Concept
Apportioning Successive Harm
Successive and subsequent causes of harm
Apportioning Successive Harm
Three Restatement (Second) of Torts rules tell you when a later harm is charged to the first negligent actor. Each begins with an actor already liable for the plaintiff's original injury and carries that liability forward: to additional harm from the normal efforts of third persons to render aid the injury reasonably requires, whether the aid is given properly or negligently; to a disease contracted because the injury lowered the plaintiff's vitality; and to harm in a later accident that the impairment made possible and that is a normal consequence of it.1 Under the original tortfeasor doctrine, the first actor is then liable for the enhanced injuries along with the later actor.2
Those rules fix who may be charged. They do not say how damages are divided among the actors, how the plaintiff proves which harm belongs to which actor, or what one actor's settlement does to the claim against another. Four problems fill that gap:
- Independent later incidents, where the plaintiff must prove what each incident caused.
- A suit against only the later actor in a related sequence, where the question is how the jury treats the absent original wrongdoer's fault.
- A force that would have harmed the plaintiff anyway, where the question is how to value what the defendant took away.
- A settlement with the first tortfeasor, where the question is whether the payment ends the claim against the later one.
All four arise because related liabilities overlap. The first actor owes the whole of a related harm, each later actor owes the increment its own conduct added, and the same dollars can therefore sit within more than one actor's liability. A case with a single defendant seldom raises the resulting questions of proof, shares, and double recovery. We begin at the edge of the doctrine, with a later incident that has no connection to the first injury, because the burden of proof becomes the central issue there.
Independent Successive Incidents
The original tortfeasor doctrine depends on a link between the first injury and the later harm, and an independent incident supplies none. In the decision that frames this problem, the court found that the plaintiff had the burden of proving what damages the first accident caused and that the defendants in that accident could not be held responsible for a second, independent accident.3 The reason lies in the risk the first wrongdoer created. A driver who leaves a pedestrian helpless in the road creates the occasion for a bicyclist's carelessness and a physician's treatment, so those later harms are charged to the driver. A collision weeks later, with no connection to anything the first tortfeasor did, was not a risk that tortfeasor created. Responsibility therefore divides instead of accumulating on the first actor, and the division has a cost: someone must say how much of the damage came from which incident. In the decision described, the plaintiff carried that burden.
The task is hardest when both incidents injure the same part of the body. In Lovely v. Allstate Ins. Co., the plaintiff hurt his right elbow in March and was still under a physician's care for continued pain and swelling when, about a month later, an automobile accident injured the elbow again. The plaintiff sued over the April accident, and the trial judge found no basis for apportioning the elbow damages between the two events. The second tortfeasor was liable for the whole injury.4 Three steps explain that result. The plaintiff showed that the April accident injured the elbow, so the defendant was a cause of the harm. The evidence could not supply a dividing line. And if the plaintiff had to produce a line that no witness could draw, the plaintiff would go uncompensated for harm the defendant helped cause, and the only beneficiary of the gap in proof would be the wrongdoer standing in court. Placing the whole on that defendant keeps the gap from operating as a windfall.
When you read a stem on this topic, check which defendant the plaintiff has sued, because the same two accidents can produce different answers for different defendants.
Montalvo v. Lapez noted the asymmetry the hypothetical shows: whether a plaintiff recovers can depend upon which unrelated tortfeasor is before the court.5 In a suit against the first tortfeasor, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving what that accident caused, so a share of damage the plaintiff cannot prove is a share the plaintiff fails to establish. In a suit against the second, the same lack of proof leaves that defendant with the indivisible harm. The related-incident rule is the opposite. When the later harm is related, the original tortfeasor owes everything and the plaintiff never has to divide anything. Only independent incidents force the division, which is why the proof problem belongs here.
Courts soften the problem by refusing to demand exact arithmetic. In McAllister v. Pennsylvania R. Co., the plaintiff injured each leg in separate accidents six months apart, with some combined effect on the back, and the physician who had treated the first injury had died. The court held that a reasonable basis of apportionment exists when there is “some evidence to sustain the apportionment made,” even though the proof cannot supply an exact dividing line between the injuries.6 The treating physician's death shows why the standard takes this shape. The best evidence of how serious the first injury was had disappeared through no fault of the plaintiff, and a requirement of precision would turn every lost record or unanswerable medical question into a total loss.
Loui v. Oakley, which involved four accidents, supplies a fallback for when even that much evidence is missing. The court held that the jury should be told to make a “rough estimate” and, if that proved impossible, “to apportion the damages equally among the various accidents.”7 Equal division is arbitrary on its face, but it lets the jury finish the task without awarding nothing. Lovely, by contrast, placed the whole injury on the one defendant before the court. The two decisions are different fallbacks for the same failure of proof, so an answer should identify which fallback applies and should not assume a single rule.
Montalvo shows how far the problem can stretch. The plaintiff's back was injured in a rear-end chain reaction automobile accident, but the plaintiff also had a congenital condition that made the back more susceptible to injury, had been injured in an earlier automobile accident, and had been the victim of assaults that included blows to the spine and face. The plaintiff had also gone boogey boarding and pushed a car with a flat tire, and both activities exacerbated the back injuries.8 The contributors there include unrelated tortfeasors, a pre-existing condition, and the plaintiff's own activities, so apportionment asks the factfinder to sort causes of different kinds. A stem built this way is testing whether you first separate the related from the independent, and only then ask how the unrelated pieces can be divided.
Allocating Fault Among Related Actors
A plaintiff injured in a related sequence sometimes sues only the later actor, and that actor may want the jury to hear about the earlier one. A passenger rides in a car driven by an intoxicated driver, the car leaves the road and strikes a tree, and a few minutes later it bursts into flames. The passenger sues only the car's manufacturer for the injuries suffered in the fire, alleging that a defect in the car caused it. The manufacturer wants to put on evidence of the driver's intoxication and excessive speed, which caused the first crash, and to have the damages apportioned, meaning divided according to each actor's share of fault, between itself and the driver.10 The Florida Supreme Court took up this question in D'Amario v. Ford Motor Co., and courts elsewhere have answered it in two different ways.11
The baseline rule makes the lawsuit look odd. Under the original tortfeasor doctrine, the driver would be responsible for all the injuries suffered in the collision, including the burns, since the fire followed from the crash the driver caused.12 The passenger therefore held a claim against the driver for everything, yet sued only the manufacturer. The choice of defendants matters because, as Egbert v. Nissan Motor Co., a Utah decision, observed, the elimination of joint and several liability (the rule that lets a plaintiff collect the whole judgment from any one liable defendant) complicates the choice between the two approaches described below.13
The majority approach lets the jury compare the fault of the original tortfeasor with the fault of the party responsible for the enhanced injuries when it allocates fault.14 The logic is that each actor should bear a share of the damages that matches its own fault. That logic gains force where joint and several liability has been eliminated, because a plaintiff who can leave the original wrongdoer out of the suit would otherwise decide, by choosing defendants, whose fault the jury gets to weigh. Under the majority view, the manufacturer in the passenger's suit may present the driver's intoxication and speed, and the jury can set the driver's share against the manufacturer's.
The minority approach, which D'Amario adopted, excludes that evidence, because the court considered it important to maintain the distinction between fault in causing the accident and fault in causing additional or enhanced injuries.15 The reasoning treats the sequence as two stages. The driver's fault produced the crash, and the manufacturer's alleged fault produced the enhancement, so the question for the jury in the manufacturer's trial is what the defect added. The driver is already answerable for all the injuries under the original tortfeasor doctrine, so a comparison with the driver is unnecessary to decide who owes for the burns. Fault in the two stages is treated as two questions and not as one pool to be divided.
The result in D'Amario did not last in its home state. The Florida legislature changed it by statute, and Florida now stands with the majority in permitting the jury to compare the fault of the original tortfeasor and the product manufacturer responsible for the enhanced injuries.16 Treat the decision as the leading statement of the minority view and not as Florida's current law. A stem that places the case in Florida calls for the majority answer, and a stem that leaves the jurisdiction open calls for both approaches, with the reasoning behind each.
Harm That Would Occur Anyway
The rules above add later harm to what a defendant owes. A different problem arises when some other force, one the defendant did not control, was already threatening the plaintiff and the defendant's negligence arrives on top of it. Dillon v. Twin State Gas & Electric Co. is the leading illustration. A teenager sitting on top of a bridge leaned over, lost his balance, and fell, and as he fell he instinctively grabbed a wire that carried electricity for the bridge lights.18 The defendant's negligence caused him to be electrocuted when he touched the wire, but the evidence showed that the fall itself would have killed him or seriously injured him. The court held that the jury must decide his probable future but for the touching of the live wire.19
The instruction follows from what damages are for. An award tries to put the plaintiff where the plaintiff would have been had the tort never happened, so the loss depends on what the plaintiff's future would have been without the defendant's act. In Dillon the defendant's causal role in the death is undisputed, since the electrocution killed him. The dispute concerns the value of what the defendant took away. If the jury priced the loss as though the teenager would have walked away from the fall, the award would put his estate in a better position than he would have occupied, and the defendant would pay for harm the fall would have produced. If the jury treated the fall as automatically decisive, the defendant would be credited with a harm that was likely but not certain. Neither extreme is reliable, because the plaintiff's probable future is a matter of degree, and estimating degree on contested evidence is what a jury is built to do.
This problem differs from the independent successive incidents discussed above. There, a second accident actually injured the plaintiff, and the difficulty was dividing damage that two events had already produced. Here the independent force, whether a fall, an illness, or a natural hazard, is poised to harm the plaintiff when the defendant acts, and the difficulty lies in valuing what the defendant's act cut off. Three comparison cases that accompany Dillon show how widely the pattern varies:
- A plaintiff suffering from terminal cancer is negligently hit by a car and killed. How does that case differ from Dillon?
- A plaintiff standing in the path of an avalanche is negligently shot and killed. Is the result the same?
- A plaintiff is about to embark on a ship when the defendant negligently shoots and kills the plaintiff, and a week later the ship hits an iceberg and sinks with everyone aboard. Is the result the same?20
The case notes pose these comparisons without giving outcomes, so do not memorize an answer for any of them. Each asks the Dillon question, what the plaintiff's probable future looked like before the defendant acted, and each varies the facts that bear on it. The cancer is a condition inside the plaintiff's own body, and the evidence about it would be medical. The avalanche is an outside force already bearing down when the shot is fired. The sinking lies a week in the future and raises the further question how much weight a later event deserves in valuing a future that the defendant ended first. In each setting the answer turns on what the evidence shows about the independent force, which is why the jury has a task to perform.
On an exam, ask of every stem whether the facts reveal an independent hazard and how likely it was to harm the plaintiff. A stem that says the plaintiff would likely have been killed or badly hurt anyway describes such a hazard, and the answer should say that the defendant's damages depend on the plaintiff's probable future but for the defendant's act. Where the stem contains no such hazard, nothing reduces the measure of loss.
Step two is where a stem hides its facts, and step three is where an answer earns its credit. The instruction in Dillon sends the probable future to the jury and treats the independent force as neither irrelevant nor automatically decisive. An answer that announces full damages because the defendant was the actual cause skips the fall, and an answer that announces no liability because the plaintiff would have been harmed anyway skips the probability, so each omits a step the jury is required to take.
Settlement With the First Tortfeasor
A settlement with the first wrongdoer in a related sequence can end the claim against the later one. A driver negligently breaks a pedestrian's leg and pays to settle the claim for that injury, and the pedestrian signs a release, a document giving up the claim. The pedestrian then sues the physician who treated the break negligently and left the leg permanently shorter. The physician answers that the release discharged the claim, relying on the old common-law rule that releasing one joint tortfeasor releases all of them.22 Some courts have accepted that argument, among them the court in Thompson v. Fox, which held that the later tortfeasor was released by the release of the driver, and others have rejected it.23
The defense has force because of the original tortfeasor doctrine. When the driver's liability extends to the total injury, the aggravation the physician added is part of what the driver owes, so the driver and the physician both answer for the same harm. A plaintiff may be compensated only once for a single harm, which is the one-satisfaction rule, and a payment accepted in settlement of everything the driver owes arguably covers the aggravation as well. Courts that bar the later claim reason this way. In Gores v. Miller the release was plain and unambiguous, and in Gallagher v. Mercy Medical Center the plaintiff signed a release when she settled with the driver who caused the accident, so the one-satisfaction rule barred her claim against the medical center where the malpractice occurred.24 All of that reasoning assumes that the driver's liability reaches the whole injury. A later incident independent of the first, of the kind discussed above, gives the defense no foothold, because a payment for harm the first tortfeasor never owed cannot satisfy the later harm.
The opposite line of decisions refuses to apply the joint-tortfeasor release rule to successive tortfeasors. Lujan v. Healthsouth Rehabilitation Corp. and Fieser v. St. Francis Hospital & School of Nursing declined to treat the release of the first wrongdoer as a release of the later one.25 That refusal protects the plaintiff's expectations. A plaintiff who accepts the driver's payment for the original injury while planning to hold the physician liable for the aggravation would lose the claim under the traditional rule, and the loss would turn on how the law classifies two defendants and not on whether anyone has actually paid for the aggravation. Declining to apply the rule avoids forfeiting a claim the plaintiff never meant to give up. The split therefore comes down to classification: the first line treats the driver and the physician as answering for one shared harm that a single payment can satisfy, and the second treats the successive relationship as different from joint wrongdoing.
Many jurisdictions have also changed the underlying common-law rule by decision or statute, and a settlement paper is read in light of those changes.26 The reforms take four forms:
- Some states distinguish a release from a covenant not to sue, which is a promise not to pursue a claim. A release discharges the other tortfeasors, but a covenant does not unless full compensation has been paid.
- Some states treat a release that expressly reserves rights against other tortfeasors as a covenant not to sue, whatever words of release it contains.
- Some states hold that even a release with no reservation leaves other tortfeasors liable unless it shows an intention to discharge them or full compensation has been paid, as in Leung v. Verdugo Hills Hospital.
- Some states act by statute: under the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act § 4(a) the others are released only when the terms of the release so provide, and the Uniform Joint Obligations Act § 4 preserves claims against others when the release expressly reserves them.27
Because these rules turn on what the plaintiff signed, the form of the document matters. A release need not be a separate paper: in Cupidon v. Alexis, the language printed on the face of an insurer's check was held to be a release once the plaintiff cashed it.28
A different release problem arises even with a single tortfeasor, because the plaintiff may sign on a mistaken assumption about how serious the injury is. Most courts will not set aside a release for a mistake about the extent of the injury, as Mack v. Albee Press illustrates with a settlement for a bruised toe that was followed by gangrene and the amputation of a leg, and that subject belongs to other courses.29
An exam answer on a settlement stem should begin by confirming that the later harm is related to the first injury, since the first tortfeasor's liability for the total injury is what gives the release any bearing on the later claim. It should then read the settlement document before choosing a rule, asking whether it is a release or a covenant not to sue, whether it reserves rights against others, whether it shows an intent to discharge them, and whether the plaintiff has been fully compensated. Because jurisdictions differ, the answer should set out both lines of authority and apply the one the stem points to.