Concept
Origins of Supplier Duty
Duty of suppliers of chattels to third persons
Supplier Liability for Dangerous Chattels
Origins of Supplier Duty
Every rule the Restatement states for chattel suppliers assumes that a person who carelessly makes or supplies a dangerous thing can owe a duty to people who never bought it. The older common law rejected that assumption, and MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. overturned the old rule. Judge Cardozo held there that when a thing is reasonably certain to place life and limb in peril if negligently made, and its maker knows that persons other than the purchaser will use it without new tests, the maker must make it carefully, irrespective of contract.1 This unit asks what rule MacPherson displaced, what limits Cardozo built into its replacement, and how the Restatement sorts suppliers once the duty exists.
Under the privity rule, the seller of a chattel owed no liability, in contract or in tort, to anyone but the immediate buyer.2 The rule traces to Winterbottom v. Wright, where Lord Abinger, the Chief Baron, feared that if the plaintiff could sue, “every passenger or even any person passing along the road, who was injured by the upsetting of the coach,” could bring a similar action, and “the most absurd and outrageous consequences, to which I can see no limit, would ensue.”3 The case itself involved nonfeasance, yet courts read it to cover any negligence, including misfeasance, and a person hurt by a carelessly made chattel had no claim against anyone but the immediate seller.4
The exception that MacPherson later widened began in Thomas v. Winchester. A poison was falsely labeled and sold to a druggist, who sold it to a customer, and the customer recovered from the seller who had affixed the label.5 A falsely labeled poison is likely to injure anyone who gets it, so the danger could be foreseen, and foreseeable danger carried a duty to avoid the injury.6 The exception stayed narrow. Chief Judge Ruggles, who wrote for the court, separated negligence imminently dangerous to the lives of others from negligence that is not, and his examples of the second kind show how little the old rule allowed: the builder of a wagon owed nothing to the person who finally hired it, and a smith who shod a horse badly owed nothing to the person who hired the horse from its owner.7
That distinction could not be defended. Courts had treated a defective bottle of water under gas pressure as inherently more dangerous than a defective automobile, and they could identify no tenable basis for separating “imminently or inherently dangerous” products from other defective ones.8
MacPherson put the question squarely. The defendant manufactured automobiles and sold one to a retail dealer, who resold it to the plaintiff. While the plaintiff rode in the car, it suddenly collapsed and threw him out: one wheel was made of defective wood, and its spokes crumbled into fragments. The defendant had bought the wheel from another manufacturer, and there was evidence that a reasonable inspection would have revealed the defect but that no one made one. The plaintiff did not claim that the defendant knew of the defect and willfully concealed it, so the claim rested on negligence.9
Cardozo refused to confine the Thomas principle to poisons, explosives, and things that in their normal operation are implements of destruction. “If the nature of a thing is such that it is reasonably certain to place life and limb in peril when negligently made, it is then a thing of danger.” “Its nature gives warning of the consequences to be expected.”10 If the maker also knows that persons other than the purchaser will use the thing without new tests, the maker owes a duty to make it carefully, whatever the contract says.11 A student who asks whether the product is a poison or an explosive is therefore applying the exception that MacPherson displaced.
The dealer’s position exposed the flaw in the old rule. The dealer was the one person of whom it could be said “with some approach to certainty” that he would not use the car, yet the defendant’s argument would have made him the only person it was legally bound to protect. Cardozo declined to follow that logic: “The law does not lead us to so inconsequent a conclusion. Precedents drawn from the days of travel by stage coach do not fit the conditions of travel to-day.”12 The same reasoning reaches ordinary retail trade. As pre-packaged, mass-produced goods spread, the retailer was often a mere conduit who had not been negligent in any way, so in the typical case MacPherson did not add a defendant; it gave the plaintiff a claim against the only party who could possibly be found liable for negligence.13
Cardozo put aside “the notion that the duty to safeguard life and limb, when the consequences of negligence may be foreseen, grows out of contract and nothing else,” and located the source of the obligation “in the law.”14 Privity is therefore not required, just as it is not required when a driver negligently injures a pedestrian. Courts extended the rule by degrees until it became a general rule imposing negligence liability on any supplier of a chattel for remuneration.15
Cardozo built two limits into the original rule. The first is the degree of danger: the thing must be one that is reasonably certain to place life and limb in peril when negligently made, which is more than a bare possibility of harm. The second is foreseeable use by others: the maker must know that in the usual course of events the danger will be shared by persons other than the buyer and that the thing will be used without new tests. Such knowledge may often be inferred from the nature of the transaction. Cardozo conceded that even knowledge of the danger and of the use might not always be enough, and he went only as far as the case required.16 The Restatement sections below express the second limit as a question of whom the supplier “should expect” to use the chattel or to be endangered by its probable use.17
MacPherson widened the class of defendants but left the plaintiff’s burden of proving negligence in place, so manufacturers could be held liable to ultimate purchasers and users only for negligence.18 Proof was often hard. The plaintiff had to show not only that a defect in the wheel caused injury but also that the wheel was defective when it left the manufacturer’s possession, and the car in MacPherson had been driven on rough country roads for a year and might have been damaged by heavy use.19 That burden recurs in every rule that follows, because each asks whether the defendant knew, had reason to know, or failed to use reasonable care. Strict liability under Restatement (Second) § 402A, which reaches a defective product’s manufacturer and distributors regardless of fault or privity, came later as a separate theory and lies outside these rules.20
Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 388 to 404 sort these negligence rules by who the defendant is. Sections 388 to 390 govern suppliers generally. They cover the failure to warn of a known danger, the chattel unlikely to be made safe before use even though the supplier has told the other of its danger, and the entrusting of a chattel to someone likely, through youth, inexperience, or otherwise, to use it unreasonably.21 Sections 391 to 393 apply when the supplier furnishes the chattel for the supplier’s own business purposes. They carry the general rules over, add a duty of reasonable care to make the chattel safe and to discover and disclose its dangerous condition, and hold the supplier to those duties even when a third person’s inspection could have found the danger.22 Sections 394 to 398 address manufacturers: the manufacturer who knows of a danger, the one who negligently makes a chattel, the effect of inspection by others, secret or obscure formulas, and negligent design.23 Sections 399 to 402 cover sellers of products that others made, whether they know of a danger, hold the product out as their own, or merely fail to test it.24 Sections 403 and 404 reach independent contractors who make, rebuild, or repair a chattel.25 MacPherson returns in the manufacturer sections, especially § 395 on negligent manufacture and § 396 on inspection by others.