Concept
Scope of the Statutory Standard
Scope of the statutory standard and effect of compliance
Statutory Scope and Compliance
Scope of the Statutory Standard
A plaintiff who proves that the defendant violated a safety statute has not yet proved negligence. Evidence of the violation is usually admissible, and it can be conclusive on the negligence question, but only when the statute establishes a standard of care relevant to the case.1 Courts therefore screen the statute before they let it replace the reasonable-person standard. Most ask two questions: whether the plaintiff was injured by a type of risk the statute intended to prevent, and whether the plaintiff belongs to the class of persons the statute intended to protect.2 Two further limits follow. A violation of a licensing statute generally is not negligence per se, and a court may decline an enactment that is too vague, too trivial, or otherwise too poorly suited to civil use.3
The judge, not the jury, runs the screen, because the jury is there to try the case and not the statute.4 Whether the legislature enacted a statute to prevent a certain type of harm is a question of law. When the plaintiff offers evidence of the violation, the judge decides whether the statute was meant to protect parties in the plaintiff's position from the type of harm suffered. If it was, the jury hears the evidence; if it was not, the jury hears nothing about the statute at all.5
Failing the screen costs the plaintiff a shortcut and nothing more. Without a relevant statutory standard, the plaintiff cannot prove breach by proving the violation.6 The plaintiff must fall back on the general negligence standard and show how the defendant's own conduct fell short of reasonable care.7 A plaintiff who loses one theory may still have another. In Kozup v. Georgetown University, for example, the court agreed that an informed consent count failed on materiality but remanded for a new trial on an alternative battery count.8
Exclusion is the usual result of a failed screen, but at least one court has taken a softer line. In Hansen v. Kemmish, a statute aimed only at preventing the misbreeding of animals required hogs to be confined by fences of a specified strength, and a hog broke through the defendant's weaker fence and reached the highway. The court held that the statute did not fix the standard of conduct as a matter of law, but the jury could consider it in deciding what kind of fence was needed to hold hogs in.
Clearing the screen has real consequences, because a defendant cannot contract away liability for failing to comply with a duty that a safety statute imposes. Courts have so held for a mine-safety statute in Martin County Coal Corp. v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. (6th Cir. 2013), for safety statutes generally in Hargis v. Baize (Ky. 2005), and for a home-inspection statute in Finch v. Inspectech, LLC (W. Va. 2012).9
Type of Harm Protected Against
The first question is whether the plaintiff's injury is the kind of harm the legislature was trying to prevent. Section 14 of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm builds that question into its rule: an actor is negligent if, without excuse, the actor violates a statute designed to protect against the type of accident the actor's conduct causes, and the accident victim is within the class of persons the statute is designed to protect.10 Courts commonly restate the rule as a two-part test: did a type of risk the statute intended to prevent injure the plaintiff, and does the plaintiff belong to the class the statute intended to protect?11
The risk requirement follows from how legislatures draft. A legislature writes a safety rule with a particular hazard in view. Its judgment that certain precautions are required tells a court what reasonable people do about that hazard and says nothing about dangers the legislature never considered. If courts admitted any violation of any statute, the evidence might show that the defendant is a generally careless person, but it would not show that the defendant's carelessness caused this accident.12 Tying the standard to the statute's purpose keeps causation honest: when the hazard the statute targets is the hazard that hurt the plaintiff, the reason the rule exists is also the reason the plaintiff was injured.
The requirement is easiest to see when the accident stays fixed and only the statute changes.
The collision is identical under both statutes, and the dog-curbing violation is as much a lapse in compliance with law as the missing signal. What differs is the hazard each legislature had in mind.13 A plaintiff who relies on a statute must therefore ask what the enactment was for before asking whether the defendant broke it.
The classic decision on a different hazard is Gorris v. Scott, in which sheep were washed overboard at sea.14 The owner relied on a regulation requiring animals on shipboard to be kept in pens of a set size and argued that compliance would have kept the sheep aboard. The court refused to find negligence from the violation: the regulation was meant to prevent the spread of disease through overcrowding, not to keep animals from being washed overboard.15 The owner's causation argument may well have been sound, since pens might have held the sheep. The result shows that the harm prong tests the statute's purpose, while cause in fact is a separate element the plaintiff must also prove.16
A livestock case from Oklahoma reaches the same result by a different route. In Kansas, Okla. & Gulf Ry. Co. v. Keirsey, an owner argued that a railroad was negligent per se for violating a statute requiring fences to keep animals off its right of way after a cow wandered onto the right of way and died from eating too much grass. The court refused to find negligence from the violation, because the statute aimed at protecting farm animals from being hit by trains, not from eating too much grass.17 In each case the legislature named a hazard, disease in one and train collisions in the other, and the animal was lost to a different one.
Modern regulatory statutes produce the same pattern. A statute requiring gasoline to be dispensed only into safe containers aims at leaks, so in Walcott v. Total Petroleum, Inc. it did not reach the risk that gasoline bought in a cup would be thrown on a person to set that person on fire.18 A prohibition on hood ornaments that protrude beyond the radiator grill addresses ornaments on moving cars piercing people, and does not address people piercing themselves on the ornament of a car at rest.19 A statute that ensures delivery trucks adequate parking aims at access for deliveries, not at preventing the type of accident the plaintiff suffered. The plaintiff in that case did not claim that the truck stuck too far into the street, only that it was there, and the same accident could have happened had the truck stayed ten minutes. A court rejected negligence per se on similar facts in Capolungo v. Bondi.20
A statute barring minors from serving in bars where liquor is sold shows how closely the harm must track the purpose. A seventeen-year-old waiter is reassigned to the bar when two scheduled servers fail to appear, and a tornado strikes the bar. The statute presumably protects minors from being corrupted or harmed by alcohol and by people under its influence, and a natural disaster is a different type of harm, so the parents cannot use the violation to establish negligence.21 A minor injured by an intoxicated patron in a brawl would stand differently, because that is the hazard the legislature addressed.
Statutes do not always announce a single purpose, and that leaves courts some room. A statute forbidding drivers to leave a car running with the keys in it on a public street could aim at preventing theft, at keeping children or other irresponsible people from starting the car, at stopping joyriding teenagers, or at protecting bystanders from a thief's flight, and courts have disagreed about which purpose controls.22 The judge resolves that question as a matter of law, and a plaintiff whose statute fails the prong keeps the ordinary negligence claim.
Class of Persons Protected
Harm that fits the statute is not enough. A plaintiff hurt by exactly the hazard the legislature feared can still lose if the legislature was thinking about someone else. The Restatement states the class requirement alongside the risk requirement: the accident victim must be within the class of persons the statute is designed to protect.24 The two requirements operate independently. A legislature writes a safety duty with particular beneficiaries in view, and extending the standard to outsiders would impose liability it never weighed.
The cleanest illustration holds the harm constant and moves only the plaintiff. A building code written to protect the people who occupy buildings reflects their situation. Workers constructing a building have different expectations and different opportunities to protect themselves, so a court would likely refuse to apply the code's standards in a suit by a construction worker injured during construction, and the code becomes irrelevant to what precautions were proper on the site.25 An occupant hurt by a defect in the finished building stands differently, because that occupant is the person the legislature had in view.
The line grows finer as plaintiffs move away from the paradigm beneficiary. A firefighter injured fighting a fire in a building that lacks statutorily required sprinklers may be refused the statute, because the sprinklers were meant to protect occupants, not emergency personnel.26 A passerby who ducks into an apartment building to escape a robber and trips in an unlit hallway raises the same problem with the harm requirement already satisfied. The lighting statute was meant to prevent stumbling over obstacles in the dark, but it was aimed at tenants, probably guests, and maybe even meter readers. It hardly seems meant for someone who enters unexpectedly to avoid a robbery, so the passerby probably cannot use it to show a standard of care.27 Matching the injury to the statute's purpose completes only half of the screen.
Regulatory statutes in products cases mark the same boundary. The federal Motor Vehicle Safety Act protects the driver and passenger of a dangerously defective car. An FDA regulation barring sulfites on raw fruits and vegetables protects sulfite-sensitive consumers. A state statute requiring makers of toxic products to supply purchasers with a safety data sheet protects users of the product, often the purchaser's employees.28 An act requiring insurers to return the titles and license plates of total-loss vehicles to the state revenue department, by contrast, seeks to protect vehicle owners from theft, not pedestrians injured by a defectively rebuilt wreck, as in Treadwell Ford, Inc. v. Campbell.29 In each pair the statute names its beneficiary through its purpose, and anyone else must look elsewhere for a standard of care.
One kind of statute can fail on either requirement, depending on who sues. In Keirsey the cow's owner stood inside the class a railroad fencing statute protects and lost on the harm requirement.30 In Long v. Daly, a motorist injured in a collision with cattle that had escaped through a railroad's fence lost on the class requirement, because the statute aimed to spare livestock owners the loss of their animals and a motorist is no livestock owner.31 The owner lost on hazard and the motorist on class, so a court asks both questions even when the statutes and the animals are alike.
Because the class is defined by purpose, and purpose must be inferred, courts can disagree about who falls inside it. Legislative history in the states can be scanty and hard to obtain, so a court may rely on a statute's title or preamble to identify the group the legislature had in mind.32 In Kelly v. Henry Muhs Co., a firefighter could not use a statute requiring elevator shafts to be guarded, because the statute's title and body referred to the safety of employees. In Drake v. Fenton, a firefighter could use a similar statute, because its title concerned the regulation of building safety and was not limited to employees.33 The two plaintiffs held the same job and met the same kind of hazard, and the results differ because each legislature described its aim differently. No occupation, firefighters included, therefore sits categorically inside or outside every protected class. The judge decides the question, since whether a statute reaches a given plaintiff is a question of law.34
A plaintiff outside the class has lost the shortcut and nothing more. Breach must then be proved the ordinary way, by showing that the defendant's own conduct fell short of reasonable care.35 A plaintiff inside the class holds the statutory standard but must still prove cause in fact and proximate cause, because the statute settles only what care was owed.36
Licensing Statutes
A defendant's violation of a licensing statute generally does not amount to negligence per se, whether a court explains the result through proximate causation or through the scope of the risk the statute addresses.38 Licensing statutes pose a problem that survives even when the plaintiff and the injury seem to fit, because the defendant lacks a piece of paper that says nothing about how the defendant behaved on the day of the injury. A restaurant that opens without a health-department license, a drug maker that markets a new drug or device without FDA approval, and an aircraft manufacturer that sells a new plane without FAA certification may each face an administrative penalty. None of those lapses turns the defendant into an outlaw subject to absolute liability.39
The missing paper and the injury are usually unconnected. Food from an unlicensed restaurant may be as pure as food from a licensed one, a drug or device may be reasonably safe without agency approval, and an uncertified plane may be as airworthy as an approved one. Because the lapse does not tend to show carelessness on this occasion, the plaintiff may not rest on the violation and must prove the defendant's negligence another way, by showing how the defendant's actual conduct fell short of reasonable care.40
Cullip v. Domann shows the rule on its facts. A hunter without a hunting license accidentally discharged a firearm and injured a fellow hunter, and the court refused to treat the missing license as a basis for negligence per se.41 The injured hunter's claim depended on how the defendant handled the gun, and the license said nothing about that. Other courts have reached the same result when a rental company rented a car to a customer with no operator's permit in Hertz Driv-Ur-Self System v. Hendrickson, when a motorist drove after a suspension for reckless driving in Fuller v. Sirois, and when a pilot's license was not current in Michaels v. Avitech, Inc.42 In each, the plaintiff kept the ordinary negligence claim and lost only the shortcut of proving breach through the violation.
The majority rule has critics. They argue that it can seem to excuse violations and leaves the public exposed to the very risk that licensing exists to screen out, a lack of skill or competence, and some would let a licensing violation raise a presumption of negligence that shifts to the defendant the burden of showing the required care and skill. Some courts have let the violation count where the license screens for the very competence at issue, as in Brown v. Shyne, which involved an unlicensed practitioner. The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm § 14 comment h takes a middle course. It notes that the reason for a person's lack of license may not be related to a safety purpose, so the relevance of the violation depends on why the actor is unlicensed.43
The refinement leaves the center of the rule in place. The licensing question is why the defendant lacks the paper, and a lapse in renewal paperwork leaves the plaintiff on the ordinary negligence claim, which the plaintiff can still win by proving careless conduct.
Inspection and certification requirements raise a related problem. Such a statute may clear both the risk and class requirements and still leave a gap in causation, because it fixes what the defendant should have done without proving that doing it would have changed the outcome.
The patron's difficulty is cause in fact. The statute settles what care was owed, and the patron must still show that an inspection would have revealed the defect.44 The same requirement applies to every statutory theory. In Gaines-Tabb v. ICI Explosives, USA, Inc., the court held that a failure to register a sale of ammonium nitrate was not a proximate cause of the Oklahoma City bombing injuries, because the unforeseeable criminal bombing was a supervening cause.45 In Horstmeyer v. Golden Eagle Fireworks, a defendant tried to use a statute against bringing fireworks into the state to show the injured plaintiff's contributory negligence. The court reasoned by analogy to the licensing cases that the violation did not establish negligent conduct because it did not cause the harm.46
Losing on the statute does not end the patron's case. The patron falls back on the reasonable-person standard and may show that the owner kept using the seats beyond their useful life or after similar accidents, ignored a manufacturer's notice of this kind of risk, or replaced the bolt with one too small for the job.47 Facts of that kind show how the owner was careless, which the missing inspection could not show.
Statutes Too General to Adopt
Satisfying both prongs of the screen does not guarantee that a court will adopt a statute as the standard of care. Applying negligence per se in a particular case is discretionary, and a court usually should decline a statutory standard that is obsolete, arcane, trivial, little more than a restatement of the general duty of reasonable care, or so vague that it gives the court little help in setting the standard for the situation before it.49 A court should also refuse an enactment when there is evidence that the legislature intended criminal or administrative penalties to be the exclusive remedy, or intended that a violation would not by itself trigger liability for negligence.50 The judgment is made enactment by enactment, so one statute book can hold a rule a court will borrow and a neighboring rule it will not.
Each ground for declining has its own logic. Adopting a statute replaces the jury's judgment about reasonable care with a fixed command, and the trade pays off only when the command is specific enough for a jury to measure the defendant's conduct against it. A statute demanding only appropriate care gives a jury nothing the common-law standard did not already give. A trivial or obsolete rule threatens civil damages for breach of a petty regulation the legislature treated as a minor offense. Some enactments fail because no fact-finder could apply them without speculating about what would have happened anyway. And where the legislature signaled that fines or administrative sanctions were the whole remedy, importing the rule into tort law would override that choice.
An Oregon decision rejected one enactment and accepted another in a single barroom brawl. A patron badly hurt when a group in a booth started a melee relied on two provisions: a statute forbidding anyone to make liquor available to a visibly intoxicated person, and a liquor-commission regulation forbidding a licensee to permit disorderly conduct or to let a visibly intoxicated person remain on the premises. The court recited the usual test of class and harm and added that a court may ask preliminarily whether the standard suits civil litigation in the circumstances presented. The statute failed that question. Determining whether a third party's injuries would have been caused anyway by an already inebriated person is extremely difficult, if not impossible. Unless a court were prepared to say that a drink served after visible intoxication causes a third party's injuries as a matter of law, a concept no one advanced, the standard would be almost impossible for a fact-finder to apply.51
The regulation passed the same inquiry. In view of the Act's stated purpose and the history of injury to innocent patrons of saloons, the court found it reasonable to assume that the commission, in promulgating the regulation, meant to prevent those abuses and had in mind the safety of bar patrons as well as the general peace of the community.52 The two enactments differ in what each asks a jury to do. The statute asks the jury to trace an injury inflicted by an intoxicated patron back to a drink served earlier, which demands an answer to an impossible counterfactual. The regulation commands the licensee to prevent disorder and visibly intoxicated patrons on the premises, and a jury can compare the bar's conduct with that command without speculating.
Specificity separates usable standards from unusable ones in other settings as well. In Ridge v. Cessna Aircraft Co., FAA regulations setting general guidelines and standards of conduct for pilots were held too general to apply as a negligence standard.53 A rule that tells a pilot in broad terms how to fly leaves the jury to decide what proper flying would have looked like, which is the common-law question itself. Decisions on a six-mile-an-hour speed limit in Stevens v. Luther and on a requirement that a streetcar bell be rung continuously in Stafford v. Chippewa Valley Electric R. Co. raise the question whether civil liability fits a rigid rule.54 A rigid rule can also fail because literal compliance would be unreasonable. The Supreme Court overruled the Goodman crossing rule in Pokora v. Wabash Ry. for reasons of that kind: the rule was too harsh and unjust in many cases and made it virtually impossible to recover for a crossing accident. It was also unworkable, since compliance would often unreasonably delay vehicular traffic, might itself be dangerous, and in some situations would not even accomplish the desired result.55
Nursing-home regulation draws the line within a single body of law. A federal provision requiring a facility to promote the quality of life of each resident states only a general principle, and a provision that requires only appropriate care cannot establish negligence per se, because it states an abstract goal without specifying particular conduct. Other provisions are specific. A facility must assess each resident and provide a care plan, and one regulation provides that a resident who enters without pressure sores must not develop them in the home unless some unavoidable reason intervenes. A court can adopt the pressure-sore rule, since it names a result a jury can check against what happened to the resident. The federal provisions create no private right of action, but state courts remain free to adopt federal standards as negligence per se or as evidence of negligence, so the open question is whether the particular standard is concrete enough to guide a jury.
A further limit applies when a statute creates a wholly new obligation without creating a cause of action. If the defendant owed the plaintiff no corresponding common-law duty, courts tend to give the statute no tort effect, because a statute can supply the standard of care but does not itself create a duty that did not previously exist.
Negligence per se borrows a yardstick for measuring care that is already owed, and it does not supply the obligation to be careful in the first place. A legislature that speaks to the point directly settles it. State disciplinary rules for lawyers typically provide that a violation does not automatically give rise to a cause of action against a lawyer or create a presumption that a legal duty was breached, and that provision shows the drafters did not intend the rules to support a negligence per se argument.56
A failure at any step leaves the plaintiff with the ordinary negligence claim, in which the plaintiff must show careless conduct under the reasonable-person standard.