Concept
Perception and Intelligence
Objective reasonable person standard and the actor's circumstances
Perception and Intelligence
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 289 moves the “reasonable person under like circumstances” test inside the actor’s head. It asks whether a reasonable man would recognize that the conduct risks invading another’s interest, and it tells the jury what mental equipment to give him: attention, perception of the circumstances, memory, knowledge of other pertinent matters, intelligence, and judgment.1 The section takes that equipment from two places. Clause (a) supplies the amount a reasonable man would have, and clause (b) adds any superior amount the actor himself has.
Physical traits enter the reasonable person’s circumstances, as the earlier discussion showed. The mental faculties work differently, through a floor and a ratchet. Clause (a) is the floor: no adult falls below the reasonable person’s attention, perception, memory, knowledge, intelligence, and judgment, so a defendant with weaker faculties is still charged with the risks a reasonable man would have seen. Conduct that creates an unreasonable risk is no less dangerous because the actor lacked the capacity to meet the standard, and it would be more unjust to make the innocent victim bear that risk.2 Clause (b) is the ratchet, and it turns one way only. An actor who has more than the minimum knowledge, skill, training, or experience must apply it.3 The standard climbs with his real ability and never falls below the floor, so the floor comes first below.
Minimum Capacities
Clause (a) sets the lower limit on what an adult must take in. He must recognize that his conduct involves a risk whenever a reasonable man would, while exercising the attention, perception of the circumstances, memory, knowledge of other pertinent matters, intelligence, and judgment that a reasonable man would have.4 The reasonable man’s endowment of each faculty is the measure, so an actor with a smaller endowment never gets to substitute it. Each faculty on the list is something a defendant might say he lacked on the occasion, and the floor answers every such claim the same way: what would a person with the full complement have noticed and done? Children are the exception, and a separate reading takes up their standard.
Perception shows the floor most plainly. A driver approaching a railroad crossing with an unobstructed view will not be heard to say that he did not see the train or hear its warning.5 A claim of not noticing describes the defendant’s inner state, which a jury cannot check, and the floor replaces it with a question the jury can answer from the scene: what would a reasonable person looking at that crossing have seen?
The first driver describes his own attention, which the floor disregards. The second describes the scene, which counts among the circumstances and changes what a prudent person would have done. Knowledge follows the same pattern, and the next section lists what every adult is expected to know. What matters here is the direction of the rule. A defendant’s actual ignorance of something a reasonable person would know leaves the standard where it was. A person who realizes he is in unfamiliar territory, such as a strange dark hallway or a product he has never used, must take care in proportion to what he does not know.6
Memory carries a built-in exception. A reasonable person does not forget what he actually knows, so forgetting a known hazard does not by itself excuse negligence. But when distracted attention, lapse of time, or similar factors make it reasonable to forget, a jury can find no negligence, as in Ferrie v. D'Arc.7 The exception is built from the circumstances of the occasion and gives nothing to a defendant whose memory is merely poor. A chronically forgetful defendant offers a personal shortfall, while one whose attention was seized by events that would divert anyone offers a feature of the occasion.
The same logic reaches faculties that no one can see from outside. The clumsy, the rash, the timid, the forgetful, the chronically careless, the fool, the ignorant, the slow reactor, and the person of low intelligence are all held to the general standard of reasonable care, whether or not they can meet it.8 Mental illness is treated the same way. Under the Restatement (Third), an actor’s mental or emotional disability is not considered in determining whether conduct is negligent, unless the actor is a child.9 The root of the rule is Vaughan v. Menlove, where the court refused to make liability coextensive with each individual’s own judgment, a test as variable as the length of each individual’s foot, and insisted instead on the caution a man of ordinary prudence would observe.10
The rule is harsh, since it holds an adult to a standard he may be unable to meet, but it is not a moral judgment. Morally, we could hardly fault a Menlove for a judgment that was the best he could do. The law needs a standard that defines fault in a predictable, universal way, and the reasonable-person-under-like-circumstances test is a neutral instrument for deciding disputes, not a verdict on anyone’s character.11 The message to those who cannot meet the standard is that the law will not lower it, so they must curtail their activity or exercise particular self-restraint, or be restrained by others.12
Step four is where exam facts usually hide the real distinction, because an excuse that describes the defendant’s temperament fails while one that describes the occasion can succeed.
Superior Capacities
Clause (b) of Restatement (Second) of Torts § 289 turns the ratchet into a rule. Besides the faculties a reasonable man would have, the actor must bring to bear “such superior attention, perception, memory, knowledge, intelligence, and judgment as the actor himself has.”14 A defendant who sees dangers a layperson could not has a risk in front of him that the layperson never faced, and the law does not let him use ordinary eyes while holding extraordinary ones. Like any reasonably prudent person, an actor with more than the minimum knowledge, skill, training, or experience for an activity must apply it, especially where he holds himself out to the public as possessing special competence.15 Section 12 of the Restatement (Third) likewise suggests that persons with superior abilities could be held to the standard of a reasonable person with those abilities.16 The superior amount is added to the floor from clause (a) and never replaces it.
The Texas Supreme Court applied the idea to a plaintiff in Jackson v. Axelrad. A patient who was himself a doctor said he had told his physician a crucial fact about his symptoms, and the physician said he had not. The jury had to resolve that dispute in deciding both negligence and contributory negligence, and the court held that it could consider the patient’s superior knowledge of what the symptom meant for diagnosis in judging his own conduct, citing comment m to § 289(b).17
The authority pointing the other way is Fredericks v. Castora, where a Pennsylvania appellate court refused to impose a higher standard on a truck driver despite twenty years of experience.18 The objection is the Menlove problem seen from the other side. If superior skill raised the standard, the jury would have to ascertain how good each defendant was before choosing his standard, grading him as expert, very good, good, or average. Raising the standard for the able implies lowering it for the less able, and Menlove indicates that a court will not do that.19
The Restatement (Third) raises a policy objection as well. Holding skilled people to a higher standard could discourage them from acquiring superior skills in the first place.20 The question whether a person with expert skills should be held to a higher standard is therefore somewhat open, and an answer that announces one rule as settled misdescribes the law.21
One situation falls outside the dispute. If a skilled skier named Dogberry were on the ski patrol in the middle of a rescue, he would be acting as an expert and would be held to that standard.22 The contested case is the ordinary activity. When Dogberry is just skiing, like everyone else on the slope, he is held to the reasonable skier under the circumstances. In the same way, a trucker driving his car to the movies may be an expert driver, but he is held to the general reasonable-person standard for ordinary driving, as Fredericks illustrates.23
Jacques shows how an essay should handle the open question. A Formula One driver, he is taking his standard-issue SUV home from dropping his daughter at school when he is in an accident. Had he used his expert braking skill he could have avoided it, although an ordinary driver could not have.24 Under § 289(b) his skill is part of what the reasonable person in his position uses, so a jury could find him negligent, and the Restatement (Third) suggests the same result.25 Under Fredericks he is an ordinary driver on an ordinary trip, and since an ordinary driver could not have avoided the accident, no breach is shown. The safest answer states both lines and applies each to the facts.