Concept
What Makes a Factor Substantial
Concurrent causes and the substantial factor test
What Makes a Factor Substantial
Proof that the harm would not have happened without the defendant's negligence does not finish the causation inquiry. Under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 431, negligent conduct is a legal cause of harm when it is a substantial factor in bringing the harm about and no rule of law relieves the actor from liability because of the manner in which the negligence produced it.1 The first condition does work that the but-for inquiry cannot do. Comment a says that, except for the joint-causation situation in § 432(2), a but-for showing is necessary but not of itself sufficient, because the negligence must also be a substantial factor.2 The multiple-sufficient-cause cases introduced the phrase. This section asks what the adjective means.
Comment a defines substantial by contrasting two senses of the word cause. Conduct is substantial when its effect in producing the harm would lead reasonable people to regard it as a cause in the popular sense, the sense in which the idea of responsibility always lurks.3 The philosophic sense takes in every event without which the harm would not have occurred.4 A collision would not have happened had the pedestrian left home a minute earlier, had the car been assembled a week later, or had the driver's parents never met, and each of those antecedents is a cause in that broad sense. The comment observes that the effect of many such events is so insignificant that no ordinary mind would think of them as causes.5 A rule that counted every antecedent would single out no one, since responsibility would spread across the whole history of the harm. The word substantial narrows the field by borrowing the judgment people ordinarily make when they ask who is responsible.
Because that judgment is one of degree, the test has no formula. One court has described it as incorporating no particular mental operation and appealing forthrightly to instinct.6 Another found the rule more direct and far easier of understandable presentation and application than the alternative before it.7 The price of that simplicity is leeway: the test clearly leaves more leeway to the jury in assigning causal responsibility, and a more jaundiced critic says it allows the jury "to do essentially what it pleases."8 The comment's wording supplies the only limit, which is that the contribution must be one that would lead reasonable people to regard it as a cause.9 The judge-and-jury sections below take up who decides whether that limit is met. Hill v. Edmonds illustrates the procedural stage at which a court can end a negligence claim against a defendant: the trial court dismissed the complaint against defendant Bragoli at the close of the plaintiff's case in a jury trial, and the plaintiff appealed.10
The test sorts contributions at two poles. At one pole, an independent force sufficient to cause the harm passes the test even though the harm would have happened without it. In Anderson, two fires merged into one and burned the plaintiff's property, and only one of the fires was due to the defendant's negligence.11 The case posed a sufficient-but-not-necessary dilemma: the property would probably have burned from the other fire anyway. The court resolved it by asking whether the defendant's act was "a material or substantial element" in producing the damage, and it held the defendant liable on a finding that it was.12 The Second Restatement states the rule in general form: if two forces are actively operating, one because of the actor's negligence and the other not because of any misconduct on his part, and each of itself is sufficient to bring about the harm, the actor's negligence may be found to be a substantial factor.13
At the other pole sits the contribution that is proved but trivial. Such an event is a cause in the philosophic sense, yet its effect is so insignificant that no ordinary mind would think of it as a cause, so it is not a substantial factor.14 What separates the poles is the work the contribution could do and did do, and the but-for result does not decide it, since the harm would have occurred without either contributor.
The warehouse case puts both poles in one creek, which isolates what the test turns on. If the storm surge had been twice as large, Rowan's breach would still qualify, so long as the breach alone could flood the ground floor. The Third Restatement recognizes the same concept in § 27 under the label "multiple sufficient causes."17 In the ordinary case, cause in fact will almost always be established once the but-for test is met, so the substantial factor test serves as an alternative approach for the unusual situations in which but-for does not yield satisfactory results.18 The next section sets the two tests side by side.