Concept
The Professional Standard
Professionals, skilled actors, and other special classes
The Professional Standard
The last section treated training and role as circumstances that give the single negligence standard its content. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 299A turns that premise into a rule for skilled work: “Unless he represents that he has greater or less skill or knowledge, one who undertakes to render services in the practice of a profession or trade is required to exercise the skill and knowledge normally possessed by members of that profession or trade in good standing in similar communities.”1 The formula governs physicians and lawyers, and it governs electricians and every other occupation whose work a lay juror cannot judge from everyday experience. It borrows its yardstick from the occupation itself. A jury that cannot say what a careful person would do with a scalpel can still ask what a competent practitioner would do, and courts reason that lay jurors need that comparison.2
Each phrase of § 299A answers a question that problems like to test. How much skill does the law demand? An objective minimum, drawn from the ordinary competent practitioner. Whose claims about ability count? The actor’s own, because a representation of greater or less skill changes the measure. Where do the benchmark practitioners practice? “In similar communities,” a phrase with a long and unsettled history for physicians. How much does the group’s custom decide? That depends on the defendant and the jurisdiction. And how does the law treat a professional’s choices differently from the care with which the professional carries them out? The five subsections follow those questions in order.
The Ordinary Competent Practitioner
Under § 299A the jury compares the defendant with the skill and knowledge normally possessed by members of the profession or trade in good standing, and it disregards how skilled this particular defendant happens to be.3 Illinois states the same idea as the knowledge, skill, and ability an ordinarily careful professional would exercise under similar circumstances.4 Two reasons support a benchmark drawn from the group. A standard pegged to each defendant’s own ability would let the least capable actors set the lowest bar for everyone they endanger. And lay jurors cannot decide what a careful lawyer, accountant, or architect would do without measuring the defendant against other practitioners.5
The professional rule does not abandon the reasonable person. That standard stays constant while the care it demands varies with the circumstances.6 Dispensing gasoline calls for more care than dispensing ice cream sodas, yet no different standard is at work; the reasonable person simply takes more care where the risk is high.7 For skilled work, the occupation supplies the circumstance, and the jury asks what a reasonable member of the group would do.
Heath v. Swift Wings, Inc. shows how easily the group benchmark slips back into an individual one. Fred Heath’s plane crashed shortly after takeoff, killing everyone aboard, and the estates of his wife and son sued his estate and the plane’s owner. The trial court told the jury that negligence meant failing to use the care of “an ordinary prudent pilot having the same training and experience as Fred Heath.”8 The jury found that Heath was not negligent, and the North Carolina Court of Appeals ordered a new trial.9 The phrase “same training and experience” invited the jury to weigh Heath’s own qualifications, whether outstanding or inferior, in setting the standard of conduct. The plaintiffs were entitled to the objective minimum applicable to all pilots, because objective standards avoid imposing a different standard of care on each individual.10 A jury told to ask what a pilot with Heath’s own preparation would have done could excuse a misjudgment because he lacked the training to avoid it, although everyone a pilot endangers relies on the baseline competence of pilots generally.11
Heath, like the Restatement, reaches past the learned professions, which is why § 299A says “profession or trade.” Physicians, lawyers, architects, barbers, and pilots all engage in activities that call for special skill, and the Illinois Supreme Court applies one formula to attorneys, physicians, podiatric practitioners, dentists, and accountants.12 A license is typical of these activities but does not trigger the standard. The trigger is undertaking the skilled work, and the benchmark is the competent member of the group qualified to do it.13
The benchmark is the ordinary competent practitioner. It is not the standard of the most highly skilled, and it is not necessarily that of the average member, because practitioners with somewhat less than average skill may still treat patients competently.14 A literal average would put half the profession below the line and make those practitioners negligent by definition; “ordinary” avoids that result. The qualifier “in good standing” directs the jury to qualified members of the group. It is not universal, though. Illinois speaks of the ordinarily careful professional, and one court has held “in good standing” too vague for a jury instruction.15
The standard also has a boundary, and the first move on a problem is to ask whether the alleged fault lies in the professional work itself. A patient who slips on a freshly mopped hospital floor complains of ordinary negligence, which the reasonable person standard governs. A patient who receives the wrong dosage complains of professional conduct, which the professional standard governs.16 The line follows the reason for the special standard: jurors need a peer benchmark for technical work they cannot evaluate from everyday experience, and they need none to decide whether a wet floor required a warning sign. The usual mistake is to apply the professional standard to everything a professional or institutional defendant does.
Holding Out and Specialists
The measure in § 299A is a default, and it yields when the actor “represents that he has greater or less skill or knowledge.”18 Reliance explains the exception. A client who hires a lawyer for advertised experience, or a patient who seeks out a specialist for the extra training, chooses on the strength of what the actor said about ability, and the law holds the actor to what the public properly relied on.19 A representation of less skill does the opposite work: it warns the person receiving the service to look elsewhere or to take precautions. Silence leaves the ordinary measure in place. The question on a problem is therefore what the actor professed, whatever diploma hangs on the wall.
Specialists show the exception at work. When a profession recognizes specialties, as medicine and dentistry do and the law does to some extent, a specialist, including one who holds himself out as a specialist, is held to the higher standard of the specialized subgroup.20 The comparison group narrows to practitioners who share the specialty’s training, because that training is what the patient or client was buying. A physician who held herself out as a specialist could not object to a jury instruction applying the specialist’s standard in Aves v. Shah, and the court in Duffey Law Office v. Tank Transport, Inc. reached the same result for an attorney who claimed a specialty. The label can come from self-description as readily as from a certificate: a lawyer who claims to be “an expert in international taxation issues” may be held to the heightened standard of lawyers who are experts in that field.21
The cardiologist’s exposure rises with the claim on the sign, while the internist’s stays tied to the general practice he professed. For board-certified medical specialists the benchmark is usually a single national standard of the specialty, because the training and examination are the same wherever the physician practices.22 That uniformity is why courts rarely apply the locality rule to specialists, a subject the next subsection takes up.23
A rural general practitioner who meets an emergency calling for an orthopedic surgeon’s skill shows the principle from the other direction. The patient’s need does not turn the generalist into an orthopedist, because a physician is held to the standard he professes, and the result would be the same in a city. The law expects him to recognize the limit of his competence and refer the patient to a provider who can supply what he lacks.24 A problem that dwells on how badly the patient needed a surgeon invites the error of measuring the generalist against the surgeon. The sound analysis asks whether a reasonably competent general practitioner would have seen the limit and referred.
The same logic governs practitioners outside medicine proper. Non-physician practitioners such as chiropractors and podiatrists are judged by the standards of their own profession, and where a legislature has sanctioned such healers, they are judged by those standards when they act within their areas of competence.25 Beyond those limits they must decline further treatment or refer the patient.26 A practitioner who professes a different calling is judged by that calling: a chiropractor who presents himself as a physician answers to physicians.27 The work performed counts as much as the title claimed. A pharmacist who listens to a customer’s symptoms, diagnoses the illness, and prescribes medication has undertaken a physician’s work and is judged by the standards applicable to a physician, whether or not the pharmacist belongs to that group.28 If the credential an actor actually holds set the bar, a person could shed the physician’s standard while performing the physician’s work, simply by pointing to a narrower license.
The qualifier cuts both ways, so a professional who professes more skill must use it. An actor who possesses more than the minimum knowledge, skill, training, or experience for an activity is required to apply it, especially when he has held himself out to the public as having that competence.29 The Restatements suggest the same, speaking of “skills or knowledge that exceed those possessed by most others.”30 The fee changes none of this. One who undertakes skilled services even gratuitously is judged by the standards of those properly qualified,31 and Becker v. Janinski applied the principle to a physician, whose measure of skill and care is the same for a pauper treated gratuitously as for a millionaire who pays. The undertaking and what the actor professed in making it fix the standard; neither the price nor the diploma controls.
Community and Locality
Section 299A measures the professional against members of the calling in good standing “in similar communities,”33 and the closing phrase raises a question the earlier subsections left open: how far from the defendant’s own office may a jury look for the benchmark practitioners? For physicians the answer was once as narrow as the defendant’s own town, and the history of how it widened explains what the phrase means today.
Traditionally, a physician was measured against what other physicians in the same locality did. The rule appears to have developed in the late nineteenth century to protect rural doctors who, because of inadequate training and experience and the lack of effective transportation and communication, could not be expected to show the skill and care of urban doctors.34 A second argument supported it: holding rural physicians to urban standards would drive them out of small towns and leave those communities without enough medical care.35 The premise was plausible when medical education was not standardized and the knowledge, skill, and practices of doctors varied widely, particularly between rural and urban areas.36
The rule carried costs in its structure. Its yardstick is local practice itself, so a community’s own habits define due care. If a town’s six doctors all ignored a helpful new drug, none would be guilty of malpractice for failing to prescribe it.37 Testing conduct only against neighbors also removes pressure to raise the local level of care, and it shields communities whose practice lags behind the rest of the country.38 The rule made claims hard to prove as well. Only an expert who could state the local standard could testify that the defendant fell short of it, so a plaintiff suing a Nantucket doctor would usually need another Nantucket doctor, and local physicians are notoriously reluctant to testify against their colleagues.39 Plaintiffs often found their only good evidence in outsiders who were not allowed to testify, and the claim failed for want of proof.40
The justification gave way under examination. The worry that a small-town physician may lack the latest equipment or training needs no locality rule, because a jury can weigh limits on equipment among all the circumstances bearing on reasonableness, and a physician who lacks the equipment or training to treat a patient need only refer the patient to a more appropriate provider.41 The factual premise eroded too. With improved communication and widespread continuing medical education, the reason for the rule faded: mainstream physicians now train in the same basic way across the country, have continuing education and instant computer guidance, and work with medical facts that are the same everywhere.42 Locality rules were peculiar to medicine in any event, because neither architects nor lawyers have been measured solely by the practice of their local peers.43
Brune v. Belinkoff, a Massachusetts decision from 1968, marks the transition. The plaintiff claimed that an anesthesiologist practicing in New Bedford negligently gave her eight milligrams of pontocaine as a spinal anesthetic during delivery.44 Some evidence showed that good practice called for less than five milligrams, while the defendant’s evidence showed that eight was customary in New Bedford.45 The trial judge told the jury that if the skill and ability of New Bedford physicians were “fifty percent inferior” to those in Boston, the defendant should be judged by New Bedford standards.46 The Massachusetts court overruled its older locality precedent, announcing that the profession “should no longer be Balkanized by the application of varying geographic standards in malpractice cases.”47 The old rule might protect a general practitioner performing difficult surgery in a small country village, the court said, but it was inappropriate for a specialist practicing in a city of 100,000 about fifty miles from Boston. In its place the court asked whether the physician used the care and skill of a qualified practitioner, taking account of advances in the profession, and it allowed the jury to consider the medical resources available to the physician as one circumstance in fixing the skill and care required.48 A small practice’s genuine limits survive as a circumstance; local custom no longer defines due care.
After the strict rule fell, courts settled on three main yardsticks for physicians, and a jurisdiction chooses among them by statute or decision.49
- The same-or-similar community test compares the defendant with physicians in the defendant’s own community or a similar one. It is the most common approach, and it avoids judging a rural general practitioner by the standards of an urban teaching-hospital specialist while still giving the plaintiff access to expert testimony.50 Critics note that courts struggle to decide when two communities are similar and that the test can still shield physicians who follow a similar community’s substandard practice.51
- The statewide test draws the comparison group from physicians throughout the defendant’s state, which ends the town-by-town inquiry.
- The national test applies where board certification has nationalized medical standards, and it holds providers trained to national standards who hold themselves out as such to a national standard of care.52
Morrison v. MacNamara shows the national test in operation. The defendant was a nationally certified clinical laboratory that held itself out as such, and the plaintiff’s expert testified that national standards called for the patient to be seated or lying down during a urethral smear test.53 The laboratory’s experts, all from the Washington area, knew of no national standard and always performed the test with the patient standing.54 The trial court told the jury to compare the laboratory’s conduct only with the standard of care prevailing in Washington, D.C. That was error. At least for board-certified physicians, hospitals, medical laboratories, and other health care providers, the standard is national, because national board certification establishes uniform standards of proficiency and laboratories are staffed by doctors with the same rigorous training and the same chance to keep up with advances.55 The local-only instruction also told the jury, in effect, to ignore the plaintiff’s expert, although the conflict in expert testimony was for the jury to resolve.56 The court called the strict locality rule “a relic of the nineteenth century” with no relevance to modern practice.57
Brune and Morrison answer different questions. Brune asked how much allowance a court should make for the defendant’s surroundings once the benchmark is drawn from qualified practitioners generally, and it left that allowance to the circumstance of available resources. Morrison asked which group supplies the benchmark for a nationally certified provider, and it answered that the group is national. The choice of yardstick matters most for expert testimony: a national standard lets physicians from anywhere testify about the practice of a small-town defendant, while a local standard confines the plaintiff to witnesses who know the local custom.58
Lawyers were never measured as strictly by place. The usual scope of a lawyer’s standard of care is the state in which the lawyer practices, so a lawyer in Buffalo could testify that a lawyer in Schenectady had been negligent.59 Each state regulates bar admission and lawyer discipline within its own borders, which explains the statewide scope.60 Vermont adopted a statewide standard in Russo v. Griffin, and the Tennessee court in Chapman v. Bearfield observed that judicial districts may have local rules of practice but there are no local standards of care.61 Local practices still bear on whether a lawyer’s conduct was proper in the situation, though the standard itself does not change, and in many specialized fields a national standard is entirely appropriate.62
What remains of locality is its place among the circumstances. Indiana’s courts treat locality as one factor alongside advances in the profession, the facilities available, and whether the provider is a specialist or a general practitioner.63 Place matters because it affects what a provider can do. It changes the care that is reasonable without lowering the skill the profession is expected to have.
One wrinkle matters on an exam. During the 1970s through the 1990s, rising claims against physicians led many legislatures to enact malpractice reform statutes, and in some jurisdictions these statutes moved the standard back from the national test to the same-or-similar locale.64 Many states now split the difference, applying the same-or-similar standard to general practitioners and the national standard to board-certified specialists, and a statute such as Idaho’s refers to the standard of health care practice of the community in which the care was or should have been provided.65 A sound answer therefore begins with the defendant’s profession and the level the defendant professed, applies the jurisdiction’s statute or the modern default, and treats the defendant’s town as a circumstance and never as the whole yardstick.
Professional Custom
Section 299A measures a professional against what members of the profession normally possess, and that wording leaves a practical question open: once the jury learns what the profession customarily does, does that practice settle whether the defendant was careful?67 Ordinary negligence law says no. Custom is evidence a jury may weigh, and it does not decide the case. In T.J. Hooper tugboats ran without radio receiving sets, an omission common in the industry, and the omission could still be found negligent. Judge Learned Hand explained that reasonable prudence is usually common prudence but is never strictly its measure, because a whole calling may have unduly lagged in adopting new and available devices, and courts must in the end say what is required.68
Courts once treated customary care as reasonable care as a matter of law. In the late nineteenth century a defendant who showed that its conduct matched custom was held not negligent, because courts trusted the free market to produce the right level of safety precaution, and that trust weakened by the 1930s after the Depression shook confidence in the market.69 Custom did not leave the case. Evidence of what a trade or an individual customarily does remains admissible, and the jury may weigh it, along with industry safety codes, in deciding whether the defendant acted with reasonable care.70 The trade supplies evidence; the jury decides what care required.
Most jurisdictions treat professional defendants the opposite way. Under the majority rule, compliance with professional custom insulates the defendant from liability, and failure to comply with it is malpractice.71 In medical malpractice the standards of the medical profession are the relevant custom, so the plaintiff proves breach by showing that the defendant violated the professional standard, and the defendant answers by showing compliance.72 A single shared omission shows the difference. A physician who skips an inexpensive, risk-free test that might save a patient’s sight avoids liability under the custom test as long as other physicians skip it too, while under the reasonable care test the shared omission does not by itself protect the physician.73
Three reasons support so sharp a departure. Necessity carries the most weight. Professional work is more complex than the activities in ordinary negligence cases and jurors know less about it, so asking them to decide whether a course of treatment was reasonable would ask for a medical judgment that no juror can give without leaning heavily on the profession’s own standard.74 Self-regulation supplies a second reason, because professions are assumed, at least in theory, to police their own members.75 A protective reason is also offered: an injured patient is a sympathetic plaintiff, and a conformity test shields the careful physician from undeserved liability, while the grossly incompetent practitioner gains little comfort because departure from accepted practice remains malpractice.76
Because medicine is an inexact science, the majority rule usually comes with a refinement. Many difficult medical questions cannot be resolved by a definitive, bright-line standard, and medical judgment is required.77 Under the “respectable minority” rule, also called the “two schools of thought” rule, a physician who departs from a practice most of the profession follows is not guilty of malpractice if the physician followed a school of thought or practice that a respectable minority of practitioners accept.78 The reasoning follows from the premise of custom itself. Where the profession is divided over which of several methods is best, punishing a physician for choosing one of them would penalize the very judgment the profession’s own standard protects. The question is whether a competent physician would have chosen the method, even if another physician would not.79
The second surgeon loses even if no study shows that the accepted methods heal better, because deviation from the standard is malpractice without proof that the customary precaution was scientifically needed.80 The respectable minority rule protects a choice among accepted methods and gives no cover to a method that no group accepts. Courts disagree about what qualifies as a school. Jones v. Chidester described an absolute defense when one group of experts approves the treatment although another school recommends a different approach, limited to cases where more than one method is accepted. The Pennsylvania court had to decide whether a school exists when a considerable number of experts advocate it, a quantitative test, or when reputable and reasonable practitioners accept it, a qualitative one.81
In practice the special rule may operate less differently than it looks. Experts rarely point to a precise professional standard governing the problem the defendant faced. Some courts treat their testimony as a conflict over what the prevailing standard actually is and leave the question to the jury, and a jury working through disputed facts may give the respectable minority instruction less weight than the doctrine suggests.82 The standard is also often established by an expert’s flat statement that specified conduct simply is the standard, with no survey of what physicians actually do.83
Critics find the custom standard too generous. It lets the defendants’ own profession set the measure of their conduct, and it removes science and the weighing of risks from the inquiry, so it changes ordinary law mainly by lowering the duty when custom calls for less care than the risks and benefits justify.84 They add that often no single standard practice exists, or that it is not really known to the physicians who testify.85 The justifications are thinner than they first appear, since nonprofessional industries make technical safety choices that demand considerable expertise, and some professional errors, such as a lawyer missing a filing deadline, are plainly negligent without expert help.86
A minority of jurisdictions apply a general reasonableness standard instead, which makes evidence of compliance or noncompliance with professional custom admissible but not dispositive.87 A number of courts have said that the standard of care for health care providers is the reasonable care standard of negligence law generally, and some statutes prescribe it. Medical custom remains relevant evidence, though not determinative if other evidence shows a lack of reasonable care. Three consequences follow: the plaintiff may prove unreasonable risk by any competent evidence rather than expert proof of custom, the sufficiency of the evidence is judged on everything in the record, and the jury is instructed on reasonable care.88
Helling v. Carey is the famous outlier. The court held an ophthalmologist negligent as a matter of law for failing to test patients under forty routinely for glaucoma, although experts on both sides testified that the profession did not require the test at that age, and it reached the result by balancing the seriousness of the risk against the cost of the test.89 The decision drew criticism, and the Washington legislature responded by declaring that professional standards would be established by the profession and that courts were not free to reject them.90 Courts have split even on similar facts. In Osborn v. Irwin Memorial Blood Bank the court upheld judgment for a blood bank because professional prudence is defined by actual accepted practice, while United Blood Services v. Quintana treated the profession’s adopted standard as a presumption of due care that plaintiffs may rebut by proving that a universal practice was itself negligent.91 Jurisdictions divide on all of this, so the first step is to identify the rule where the case arises.92
The custom approach reaches beyond medicine. A lawyer owes the competence and diligence normally exercised by lawyers in similar circumstances, custom is described as dispositive of the standard of care, and a client suing a lawyer must generally offer expert testimony to establish the standard and the lawyer’s failure to meet it.93 Informed consent is the area where many courts refuse to let custom set the standard. A physician must tell the patient enough about the treatment, the alternatives, and the collateral risks to permit an intelligent choice, and a patient who consented without that information has a negligence claim even when the treatment itself was performed with due care.94 Courts following Canterbury v. Spence reject a rule that ties disclosure to what local physicians customarily disclose, because binding disclosure to medical usage leaves the decision on revelation to the physician alone. They ask instead whether a risk is material, meaning likely to affect the patient’s decision.95 A disclosure rule exists to serve the patient’s own choice, and a custom set by physicians would let the party advising the patient decide how much the patient may know.
Judgment Versus Due Care
Section 299A speaks of the skill and knowledge normally possessed by members of the profession, and the earlier subsections developed what that phrase demands.103 Courts applying the rule recognize two further elements of professional conduct: the exercise of a discerning judgment in choosing among options, and the use of due care in applying the skill and knowledge to the task at hand.104 The three elements fail in different ways, and the law treats the failures differently. A lawyer may lack the knowledge a competent lawyer has, may have it and choose a sound course that reasonable lawyers could have chosen, or may have it, choose soundly, and then botch the execution. The first and third situations fall below the standard. The middle one is the situation the law protects.
The judgment element is usually expressed by saying that a professional is not liable for a mere error of judgment.105 In Crosby v. Jones, tactical decisions and decisions on a debatable point of law were held not actionable so long as the attorney exercised best judgment, and similar language appears in cases about a lawyer’s recommendation to settle, such as Thomas v. Bethea.106 Blankenship v. Baptist Memorial Hospital carries the idea into medicine: as long as competent physicians could honestly differ, a physician who used best judgment is not liable even if it later turns out that the physician was mistaken.107 The reason lies in the nature of the work. Professionals are hired to choose, often on questions where competent practitioners genuinely differ, and the result of a choice frequently lies beyond their control. If liability followed every poor outcome, the professional would become an insurer of results. Where reasonable professional judgments could differ, a practitioner who picks any of the reasonable options has not violated the standard at all, which is why courts speak of no breach and not of an excuse.108
The rule has a boundary that matters as much as the rule. Courts often say that lawyers are not liable for good-faith errors in judgment, but read literally that statement would erase nearly all lawyer liability, since almost every lawyer who errs believes in the choice made.109 Most courts therefore confine the rule to situations in which reasonable professional judgments could differ, and many cases restrict it further to unsettled areas of law. Even in unsettled territory a lawyer can fall below the standard, as by conducting inadequate research or by missing alternatives that would have kept the client out of a murky area of the law. Neither good faith nor the uncertainty of the terrain protects a lawyer who acts unreasonably when compared with prudent lawyers in the same position.110 In Wood v. McGrath, a lawyer’s recommendation to settle without disclosing that the agreement conceded issues the client might have won was held not to be an exercise of best judgment.111
Medicine draws the same line. Where several procedures were available, the issue is whether a competent physician would have chosen the one used, and the standard is not one of good faith.112 A practitioner who follows a practice inferior to that of the average qualified practitioner gains no shelter by saying the practice reflected best judgment.113 Whether a physician who knows a better practice than the accepted one must use it is a harder question, and the cases do not resolve it cleanly.114 The phrase “best judgment” invites a misreading, because it sounds as though the professional’s own sincerity were the test. The test looks outward, to whether a reasonably prudent practitioner could have made the choice under the circumstances.
That outward focus explains why instructions on this subject draw criticism. A charge telling the jury that a physician is not liable for honest error or good-faith mistake injects subjective issues into an objective test and may lead jurors to think that bad faith, and not a departure from professional standards, is what makes a professional liable.115 West Virginia’s high court found in Pleasants v. Alliance Corp. that a mistake-of-judgment instruction wrongfully injects subjectivity into the evaluation of the standard of care, and Pennsylvania’s high court held in Passarello v. Grumbine that an instruction excusing errors in judgment risks confusing jurors about that standard.116 The flaw resembles the one in the pilot instruction in Heath, where an objective rule acquired a subjective element. A problem that dwells on the professional’s good intentions offers sincerity as if it were the measure of care, and the answer is to ask what a competent practitioner could have done.
The third element, due care in applying skill and knowledge, covers the steps of professional work that are mechanical instead of discretionary. Such a step involves no professional judgment, so no judgment exists for the law to protect, and courts are more ready to find liability.117 The standard illustration for lawyers is failing to file suit before the statute of limitations runs. For physicians it is failing to gather the data on which trained discretion depends, as when a physician does not read the test results before diagnosing.118 Neither professional made a choice that the law needs to shield. Each skipped a step that any competent practitioner takes without deliberation, and the skipped step is the breach. The line can blur when a deadline passes because of a legal judgment, such as a view about when the claim accrued, and in that case expert testimony is still needed to show that the judgment fell below professional standards.119