Concept
Competence and Qualification
Professionals, skilled actors, and other special classes
Competence and Qualification
The professional standard tells a jury what a competent practitioner does. Four questions remain about the actor who falls short of it. Should he have taken the work at all? Does his lack of a license matter? Does his inexperience? Did he prepare? Two companion Restatement rules answer the first and last by moving the negligence inquiry ahead of the harmful act. The other two questions share one answer: the standard follows the work undertaken, so a missing credential and a thin record of experience both leave it where it was.
Acting Without Competence
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 299 provides that an act may be negligent if the actor does it without the competence that a reasonable person in his position would recognize as necessary to prevent an unreasonable risk of harm to another.1 Section 299A describes the skill a competent practitioner brings to the work.2 Section 299 addresses the actor who starts without it. The inquiry shifts from how well he performed to whether he should have undertaken the work at all, so the negligence can precede the first careless step.
The rule gives the actor the duty to recognize a limit because only the actor can see it. A patient on the examining table cannot tell whether her physician is out of his depth; the physician can decline the case or bring in someone qualified, at little cost beside the harm an unqualified attempt can do. Without § 299, an actor could answer every claim by saying he did his best with the skills he had, and that is the subjective measure the law rejects for skilled actors. The reasonable actor is therefore judged partly by what he does about the gap. One who knows or should know that a task exceeds him, and who declines or refers, has acted reasonably. One who presses ahead has not, even if every later step receives his best effort.
The words “would recognize” measure what a reasonable person in the actor’s position would have realized, so an actor cannot escape by never asking the question. Gobrecht v. Beckwith shows the point. A landlord installed a gas heater in a closed, almost unventilated bathroom without knowing that it would fill the room with carbon monoxide, and the tenant who lit it was poisoned. The court held the landlord negligent for failing to investigate the heater’s safety before installing it, and held the tenant not negligent for failing to inquire and for relying on the landlord.3 The landlord’s ignorance was a fact, but his breach lay in not learning what a careful person in his position would have learned. He introduced the risk and was in a position to inquire; the tenant was entitled to assume someone had. An actor who takes on a risky task must find out enough to know whether he can do it safely, and “I didn’t know” is a defense only when a reasonable person in his position would not have found out either.
Physicians supply the main application. A physician must use reasonable care to consult a specialist or refer the patient whenever he knows or should know that diagnosis or treatment is beyond his competency, that specialist care is needed, or that treatment requires equipment he lacks.4 He is liable for failing to refer, and equally for referring the patient to a provider he should know is inappropriate for the patient’s care.5 Referral closes the competence gap. A physician who skips it has proceeded without the competence the case required, and one who refers carelessly has not closed the gap. The words “should know” import a duty to find out, so he cannot rely on never having asked whether the condition exceeded his training.
A bad outcome after a general practitioner treats a complicated condition proves nothing by itself. The question is what the physician recognized, or should have recognized, about the limit of his competence.
Even the first physician’s liability depends on causation: the plaintiff must show that a timely referral was reasonably likely to lead to a better outcome or at least to improve the patient’s chances.6 The competence rule fixes the breach, and causation remains a separate element for the plaintiff to prove.
The same reasoning reaches providers who are not physicians. Chiropractors and podiatrists are judged by the standards of their own professions, but they must know the limits of their competency and, beyond those limits, decline further treatment or refer the patient elsewhere.7 Section 299 speaks of any actor, not only of health care, so an electrician or lawyer who takes on work that a reasonable person in his position would recognize as beyond his competence has likewise created the risk at the moment of undertaking. The next subsection asks what changes when the actor holds no license at all.
Unlicensed Practitioners
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 299A applies to “one who undertakes to render services in the practice of a profession or trade,” and the formula never mentions a license.9 Taking on the work triggers the professional standard, so a person who performs a professional’s services answers to the professional’s measure whether or not any licensing board has approved him. Two questions follow, and students tend to merge them. What care did the defendant owe? And can the missing license prove that he fell short of it? The first has a firm answer: the care of those qualified to do the work. The second usually gets none.
The standard attaches to the undertaking because the public relies on it. A patient on an examining table, or a homeowner watching someone open a wall, usually cannot tell whether the person at work holds a credential, and expects the skill the work requires. The law therefore judges persons who undertake skilled activities, even gratuitously, by the standards of those properly qualified to perform them, whether or not they belong to the recognized group.10 A credential-based trigger would give the unlicensed practitioner a lower bar than the licensed one, so that those least qualified to do the work would owe the least care to the people they endanger. A pharmacist who diagnoses and prescribes for a customer is already judged as a physician;11 the unlicensed practitioner is the limiting case, in which the license covers nothing at all.
Brown v. Shyne illustrates the rule with a chiropractor. A chiropractor who holds himself out as a chiropractor is judged by the standard of other chiropractors, but one who claims to be a physician is held to the physician’s standard, and Brown v. Shyne is the cited example of the second result.12 His actual credential set no ceiling on the care owed. The role he claimed and the work he undertook fixed the measure, and the missing medical license earned him no discount.
Because the standard follows the undertaking, it also ignores the fee. A professional serving without charge owes the same duty as a paid one, and so does the unlicensed person who serves without charge.13
The rule has a boundary. It governs the person who undertakes the services of a profession or trade, and it leaves open the different case of an amateur who offers no services and simply happens to have superior ability. The section on amateurs with superior skill takes up that person.
What does the same missing license prove when the plaintiff offers it as evidence of carelessness? Usually nothing. Most courts hold that a failure to comply with a licensing statute is not admissible, because it does not tend to prove that the defendant was negligent on the occasion in question.14 A license is a fact about who the defendant is, while breach concerns what he did on a particular day, so the inference from one to the other is weak. Licensing statutes also differ from conduct statutes. A speed limit tells a driver how to act at the moment of the collision, and in most jurisdictions its violation is negligence per se or prima facie negligence. A licensing statute regulates who may act, so it poses a special problem for that doctrine.15
When the statute is excluded, the plaintiff’s case falls back on the ordinary common-law negligence inquiry, where proof that the defendant failed to act as required can still succeed.16 For an unlicensed practitioner that inquiry runs through the professional standard established above, so the plaintiff proves breach by showing what a qualified practitioner would have done differently.
The majority rule has critics. Some courts and dissenters object that it seems to authorize violations and exposes the public to the very risk the licensing statute exists to prevent, a lack of skill and competence, and they have suggested that a violation should create a presumption of negligence that shifts to the defendant the burden of showing proper care and skill.17 The newer Restatement takes a middle course under which admissibility depends on the reason the actor is unlicensed. A defendant who lacks a license because he failed necessary qualifications that have a safety purpose may face evidence of the violation.18 The distinction fits the underlying logic: failing a safety-related qualification says something about competence, while a lapse in paperwork says little.
The license gap thus does no work for either side. The defendant cannot use it to lower the standard, because the standard follows the undertaking. The plaintiff ordinarily cannot use it to prove breach, because a status is not a careless act. On an exam question with an unlicensed defendant, identify the work undertaken, apply the standard of those qualified to do it, and ask what the defendant did that a competent practitioner would not have done.
Novices and Trainees
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 299A measures anyone who undertakes professional or trade services by the skill and knowledge normally possessed by members of that calling in good standing, and its text contains no lower tier for a member who has just joined it.21 Courts supply the missing rule: the law has refused to create a subgroup for novices. A learner, beginner, or trainee, whether pilot, driver, employee, or new professional, is held to the conduct of persons who are reasonably skilled, learned, and experienced in the activity.22 A lower tier for the inexperienced would put each defendant’s personal history back into the jury’s calculation, and the defendant who most needs a discount would receive the largest.
The reason for the rule lies in who can adjust to the inexperience. A beginner knows, or can find out, how little experience he has, and he can respond by taking extra care, getting help, or declining the task. Section 299 expects exactly that response when it asks what competence a reasonable person in the actor’s position would recognize as necessary to prevent an unreasonable risk of harm.23 The people exposed to his work usually cannot see how new he is, since a patient on a table or a motorist on the road has no way to check the operator’s record, and they cannot protect themselves. A novice subgroup would therefore make those people bear the cost of the beginner’s learning curve without any chance to avoid it.24 The rule is admittedly hard on beginners. The activities involved are socially useful, everyone who takes them up must be unskillful at first, and the standard sometimes demands more than a beginner can deliver. The law accepts that result because the loss falls on the party with the means to avoid it, not on the party with none.25
Centman v. Cobb applies the rule at the start of a medical career: a defendant who had just graduated from medical school and was serving an internship at a hospital was held to the same standard of care as a physician.26 Residents, who hold a medical degree and are completing specialty training, raise the same question. The Seventh Circuit noted in Arpin v. United States, applying Illinois law, that the majority rule holds residents to the standard of physicians who have completed residency in the same field.27 A patient treated by a first-year trainee rarely knows how far along the doctor is, so the protection the patient receives cannot depend on a fact the patient is unable to see. The trainee’s remedy lies in what he does about the gap, which means consulting a supervisor, seeking help, or referring the case, as § 299 requires of anyone who recognizes that a task exceeds his competence. The usual error in a trainee problem is to ask what a person with the defendant’s limited experience could fairly have been expected to do. The correct question asks what a reasonably skilled practitioner would have done.
The same reasoning governs a resident who presents himself as a fully qualified doctor. Clark v. University Hospital-UMDNJ rejected a lower standard for residents on that ground: “Defendants held themselves out as doctors and should be held to the standard of care they claimed to profess.”28 The holding-out clause of § 299A is at work, since an actor who claims the status of a physician cannot ask the jury to treat him as something less.
The law on residents is less uniform than the intern cases suggest. Courts have taken three broad approaches to the standard of care for licensed residents,29 so an answer should present the physician standard as the majority view and not as universal. A closer question arises when a resident truthfully tells the patient he is only a trainee. The opening clause of § 299A makes a representation of less skill relevant to the measure,30 and the decisions on residents leave open how far such a disclosure lowers the standard, so an exam answer should flag the question and not present one result as settled.
A beginner’s inexperience can still affect the outcome of a lawsuit, though it does so on the plaintiff’s side of the case. A victim who knowingly and voluntarily assumed the risk of dealing with a neophyte, such as a flight instructor who agrees to teach a student pilot, may find recovery barred or reduced by that choice, and the defense leaves the standard applied to the novice unchanged.31 The division of labor follows from the reason for the novice rule. The rule withholds a discount because the public cannot see or avoid the beginner’s inexperience, and that premise fails for a person who knows the operator is a beginner and accepts the risk anyway. The law answers that person with a defense that looks to what this plaintiff knew and chose, and it keeps the standard of care constant for everyone else the beginner endangers.
Reasonable Preparation
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 300 is the companion to § 299. When an act is negligent if done without reasonable preparation, the actor must make the preparation that a reasonable person in his position would recognize as necessary to prevent the act from creating an unreasonable risk of harm to another.33 Section 299 asks whether the actor should have taken the task on at all; § 300 asks whether he made ready before starting it. Negligence can therefore occur before the act. A lawyer who files a polished brief resting on research he never did, or a physician who performs a technically perfect procedure without reading the available test results, does nothing wrong at the moment of performance, and the fault lies in the interval before it. Gobrecht fits the same pattern outside the professions: the landlord installed a gas heater in a closed, nearly unventilated bathroom and was held negligent for failing to inquire into its safety first.34
The rule has two working parts. Its opening clause confines the duty to acts that are negligent if done without preparation, which keeps § 300 from demanding study before every trivial task; the preparation owed grows with the risk the act carries. Its measure then supplies the content: the preparation a reasonable person in the actor’s position would recognize as necessary. For a professional, that position includes his training and role, so the preparation owed is whatever a competent practitioner does before acting, such as research, investigation, inspection, and gathering data. The law assigns this stage to the actor because much of the danger in skilled work can be removed before the work begins, and because the people affected cannot see it: a client cannot tell whether the lawyer read the cases, nor a patient whether the physician reviewed the chart. A standard that measured only the performance would miss the harm that a skillful performance causes when it rests on bad information.
The duty to prepare is the due-care element of the professional standard seen from the front end. Beyond knowledge and skill, and beyond the exercise of judgment, the standard requires due care in applying skill, which covers mechanical steps such as obtaining the data on which trained discretion depends, and a physician who fails to read the test results has skipped one of them.35 Medical standards likewise expect a physician to keep the records needed for patient care.36 For lawyers, inadequate trial preparation and inadequate research are recognized ways to breach the duty.37 Preparation also decides whether the judgment defense is available at all. The error-of-judgment rule shelters a choice among options that reasonable lawyers could have made, and a choice reached without the research a prudent lawyer would have done has not earned that shelter.38
The first lawyer’s breach is the missing research, and it exists whatever a court later says about the reasonableness of his reading. Even where an area of law is unsettled, a lawyer may fall below the standard of care by conducting inadequate research, especially where research would reveal alternatives that keep the client out of a murky area.39 The second lawyer prepared as a prudent lawyer would, so the unfavorable ruling is the kind of result the error-of-judgment rule absorbs.
A California decision on a brokerage’s liability supplies the clearest application. The brokerage appealed a verdict that its agents negligently failed to discover a property’s history of soils problems. The evidence did not establish that the agents had actual knowledge of the slides, but the court held that actual knowledge was unnecessary: the jury had only to conclude that a reasonably competent and diligent inspection would have uncovered the history.40 Real estate agents hold themselves out to the public as professionals and must make reasonable use of their superior knowledge, skills, and experience within their area of expertise.41 Because they are engaged for that knowledge and skill, and because these agents were or should have been alert to the signs of soils problems, the jury was well within reason in finding that a diligent inspection would have included more than a casual visual look and a general inquiry of the owners.42
The reasoning tracks § 300 closely. Alertness to warning signs is part of what a reasonably diligent inspection requires, so signs of trouble raise the preparation owed, and a casual look that suffices for a quiet property can fall short for a suspicious one. The court also refused to import a limit from the real estate fraud cases, which require that the undisclosed facts be beyond the diligent attention and observation of the buyer. It declined to confine the duty to investigate in that way because the limit might weaken the broker’s incentive to conduct the inspection the law seeks to encourage, and it left comparative negligence principles to protect a broker who neglects to disclose a manifest defect.43
Two mistakes are common when a problem turns on preparation. The first looks only at how skillfully the act was performed. A broker who walks the property, a lawyer who files on time, and a surgeon who operates can each perform well and still breach because the information behind the act was gathered carelessly. The second treats every bad result as proof of careless preparation. The plaintiff must connect the missing preparation to the harm, as the broker court did when it asked whether a diligent inspection would have uncovered the problem, so a skipped step that would have turned up nothing does not make the later loss recoverable.44