Concept
Intent or Recklessness
Intentional infliction of emotional distress
Intent or Recklessness
Section 46(1) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts imposes liability on a defendant whose extreme and outrageous conduct “intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another.”1 The adverbs modify causes, and the object of that verb is the distress, so the defendant’s state of mind has to point at the distress itself. A defendant who deliberately did something and never contemplated its emotional effect has not met the element. The conduct element asked what the defendant did and measured it against community standards of decency; this element asks what the defendant wanted or knew while doing it.
Comment i to § 46 states, and the cases generally recognize, three states of mind that satisfy the element: the defendant desires to inflict severe emotional distress; the defendant knows that such distress is certain, or substantially certain, to result; or the defendant acts recklessly in deliberate disregard of a high degree of probability that the distress will follow.2 The first two are intent and the third is recklessness. Below all three lies the foreseeable risk. Conduct that merely creates a foreseeable risk of harm is negligent or reckless depending on the size of the risk, but it is not an intentional tort,3 and this tort reaches the reckless end of that range while stopping short of negligence.4
The elements stand apart, and a plaintiff can satisfy one and lose on another. In Harris v. Jones the court called it crystal clear that Jones’ conduct was intentional, yet the claim failed because the evidence of severe distress was legally insufficient to go to the jury; severity is a necessary element of recovery and not merely a measure of damages.5 Many courts no longer demand physical symptoms as proof of severity, a point the later severity sections take up.6 The three subsections below cover purpose and substantial certainty, recklessness, and the limits on transferred intent.
Purpose or Substantial Certainty
Intent in this tort takes two forms. A defendant intends severe distress by desiring to inflict it, and also by knowing that it is certain, or substantially certain, to result from the conduct.7 Most decided cases fall under one of these two, because the defendant either desired the distress or knew it was substantially certain to occur.8
The law treats knowledge like purpose because in both cases the defendant has chosen the harm. A defendant who wants the distress has made it the goal. A defendant who knows it will follow has accepted it as the price of reaching some other goal. Motive therefore does not decide the question. A defendant who acts for a bet, a profit, or a laugh, and cares nothing about the plaintiff’s feelings, still intends a distress that he knows is substantially certain to follow. Revenge, protest, punishment, and even a wish to help may aggravate, mitigate, or excuse a wrong, but they answer a different question from whether the consequence was intended.9
Substantial certainty is a demanding standard. A foreseeable risk that distress may follow, however real, is not enough; that describes negligence or, at most, recklessness, which the next subsection takes up.10 The standard also looks at what this defendant desired or knew. A defendant who merely should have foreseen the distress is negligent, and negligence does not support the tort.11
Because defendants seldom announce a wish to cause suffering, plaintiffs prove this element circumstantially. The defendant’s conduct, read against the surroundings and what the defendant presumably knew and perceived, is evidence of intent, and the usual inference is that a person intends the natural and probable consequences of acts done with that awareness.12 Outrageousness supplies a second source of inference, since the requisite intent or recklessness may be inferred from the outrageousness of the acts themselves.13
Threats show why intent and outrageousness are so often proved together. In one reported case, union officials phoned a man and told him to rejoin the union or he might not live to regret it, and that, if he was unconcerned about his own safety, he might be concerned about his wife and children. The appellate court held that each statement, taken alone or as part of a course of conduct, was outrageous enough to state a claim.14 That holding concerns outrageousness, but a threat delivered to the plaintiff’s ear is aimed at the plaintiff’s fear.
What the defendant knew about the plaintiff matters as much as what the defendant did, because the certainty must be certainty that this plaintiff will suffer. In Taylor v. Vallelunga, a daughter who watched defendants beat her father sued for her own severe fright and lost at the pleading stage. Her complaint did not allege that defendants knew she was present and watching, that the beating was meant to distress her, or that they knew severe distress to her was substantially certain to result.15 A Restatement illustration shows what would have changed the result. C hates B and is friendly to B’s wife A. Knowing that A is sitting on her front porch watching, C stabs and kills B, and C is liable to A for the mental anguish, grief, and horror he causes.16 The violence is the same in both settings. C chose to act in front of a person whose anguish he knew would follow, while the Taylor defendants were not alleged to have known she was there.
Courts accordingly treat a murder or suicide as no tort against an eyewitness unless the act is directed at the witness or the defendant knew that severe distress was substantially certain to follow. In Mahnke v. Moore, the court overturned a demurrer where a father killed the child’s mother with a shotgun in the child’s presence, kept the child in the cottage with the body for a week, and then killed himself, spattering the child with his blood.17 Bystander recovery gets its own treatment in the third-party sections.
The stranger case is the hardest to prove. A state trooper’s conduct distresses a teenager’s family, but the trooper knew nothing about the teenager or whether she had a family. Could the family show that he acted for the purpose of causing them distress, or knowing that distress was substantially certain? In Catsouras v. Department of California Highway Patrol, the court found the allegations of intent sufficient to withstand a demurrer, and the case then settled before trial.18 The ruling decided only that such allegations could go forward, but it shows that a defendant’s ignorance of the plaintiff’s identity does not necessarily defeat a pleading of intent.
However the defendant’s aim is established, it must be an aim at the distress. Deliberately repossessing a car, ending a lease, or striking a blow is an intended act, but the plaintiff must still show that the defendant desired the distress, knew it was substantially certain, or acted in conscious disregard of a high probability of it.19 The last subsection returns to why intent to commit another tort cannot fill that gap.
Recklessness
Recklessness is the second route to the mental-state element, and most courts and the Restatement accept it. A defendant who is merely reckless (“willful and wanton”) is liable when there is a high probability that emotional distress will follow from the conduct and the defendant goes ahead in conscious disregard of that risk.21 Comment i states the same idea as acting “in deliberate disregard of a high degree of probability that the emotional distress will follow.”22 Recklessness sits one step below intent, because the defendant need not desire the distress or be certain of it, and one step above negligence, because the defendant must have perceived a high probability of it.
The definition has three working parts, and each marks a limit. The disregard must be deliberate, so a defendant who never noticed the danger has not disregarded it. The probability must be high, so the bare chance that someone might be upset does not qualify. And the probability must be of emotional distress. A driver who speeds through a crowded crossing may be reckless about physical injury, but this tort asks whether the defendant went ahead in conscious disregard of a high probability of distress.23 For most intentional torts, a risk of harm is not intent however large it is; this tort is unusual in treating reckless disregard as enough.24
Two reasons support reaching this middle state. A defendant who sees that severe distress is highly probable and goes ahead anyway has treated the plaintiff’s peace of mind as not worth protecting. And courts worry whether claimed distress is real. Where the defendant knew that severely upsetting the plaintiff was a highly probable result, there is some objective assurance that the injury is real, and the claim is reinforced by the social interest in deterring such conduct.25 Negligence offers neither. A driver who carelessly runs a red light and narrowly misses a pedestrian may badly frighten the pedestrian, but the circumstantial probability that the pedestrian was severely distressed is lower, and liability for the fright may be disproportionate to the driver’s fault.26
Chuy v. Philadelphia Eagles shows both halves of the rule. Section 46 does not recognize liability for mere negligent infliction of emotional distress, but reckless conduct causing emotional distress makes the actor as liable as if he had acted intentionally.27 The claim arose from remarks Dr. Nixon made about the plaintiff, Chuy. The challenge on appeal was that, unless Dr. Nixon was aware that his comments were substantially certain to cause Chuy severe distress, they could not be found reckless. The court rejected that argument. If Dr. Nixon’s statements were intentional, he need not have been aware of their natural and probable consequences; it was enough that Chuy’s distress was substantially certain to follow the rash statements. Intentionally propagating a falsehood whose natural and probable consequence is distress is equivalent, in comment i’s words, to deliberate disregard of a high degree of probability that the distress will follow, so the jury could find the remarks reckless.28
The court’s method is the lesson. It did not demand proof of what Dr. Nixon was thinking. It asked what intentionally spreading a falsehood naturally produces. That inference is generous to plaintiffs on proof, yet the opinion states plainly that mere negligence is not enough, so a defendant who only should have foreseen the distress remains outside the tort.
The line between intent and recklessness can be thin. Chuy discussed substantial certainty and then called the mental state reckless. The label rarely changes the outcome, because either state of mind satisfies the element. It matters only in a court that insists on intent, so an answer should state the majority rule and note that not every court accepts recklessness.29
What separates the two agents is the object of their awareness. Recklessness about whether the repossession was justified is a different thing from recklessness about the owner’s emotional state, and the tort asks only about the second.30 In practice the plaintiff proves that awareness from the setting, from what the defendant knew about the plaintiff, and from any statement of indifference, as with intent.
Limits on Transferred Intent
Tort law sometimes lends a defendant’s intent from one target to another. Under the doctrine of transferred intent, a defendant who intends to harm one person and instead harms another is treated as an intentional tortfeasor toward the second person. In the familiar example, A intends only an assault on B and shoots in his direction to frighten him, and the bullet unexpectedly strikes C; A’s intent to commit an assault can support liability for a battery to C.32 The doctrine has a defined range. Intent transfers among the five progeny of the parent trespass action (battery, assault, false imprisonment, trespass to land, and trespass to chattels) so long as the harm is direct and immediate.33 Intentional infliction of emotional distress is not on that list, and its absence yields two rules that point in opposite directions. Intent cannot enter this tort from another tort, but it can pass from one person to another within it.
The first rule is that intent to commit another tort does not supply the intent this tort requires. The intent to commit a battery, or to harm the plaintiff’s property, is not enough. The defendant must intend to cause emotional distress, or at least act in conscious disregard of a high probability of it.34 A Texas appellate decision states the same limit as a boundary on the tort itself: properly limited, it is not available when the actor intends to invade some other legally protected interest, even if emotional distress results.35 The trespass torts share an origin and a requirement of direct, immediate harm, and this tort sits outside that family. Its blame also attaches to a different choice. A person who set out to dent a car or shove a stranger has not chosen to attack anyone’s peace of mind or to run a high risk of doing so. If that intent could be borrowed, a defendant who never wanted or expected anyone’s anguish would answer for it whenever a battery or property invasion left someone badly upset, and the tort would lose the confinement its intent element gives it.
The second rule runs the other way. Where a defendant intends to inflict emotional distress on A and takes steps to do so, but unforeseen events leave B traumatized instead, B should have a cause of action.36 The culpable aim is still the defendant’s, and only the identity of the sufferer has changed. Suppose a defendant dials what he believes is a rival’s number to announce falsely that the rival’s child has been killed, and the rival’s sister answers. The wrong number does not reduce his blame, and the sister can rely on his intent. She must still prove outrageous conduct and severe distress, but she need not show physical symptoms, because a large number of courts have dropped that requirement and the Restatement (Third) limits claims to serious emotional disturbance whether or not physical manifestations accompany it.37
These two rules explain why transferred intent does not solve the bystander cases. In Taylor, the defendants’ aim was a battery on the father, so the only intent available to pass to the daughter was an intent to commit a battery on someone else. That is the wrong tort, and the person-to-person rule helps only where the original aim was distress.38 The stabber in the Restatement illustration shows what would have changed the result: his knowledge of the wife’s presence supplied his own substantial certainty about her distress, so nothing had to transfer.39 Section 46(2) of the Second Restatement addresses the problem directly. Where the conduct is directed at a third person, the actor is liable if he intentionally or recklessly causes severe distress to a member of that person’s immediate family who is present, whether or not the distress results in bodily harm,40 or to any other person who is present, if the distress results in bodily harm.41 The later sections on third-party claims develop that rule.