Concept
When Trespass Liability Attaches
Trespass to chattels and conversion
When Trespass Liability Attaches
Touching, using, or moving another person's chattel does not by itself give the possessor a claim. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 218 makes liability turn on a result: the trespasser is liable to the possessor “if, but only if,” one of four consequences follows.1 The trespasser dispossesses the possessor; the chattel is impaired in its condition, quality, or value; the possessor loses its use for a substantial time; or bodily harm is caused to the possessor, or harm is caused to some person or thing in which the possessor has a legally protected interest.2 Because the list is exclusive, a trespass that produces none of the four creates no liability, however deliberate the contact.
Section 218 thus asks a second question after § 217. Section 217 asks what the actor did: dispossessed, used, or intermeddled. Section 218 asks what resulted. A trespass can be complete under § 217 while the possessor still has no claim, because no § 218 consequence followed. The Restatement's own illustration shows the gap. D releases the brake on P's car and pushes it forward a few feet to make room to park behind it. D has intermeddled, but P was not dispossessed and the car was not damaged, so D is not liable.3 A stranger who sits on the bumper of a parked car and leaves it unmarked stands in the same position: the contact is an intermeddling, and § 218 gives no recovery when no damage results.4
Trespass to land works the other way. An entry on land is actionable without any resulting harm, while trespass to a chattel is actionable only when a § 218 consequence follows.5 In Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, the California Supreme Court explained why. A chattel possessor's interest in the bare inviolability of the chattel, unlike a land possessor's similar interest, is not protected by an action for nominal damages for harmless intermeddlings, because the possessor already holds a privilege to use reasonable force to protect possession even against harmless interference.6 A stranger perched on a car's bumper can be told to get off and, if need be, made to. The law saves its courts for interferences that reach something more important than that interest: the thing itself, its use, or a person.
The subsections below take the four consequences in turn, beginning with the one that is itself the harm.
Dispossession as Harm
Of the four § 218 consequences, dispossession alone needs nothing beyond the interference itself. A trespasser who dispossesses the possessor of a chattel is liable under § 218(a),7 while each of the other three requires proof that something further happened to the chattel, to its use, or to a person.8 Hamidi read the section that way: dispossession alone, without further damages, is actionable, and other forms of interference require some additional harm to the personal property or to the possessor's interests in it.9
The rule follows from what the tort protects. Trespass to a chattel guards possession, meaning control of the thing, and a taking ends that control. The law declines to protect harmless touching because the possessor can defend against it with reasonable force;10 a possessor who has lost the chattel has lost the very control that privilege exists to preserve. Demanding proof of further injury, such as a scratch or a missed errand, would also let anyone borrow a chattel without consequence so long as the borrower returned it clean.
Liability under § 218(a) does not promise a large recovery. One who dispossesses another of a chattel is liable in trespass for the damage done,11 so a brief taking that harms nothing still supports a claim, though the award may be only nominal, a token sum that vindicates the right without compensating a loss. A longer taking raises the recovery with what the loss cost the possessor. If the dispossession seriously interferes with the possessor's right to control the chattel, the actor may also be liable for conversion,12 and total deprivations are usually treated that way, so the two torts overlap.13
The question that separates a dispossession from a harmless touching is what happened to the possessor's control. In the Restatement's brake illustration, P still has the car and nothing is damaged, so D owes nothing.14 D's push was deliberate; what was missing was a § 218 consequence.
D and Ripper each handled a stranger's chattel on purpose and left it unharmed, so neither intent nor the absence of injury separates them. P's control of the car never lapsed; Wells's control lapsed for as long as the machine was out of reach.
Students tend to err in two directions. They deny any claim to a possessor whose chattel came back unharmed, and they award full value for every taking. The first overlooks that § 218(a) requires no further harm; the second overlooks that full value requires a serious interference with the possessor's control.15
Impairment of the Chattel
Section 218(b) supplies the second consequence: the possessor recovers when the chattel is impaired in its condition, quality, or value.17 Impairment means a change for the worse in the thing itself. Condition is its physical state, which a tear or a dent alters. Quality is how well it performs or what kind of thing it is, which a lamed horse or a warped tool has lost. Value is what it would bring or is worth to the possessor, and it can fall when no mark is visible. The three words are alternatives, so a possessor needs to show only one. The California Supreme Court described the requirement as harm to the possessor's “materially valuable interest in the physical condition, quality, or value of the chattel.”18
The possessor needs impairment, and not mere contact, because the law already protects the interest in being left alone with the thing in another way. The possessor may use reasonable force to defend possession even against harmless interference,19 so a stranger on a car's bumper can be told to get off and, if need be, made to. An action for nominal damages would add little to that protection, and the privilege does nothing to remove a stain or heal a lamed horse afterward. The law therefore reserves damages for harm to something more important than the chattel's bare inviolability: its material condition or worth. The requirement also sorts claims by what a court can measure. A repair bill, a veterinary bill, and a drop in market value can each be proved, whereas the possessor's annoyance at being touched is a feeling about the contact and changes nothing in the chattel.
Damage to the chattel is the plain case. When Horton damages Cobble's hat, the result is likely a trespass to chattels under § 218(b), since the hat is damaged; only if the damage left the hat useless would Horton be liable for conversion.20 Living chattels count too. If Puso rides Carter's horse Flora so hard that she develops shin splints, he may be liable under § 218(b).21 A horse can also lose quality and value without any visible wound. In Van Eaton v. Thon, a blow to a horse's jaw left the animal head-shy, and the harm sued on was the loss in its value.
Glidden v. Szybiak turned on the absence of impairment. New Hampshire's dog-bite statute lets a person recover for damage done by a dog unless the damage came while the person was engaged in a trespass or other tort. Four-year-old Elaine climbed on a dog named Toby, pulled his ears, and was bitten, and the owners argued that her conduct was a trespass to chattels that barred her claim. No claim was advanced that her conduct injured Toby, so she could not be held liable for a trespass to the dog, and her conduct did not constitute a trespass that would defeat her recovery under the statute.22 Pulling a dog's ears is physical contact with a chattel in another's possession, an intermeddling under § 217, so the missing element was harm. Damage changes a hat; no injury to Toby was claimed. A dog-bite case can therefore turn on the elements of trespass to chattels, because the statute asks whether the plaintiff was committing one.
Students go wrong here in two opposite directions. Some reason by analogy to trespass to land and treat any deliberate touching as actionable, which overlooks that a chattel claim needs one of the consequences in § 218. Others see damage and reach for full value, which overlooks that damage ordinarily supports trespass and that conversion is reserved for interference serious enough to justify paying for the whole chattel.23 Impairment is also only one route to liability, since a possessor whose chattel comes back unharmed may still recover if kept from using it for a substantial time, the consequence taken up next.
Loss of Use for Substantial Time
Section 218(c) makes a trespasser liable when the possessor is deprived of the chattel's use for a substantial time.25 Dispossession ends the possessor's control, and impairment changes the chattel itself; this clause looks at something else, the use the possessor lost. A possessor may keep the chattel, and may get it back without a mark on it, and still recover if the interference cost a substantial stretch of its use. If Puso rides Carter's horse Flora for three hours, he is likely liable under § 218(c), because he deprived Carter of her use for a substantial period.26
Use is the harm because use is what makes a chattel worth having: a horse is worth what its possessor can do with it, and a machine is worth the work it turns out. The loss can be priced as a rental value or as a day of lost work. The word “substantial” does separate work. A delay of a few moments, such as a stranger resting a hand on a delivery cart while the driver walks to the door, costs the possessor nothing worth a lawsuit, and treating every pause as a tort would turn ordinary friction among other people's belongings into litigation. The requirement screens out those trivial delays and leaves the claim for stoppages that cost the possessor something.
A protester's stoppage shows the clause at full strength. Muir chains himself to a giant logging machine owned by Monumental Paper, and work stops for a day. He neither carries the machine off nor damages it. He intermeddles by putting his body in contact with it, and Monumental loses a day's logging with an enormously expensive machine, a deprivation of use for a substantial time.27 His principled motive does not change the result, because the intent the tort requires attaches to the act on the chattel, whatever the actor's reason for it. An Oregon decision from 1993, Huffman and Wright Logging Co. v. Wade, affirmed a verdict for compensatory and punitive damages for trespass to chattels on similar facts.
Substantial loss of use can also coincide with conversion. Where Cobble has been deprived of the use of his hat for “a substantial time,” the facts fit the definition of trespass to chattels even though they may also make out a conversion.28 Because the two torts overlap in such cases, a plaintiff in Cobble's position would plead both and let the court sort it out.29
Whether the clause reaches a possessor who planned no use of the chattel during the interference is harder. Sailor keeps a mooring in the harbor, but his boat is in dry dock for the season. Sneaky Pete ties up to the empty mooring for about twelve hours and leaves it undamaged. Pete has intermeddled with the mooring and used it for half a day, yet it is doubtful that he deprived Sailor of its use, since Sailor meant to use the mooring at no time during the interference. Change the facts so that Sailor arrives that evening with his boat ready to tie up and finds Pete's boat on the mooring, and the deprivation is shown. Pete did the same physical thing in both versions; what changed is whether Sailor wanted the mooring while Pete held it.
The text of § 218(c) leaves two readings open. On the first, the clause protects the use the possessor would actually have made of the chattel, so a possessor with no plan to use it during the interference lost nothing the clause compensates. That reading ties the consequence to its reason. On the second, the possessor's standing ability to use the chattel whenever he chooses is itself the interest, so a stranger who occupies it has deprived the possessor of that ability whether or not a use was planned. The better view of the mooring facts is that Pete is probably not liable, which favors the first reading, but the question is not settled, and a good answer presents it as open.
Two errors are common on this clause. One treats any occupation of a chattel as a loss of use, which overlooks the requirement of a substantial time and a real stoppage. The other treats the absent-owner case as settled in either direction, when the better answer states both readings and the facts that decide between them: whether the possessor planned to use the chattel, and how long the interference lasted.
Bodily Harm or Protected Interests
The fourth consequence is the catch-all. A trespasser to a chattel is liable to the possessor if bodily harm is caused to the possessor, or if harm is caused to some person or thing in which the possessor has a legally protected interest.31 A legally protected interest is a stake the law recognizes and defends, such as a person's body, other property, or the goodwill of a business. Because § 218 permits recovery only when one of its four consequences follows,32 clause (d) reaches a possessor whose chattel was not taken, impaired, or kept from use, so long as the interference caused one of the harms the clause describes.
The clause exists because the other three consequences look at the chattel or at the possessor's control of it. A stranger whose interference left the thing unmarked and the possessor's use undisturbed would escape liability even if the interference hurt someone. A deliberate touch can do exactly that, since a tampered chattel may look and work as it did before while becoming dangerous to use. Clause (d) closes the gap by treating injury to the possessor's body as enough and by extending the same treatment to harm that reaches a person or thing in which the possessor has a protected stake. The clause carries its own limit: the protected interest must itself be harmed. The interference alone does not supply that harm, and neither does the possessor's displeasure at it. Without the limit, clause (d) would swallow the rule that a harmless intermeddling is not actionable, since almost any unwelcome touch can be described as upsetting something the possessor cares about.
The second half of the clause, harm to a person or thing in which the possessor has a protected interest, is easiest to see in the decisions about electronic mail. In CompuServe Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., the defendants sent bulk unsolicited email through CompuServe's computer system. Many subscribers terminated their accounts specifically because of the unwanted messages, and the court held that the defendants' intrusions were actionable under § 218(d) insofar as they harmed CompuServe's business reputation and goodwill with its customers.33 Goodwill is a protected interest of the service provider, and the harm reached it through the way the system worked: the messages ran through CompuServe's system, and customers left because of them.
The California Supreme Court drew the limit on that theory in Hamidi. Intel asserted an interest in its employees' time, which it said Hamidi's emails disrupted, and the court rejected the claim. It concluded that Intel had not shown an injury to its personal property, or to its legal interest in that property, and it refused to find a property interest in employees' time.34 Intel's complaint was about the contents of the messages rather than the functioning of its email system, and the court would not recast the effect of a message's content on its readers as an impairment of the system that carried it. That theory of “impairment by content” would stretch trespass law to cover injuries far afield from the harms to possession the tort evolved to protect.35
The two decisions apply one rule to two sets of facts, and the difference between them is the source of the harm. In CompuServe, the injury to goodwill came from the bulk messages passing through the system. In Hamidi, the injury came from what the messages said. The tort protects the possessor's interest in the chattel, so harm that reaches the possessor only through a reader's reaction to ideas is not harm to an interest in the thing. An exam stem about a company whose staff stopped work to argue over the contents of an email is testing this line. The fuller contrast between the bulk-mail cases and the content case belongs to the later section on computers.