Concept
Substantial Factor Today
But for and substantial causes
Substantial Factor Today
Section 431 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts defines legal cause in two parts: the actor’s negligence must be a substantial factor in bringing about the harm, and no rule of law may relieve the actor from liability because of the manner in which the negligence produced it.1 Section 433 lists the considerations that bear on the first part.2 The earlier sections of this chapter used that vocabulary because the phrase “substantial factor” originated in the First and Second Restatements.3 Today the phrase is contested, and an answer that uses it must say what it means.
The Restatement (Third) of Torts builds on a plainer foundation. Conduct is a factual cause of harm when the harm would not have occurred absent the conduct.4 Cause in fact will almost always be established if that test is met, and the test fails only in a few quirky situations where it gives an unsatisfactory result even though courts still think the defendant should be treated as a cause.5 One such situation is the overdetermined harm. In Anderson v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. S. M. Ry. Co., two fires merged and burned the plaintiff’s barn. Only one fire was due to the defendant’s negligence, and the other would likely have caused the damage anyway, so no one could say that but for the defendant’s fire the barn would still stand. Yet the defendant’s culpable act clearly contributed, and it seemed fair to hold him liable.6 Section 27 of the Third Restatement recognizes that concept under the label “multiple sufficient causes,” and the Third Restatement otherwise disavows the phrase “substantial factor” in any context.7
The phrase causes trouble because courts use it in three different ways, and its meaning is unclear in each of them.8 Some courts use it as a test of cause in fact where but-for does not work. Others use it as a test of proximate cause, asking whether a cause in fact is substantial enough to be treated as a legally responsible cause. Still others use it as shorthand for both inquiries, and routine jury instructions often ask only whether the defendant’s negligence was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff’s injury, as a proxy for both.9 The proximate-cause use asks a fairness question: even if the defendant factually caused the harm, responsibility may be withheld when imposing it would be unfair.10 The question whether liability should be cut off although the conduct was negligent and a factual cause can be raised under any of the four elements of negligence: duty, breach, causation, or damage.11 A jury asked one substantial-factor question may therefore answer either inquiry, or both, without anyone saying which.
Jurisdictions differ in how much work they let the phrase do. At the broad end, courts use it as the jury’s single question about causation, so that one instruction covers both cause in fact and proximate cause.12 California illustrates this approach: in Mitchell v. Gonzales, the California Supreme Court favored a substantial-factor instruction over the “proximate cause” instructions it found confusing to jurors. New Jersey applies the test outside the concurrent-cause setting as well. One opinion discussing New Jersey law points to decisions, including Hake v. Manchester Township, that were not concurrent-causation cases and in which the defendant’s conduct would not by itself have caused the injury. Because each defendant’s conduct substantially increased the probability of the plaintiff’s injury, the courts allowed recovery.13
Other courts confine the phrase to the unusual situations in which but-for yields unsatisfactory results, and they apply but-for everywhere else.14 That keeps the ordinary case simple, because a defendant whose conduct was not a but-for cause will generally escape liability.15 California itself drew this line in Viner v. Sweet, holding that the but-for test governs all negligence cases except those involving concurrent independent causes, where the substantial-factor test applies. In the situations where but-for strains, usually toxic substance cases, the substantial-factor test normally works quite well.16
At the far end, the Third Restatement abandons the phrase and treats each of several sufficient causes as a factual cause, so a sufficient cause counts without a separate judgment about its size.17 Some state courts share the wariness. In a mesothelioma case, Virginia’s highest court disapproved the related phrase “substantial contributing factor” because of how jurors may hear the word substantial, as Ford Motor Co. v. Boomer reflects.
The vocabularies part company at the edges, and the clearest edge is delayed treatment. Suppose a delay did not produce the disease but may have worsened the result. New Jersey allows recovery where the defendant’s conduct substantially increased the probability of the plaintiff’s injury, even though the conduct alone would not have caused it.18 Negligent failure to diagnose is likewise a setting in which some courts treat but-for as unworkable and substitute the substantial-factor test.19 A court that confines the phrase to concurrent independent causes will ordinarily hold the plaintiff to the but-for showing instead. Such claims also carry a timing problem separate from causation. When a misdiagnosis causes a later injury that is hard to date precisely, the limitations period runs from the date symptoms attributable to the new injury become obvious to the plaintiff.20 Procedural posture shapes how these disputes arise, too. In Hill v. Edmonds, a New York appellate court reviewed a judgment dismissing the complaint against one defendant at the close of the plaintiff’s case in a jury trial.21 Who decides what the plaintiff must show, and when, is the subject of the next section.
Steps two and three do the heavy lifting: but-for settles the ordinary case, and the rule for sufficient causes settles the overdetermined one. The ambiguous phrase is then needed only where the jurisdiction makes it the general test or the facts put proximate cause in play.