Concept
Eliminating Other Causes
Res ipsa loquitur
Eliminating Other Causes
The first condition of Restatement (Second) of Torts § 328D(1) establishes that the event is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of negligence.1 The second asks whom that negligence points to: other responsible causes, including the conduct of the plaintiff and of third persons, must be sufficiently eliminated by the evidence.2 The two conditions are separate because an accident can signal carelessness in general while pointing no more toward the defendant than toward the injured person or a stranger. The flour barrel in Byrne v. Boadle proves that someone was careless. It implicates the shopkeeper because the barrel came from his shop and his employees were the people likely to be handling it. Had the evidence left open that someone outside the shop set the barrel in motion, the inference would have lost its footing.
The standard is probability, not certainty. The plaintiff need not eliminate every other possible cause, but must reduce their likelihood far enough that a jury can reasonably find that the negligence, if any, lies at the defendant’s door.3 That leniency fits the doctrine’s purpose. Res ipsa serves plaintiffs who cannot say what went wrong, whether because the product was destroyed in the accident or because no one can now uncover what went wrong on an assembly line long ago.4 A demand for total exclusion would withhold the doctrine from the very plaintiffs it exists to help.
The evidence on which the competing causes are weighed comes from several places. The basis of past experience for the first condition is usually common to the community, and the court recognizes it much as it takes judicial notice of facts everyone knows, but the parties’ evidence may supply it, and expert testimony that such an event usually does not occur without negligence can be a sufficient basis.5 In some malpractice actions that testimony is essential, because laypeople have no fund of common knowledge from which to draw the conclusion.6 Defendants use experts in the other direction too. Suppose a surgeon offers an expert who testifies that loss of sensation after surgery may result from the underlying medical problem, poor post-surgical nursing care, unavoidable surgical abrasion of the nerve, or negligence.7 The competing causes here are neither people nor wrongdoers, and the judge must ask whether negligence still looks like the more probable explanation against that testimony.
Courts have handled the second condition in three recurring settings. The oldest is a formula, exclusive control, which tried to compress the whole inquiry into one phrase. The other two ask what the evidence must show about the plaintiff’s own conduct and about third persons, including co-defendants, who might share responsibility for the harm. Exclusive control comes first because the way courts loosened it shows what the Restatement’s wording was written to capture.
Exclusive Control and Its Decline
Older decisions compressed the second condition into a single phrase: the instrumentality that caused the harm must have been within the defendant’s exclusive control, meaning the defendant’s sole management of and responsibility for it.8 The phrase had a job to do. Control supplies the basis for an inference that whatever negligence was involved may properly be charged to the defendant, because a defendant who alone managed the thing leaves no one else to blame.9
Read literally as control at the moment of injury, however, the phrase would defeat the plaintiffs the doctrine was meant to protect. Some courts did once require that control or management exist at the time of the injury, but the better rule asks only whether the jury can find that the negligence, if any, occurred while the instrumentality was within the defendant’s control.10 The literal version fails in product cases for a structural reason: manufacturers typically relinquish control long before an accident, and plaintiffs themselves often hold the product when it fails.11 If a driver’s estate sues the maker of a new car that left a clear, empty road, and the driver was awake, sober, and driving properly, the relevant time of control is when the car was designed and made, not when it went into the ditch.12
Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno moved the inquiry to the right moment. A restaurant waitress was injured when a soda bottle exploded in her hand. The California Supreme Court reasoned that the bottle was charged with gas under pressure, that the charging was within the bottler’s exclusive control, and that it is a matter of common knowledge that an overcharge would not ordinarily result without negligence, so that if the bottle was in fact excessively charged an inference of the bottler’s negligence would arise.13 The court kept the words “exclusive control” but applied them to the moment of the likely lapse, the filling of the bottle, and not to the moment of the explosion.
Kilgore v. Shepard Co. shows what the literal reading costs. A customer’s chair collapsed beneath her in the defendant’s store, and the court refused to apply res ipsa loquitur because she, not the store, was in control of the chair when it gave way. The court asked who held the chair at the moment of injury. The better question is whose carelessness probably made the chair fail.
Moving the relevant moment earlier carries a cost for the plaintiff. A bottle that has left the bottler may have been handled by the distributor, the retailer, and the consumer, so it is harder to show that the negligence, if any, was the bottler’s.14 The plaintiff answers with evidence that tends to exclude causes arising after the defendant’s possession, such as a showing of careful handling between the time the bottle left the bottler and the time it exploded.15 She need not name the lapse. If the bottler may have missed a defect in one bottle or overcharged a sound one, negligence in either process counts, and the requirement is met when negligence in one or the other is more probable than the sum of the nonnegligent possibilities.16
Giles v. City of New Haven states the modern test. Control matters, the court explained, because it provides the basis for an inference that whatever negligence was involved may properly be charged to the defendant, and the plaintiff need only offer evidence from which a reasonable person could say that, on the whole, it was more likely than not that the defendant was negligent.17 Control, in other words, is one way of making that showing and not a separate hurdle.
The Restatement (Second) formulation asks directly whether other responsible causes are sufficiently eliminated and does not mention control at all.18 Many states and the Restatement (Third) of Torts have now eliminated the exclusive control requirement.19 Others still list it as an element. Puerto Rico, for example, requires that the accident be caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant.20 Where the language survives, the requirement is usually met by evidence that tends to exclude other possible causes.21
A defendant keeps the inference against it when it, and not a third party, was ultimately responsible for the instrumentality. In Colmenares Vivas v. Sun Alliance Insurance Co., an airport escalator’s handrail stopped while the steps kept climbing, and Mrs. Colmenares lost her balance; her husband caught her from behind but then lost his own balance and tumbled down the stairs.22 The Puerto Rico Ports Authority had a maintenance contract with Westinghouse, yet its own supervisor inspected the escalators every weekday. The court treated the authority’s duty to keep the airport reasonably safe as nondelegable. No fixed criteria decide whether a duty is nondelegable. The question is whether the responsibility is so important to the community that it should not be transferred to another, and an authority created to operate and manage an airport holds such a responsibility, because the public is entitled to rely on the authority, not on its agents or contractors.23 A defendant in that position cannot defeat the control requirement by pointing to the contractor it hired.
Divided responsibility defeats the inference in the opposite way. In Larson v. St. Francis Hotel, a heavy armchair fell and struck a pedestrian on the sidewalk below the hotel during the V-J Day celebrations. No one saw where it came from, but the court assumed it came from the hotel. The court held that res ipsa loquitur did not apply. A hotel has no exclusive control, actual or potential, over its furniture, because guests have at least partial control, and the mishap was as likely the fault of a guest throwing the chair from a window as of the hotel. The evidence left a competing cause open, and the inference failed on the probabilities.
Time erodes attribution in the same way. In Cruz v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., a car’s airbags deployed spontaneously while a passenger was cleaning out the vehicle, roughly three years after it was sold. Even assuming that spontaneous deployment ordinarily signals negligence, the court held that other responsible causes had not been sufficiently eliminated. The plaintiffs’ theory assumed the vehicle was defective when sold, and res ipsa might have supported that assumption had the airbags deployed shortly after purchase. The reason is cumulative. Wear, repairs, weather, and misuse pile up over a product’s life, and the longer it has been out in the world, the likelier it is that a failure traces to one of those events and not to the supplier’s original negligence.
The Plaintiff’s Own Conduct
Older formulations of res ipsa add a third element to the first two: the event must not have been due to any voluntary action of the plaintiff. Puerto Rico’s test shows the full pattern: the accident must be of a kind that ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone’s negligence; it must be caused by an agency or instrumentality within the defendant’s exclusive control; and it must not be due to any voluntary action on the part of the plaintiff. If all three are met, the jury may infer that the defendant was negligent even though there is no direct evidence of it.25
The third element tracks contributory fault, since it suggests an absence of the plaintiff’s contributory negligence. Prompted by the widespread adoption of comparative fault, many courts have eliminated it, and sounder formulations limit the essential elements to the first two, which establish that the accident probably resulted from someone’s negligence and that the negligent actor probably was the defendant.26 The reason is easy to see. Under comparative fault a careless plaintiff recovers a reduced amount, so denying her the inference altogether would penalize the same carelessness twice, once by withholding her only means of proof and again by cutting her damages.
What survives is attribution. If it is equally probable that the plaintiff’s negligence created the danger, she has not brought the negligence home to the defendant. But when the circumstances show that the negligence that created the initial danger was probably the defendant’s, res ipsa remains available even if the plaintiff was negligent in reacting to the danger.27 The working distinction is therefore one of timing and source. Conduct that follows the danger and responds to it is a contributing cause, which comparative fault handles by reducing damages after the jury has found the defendant negligent. Conduct that may itself have produced the danger is an alternative cause, and it defeats the inference because it competes with the defendant as the explanation for the accident.
Courts that have abandoned the third element apply the same distinction. In Cramer v. Mengerhausen, a plaintiff whose truck began slipping off a jack at a repair shop grabbed it to stop it and was injured when it fell. The court let him invoke res ipsa to establish the repair person’s initial negligence even if his reaction was negligent, leaving any fault in the reaction to comparative negligence. In McGuire v. Davidson Manufacturing Corp., the Eighth Circuit concluded that Iowa would join the majority of states that have eliminated the requirement that the plaintiff show that his own conduct did not contribute to the accident.
The inference stops where the plaintiff becomes the probable source of the danger. A scalding bath is the kind of event that common experience says ordinarily signals negligence, and the court in Carroll v. Faust accepted as much. The guest, however, controlled the mix of hot and cold water, so the hotel was not in exclusive control.28 The guest’s handling of the taps competes with the hotel as the explanation for the hazard itself. The scaffold plaintiff and the hotel guest both touched the event, and what separates them is whether the evidence makes the plaintiff the probable source of the danger. Ansari’s carelessness followed the cause of the collapse, while the guest’s handling of the taps may have been the cause.
Defendants often prove the competing cause through discovery. In Nutting v. Northern Energy, Inc., a fire broke out in a closet housing a gas heater. The plaintiffs had to admit that they had been working around the heater, which weakened the inference that the negligence, if any, was the gas company’s, and weather records suggested that 80-mile-per-hour winds had caused a downdraft that blew the burner flame outward and ignited combustible materials stored in the closet. The court held that the plaintiffs had not made a case for the foundation fact that the negligence, if any, was likely attributable to the defendant, and it refused a res ipsa instruction.29
A plaintiff on the safe side of the line needs no elaborate proof of innocence. In Colmenares Vivas, the court found the plaintiff-conduct requirement met because there was no evidence that the couple did anything other than try to ride the escalator in the ordinary manner, and it held that the jury should have been allowed to consider the inference.30 In medical cases this requirement is usually the easiest part of the plaintiff’s showing. Patients are often anesthetized and have entrusted their care to the physician, and they generally do not voluntarily cause a mishap while under the physician’s exclusive control, although a patient who declines care, elects among procedures, or acts against medical advice may bring about or worsen a condition.31
Third Persons and Multiple Defendants
The second condition bites hardest when several people had a hand in the instrumentality, because proof that someone was careless does not show that this defendant was. If five people could have mishandled a device and the evidence shows only that one did, each is on the proof about 20 percent likely to be the careless one. No defendant is probably the negligent one, and each is entitled to a directed verdict. The control element therefore ordinarily precludes res ipsa against multiple defendants, except in cases of vicarious liability or shared responsibility for the same instrumentality or condition such that either all or none were similarly negligent.33
Product cases show the problem in its familiar form, because an instrumentality passes through successive hands. A bottle that explodes in a consumer’s hand may have been handled by the distributor, the retailer, and the consumer after it left the bottler, and each additional handler makes it harder to show that the negligence, if any, was the defendant’s.34 No matter how clearly the plaintiff shows that someone was negligent in making or handling the product, the case fails unless she also shows that the defendant is most likely the particular party who was negligent.35 She repairs the case by implicating one defendant or excluding the others, as with proof of careful handling after the bottle left the bottler.
Students are tempted to reach for res ipsa whenever two defendants point at each other, and the temptation is a trap. Consider a truck that backs into a propane tank. Nothing about the accident is unexplained, since everyone knows the truck backed into the tank. The only problem is the conflict in the evidence about which of two negligent acts caused it.36 That is a credibility question for the jury and not a res ipsa question. Suppose in Byrne v. Boadle that Boadle had testified that a delivery person for another company dropped the barrel, while the delivery person blamed Boadle. The court would simply have left it to the jury to decide who was telling the truth.37
The standard way around the multiple-defendant problem is to sue an employer. Under respondeat superior, an employer is vicariously liable for the negligence of an employee acting within the scope of the job, so it answers for whichever employee was careless. When the evidence shows that the probable negligence belonged to someone on one employer’s payroll, the plaintiff need not say which worker it was. This is the vicarious-liability situation in which the control element permits res ipsa despite several possible actors.38
The employer route is not always open. A hospital patient may be treated by independent surgeons, an anesthetist employed by one defendant, and nurses employed by another, with no single employer standing behind all of them. Ybarra v. Spangard arose in that setting and is a striking exception to the general rule. The plaintiff was unconscious during an appendicitis operation and sustained a traumatic injury to his shoulder. Res ipsa was applied against all of the doctors and hospital employees connected with the operation, although clearly not all of them were negligent.39 The defendants argued that where responsibility is divided and the injury might have resulted from the separate act of any one of several persons, res ipsa cannot be invoked against any of them, and that where there are several instrumentalities and no showing which caused the injury or which defendant controlled it, the doctrine cannot apply.40 The California Supreme Court held those objections not well taken in the circumstances of the case.41
The holding is narrow. Where a plaintiff receives unusual injuries while unconscious and in the course of medical treatment, all defendants who had any control over his body or the instrumentalities that might have caused the injuries may be called on to meet the inference of negligence by explaining their conduct. The reasoning rested on the plaintiff’s position. He had been rendered unconscious by the defendants, and it was manifestly unreasonable for them to insist that he identify any one of them as the person who did the negligent act.42 Without the doctrine, a patient with permanent injuries obviously resulting from someone’s negligence would recover only if the doctors and nurses chose to disclose who was at fault, and the courts would be pushed toward absolute liability irrespective of negligence.43 The court therefore shifted the burden of explanation to those with sole knowledge of the true facts, given the special relationship between medical personnel and patients and their notorious reluctance to testify against one another.44 The hope was that invoking res ipsa against all of them would encourage each to reveal what he or she knows, where otherwise each could join a conspiracy of silence and force the plaintiff to prove his own case.45
The exception has critics, and their objections explain why it has not spread. Older decisions sometimes said that cases in which the defendant had superior access to the evidence on negligence were particularly appropriate for res ipsa.46 On that view the doctrine “smokes out” evidence in the defendant’s possession by creating an artificial inference of negligence that gives the defendant an incentive to explain what actually happened.47 The device works only if some defendant has useful knowledge and will reveal it at trial. Modern discovery weakens the argument for it, because a plaintiff can depose everyone involved and use whatever favorable evidence results as part of her prima facie case.48 Critics add that Ybarra functionally imposes strict liability under a negligence label, and that it is at odds with the traditional rule that a plaintiff loses unless she establishes every element of negligence, including the identity of the person who caused the harm.49 The access-to-evidence rationale also appears elsewhere in the doctrine, since some courts state the defendant’s superior knowledge or means of information about the cause as a requirement of res ipsa, a point taken up below.50
Courts have divided. Frost v. Des Moines Still College of Osteopathy and Beaudoin v. Watertown Memorial Hospital followed Ybarra on similar facts, while Rhodes v. De Haan and Talbot v. Dr. W.H. Groves’ Latter-Day Saints Hospital, Inc. rejected it. Novak Heating & Air Conditioning v. Carrier Corp. upheld the requirement that a plaintiff ascribe the negligence to a particular defendant and not to one of two. A plaintiff who sues only the hospital has the opposite problem, because the surgeon and anesthetist remain possible sources of the injury, and the hospital in Darrah v. Bryan Memorial Hospital won summary judgment on that ground.