Concept
The Same Pattern for Causation
Judge and jury roles in deciding fault
The Same Pattern for Causation
Section 434 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which Mitchell v. Volkswagenwerk quotes in a footnote, carries the court-jury division over to causation. The court decides three things: whether the evidence makes an issue on which the jury may reasonably differ about whether the defendant's conduct was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff's harm; whether the harm is capable of apportionment among two or more causes; and causation and apportionment themselves, in any case in which the jury may not reasonably differ.1 The jury decides two things, and only where it may reasonably differ: whether the defendant's conduct was a substantial factor, and how the harm is apportioned among the causes.2 The court asks whether the harm can be apportioned; the jury does the apportioning.
The shape is the one this chapter has already traced for negligence. The court screens the evidence for sufficiency and decides the question itself when the jury could not reasonably differ; the jury decides everything in between. Only the subject changes, since the questions are now substantial factor and apportionment instead of breach. The tests for those belong to the study of causation. This unit asks only which decision-maker applies them.
The Connecticut court in Mahoney v. Beatman cast the court's role as a threshold question about reasonable minds. If the issue is not so plain that reasonable people could not find the causal relation and render damages for the injury, or for a part of it, the court must leave to the jury the question whether the defendant's conduct was a substantial factor in producing the injury or part of the injury.3 The converse follows: when the evidence is so plain that reasonable people could not find the relation, the question never reaches the jury. The judge therefore asks whether the jury can reasonably find causation, and the jury asks whether it does.
Marshall v. Socony shows the jury's side of the line on a concrete record. The negligence of the defendant's servant produced a traffic mix-up, and the plaintiff was struck by the Nugent car while that mix-up was still persisting, not after the traffic flow had become normal again.4 The injury was not remote from the negligent conduct in either time or place, and the court of appeals concluded that the district court committed no error in leaving proximate cause to the jury.5 Every reason the court gave concerns how closely the injury stayed tied, in time, in place, and in continuing disruption, to the negligence.
Two classic opinions tie liability to what could be anticipated, and both draw the same line between court and jury. In Ryan v. New York Central R.R. Co., Judge Hunt asked what principle lets one sufferer recover and another fail, and he placed it in anticipation: the destruction of the building on which the negligent sparks fell was the ordinary and natural result of its being fired, a result to have been anticipated the moment the fire reached it.6 The Palsgraf majority defined wrong in kindred terms, as the natural or probable when the conduct is unintentional, and then assigned the decision: the range of reasonable apprehension is at times a question for the court and, if varying inferences are possible, a question for the jury.7
These sources put one question about two decisions: on this evidence, may the jury reasonably differ? If it may, the jury decides substantial factor and, once the court has found the harm capable of apportionment, apportionment as well. If it may not, the court decides. A judge's own sense of which side ought to win does not answer the question, because the test is what a reasonable jury could find, not what the judge would find. In Marshall, the disruption the negligence caused had not ended when the plaintiff was hurt, and the injury stayed close in time and place. That left a reasonable jury free to find the causal link.