Concept
Causation
Intentional infliction of emotional distress
Causation
Section 46(1) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts holds a defendant liable for the severe emotional distress that extreme and outrageous conduct causes, and for any bodily harm that results from the distress.1 The verb causes carries the third element. Harris v. Jones adopted the four elements identified in Womack v. Eldridge: the conduct must be intentional or reckless, it must be extreme and outrageous, a causal connection must link the wrongful conduct to the emotional distress, and the distress must be severe.2 A causal connection exists when the defendant's intentional or reckless extreme and outrageous conduct produces the plaintiff's emotional distress, and the intensity and duration of the distress figure in that inquiry.3
The first two elements ask what the defendant did and what the defendant had in mind, and the fourth asks how badly the plaintiff suffered. Causation joins them, because the distress the plaintiff proves must be the product of the conduct the plaintiff proves. The joint is needed because distress has many sources. A layoff, a bereavement, a failing marriage, or a long-standing nervous disorder can each produce anguish as severe as any defendant's behavior, and the anguish does not say where it came from. Without a causal requirement, a plaintiff whose suffering is real could collect from a defendant whose conduct was objectionable but had little to do with it. The Maryland court in Harris v. Jones saw a related danger when it said that closely adhering to the four elements minimizes two problems inherent in the tort: distinguishing the true claim from the false and the trifling annoyance from the serious wrong.4 Causation helps with the first problem by requiring the plaintiff to tie real suffering to the defendant's conduct and not to some other event.
Courts ask two causation questions. The first is whether the distress came from the defendant's conduct or from other events that would have produced it anyway. The second is what a pre-existing condition does to the answer. Harris v. Jones shows the first question at work. The plaintiff had been under a physician's care for a nervous condition for six years before the defendant's harassment began, and he admitted that many things made him nervous, 'bosses' among them. He also acknowledged that other employees mimicked his stuttering, in a plant that employed some 3,000 people on each of two shifts and had its share of profanity, name-calling, and roughhousing.5 He testified that the defendant's conduct heightened his nervousness and worsened his speech impediment, yet he saw his physician only once during the five months of mistreatment, and the physician prescribed pills for his nerves.6 The court observed that his nervous condition may have been exacerbated somewhat, but that his family problems antedated his encounter with the defendant and were not shown to be attributable to the defendant's actions, and that the evidence did not reveal how, or to what degree, his speech impediment worsened.7 The court never resolved causation. It found it crystal clear that the defendant's conduct was intentional, declined to decide whether the conduct was extreme or outrageous or causally related to the distress, and rested its decision on the failure to prove severe distress.8
A footnote in Harris v. Jones answers the second question. A plaintiff's pre-existing susceptibility to emotional distress does not necessarily preclude liability if the conduct intensified the pre-existing condition of psychological stress.9 The tort makes the defendant answer for what the defendant added. A defendant who worsens an existing condition has caused the worsening, and excusing the defendant because the plaintiff was fragile would reward the choice of a vulnerable target. The plaintiff, for his part, must prove the increment. A condition that simply continued along its prior course does not satisfy the element, and in Harris the gaps in the record about how much the plaintiff's condition had changed left the court little to measure. The court held that the humiliation he suffered was not, as a matter of law, intense enough to be severe, a holding the next section examines.10
The plaintiff gets help from the nature of the conduct itself. In Brandon v. County of Richardson, the court sent the question whether the defendant's conduct caused the plaintiff severe distress back to the district court, because the trial court had failed to consider certain evidence. The court said how the result would run: if the district court found no severe distress, or found that the conduct was not a proximate cause of any severe distress, the plaintiff could not recover, and if it found both severe distress and proximate cause, it was to award damages.11 The court added that the extreme and outrageous character of the conduct is itself important evidence that severe emotional distress existed on account of the conduct.12 The inference is a natural one. Treatment that goes beyond the bounds of decency tends to shake people badly, so a fact finder can infer from the treatment itself that the plaintiff's distress owes to it, whereas petty rudeness leaves ample room for other explanations. Outrageousness is evidence, though, and never replaces proof. The plaintiff must still show severe distress, and the Brandon court left open the possibility that the fact finder would find none.
The same link explains why the outrageousness screen matters to causation. A claim that fails the screen never reaches the causal question. A court may end it on summary judgment when no reasonable juror could find the conduct outrageous, as in Abourezk, where the court concluded that a pilot's refusal to allow the plaintiff to deplane did not qualify and affirmed summary judgment even after drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor.13 Claims that clear the screen go to a fact finder, who may rule on the distress claim apart from the plaintiff's other claims. In Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, the jury found against the plaintiff on libel, specifically finding that the ad parody could not reasonably be understood as describing actual facts about him or actual events in which he participated. It nonetheless ruled for him on the intentional infliction claim and awarded $100,000 in compensatory damages, plus $50,000 in punitive damages from each petitioner.14 The constitutional limits on that kind of verdict come later in the chapter.
A plaintiff in many courts does not have to prove the distress through physical symptoms. In emotional distress cases generally, a large number of courts have dropped the requirement of physical symptoms or manifestations, or hold that it does not apply when the facts tend to show the reality of the plaintiff's emotional harm. The Restatement Third of Torts directly disavows the requirement and limits claims to 'serious emotional disturbance,' whether or not physical manifestations accompany it.15
Detail at both ends of the link helps a plaintiff survive a challenge. In Feltmeier v. Feltmeier, the wife's complaint set out an alleged pattern of marital misconduct in great detail and alleged severe distress, including a loss of self-esteem. It then translated that distress into ongoing symptoms: a diagnosis of posttraumatic stress disorder, depression, fear of other men, an inability to form relationships with them, and medical and psychological expenses that she expected to keep incurring.16 The court rejected the argument that the complaint fell short of alleging severe distress. The complaint gave a fact finder identifiable acts and identifiable effects to connect.
Causation also reaches past the distress to what follows from it, and suicide is the hard case. The court in Clift v. Narragansett Television reasoned that a stricter substantial factor rule is inherently necessary in suicide cases, because the final cause of death always appears as an independent act of a separate will, which raises the very real possibility that the suicide was unrelated to the defendant's actions.17 The plaintiff must also prove an intent to cause injury, and not just an intent to act, so liability attaches only where the actor intended to cause injury and the injury is a substantial factor in bringing about the suicide.18 The section on bodily harm below develops that side of the chain.