Concept
What Counts as Custom
Custom as evidence of the standard of care
What Counts as Custom
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 295A tells the fact-finder to take into account “the customs of the community, or of others under like circumstances” when it decides whether conduct is negligent.1 The instruction presupposes that a custom exists, and the party who offers one must prove it. That proof works like proof of any other fact: the parties put in direct and circumstantial evidence, often conflicting, and the jury draws the inferences.2
Proof of a common practice is worth the trouble because it aids in “formulat[ing] the general expectation of society as to how individuals will act in the course of their undertakings, and thus to guide the common sense or expert intuition of a jury or commission when called on to judge of particular conduct under particular circumstances.”3 A vague practice cannot supply that expectation, and neither can a practice borrowed from people whose work differs from the defendant’s. The offering party must therefore show what the practice is, who follows it, and how closely their circumstances resemble the defendant’s.
Two kinds of material can make that showing: an unwritten practice shared by those in the same calling, and written material, such as standards from trade associations and other standard-setting bodies, together with the rules a defendant adopts for itself. The unwritten practice comes first. Whether a proven custom settles the negligence question is a separate matter, taken up in the next part of the chapter.
A Well-Defined Practice
In Trimarco, the court explained that a custom need not be universal; it suffices that the practice is “fairly well defined and in the same calling or business” so that “the actor may be charged with knowledge of it or negligent ignorance.”4 Section 295A’s phrase “others under like circumstances” points the same way. The comparison group is people doing the defendant’s kind of work and facing a risk like the one the defendant faced.
Both requirements rest on one premise: custom persuades because the actor had the chance to learn it. When a practice is too vague to identify, no one can say what precaution the defendant should have known to take. When a practice belongs to another calling, the defendant had no occasion to meet it. Charging a person with “knowledge of it or negligent ignorance” makes sense only when someone in that position would ordinarily have encountered the practice, and definiteness and a shared calling are the two ways a plaintiff shows that. Universality adds nothing to the showing, and demanding it would let a defendant defeat the proof by pointing to a single holdout. The question is whether a recognizable practice prevails in the business, not whether every member observes it.
Trimarco shows how a plaintiff proves such a practice. The plaintiff, a tenant, sued landlords over a plain-glass shower enclosure. Bulletins from nationally recognized safety and consumer organizations, together with official federal publications, had joined in warning of the dangers of plain glass in “hazardous locations,” including “bathtub enclosures,” and that showing reinforced the plaintiff’s earlier proof.5 Warnings in circulation make it fair to say that a landlord could have learned of the safer way. The defendants’ own managing agent, who had long been familiar with the management of multiple dwellings in the New York City area, then agreed on examination that since at least 1965 landlords who installed glass for shower enclosures, whether to replace broken glass or to comply with a tenant’s request, customarily used “some material such as plastic or safety glass.”6 That testimony tied the practice to the defendants’ own business, and it came from the defendants’ side of the case. Neither item had to carry the whole showing. Together they pointed to a definite practice within the landlord’s own line of work.
The same case shows what falls short. The trial judge told the jury that the mere fact that another landlord may have used a better or safer practice does not establish a standard, and that the jurors were to decide whether the evidence established a general custom or practice. The court of last resort held the charge correct.7 A plaintiff who proves only that one or two other landlords installed plastic glazing has offered a data point, and it shows no practice that a landlord could be charged with knowing. The charge also settles who decides: whether a general custom exists is a question of fact for the jury. Whether that custom is itself reasonable is a separate question, taken up in the sections that follow.
Even a well-defined practice in the right calling helps only if it speaks to the dangerous aspect of the situation. Evidence of compliance or noncompliance with an industry standard is almost always admissible on due care, assuming the standard applies to the dangerous aspect of the product in question.8 The practice must also serve a safety purpose to be relevant.9 In Trimarco, safety glazing met both conditions, because it answered the very danger the warnings described: plain glass in a bathtub enclosure.
Codes and Internal Rules
Written standards carry custom into documents. Trade associations and standard-setting organizations such as the American National Standards Institute and Underwriters Laboratories publish safety “codes,” and parties offer them in negligence cases as proof of what an industry regards as proper care. Compliance or noncompliance with such a standard is almost always admissible on whether the defendant exercised due care, assuming the standard applies to the dangerous aspect of the product, but it is rarely conclusive of negligence.11
A code earns its weight from the way it is made. These organizations typically work closely with industry so that the standards they set are practicable as well as useful, and their codes normally represent the industry’s consensus on the most appropriate balance of safety, practicality, and cost.12 Industry may heavily influence, or even control, the body that issues a code, however, so courts generally treat the admissibility of a code like that of any other industry standard.13 Some courts nonetheless find certain industry safety codes particularly persuasive, reasoning from the formal way the standards are developed and from industry’s reliance on them, and an argument can be made that compliance or noncompliance with clear and important standards should be dispositive in special situations.14
Products liability uses industry standards in the same way. A plaintiff may offer industry customs, standards, and practices on the question of defect to show that the defendant lagged behind, and a defendant may offer them to show that a proposed safety feature is not standard in the industry. In a strict liability design defect case, that evidence is something the jury considers and not something that decides the question, as Kim v. Toyota Motor Corp. illustrates.15 Courts have admitted a defendant’s failure to meet industry design standards for unguarded machinery and for equipment lacking an emergency stop device, and they have admitted a manufacturer’s compliance with design standards for a press or a treadmill as proof of due care.16
A defendant’s own rules and policies receive similar treatment. Courts often admit them as some evidence of the standard of care, though they do not conclude the question.17 A rule the defendant adopted for its own operations shows what the defendant itself thought sensible, which is why a jury may hear it. In Roddey v. Wal-Mart Stores East, a shoplifter’s getaway driver was injured in a crash while fleeing a store security guard, and the store’s policy against pursuing suspected shoplifters off the premises was offered as evidence of negligence, as custom can be.18
The policy cannot settle the standard, because internal rules rest on mixed motives. In Morgan v. Scott, a car dealership adopted an in-house rule that a salesperson accompany a prospective buyer on a test drive and then failed to follow it; the court held that breaking its own rule did not impose a duty on the dealership to accompany the buyer.19 The Utah Supreme Court reached a similar result in Jenkins v. Jordan Valley Water Conservancy District, where an internal determination that a pipeline should be replaced did not establish a tort duty to replace it, because internal decisions may be made for any number of reasons, such as convenience, caution, budget, or mistake, that have little to do with the standard of care.20 Together with Roddey, these cases draw one line: a policy may reach the jury as evidence of what reasonable care required, but breaking it does not by itself create the legal duty. The next part of the chapter takes up why even a custom the defendant followed fails to end the inquiry.