Concept
Nominal Damages
Remedies and damages for intentional torts
Nominal Damages
A neighbor who cuts across your pasture on the way to the bus stop leaves no mark. The grass springs back, the cattle graze on, and no witness could put a price on the harm. The law still treats the crossing as a trespass, and the owner is entitled to a judgment. That judgment carries nominal damages: a trivial sum of money awarded to a litigant who has established a cause of action but has not established entitlement to compensatory damages.1
The sum is small by design. Most case law and state statutes limit it to one dollar, and other cases hold that it should not exceed $100, lest the sanction change from nominal to compensatory.2 In trespass, actual damage is not an element of the tort, so a defendant who causes none is liable for nominal damages.3 A plaintiff who wants more must prove loss, and proof of loss has limits. As losses grow more remote from the wrong, courts grow more skeptical that the defendant caused them, and causation, certainty, foreseeability, and avoidable consequences limit what can be recovered.4 Nominal damages are what remains when the claim succeeds and the proof of loss does not.
Torts Supporting Nominal Damages
Nominal damages attach to torts that are complete when the invasion occurs, because those torts protect an interest the law treats as violated whether or not loss follows. The law awards them for the infraction of a legal right where the extent of loss is not shown, or where the right does not depend on loss at all, as with rights of bodily immunity and the right to have one's property undisturbed by direct invasion. The award is a judicial declaration that the plaintiff's right was violated.5 A plaintiff who proves an intentional physical tort to the person or to property can always recover nominal damages.6
False imprisonment works like battery and assault: no actual damages need be proved.7 In Banks v. Fritsch, a teacher chained a student to a tree because of repeated absences, and the teacher was liable for nominal damages if the student could not prove actual damages.8 A confined plaintiff rarely sues only to be declared wronged. The realistic goal is a substantial award, which a jury might grant for psychological injury, as when a store clerk accused of theft testified that the incident made her throat swell and left her afraid to work in a store. Some states add punitive damages as a further incentive.9 The nominal award still guarantees that proof of the confinement itself wins the case.10
Trespass to land is the clearest case. The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 158 imposes liability for an intentional trespass irrespective of whether the entry harms any legally protected interest of the other.11 Actual damages are therefore not an element of the tort, and without them the trespasser answers for nominal damages.12 A possessor always may recover at least nominal damages, even if unharmed.13
Herrin v. Sutherland shows how little physical intrusion the rule requires. The plaintiff complained of shotgun fire at waterfowl in flight over his dwelling house and cattle. The court reasoned that air space near the ground is almost as inviolable as the soil itself, that a shotgun is a firearm of short range, and that being exposed to the danger of its discharge over one's home and cattle is far from inconsequential. The allegations were very general, but they stated a cause of action for nominal damages at least, and the court affirmed.14
The nominal award belongs to the owner's civil action. Criminal trespass is a separate proceeding that government officials, rather than private citizens, generally initiate. In State v. Shack, Tedesco invoked the criminal system by calling the police and filing a criminal complaint.15
Conversion supports nominal damages too, and its contrast with trespass to chattels shows why the two torts must be kept apart. In Pearson v. Dodd, the court explained that a judgment for conversion can be obtained with only nominal damages, whereas liability for trespass to chattels exists only on a showing of actual damage to the property interfered with. The district court had granted partial summary judgment on liability alone while conceding that no more than nominal damages might be awarded at trial. That step was available only on a conversion theory, because partial summary judgment for liability could not have been granted on a theory of trespass to chattels.16
Why Courts Award Them
The first thing a one-dollar judgment buys is vindication. A right is only as great as the remedy that vindicates it, and a right with no remedy is a paper tiger. The nominal award is a limited remedy but not an empty one, because it declares that the plaintiff won on the substantive claim.17 In Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski, the Supreme Court called it well established at common law that a party whose rights are invaded can always recover nominal damages without furnishing any evidence of actual damage. The rule is unsurprising, the Court explained, because a contrary rule would have left no remedy at all for rights, such as due process or voting rights, that are not readily reducible to monetary valuation.18 The Wisconsin Supreme Court applied the same logic to land in Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc.. Because a legal right is involved, the law infers some damage from every direct entry upon land, and a nominal award in an intentional trespass case recognizes that actual harm occurred even though dollars cannot measure it.19
A trespass suit also protects title and blocks prescription. Historically the action was the vehicle for determining possessory rights in land: the court had to decide the plaintiff's title in order to decide whether the defendant was a trespasser, and a judgment for nominal damages confirmed that title. The tort was probably used as much to keep trespassers from acquiring easements or adverse possession rights as to remedy significant economic damage.20 Repeated entries, left alone, might ripen into a prescriptive right, the entitlement to use land that the law grants to a longtime user who never had the owner's permission. That risk is why courts refuse to apply the maxim that the law does not concern itself with trifles.21 The owner in the opening example is in just this position. If the owner ignores the daily crossings, they could ripen into an easement, the right to cross the land to reach the bus stop, so the owner needs a right to sue even though the crossings cause no damage.22 A possessor may bring an action for nominal damages to establish a property right, to settle a boundary dispute, or to stop the statute of limitations from running.23
The nominal award also decides who prevails. Even the slightest trespass entitles the plaintiff to nominal damages, which gives the plaintiff prevailing-party status, and that status ordinarily controls the right to court costs and any awardable attorney fees.24 In civil rights cases the award can support attorney's fees under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, an incentive without which most plaintiffs would find it difficult to pursue a claim. In some jurisdictions an award of even nominal damages can serve as the basis for punitive damages if other circumstances are met.25 A deliberate or malicious trespass can support punitive damages even though only nominal damages are awarded for the trespass itself, a point developed in the punitive damages sections below.26
Where Nominal Damages Fail
Every function above assumes a claim that is complete without proof of loss. When the defendant's mental state falls short of intent, harm becomes part of the plaintiff's case. An intentional entry on another's land is actionable without harm, but where the entry was recklessly or negligently caused, there is liability only if and to the extent that some damage results.27 A plaintiff who proves a careless entry and no damage therefore recovers nothing, not even a dollar.
Trespass to chattels draws the line in a different place from trespass to land, which is why the shared trespass label misleads. Where there is merely interference with the chattel, as by laying hands on a horse or an automobile, the few American decisions hold that the action cannot be maintained without proof of actual damages.28 The Restatement's illustration makes the point with a parked car. D releases the brake on P's car and pushes it forward a few feet to make space to park behind it. If no harm is done, D is not liable, since D did not dispossess P of the car or cause any damage to it.29 The opinion in Intel Corp. v. Hamidi describes Glidden v. Szybiak the same way: an action for trespass to chattels could not be maintained without some form of damage, where the plaintiff did not contend that the defendant's pulling on her pet dog's ears caused any injury.30
Dispossession is the exception that keeps this limit from swallowing the tort. Any dispossession is a trespass for which at least nominal damages may be awarded, and a possessor deprived of a chattel for even a short time has been dispossessed, even if the chattel is returned before there is any significant injury.31
A final limit comes from modern pollution cases, where the rule that any trespass supports nominal damages meets a potentially enormous class of plaintiffs. In Bradley v. American Smelting and Refining Co., the court acknowledged that at common law any trespass entitled a landowner to nominal or punitive damages, but held that such a rule was not appropriate there. No useful purpose would be served by sanctioning trespass actions by every landowner within a hundred miles of a manufacturing plant; manufacturers would be harassed, and the litigious few would escalate costs to the detriment of the many. The elements the court adopted require that the plaintiff have suffered actual and substantial damages, so a landowner who cannot show them has no claim and no nominal award.32
A Minnesota decision approaches the same problem from a different direction. It restates that actual damages are not an element of ordinary trespass, but it reasons that an invasion by an intangible agency, such as particulate matter, does not disrupt the owner's exclusive possessory interest in the way a physical object does. Such invasions may interfere with use and enjoyment, but they do not require the owner to share possession.33 One court sets a harm threshold for particulate trespass, and the other asks whether the invasion disturbs possession at all.