Concept
Severe Emotional Distress
Intentional infliction of emotional distress
Severe Emotional Distress
Section 46(1) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts imposes liability only when extreme and outrageous conduct causes severe emotional distress.1 The elements covered so far describe what the defendant did and intended and connect that conduct to the plaintiff's suffering. This element measures the suffering itself, and the adjective severe is a condition of recovery.
Severity decides whether the plaintiff recovers at all. When distress is only an item of damages, as in assault or false imprisonment, a plaintiff with mild distress still wins and recovers less. Under § 46(1), a plaintiff who proves outrageous, intentional conduct and causation but shows only ordinary upset recovers nothing. In Harris v. Jones, the Maryland court said exactly that: the severity of the distress is relevant to the amount of recovery and is also a necessary element of any recovery.2 The court did not even decide whether the supervisor's conduct was extreme or outrageous, or whether it caused the plaintiff's distress, because the severity element failed.3
Everyday quarrels supply the raw material for many of these claims. In one lease dispute, a landlord objected to a tenant's continued remodeling without written permission, relations between the parties grew strained, and the landlord's lawyer wrote a letter charging lease breaches.4 Anger and worry follow quarrels like that as a matter of course, which is why the severity element asks for far more than upset.
Three questions organize what follows: how severe the distress must be, how a plaintiff proves it, and whether a reaction stronger than the conduct would ordinarily produce can count.
The Severity Standard
Comment j to § 46 defines emotional distress generously and then narrows the definition sharply. Distress includes all highly unpleasant mental reactions, among them fright, horror, grief, shame, humiliation, embarrassment, anger, chagrin, disappointment, worry, and nausea, but “it is only where it is extreme that the liability arises.”5 The law intervenes only where the distress is so severe that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it, and the intensity and the duration of the distress are the factors that measure severity.6
The breadth of that list explains the height of the bar. Disappointment, worry, and anger accompany nearly every dealing with other people, and comment j accepts that some transient and trivial distress is “a part of the price of living among people.” Harris quotes the policy behind that acceptance: indiscriminate allowance of actions for mental anguish “would encourage neurotic overreactions to trivial hurts,” and the law “should aim to toughen the psyche of the citizen rather than pamper it.” Still, “a line can be drawn between the slight hurts which are the price of a complex society and the severe mental disturbances inflicted by intentional actions wholly lacking in social utility.”7 Severity is that line.
Because severity separates actionable distress from ordinary distress, it can defeat a claim that is otherwise strong, and Harris shows how completely. The intermediate appellate court found that the supervisor, Jones, who had mocked Harris's speech impediment, intended to inflict emotional distress and that his conduct was extreme and outrageous, and the Court of Appeals agreed that it was “crystal clear” the conduct was intentional.8 Harris lost anyway. The evidence showed only that he was “shaken up” and so humiliated that he felt “like going into a hole and hide.”9 His nervous condition may have been aggravated somewhat, but his family problems antedated the encounter and were not shown to come from Jones, and the record did not reveal how, or how much, his speech impediment worsened.10 Granting the cruel and insensitive character of the conduct and Jones's position of authority, the court held that the humiliation was not, as a matter of law, so intense as to be the “severe” distress the tort requires.11
Intensity and duration give the standard its working content. In Fletcher v. Western National Life Insurance Co., a California court defined severe distress as “emotional distress of such substantial quantity or enduring quality that no reasonable man in a civilized society should be expected to endure it.”12 Quantity and enduring quality are alternatives, so depth and length each count and a court weighs them together. A plaintiff who becomes unhappy, humiliated, or mildly despondent for a short time and spends a sleepless night or two cannot recover; if the anguish is great, and especially if it is prolonged, most courts will allow the claim.13
Two cases that Harris collects show the line on concrete facts. In Johnson v. Woman's Hospital, the court found severe distress established by the nervous shock of a mother who was shown her dead newborn in a jar of formaldehyde. In Swanson v. Swanson, the Illinois court held that severe distress was not shown by evidence of a man's nervous shock after his brother deliberately refused to tell him of their mother's death or to publish her obituary.14 Both plaintiffs reported nervous shock, so the label cannot explain the different results; the question in each case was whether the evidence reached distress that no reasonable person could be expected to endure. Swanson also shows that deliberate wrongdoing cannot stand in for severity. The brother acted on purpose and the plaintiff still lost, because this element measures the plaintiff's suffering and the defendant's culpability is tested under the other elements.
Ordinary upset sits on the losing side of the line. Applying Virginia law in Denny v. Elizabeth Arden Salons, Inc., the Fourth Circuit noted that the plaintiffs claimed no objective physical injury, no medical attention, no confinement at home or in a hospital, and no lost income, and it cited a Virginia decision dismissing a claim that alleged only nervousness, stress, and inability to sleep or concentrate at work.15 The court's reasoning is practical: if distress of that kind were actionable, courts “could become arbiters of every human interaction that culminated in embarrassment, disappointment, or hurt feelings.”16
Judge and jury divide the severity question. The court decides whether, as a matter of law, the evidence permits a finding of severe distress, and the jury decides whether the distress has in fact been proved.17 Harris shows the court's screen at work: the Court of Appeals held that the evidence of severity was not legally sufficient to justify submitting the case to the jury.18 Without that screen, a jury moved by sympathy could find severity on a plaintiff's testimony that she was upset, and the threshold would mean little.
Maryland courts apply the element strictly. As described in Snyder v. Phelps, the tort is “very narrow,” its requirements “are rigorous, and difficult to satisfy,” and recovery “will be meted out sparingly,” its balm reserved “for those wounds that are truly severe and incapable of healing themselves.”19 Exam fact patterns often pair vile conduct with a plaintiff who is merely upset, embarrassed, or angry, and that pairing sets up this element as the one that fails. State the standard, then name the missing facts about intensity and duration.
Proving Severity
Severe distress must be proved, and comment j names the yardsticks: intensity and duration.21 The practical question is what evidence gets the issue to a jury, and the cases answer with particulars about how deeply and how long the plaintiff suffered. Testimony that the plaintiff was upset describes what almost any unpleasant encounter produces.
The demand for particulars follows from the nature of the injury. Distress is invisible and cheap to claim, so a court that accepted a plaintiff's statement of upset would admit every bruised feeling through the gate this element guards. A court that demanded medical records in every case would instead shut out sufferers whose anguish left no clinical trace. The decisions run between those poles, and they first settle what falls short. In Hatch v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co., the Wyoming court held that evidence of crying, being upset, and being uncomfortable does not show distress that no reasonable person could be expected to endure.22 Read in reverse, Denny's list of what the plaintiffs did not claim (objective physical injury, medical attention, confinement at home or in a hospital, lost income) names the facts that make a claim persuasive.23
Harris shows how a record full of cruelty can still fail on severity. The plaintiff offered that he felt “shaken up” and wanted to hide, that his nervousness and speech impediment worsened, and that he saw his doctor once during the harassment for the same nerve medication he had taken for years.24 The court granted the cruelty of the conduct and the supervisor's authority, so the failure lay in the proof of Harris's own suffering.25 A stronger record would have contained:
- a comparison with his condition before the conduct, showing that his symptoms, treatment, or frequency of care had changed;
- a description of how, and how much, his speech impediment worsened, and for how long;
- evidence separating the effects of the conduct from the family problems that, as the court noted, antedated the supervisor.26
Exam graders reward application over recitation, so an answer that merely announces “severe distress” earns little; the credit goes to naming the facts that show, or fail to show, intensity and duration.27
Records that clear the line look like the second plaintiff's. One complaint alleged a loss of self-esteem, a diagnosis of posttraumatic stress disorder manifested by depression, fear of other men, and inability to form relationships with them, and continuing medical and psychological expenses; the court rejected the argument that this pleaded too little.28 Those were allegations, tested only at the pleading stage, but they show the detail a court expects. In Norcon, Inc. v. Kotowski, the court reasoned that a worker in an isolated location would naturally suffer great distress on learning that her assignments depended on whether she submitted to a supervisor's sexual advances, and more so on finding that she, and not the supervisor, had become the target of the employer's investigation.29 She testified that she was afraid to sleep in the employer's housing and spent two nights in a car, and the court held that a jury might reasonably find her distress severe.30 Each of these plaintiffs gave the fact finder something concrete, such as a diagnosis, ongoing expenses, or a change in where she slept, while Harris offered little beyond a label.
Whether a plaintiff must also produce physical symptoms or expert testimony depends on the jurisdiction, and most jurisdictions require neither. A large number of cases have dropped the requirement of physical symptoms or manifestations, or hold it inapplicable when the facts show the reality of the plaintiff's harm, and the Restatement (Third) disavows a physical-manifestation requirement and limits claims to “serious emotional disturbance,” whether or not physical symptoms accompany it.31 Decisions from Tennessee, Washington, Nebraska, and Montana illustrate the majority approach, relying on the flagrant and serious character of the defendant's conduct, testimony from the plaintiff and others, and physical symptoms where they exist.32 A minority goes the other way. Rhode Island's Vallinoto v. DiSandro required competent medical evidence of an objective physical manifestation of the claimed psychic injury,33 and a few jurisdictions generally require a physical manifestation of the mental suffering.34
The majority view follows a practical observation. A jury can judge from its own experience what disagreeable emotions outrageous conduct may produce, whereas whether the distress caused physical injury is a difficult medical question, and a defendant's conduct, designed to bring about suffering, is better proof that suffering occurred than a physical injury that may or may not have resulted.35 The minority rule offers an objective marker that is hard to fake, but it leaves without a remedy the plaintiff whose anguish was real and left no medical trace.
Physical symptoms remain useful evidence when they connect to the conduct. One plaintiff failed to prove distress where her symptoms were associated with a preexisting medical condition and she did not see her physician right after the incident.36 The single doctor's visit in Harris fell short for a similar reason, since it looked like continuing care for a condition that predated the conduct.
Comment j supplies a second source of proof that does not depend on the plaintiff's records: in many cases, “the extreme and outrageous character of the defendant's conduct is in itself important evidence that the distress has existed.”37 Treatment that goes beyond all bounds of decency shakes people badly, so a jury can infer suffering from the treatment, while a petty slight leaves ample room for the plaintiff to have been fine. The more extreme the conduct, then, the less additional proof severity may need. The conduct never substitutes for proof, though. Comment j begins by saying that severe distress “must be proved,” and Harris accepted the cruelty of the conduct and still found the plaintiff's own proof insufficient.38 The remand instructions in Brandon v. County of Richardson make the same point from the other direction: the fact finder must find that the plaintiff suffered severe distress, and that the defendant's conduct was a proximate cause of it, before awarding damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress.39
Reasonable Reaction
Beyond the text of § 46(1),41 comment j attaches a second condition to the severity element: the distress must be “reasonable and justified under the circumstances.” There is no liability for exaggerated and unreasonable distress “unless it results from a peculiar susceptibility to such distress of which the actor has knowledge.”42 The two requirements ask different questions. Severity asks how deeply and how long the plaintiff suffered; reasonableness asks whether that suffering is a response the defendant's conduct can fairly be held to account for. A plaintiff can be badly and genuinely hurt and still fall outside the tort when the injury is out of proportion to what the conduct would ordinarily produce.
Emotional distress departs from the usual rule for physical harm in this respect. A tortfeasor ordinarily takes the victim as found, but a defendant who inflicts emotional distress is not liable to the extent the plaintiff's response falls outside the range of normal human reactions to the conduct. The conduct must be such that a reasonable person of ordinary sensitivity would be expected to experience severe distress.43 A corollary governs aggravation: a defendant who intended to inflict only severe emotional distress is not liable for greater harm, such as illness or other bodily harm, unless the conduct created a foreseeable risk of that aggravated harm.44 The next section takes up the bodily harm rules.
The ordinary-person yardstick makes liability predictable. Emotional reactions depend on a person's history and fears, which vary widely and which a stranger cannot see. If defendants took every plaintiff as found, the same remark could be harmless to one listener and ruinous to another, and no speaker could gauge the risk in advance. Measuring the reaction against an ordinary person keeps liability tied to what the conduct itself would do, which is the same yardstick the decency standard applies to the conduct element.
Known susceptibility restores liability. A defendant who knows that the plaintiff has a peculiar or special sensitivity may be liable for conduct that is extreme and outrageous in light of that vulnerability, even though the same conduct would not produce a severe response in a normal, healthy adult, and the standard examples are the physically infirm, the mentally ill, and children.45 This is the principle the Known Sensitivity subsection developed for the conduct element, now at work on the distress element. Knowledge does the work in both places because a defendant who learns of a weakness and proceeds has chosen the weakness as the target, so the unusual reaction is a foreseen result. The comment speaks of knowledge, so a defendant who merely should have realized that some listener might be fragile remains under the ordinary-person yardstick.
Chuy v. Philadelphia Eagles Football Club shows the limit asserted and rejected. A newspaper published a team physician's false statement that a player had a potentially fatal blood disease, and the player became depressed and despondent and put off for six months the tests that would have disproved it.46 The club argued that his failure to secure prompt medical verification was unjustified and so defeated liability. The Third Circuit disagreed on two grounds. First, the jury's finding that the physician's statements went beyond the bounds of decency implied that a person of ordinary sensibility could not have withstood the distress without severe anguish, and that the player had not feigned his anxiety.47 Second, delay is a matter of mitigation and not of liability. No case the club cited required the victim of this tort to seek immediate treatment or verification, and the trial court had told the jury that an unreasonable failure to minimize his injuries could reduce his damages. The Third Circuit approved that instruction because it correctly distinguished the severity of distress as an element of liability from the victim's failure reasonably to mitigate damages.48
The two inquiries look in opposite directions. The reasonable-reaction question looks back from the injury to the conduct and asks whether an ordinary person would have been severely distressed by it. Mitigation looks forward from the injury and asks whether the plaintiff acted sensibly to limit its cost. If a slow or imperfect response could erase liability, a defendant who had caused severe distress would escape because the victim coped poorly, and delay can be part of the distress itself, as when a person frightened by a grim diagnosis avoids the very test that would settle it. Treating delay as a damages question holds the defendant answerable for what the conduct would do to an ordinary person and still reduces the award for losses the plaintiff could have avoided.
Fact patterns blur these lines in two ways. A stem may describe a plaintiff who waited, avoided doctors, or declined testing, and the tempting move is to call that reaction unreasonable. A plaintiff's delay is not a separate ground for defeating liability, because it may be part of the distress itself, and it ordinarily reduces damages through mitigation.49 Another stem describes an unusually strong reaction to mild conduct, and the first question there is whether the defendant knew of the susceptibility, because the answer decides which yardstick applies. A stem that says only that the plaintiff was fragile, or that the defendant should have known, supplies no knowledge, and mild conduct in that setting also fails the outrageousness element.