Concept
Punitive Damages
Remedies and damages for intentional torts
Punitive Damages
Compensatory damages pay for what the plaintiff lost, and nominal damages declare that a right was violated. Neither responds to how badly the defendant behaved. Punitive damages do. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 908(1) defines them as damages, other than compensatory or nominal damages, awarded against a person to punish him for outrageous conduct and to deter him and others like him from similar conduct in the future.1 The first two measures look to the plaintiff's side of the case. Punitive damages look to the defendant's side, and they sit on top of a compensatory or nominal award rather than replacing it.2
The need for a separate layer follows from how compensation is built. A fractured wrist is worth the same compensatory sum whatever was in the mind of the person who caused it, so a remedy that looks only at the loss cannot register a difference in blame. It also gives a deliberate wrongdoer no reason to stop whenever paying for the harm costs less than refraining from it. Punitive damages answer both problems: the factfinder may add a sum that reflects how bad the conduct was, and the prospect of that sum raises the price of deliberate wrongdoing above the price of the plaintiff's loss.
Intentional torts are the main home of the remedy, because a deliberate invasion of a person's body, liberty, land, or goods is where evil motive appears most readily. Section 908(2) allows punitive damages for conduct that is outrageous because of the defendant's evil motive or reckless indifference to the rights of others.3 The standard attaches to the defendant's conduct and state of mind, so the label on the tort does not settle the question, although battery, false imprisonment, trespass, and conversion supply the facts that most often meet it. The same subsection lists what the factfinder may weigh in setting the amount: the character of the act, the harm to the plaintiff that the defendant caused or intended, and the defendant's wealth.4 Nothing in that list ties the figure to the plaintiff's measurable loss.
The subsections that follow take up the questions a punitive claim raises. Why may a civil court punish at all, and what does deterrence ask of the size of the award? What conduct qualifies, and how does a jury choose a figure? Can a plaintiff whose own recovery is one dollar support a punitive award, a possibility the earlier discussion of nominal damages left open for deliberate trespass to land? What does the Constitution allow? Due process bars grossly excessive punitive awards, and courts review them against three guideposts.5 Last, when must an employer answer in punitive damages for an agent's intentional tort?
Purposes of Punitive Damages
Two purposes sit inside the § 908(1) definition: punishment of outrageous conduct and deterrence of the defendant and others like him.6 Because the award responds to the defendant's behavior and characteristics, the plaintiff's loss does not set the figure.7 The Supreme Court states the purpose in the same terms in Memphis Community School District v. Stachura: punishment of willful or malicious conduct and deterrence of similar behavior by others.8 This subsection covers what each purpose demands, how the award depends on an underlying claim, and the arguments for and against allowing it.
The two purposes face in different directions. Punishment looks backward and treats the sum as a response to a violation that has already happened. Deterrence looks forward and tries to change what the defendant and others do next. In Chuy v. Philadelphia Eagles Football Club, the Third Circuit, applying Pennsylvania law, described the award as serving both functions, penalizing past conduct and deterring such behavior in the future.9 Section 908(1) names two audiences for the deterrence, and each has its own job. A verdict that deterred only the defendant would leave other would-be wrongdoers free to try the same conduct once, and a verdict aimed only at others would leave a proven wrongdoer untouched. Chuy also shows that these purposes can coexist with a liability standard that already turns on outrageous conduct. The plaintiff there sued for infliction of emotional distress, a tort that itself requires outrageous conduct, and the court saw no inconsistency in using that conduct to support a separate punitive assessment, because compensation pays for the injury while punitive damages punish and deter.10
A claim for punitive damages is not an independent cause of action. It rides on an underlying claim, so the plaintiff must win that claim first, and winning it does not settle entitlement, because the plaintiff must still prove the defendant's culpable state of mind for the punitive award itself.11 That dependence explains why a deliberate breach of contract, standing alone, does not support punitive damages. Contract law compensates economic loss and does not punish the breach, so the award becomes available only when the same conduct is also a tort for which punitive damages would be allowed.12 The dependence also explains why the award rests in the discretion of the factfinder and is not recoverable as a matter of right.13 Intentional torts are the paradigm setting for the award, which is why it appears in this chapter, but the paradigm describes where punitive damages usually arise and does not make them automatic.14
Horton v. Suzuki shows liability and entitlement coming apart. The court found that Suzuki committed battery and affirmed $7,500 in compensatory damages, made up of $1,500 for medical expenses and $6,000 for pain and suffering. Punitive damages are also available in civil battery cases, but the trial court denied the request, and the denial was not appealed.15 The battery was proved and compensated, yet the extra sum stayed out of the judgment, so proof of the tort and entitlement to punishment are separate findings. An exam answer that moves from a proven battery straight to punitive damages has skipped the second finding.
Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc. presents the setting in which the purposes have the most work to do. A mobile-home seller wanted to deliver a home to a customer, and when the Jacques refused to let it cross their field, the seller plowed a path across the field and dragged the home over it. The only public sanction was a $30 forfeiture, and the landowners' own award for the trespass was $1 in nominal damages.16 The seller delivered mobile homes for a living, so it would face the same choice again: take the shorter route and pay the small forfeiture, or take the costlier lawful course.17 The Wisconsin Supreme Court reasoned that punitive damages deter by removing the profit from deliberate wrongdoing, and that to do so they must exceed the profit the misconduct created, so that the defendant recognizes a loss. A $30 forfeiture did not do that, and the court reinstated the jury's $100,000 award.18 The mechanism is a matter of price. Compensatory damages track measurable harm, and a path across an open field produces little of it, so a defendant that counts only the harm will treat the trespass as a cost of doing business. The punitive layer reprices the choice. Whether a nominal award can carry that layer is the subject of a later subsection. Jacque differs from Horton in whether punishment and deterrence had any work left after compensation was paid. In Jacque the seller's cost of the invasion was almost nothing, so its incentive to repeat it was intact. Nothing comparable appears in Horton, where the injuries were minimal and the compensatory award covered them.
Courts give four standard justifications for allowing the award, and Jacque draws on several of them.19
- An incentive to bring suit, especially where actual damages are too small to make litigation worth the expense.
- Punishment of quasi-criminal wrongs that escape the criminal law or fall beyond its reach.
- Compensation for losses the law does not otherwise pay, such as wounded feelings and the expenses of litigation.
- A means of stopping a known tortious practice that a defendant would otherwise continue because paying, or insuring against, compensatory damages is cheaper.
The Wisconsin court noted that a substantial punitive award gives landowners a reason to pursue a trespass claim that self-interest might otherwise lead them to drop, which is the first justification.20 It also observed that punitive damages bring to punishment conduct that, though oppressive to the individual, almost invariably goes unpunished by the public prosecutor, which is the second.21 The profit-removal reasoning in the previous paragraph is the fourth. The third justification sits uneasily with the label extracompensatory, because an award that pays for feelings and fees functions partly as compensation. The tension has historical roots: in the eighteenth-century English decisions from which the modern award descends, the extra sum seems to have begun as compensation for mental distress or intangible loss, and retribution and deterrence were identified later as the basis for a separate award.22
Each justification meets an objection, and the objections explain why the award is confined to outrageous conduct. Punitive damages are quasi-criminal because they punish anti-social conduct, yet the civil defendant lacks the constitutional safeguards a criminal defendant has. They give a successful plaintiff a windfall, meaning a payment beyond the actual loss, and they leave juries wide discretion over both entitlement and amount. The prospect of a large award may encourage litigation that would not otherwise be brought, and punitive damages pose special problems in mass disaster and products liability cases.23 Awards are infrequent, and the complaint is aimed at the very largest ones, which an empirical study found unpredictable and uncorrelated with compensatory damages.24
A dissent in Katko v. Briney, a spring-gun case, applies those objections to a particular plaintiff. It reasoned that punishing wrongdoers has increasingly become the work of the criminal law, and that punitive damages go to the plaintiff's private purse as a windfall measured by the defendant's conduct, with no tie to what the plaintiff lost.25 From that premise it would have denied punitive damages to a plaintiff who was himself engaged in a crime when injured, because the award would reward him for the crime, and it added that high compensatory damages can themselves punish and deter.26 Because it is a dissent, it records the critique and does not state the law that governs the award.
Even so, the great majority of states and the federal courts approve punitive damages as extracompensatory awards, while a few states still treat them mainly as a species of compensation.27 The windfall is tolerated as the price of securing a public good through quasi-criminal punishment in a civil suit, on the working assumption that the criminal law alone would be inadequate.28 A handful of states reject the award as a form of civil punishment, though some of them still allow it under particular statutes, and statutes elsewhere may expressly allow, bar, or regulate it, so a problem that names a jurisdiction may call for a different answer.29 The objections also account for the shape of the later subsections. Because the award is open to the charge of arbitrariness, the law limits it to outrageous conduct, guides how the factfinder sets the amount, and reviews the result against constitutional limits.
The Outrageous Conduct Standard
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 908(2) sets the threshold in a single sentence: punitive damages “may be awarded for conduct that is outrageous, because of the defendant's evil motive or his reckless indifference to the rights of others.”33 The sentence names one quality, outrageousness, and then says what produces it, so the defendant's state of mind is the source of the outrage. A severe injury, standing alone, does not satisfy the test. The plaintiff must proceed down one of two routes. The first is evil motive, where the defendant acts to injure, or out of spite or ill will. The second is reckless indifference, where the defendant knows that another's rights or safety are at risk and goes ahead anyway. The demand for one of those mental states follows from what the award is for. Compensatory or nominal damages already answer the plaintiff's loss, so an additional sum is justified only when the defendant's mind makes punishment and deterrence meaningful. A defendant who chose to harm, or who saw a risk and chose to disregard it, can have later choices changed by a penalty, while a defendant who never noticed the risk gives punishment nothing to act on.
In Kolstad v. American Dental Association, the Supreme Court construed the punitive-damages provision of a federal civil rights statute. It noted that conduct warranting punitive awards has been called egregious because of the defendant's mental state, and it cited § 908(2) as an example.34 It added that egregious misconduct is evidence of the requisite mental state, but that the statute does not require a showing of egregious or outrageous conduct apart from the employer's state of mind.35 Because Kolstad construes a statute, it is persuasive on the common-law concept and does not itself set the tort rule. For an intentional-tort problem, the practical consequence is that the shocking facts matter chiefly as proof of what the defendant was thinking, so the analysis moves from the facts to the mind.
The evil-motive route covers the defendant who acts from spite, ill will, or an intent to injure or defraud.36 It also reaches imputed intent, meaning the defendant who did not aim at the harm but knew to a substantial certainty that harm would result.37 Personal hatred is not required. In Jones v. Fisher, a couple who had lent a former employee the money for dental work forcibly removed her dentures to hold as collateral after she quit without repaying them. The example shows that conduct need only have the character of outrage, whether or not the defendants were driven by hatred.38 The standard tolerates this breadth because the justification for punishment lies in the defendant's willingness to override another person's interests deliberately, and a deliberate override can come from greed or irritation as readily as from malice in the narrow sense.
The reckless-indifference route depends on awareness. A defendant acts with reckless indifference when conscious of a risk to others and willing to impose it, so the standard demands more than extreme carelessness.39 Iowa's formulation shows the idea in operation: in Miranda v. Said the court described willful and wanton conduct as an intentional act of unreasonable character in disregard of a known or obvious risk so great that harm is highly probable, usually accompanied by conscious indifference to the consequences.40 States differ on how great the risk must be, and some ask whether the harm was significant, probable, or substantially likely.41 Whatever the threshold, the defendant must have appreciated the risk, because only a defendant who appreciated it made the choice that a penalty is meant to influence.
In Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., Steenberg Homes delivered a mobile home across the Jacques' field despite their repeated refusals. After a meeting that left the Jacques and the town chairman believing the matter was settled, the assistant manager told employees to use any means to deliver the home.42 In reviewing the award, the Wisconsin Supreme Court found that the intentional trespass revealed indifference and reckless disregard for the law and for the rights of others, and it treated the deceit as egregious.43 The risk in that case was no abstraction. The defendant knew whose rights it was overriding because the owners had told it so, and the decision to proceed anyway was the choice the standard targets.
Intentional torts are the usual setting for punitive damages. Assault, battery, false imprisonment, conversion, trespass, malicious prosecution, and intentional infliction of emotional distress generally permit them, and any intentional tort will usually suffice.44 A deliberate invasion of a person's body, liberty, land, or goods is a choice, and that choice is ordinarily the best evidence of evil motive or knowing disregard for the plaintiff's rights. The label does not finish the analysis, though, because the intent an intentional tort requires is a lower bar than the mental state punitive damages require. A tort is intentional when the defendant acts deliberately in a way substantially certain to invade the plaintiff's protected interest, and the defendant may intend no harm and may even have good intentions. Most jurisdictions require for punitive damages an evil mind, meaning an intent to cause injury.45
Ross v. Louise Wise Services, Inc. marks the gap. An adoption agency followed a policy of withholding family history that it considered nonhereditary and likely to interfere with bonding, so it told prospective parents the baby was healthy and did not disclose mental illness in the child's biological family, which later surfaced in the child. The agency's acts were intentional, but they were neither malicious nor vindictive, and the court upheld summary judgment against the punitive claim.46 A defendant who unknowingly buys a stolen article, or who unwittingly operates on the wrong patient, likewise commits a technically intentional tort without necessarily acting with malice.47
Even where liability itself requires outrageous conduct, the award stays discretionary. In Chuy v. Philadelphia Eagles Football Club, the Third Circuit, applying Pennsylvania law, recognized that punitive damages may be awarded in an emotional-distress case. It cautioned, however, that they are not proper in every case of proven liability: the factfinder may weigh the character of the act, the tortfeasor's motive, and the relation between the parties and conclude that exemplary damages are not warranted.48 An exam answer should say that an intentional tort makes a punitive claim available and a jury question likely, without saying that the award follows automatically.
Negligence marks the other pole. Negligence, even gross negligence in the sense of extreme carelessness, generally does not support punitive damages, and strict liability does not either.49 The reason is structural. A negligent defendant failed to notice or guard against a risk and so never made the choice to impose it, so a penalty has no mental state to deter, and the compensatory award already moves the loss onto the defendant. In Smizer v. Drey, a driver negligently failed to yield before pulling onto a road and struck the plaintiffs' car, and the court sanctioned the plaintiffs who sought punitive damages, consistent with the rule that merely negligent conduct is insufficient even when it causes severe damage.50 Iowa applies the same line by requiring evidence of a persistent course of conduct showing no care with disregard of consequences, since otherwise a court would infer recklessness from every negligent act.51 A stem that dwells on how badly the plaintiff was hurt, while describing a defendant who was merely careless, describes a negligence case in which the punitive claim fails.
Gross negligence is the label that causes the most confusion. When it means extreme carelessness, it is usually held insufficient, as in Doe v. Isaacs, where a hit-and-run drunk driver's conduct was gross negligence but not the willful recklessness that supports punitive damages.52 Some states do allow punitive damages for gross negligence, though the line between negligence and gross negligence is hard to state in a rule.53 Courts that use the term to support punitive damages generally require a bad mental state as well as bad conduct.54 The label therefore matters less than whether the defendant was consciously aware of the risk, which is the question the reckless-indifference route asks.
Jurisdictions differ on where the line sits, and many of the differences are differences in wording. Courts speak of an evil mind, bad faith, a culpable mental state, or conduct that is wanton, willful, malicious, oppressive, or fraudulent.55 Some states allow malice to be inferred from conscious indifference to the consequences, as one court did in allowing a plaintiff to introduce a drunk driver's two prior DWI convictions on the punitive claim. Others require actual malice, meaning evil motive, intent to injure, ill will, or fraud.56 Some courts even say that only truly malicious conduct, and not reckless or wanton conduct, justifies punitive damages. The distinction, between intentional harm and intentional risk-taking, matters for some purposes: liability insurance may cover intentional risk-taking but not intentional harm, and recent statutes have sometimes limited punitive liability for risk-taking but not for harm.57 The terms are abstract enough that few can separate oppressive from wanton with confidence, but each implies a bad state of mind as well as bad conduct.58 Statutes may also raise the burden of proof, for example by requiring clear and convincing evidence.59 When an exam does not name the jurisdiction, state the Restatement test, identify which route the facts fit, and note that a stricter jurisdiction would require actual malice.
The second and third steps correspond to the two routes in § 908(2), and the fourth is where most stems built on carelessness come to an end.
Factors in Setting the Amount
The second sentence of § 908(2) moves from whether punitive damages may be awarded to how large the award should be. In assessing punitive damages, the trier of fact can properly consider the character of the defendant's act, the nature and extent of the harm to the plaintiff that the defendant caused or intended to cause, and the wealth of the defendant.64 The sentence lists considerations and supplies no formula, which matches how courts treat the figure. In Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., the Wisconsin Supreme Court said that the amount rests within the jury's discretion and declined to adopt a mathematical formula for awarding such damages.65 Each factor answers to one of the purposes taught earlier. The character of the act measures how much blame the defendant deserves, the harm to the plaintiff keeps the sum tied to the wrong actually done, and the defendant's wealth tests whether the sum will deter.
The character of the act comes first because punishment is meant to fit the wrong, and some wrongs are more blameworthy than others.66 Jacque shows what a high position on that scale looks like. Steenberg Homes delivered a mobile home across the Jacques' field after repeated refusals. After a kitchen meeting that left the Jacques and the town chairman believing the matter settled, its assistant manager told employees to use any means to complete the delivery.67 The court found that the deliberate trespass revealed indifference and reckless disregard for the law and for the rights of others, treated the deceit as egregious, and concluded that the degree of reprehensibility supported a substantial award.68 The mental state that makes conduct outrageous under the first sentence of § 908(2) therefore also helps fix where that conduct sits on a scale of blame. A defendant who ignores explicit refusals and then misleads the owners has shown more culpability than one who stumbled into a risk. Because this factor aims at blame, the factfinder may also hear about a pattern. In TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., the Supreme Court pointed out that evidence of similar wrongdoing elsewhere and evidence of the defendant's net worth are typically considered in assessing punitive damages.69
The second factor looks to the harm to the plaintiff that the defendant caused or intended to cause. Its job is proportion: an award should respond to the wrong done to the person before the court, and a larger injury, or a larger injury intended, supports a larger sum. Two features of the wording matter. The word intended means a defendant gains nothing by pointing to the failure of the plan, since a scheme that falls short may still draw a substantial award although it caused little loss.70 The phrase to the plaintiff confines the factor to this plaintiff's injury. Evidence of repeated wrongdoing or of harm to others may be offered to show how reprehensible the defendant's conduct was, but a jury may not be invited to give this plaintiff a punitive award based on harm to others, because those others can bring and prove their own claims.71
Jacque shows the harm factor from the opposite direction. The damage to the Jacques was a path across a field, and their recovery for the trespass was $1 in nominal damages, yet the court held that a $100,000 punitive award was not excessive and reinstated it.72 The award rested on the egregiousness of the conduct and on what it would take to deter it, so the small measurable harm did not cap the sum. How a nominal award can carry a punitive award of that size is the subject of a later subsection.
The third factor, the defendant's wealth, is admissible because deterrence depends on what the defendant can feel. A sum that is a serious penalty for a defendant of modest means can be an unnoticed expense for a large enterprise, so a figure chosen without regard to means may fail to deter the very defendant it was meant to reach.73 Evidence of the defendant's financial circumstances is therefore usually admissible on the amount, and the same reasoning explains why most states do not allow punitive damages against an estate, since a defendant who has died cannot be deterred.74 The jury instruction approved in TXO told jurors that deterring a defendant of large means may require a larger fine than would be needed for a defendant of ordinary means.75
Jacque applies the same logic to a wrong committed for profit, and it measures the sting against the defendant's business. Steenberg sold and delivered mobile homes, so it would face the same dilemma again: trespass and pay a forfeiture, which was $30 in that case, or take the costlier lawful course.76 The court reasoned that punitive damages deter by removing the profit from the wrong, so the sum must exceed the profit the misconduct created in order for the defendant to recognize a loss. A $30 forfeiture did not significantly affect the profit from delivering the home, and $100,000 would.77 That reasoning supplies the working test for this factor: the figure should be large enough to register against what the defendant has and against what the wrong earned it.
Wealth calibrates sting and does no other work. It bears on the amount only, so a stem that stresses the defendant's size does not make an ordinary tort punishable, since entitlement turns on the conduct under the first sentence of § 908(2). Nor can wealth rescue an inflated figure. A defendant's resources do not justify an award that would otherwise be unconstitutional, and wealth cannot make up for other factors, such as reprehensibility, failing to restrain an award that purports to punish the conduct.78 Review of that kind, including the relationship between punitive and compensatory sums, is taken up in a later subsection.
Punitive Damages With Nominal Awards
Punitive damages sit in a category apart from compensatory and nominal damages, so a plaintiff whose only other recovery is a nominal dollar raises a real question: is there anything for the punitive award to rest on?80 The traditional answer is no. Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc. carved out an exception for intentional trespass to land, holding that when nominal damages are awarded for an intentional trespass to land, punitive damages may, in the discretion of the jury, be awarded.81 The exception matters most in trespass to land, because that is the tort in which a plaintiff can win without proving any measurable loss. The paragraphs below follow the court's reasoning in the order it gave it and then mark where other jurisdictions part company.
The Jacques refused Steenberg Homes' repeated requests to move a mobile home across their field, and the company plowed a path across it and dragged the home over the path anyway.82 The only public sanction was a $30 citation issued to the company's assistant manager.83 At trial, Steenberg conceded the intentional trespass but argued that no compensatory damages had been proved, so punitive damages could not be awarded. The jury returned $1 in nominal damages and $100,000 in punitive damages. The circuit court set the punitive award aside, and the court of appeals affirmed, reluctantly, because it was bound by precedent that a nominal award will not sustain punitive damages.84
That precedent came from Barnard v. Cohen, a libel case that asked whether punitive damages can be recovered when only nominal compensatory damages are found and answered no. Barnard stated the general rule in Wisconsin.85 The rule rests on an inference. A plaintiff who cannot show actual harm has only a nominal interest in the outcome, so society has little stake in deterring conduct that was unlawful but otherwise harmless, and punitive damages are inappropriate.86 For a libel plaintiff who proves no injury to reputation, the inference is plausible. The Wisconsin Supreme Court confined its analysis to intentional trespass to land and asked whether the inference survives there. It concluded that it does not, for one reason concerning the landowner and one concerning society.87
The first reason is the landowner's interest. The Jacques had the right to tell Steenberg Homes and any other trespasser, “No, you cannot cross our land,” but that right has no practical meaning unless the State protects it.88 As the court recognized as early as 1854, a “halfpenny” award does not constitute state protection.89 The nominal award itself supplies the next link. Because a legal right is involved, the law infers some damage from every direct entry on another's land, so the nominal award represents recognition that actual harm occurred even though no dollar figure can capture it.90 That step removes the premise of the traditional rule, which reads a nominal award as a sign that nothing of consequence happened. In trespass to land the nominal award points the other way: the plaintiff's right was invaded, and the invasion was the harm.
The harm also has a forward-looking side. A series of intentional trespasses can ripen into prescription or adverse possession and cost the owner the land.91 The Jacques knew the danger firsthand, because they had lost property valued at over $10,000 to neighbors in an adverse possession action in the mid-1980s and were sensitive about allowing others on their land.92
The second reason concerns society. Society has an interest in punishing and deterring intentional trespassers beyond the individual owner's interest, because a landowner who trusts the legal system to punish wrongdoers is less likely to take matters into his own hands.93 Punitive damages also reach conduct that, though oppressive and hurtful to the individual, almost invariably goes unpunished by the public prosecutor.94 The deterrence point is a matter of price. A company that delivers mobile homes for a living can compare the cost of trespassing, a $30 forfeiture and a $1 nominal award, with the cost of the lawful route and conclude that breaking the law is the more profitable choice. Only a punitive award large enough to change that comparison will restrain the next delivery.95 From these two steps the court held that, assuming the other requirements for punitive damages have been met, nominal damages may support a punitive award in an action for intentional trespass to land.96
The Restatement (Second) of Torts supports the result in two places. The comment to § 163 says that a trespasser who knows the entry is without the possessor's consent shows such complete disregard of the possessor's interest in exclusive possession that punitive damages may be imposed in addition to nominal damages, even for a harmless trespass.97 The comment to § 908 likewise says that nominal damages support a punitive award when a tort such as trespass to land is committed for an outrageous purpose and no significant harm results.98 The holding removes only the compensatory-damages prerequisite. The plaintiff must still show conduct that is outrageous because of evil motive or reckless indifference, and the jury keeps its discretion over whether to award punitive damages at all.99
The exception reaches only as far as its reasoning. Each step rests on features of trespass to land: the right to exclude, the inference of harm from every direct entry, the danger of prescription, and a deterrence gap when the invader can price the trespass. A tort that lacks those features gets less help from the reasoning, and Barnard's libel rule shows the other pole: only nominal compensatory damages means no punitive recovery.100 Some courts nonetheless extend the idea, so that a nominal award will often support substantial punitive damages where the tort is particularly offensive or outrageous and no substantial damage resulted.101 Even for trespass, jurisdictions divide. The Jacque court described the jurisdictions following its approach as a minority.102 A current statement of the law reports that in a majority of jurisdictions even an award of nominal damages will sustain punitive damages.103 A few states, Ohio among them, reject punitive damages unless the plaintiff recovers actual compensatory damages.104
Behind the split lies an ambiguity in the phrase “actual damages requirement.” The most reasonable reading is that it is shorthand for the idea that the plaintiff must first establish a cause of action, and in negligence a cause of action requires actual harm, which is why courts speaking of negligence cases came to talk about actual damages.105 Once the facts show a valid cause of action, as they do for an intentional trespass, there is no reason to deny punitive damages merely because the jury awarded a nominal sum, and the need for deterrence may even grow because the defendant faces no compensatory liability.106 The cases appear to be moving toward that reading, although the direction is uncertain.107 Read that way, the Jacque exception follows from the general rule once the tort is one that is complete without harm.
A stem that reports a nominal award alongside deliberate misconduct is therefore asking two separate questions. The first is whether the tort is one that is complete without proof of harm, and the second is whether the jurisdiction treats a nominal award as enough. An answer that jumps from the intentional tort straight to a punitive award has skipped both.
Constitutional Limits
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment limits how large a punitive award may be. In Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., the Wisconsin Supreme Court stated both the limit and the standard of review in terms that organize this subsection. The amount of punitive damages lies within the jury's discretion, though the circuit court may reduce an award to an amount it determines is fair and reasonable.110 The Clause nonetheless forbids grossly excessive punishment, because a defendant is entitled to fair notice not only of the conduct that will subject it to punishment but also of the severity of the penalty a state may impose. An award enters the zone of arbitrariness that the Clause prohibits only when it is grossly excessive in relation to the state's legitimate interests in punishment and deterrence.111
Both halves of that standard follow from how punitive damages work. The jury sets the sum without a formula, and the sum is not tied to a measurable loss, so a defendant's only protection against an arbitrary figure is a rule that tells it in advance, in rough terms, how much its conduct may cost. Without an outer limit, a verdict could also express hostility toward the defendant instead of a measured response to what it did. A concurring opinion in TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp. shows the worry and its answer. It acknowledged the argument that the jury's figure came from antipathy toward a wealthy out-of-state corporation, yet it declined to find the award improper, because the record also supported another explanation: TXO acted with malice, and the case was not one of negligence, strict liability, or respondeat superior.112 What separates a defensible large award from an arbitrary one, on that reasoning, is evidence of how bad the defendant's conduct actually was.
Courts decide whether an award has crossed the line by applying three guideposts, which Jacque took from BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore.113 The guideposts are these:
- The degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct.
- The disparity between the harm or potential harm the plaintiff suffered and the punitive award.
- The difference between the punitive award and the civil or criminal penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases.
Reprehensibility carries the most weight, because the best indicator of a reasonable award is how egregious the defendant's conduct was: some wrongs are more blameworthy than others, and the punishment should fit the offense.114 In State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, the Supreme Court listed the questions that measure it. They ask whether the harm was physical or only economic, whether the conduct showed indifference or reckless disregard for the health or safety of others, whether the target was financially vulnerable, whether the conduct was repeated or isolated, and whether the harm came from intentional malice, trickery, or deceit or from mere accident.115 Jacque shows high reprehensibility without any physical injury. Steenberg Homes hauled a mobile home across the Jacques' field after repeated refusals, and after a meeting that left the Jacques and the town chairman believing the matter settled, its assistant manager told employees to use any means to deliver the home. The court found indifference and reckless disregard for the law and for the rights of others, and it called the deceit egregious.116 The harm to the Jacques was a path across a field and no one's safety was at risk, so the finding rests on deliberateness, repeated refusals, and trickery. The same list can pull downward. A federal appeals court applying it in a § 1981 race-discrimination case treated the economic character of the harm and the absence of any threat to physical safety as lowering reprehensibility, while repeated, intentional conduct aimed at a financially vulnerable target kept it high.117
The second guidepost compares the punishment with the harm, and the Supreme Court has given it a rough numerical anchor without turning it into a rule. In State Farm the Court rejected any formula but indicated that few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio of punitive to compensatory damages, to a significant degree, will satisfy due process, leaving room for the rare case in which a particularly egregious act caused only a small amount of economic damage.118 The Court held a $145 million punitive award in that case to violate due process.119 The compensatory award was about $1 million, so the ratio ran near 145 to 1, and when the case returned to the Utah Supreme Court the punitive award was set at $9 million, a ratio of 9 to 1.120 The single-digit figure remains a guide that courts apply with flexibility: courts still sustain awards with much larger ratios on unusual facts, and for one category of maritime cases the Court adopted a 1 to 1 upper limit.121
The denominator in that comparison is the harm or potential harm to the plaintiff, and the words potential harm matter. Courts may measure the ratio against the harm the misconduct might have caused, so a defendant whose scheme failed can face a substantial punitive award despite little actual loss.122 Where the wrongful plan succeeded, actual harm is the measure. In the § 1981 case, the court took $50,000 of actual harm as the denominator and concluded that nine times that sum, $450,000, was the most the ratio would allow, since the case did not fit the rare small-damages exception. It found the jury's $5,000,000 award, one hundred times the harm, far beyond that ceiling.123 Due process also bars punishing a defendant for harm it caused to nonparties. In Philip Morris USA v. Williams the Court held that evidence of harm to others may be offered to show reprehensibility but may not form any part of the award itself, and states must adopt procedures that keep those two uses apart.124
A ratio is meaningful only when the compensatory figure measures the actual harm, and a nominal award does not. Jacque said so directly: when nominal damages support a punitive award, a multiplier is of dubious assistance because the nominal award may not reflect the actual harm, and if it did, the breathtaking 100,000 to 1 ratio could not be upheld.125 A $1 award can properly support $100,000 where a much larger compensatory award might not, as when egregious acts produce injuries that are hard to detect or noneconomic harm that is difficult to measure, and a mathematical bright line in those cases would turn punitive damages on their head.126 The Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc in Arizona v. ASARCO, reached a compatible result. It upheld a $300,000 punitive award, the statutory maximum, although the plaintiff recovered only $1 in nominal damages on a sexual harassment claim, relying in part on a statutory scheme that told the defendant what sanction it might face.127 The contrast with State Farm lies partly in what the denominator measures. A $1 million compensatory award stands for real, measured harm and gives the ratio meaning, while a $1 award stands for a violated right whose cost no one could price.
The third guidepost compares the award with the civil or criminal penalties for comparable misconduct, and a reviewing court gives substantial deference to legislative judgments about the proper sanction.128 Large authorized sanctions make a large punitive award more likely to survive, because the defendant had warning of what it risked, while small ones leave the defendant without notice of a severe penalty.129 Jacque found the factor largely irrelevant on its facts. Steenberg had been cited under a statute that made entering or remaining on land after notice a forfeiture with a maximum of $1,000, but the company had plowed a path across a field and hauled a mobile home over it, conduct the legislature had scarcely contemplated when it penalized simple entry.130 The actual forfeiture was $30, and the court reasoned that the statute had failed to deter, so that without punitive damages Steenberg kept a financial incentive to trespass again.131 A benchmark that fits the conduct works the other way. In the § 1981 case, the court treated the $300,000 statutory cap on punitive damages in a comparable federal discrimination statute as a measure restraining the award, even though that cap did not directly apply.132
Weighing the guideposts together, the Wisconsin court reinstated the $100,000 award. The conduct was brazen and deceitful, the sanction actually imposed was $30, and a ratio against a $1 nominal award tells a court little. The court declined to adopt a mathematical formula, treating actual harm and criminal penalties as relevant considerations without making them controlling, and it said the award neither shocked its conscience nor took its breath away, because the shocking thing was the defendant's brazen conduct and not the figure.133 Two further limits complete the picture. Evidence of the defendant's resources properly informs how large a sum will sting, yet wealth cannot justify an award that is otherwise unconstitutional, and it cannot make up for the failure of other factors, such as reprehensibility, to restrain an award.134 On review, an appellate court decides the constitutional excessiveness of a punitive award de novo, so it gives the lower court's view no deference on that question.135 State law can add a separate and more deferential test, and Wisconsin disturbs a jury's verdict only when it is so clearly excessive as to indicate passion and prejudice.136
An exam stem that pairs a nominal award with a large punitive sum is testing whether the ratio gets applied mechanically. A strong answer names the three guideposts, gives reprehensibility the most weight, and treats the single-digit ratio as a guide for awards backed by real compensatory damages. It then explains that a nominal award makes the ratio unhelpful, so egregious, deliberate conduct and a weak comparable penalty carry the analysis, as they did in Jacque. An answer that calls a 100,000 to 1 ratio unconstitutional per se, or one that treats a rich defendant as justifying any figure, has missed that no formula controls.
Punitive Damages Against Employers
The purposes of punitive damages taught above, punishing outrageous conduct and deterring it, raise a further question when an employee committed the tort and the defendant with the money is the employer. Section 909 of the Restatement of Torts answers it. Punitive damages can properly be awarded against a master or other principal because of an agent's act if, but only if, one of four things is true. The principal authorized the doing and the manner of the act; or the agent was unfit and the principal was reckless in employing him; or the agent was employed in a managerial capacity and was acting in the scope of employment; or the employer or a manager of the employer ratified or approved the act.140 The Eagles relied on this provision, which the Restatement (Second) of Agency carries as § 217C, when they resisted a punitive award in Chuy v. Philadelphia Eagles Football Club.141 Most courts follow the Restatement position, so it is the default approach for an exam answer.142
The four routes follow from what punishment is for. A punitive sum is meant to change the behavior of someone who chose the wrong, so it does its work only when it lands on a party that made a choice. The Eagles pressed this very point, arguing that damages designed to punish rather than to make victims whole should fall only on parties personally responsible for the tort.143 Each route supplies that personal responsibility in a different way. Authorization means the principal chose the act and its manner. Reckless employment means the principal chose to place an unfit agent in a position to do harm, so the culpability belongs to the employer and does not depend on attributing the agent's state of mind to it. The managerial route treats a manager's decision within the scope of the job as the decision of the enterprise, because a manager is the person through whom an enterprise decides what to do. Ratification, meaning the employer's or a manager's after-the-fact approval of the act, adopts the wrong as the employer's own, since an employer that could disown the act and embraces it has made its choice. Without one of these links, a punitive award would fall on an innocent principal and deter little, because nothing the principal could have done differently would have prevented the act.
The limit applies only to punitive damages. An employer may owe compensatory damages for an employee's intentional tort whenever the act is reasonably connected with the employment and so within its scope.144 Compensation asks who should bear a loss that the employer's activities produced, so a connection to the job is enough. Punishment asks who deserves a sanction, so it requires one of the four routes.
Pennsylvania law, as the Third Circuit read it in Chuy, takes a looser path. The court observed that no Pennsylvania case had been cited applying § 909. It relied on an earlier Third Circuit decision, Skeels v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., in which Judge Hastie reviewed the state precedents and concluded that Pennsylvania follows the “less restrictive” rule of Lake Shore & Michigan Southern Railway v. Rosenzweig: a corporation is liable for exemplary damages for the acts of its servant acting within the scope of his authority.145 Judge Hastie recognized that the rule could be harsh and added a safeguard, requiring that the agent's conduct be “rather clearly outrageous” before exemplary damages may be imposed vicariously on the principal.146 The safeguard sits in the quality of the agent's act, and management's involvement plays no part in it.
The Chuy court followed that analysis. The jury had found the team physician's statements extreme and outrageous, a finding that supported the underlying emotional-distress claim and the punitive award alike, so punitive damages could properly have been assessed against either the physician or the Eagles.147 The instructions the jury received were consistent with those the defendants themselves proposed and accorded with Pennsylvania law, and the court held that Pennsylvania courts would adopt a standard of vicarious liability that reaches the physician's conduct, leaving the award to the jury.148 The two rules therefore place their protection differently. Section 909 asks what the principal did: authorize, hire recklessly, act through a manager, or ratify. The Pennsylvania rule asks what the agent did: act within the scope of authority in a clearly outrageous way. The Eagles' argument that management never participated in or approved the statements would have been central under § 909, and it carried no weight under Pennsylvania law.