable cause to believe an offense was committed and that the person arrested committed it.44 An arrest made without legal authority is false arrest and therefore false imprisonment.45
Enright v. Groves shows that an officer can have a reason to approach a person and still lack authority to arrest. Groves demanded Mrs. Enright's driver's license and arrested her when she refused. The court held that the demand was not a lawful order and that refusing it was not an offense in itself, so Groves was not entitled to use force in arresting her, and his defense, which rested on an arrest for and conviction of a specific offense, failed as a matter of law.46 The general rule is that conviction of the crime for which one is specifically arrested is a complete defense. The case shows the limit of that rule: an arrest for refusing an unauthorized demand has no offense beneath it, and no later conviction can supply authority the officer did not have when he acted.
The two arrests differ in one respect only: whether the authority the officer asserted existed when he acted.
Arrest is only one justification. Restraint or detention that is reasonable under the circumstances and in time and manner, imposed to prevent another from inflicting personal injuries or damaging real or personal property in one's lawful possession or custody, is not unlawful.47 Sindle v. New York City Transit Authority applied that rule to a school bus driver who held student-passengers after damage was done to the bus. A school bus driver is entrusted with the care of his student-passengers and with public property, so he must take reasonable measures for the safety and protection of both. The Court of Appeals reversed and sent the case back for a new trial, because the reasonableness of the driver's actions, as bearing on justification, depends on all the circumstances. At a minimum those include the need to protect the persons and property in his charge, the duty to aid the investigation and apprehension of those inflicting damage, the manner and place of the occurrence, and the feasibility and practicality of other courses of action.48
The rule has two parts, and each has its own logic. The purpose requirement follows from responsibility: someone in charge of people or property cannot always wait for help while harm is under way, so the law lets that person restrain a wrongdoer to stop it. The time-and-manner requirement keeps the privilege from outgrowing its reason, because the need to prevent harm justifies only as much restraint as that need requires. The feasibility factor shows the second part at work: if a milder step would have protected the bus and its passengers, a jury has a basis to find the chosen restraint unreasonable.
Medical settings draw the same line between justified and unjustified holds. Patients have been detained for unpaid bills or unsigned billing forms, and psychiatric and other patients who show emotional problems have been confined without justifiable cause. A patient who has not been lawfully committed to an appropriate facility has no obligation to stay, and physical or coercive efforts to restrict movement may be false imprisonment.49 In Williams v. Smith, a doctor called to make an emergency evaluation diagnosed a woman as mentally ill and had her detained, and no false imprisonment lay because the commitment procedures were followed, even if the diagnosis was negligent. In Riffe v. Armstrong, a hospital held a woman for two hours while its staff began involuntary commitment proceedings because she was agitated and had threatened suicide, and the court found the hold justified by her condition on arrival. Foshee v. Health Mgt. Assocs. came out the other way: a nurse physically prevented a patient from leaving a psychiatric facility and coerced the patient into signing voluntary admission papers without following the statutory procedures, and that was false imprisonment. A commitment statute is the source of the authority, so a hold is justified only to the extent that its procedures were followed.
The third step decides most disputes. Each case in this section began with a real problem that called for some response, whether a loose dog, a damaged bus, or an agitated patient. The existence of the problem settles nothing. The answer depends on whether the restraint the defendant chose matched the authority or need that the law recognizes.