Concept
Release, Credit, and Satisfaction
Joint and several liability versus apportionment of harm to causes
Release, Credit, and Satisfaction
A plaintiff injured by several tortfeasors can settle with one, sue another, and collect from a third. Three rules keep that freedom from turning one injury into several recoveries, and the Restatement (Second) of Torts states them together: a release or covenant not to sue given to one tortfeasor does not release the others unless it so provides; payments made by one of the tortfeasors reduce the amount payable by the others; and a satisfaction or discharge of a judgment against one terminates the claim against the others.1 Each rule answers a different event, and the events track how much the plaintiff has actually received: a settlement document, a partial payment, a full payment.
The rules matter because joint and several liability lets each of several tortfeasors be sued together with the others and makes each individually liable for the full amount of the plaintiff’s damages. The plaintiff may collect from any one of them, or from any group of them, up to that full amount.2 The plaintiff has suffered one injury, however, and the law pays for it once. Two opposite mistakes threaten. If a settlement with one tortfeasor ended the claim against all, no plaintiff could take any single defendant’s money without risking the rest of the recovery. If payments went uncounted, a plaintiff could collect the same loss twice. The three rules let the plaintiff settle with some defendants and pursue the others while counting everything received toward one compensation. They govern what the plaintiff may collect; how the defendants divide the cost among themselves is a separate question of contribution. The setting is ordinary multi-defendant negligence litigation, in which the case against one defendant can end on its own timetable. In Hill v. Edmonds, for instance, the trial court dismissed the complaint as against one defendant, Bragoli, at the close of the plaintiff’s case, and the plaintiff appealed.3
Effect of a Release
A release or covenant not to sue given to one tortfeasor discharges that tortfeasor and no one else, unless its own terms reach further.4 The document’s words therefore decide the question. A plaintiff who signs a paper with one of two negligent drivers keeps the claim against the other driver unless the paper discharges the other as well, and calling the paper a “release” or a “covenant not to sue” does not change the analysis. The rule reversed a doctrine that once governed every settlement.
Early cases held that a release given to one tortfeasor released the plaintiff’s claims against all joint tortfeasors, regardless of the amount the settling tortfeasor paid.5 Suppose Fermi settles with Joule for $13,000 and signs a release. Under the early rule, Fermi is deemed to have released Edison, Watt, and every other possible defendant as well, however far his damages exceed $13,000.6 The rule discouraged settlement. Because a release barred the plaintiff from suing any other party on the same claim, a plaintiff would settle with one of several tortfeasors only if the offer came close to what she would likely recover by trying the case against them all; she could not take part of her damages from one and hope to recover the rest from someone else.7
The covenant not to sue offered a way around that trap, because unlike a release it did not discharge the other tortfeasors.8 A plaintiff could take a partial payment and keep suing the rest. Cox v. Pearl Investment Co. illustrates the contest over labels: the plaintiffs’ settlement document was styled a covenant not to sue, and the dispute was whether it should operate as a release of every tortfeasor.
Courts abandoned the strict rule once they saw that its premise was wrong. Even when a plaintiff’s damages are indivisible, the plaintiff has independent claims for those damages against each tortfeasor, so it is no longer logical to infer that settling with one abandons the claims against another.9 Nor does any tortfeasor deserve a windfall from someone else’s settlement. Where a defendant’s conduct was sufficient by itself to cause the harm, neither his fault nor his causal impact is less merely because other tortfeasors also took part, and no logic suggests why a second tortfeasor’s appearance should reward him: he is no less at fault and has caused no less harm.10 The risk of double payment is met by crediting the settlement, not by ending the claim. Fermi’s $13,000 from Joule would be credited against a later judgment against Edison, yet Fermi would still be made whole despite settling with one of the tortfeasors.11
The Uniform Contribution Act’s release provision spells out both halves of the rule. A release or covenant does not discharge any other tortfeasor unless its terms so provide, and it discharges the tortfeasor to whom it is given from all liability for contribution to any other tortfeasor.13 The settling tortfeasor thus buys peace from the plaintiff and from the co-tortfeasors at once.
Some accounts, particularly of employer and employee liability, still report the older line that a release of one joint tortfeasor releases all of them, unlike a covenant not to sue.14 When a problem tells you which rule governs, apply it. When the problem is silent, apply the modern rule and note the older distinction.
Credit for Payments
Payments made by one of the tortfeasors reduce the amount payable by the others.16 The credit is the companion of the release rule. A plaintiff who settles with one tortfeasor keeps the claim against the rest, and the credit makes the settlement money count when that claim is tried. Without it, a plaintiff already paid by one tortfeasor could collect the whole loss again from another, although the plaintiff is entitled to only one satisfaction for the damages.17
The dollar credit shows the mechanics. Suppose Erg, injured by the combined negligence of Kelvin and Volt, settles with Kelvin for $7,000 and keeps the claim against Volt. If the jury finds Erg’s damages to be $24,000, the judge applies the dollar credit and enters judgment against Volt for $17,000. In most cases the better course is to tell the jury nothing about the settlement and let the judge adjust the verdict.18
Because the credit follows the dollars paid, a low settlement leaves the nonsettling defendant with more of the judgment. Change the facts: the judgment is $16,000 and Kelvin paid $4,000. Volt receives a credit for the settlement and owes $12,000. He will have paid more than half of the damages, yet at common law that gave him no right of contribution from Kelvin.19 The Uniform Contribution Act measures the reduction by the amount stipulated in the release or covenant or the consideration paid for it, whichever is greater.20
Some jurisdictions measure the credit by the settling tortfeasor’s share of responsibility instead of by the price the plaintiff accepted. The proportional credit treats the settlement as the plaintiff’s sale of that percentage of the eventual judgment, whatever the price. Suppose a jury finds Nell’s damages to be $100,000 and assigns 20 percent of the fault to Nell, 70 percent to Fagan, and 10 percent to Twist, so that Twist is jointly liable for an $80,000 judgment, and suppose Nell had settled with Fagan for $25,000 before trial. A dollar credit leaves Twist owing $55,000. A proportional credit gives Twist a $70,000 credit, Fagan’s 70/80ths of the $80,000 judgment, and Twist owes $10,000.21 Nell collects $80,000 in all under the dollar credit but only $35,000 under the proportional one, because she settled Fagan’s $70,000 share for $25,000.
Reverse the settlement. If Nell had instead settled with Twist for $3,000 and gone to trial against Fagan on the same verdict, Fagan would receive a 10/80ths credit against the $80,000 judgment and would pay $70,000.22 Nell would collect $73,000 in all, because her settlement fell short of Twist’s $10,000 share. The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Apportionment of Liability gives the reasoning: “Since the plaintiff bears the risk of an inadequate settlement (in which case the plaintiff will recover less than the damages determined by the factfinder), the plaintiff should also obtain the benefit of a favorable settlement.” §16 cmt. e.23
The two methods differ in who carries the risk of the settlement price. Under a dollar credit, every dollar paid comes off the judgment, so a high settlement helps the nonsettling defendant and a low one hurts. Under a proportional credit, the nonsettling defendant’s bill depends on the jury’s allocation and not on the price, and the plaintiff keeps the gain or bears the loss of the bargain. McDermott, Inc. v. AmClyde adopted the proportionate share rule. Three considerations guided the Court: consistency with the proportionate fault rule of Reliable Transfer, the effect on settlement, and judicial economy. The first was the crucial point, since the Court regarded the other two as ambiguous.24
No credit is needed where the other defendants are only severally liable, because each already owes just its own share. A tortfeasor who settles simply extinguishes liability for his share.25 Suppose Flite’s damages are $60,000 and she is 20 percent at fault, leaving $48,000 to divide among Micawber, Heap, and Murdstone, who owe 50/80ths ($30,000), 20/80ths ($12,000), and 10/80ths ($6,000).26 When Flite settles with Micawber for $9,000, the settlement extinguishes Micawber’s share and nothing else. Heap and Murdstone still owe $12,000 and $6,000, so Flite collects $27,000 in all, having settled a $30,000 share for $9,000.27 One defendant’s settlement figure reveals nothing about the harm the others caused, and the double-recovery risk that justifies a credit does not arise when no defendant owes more than its own share. Courts applying statutes of that kind have denied a setoff. See McReynolds v. Krebs (no setoff once the defendants were no longer jointly liable). Statutes that keep joint liability only for economic damages produce a matching credit. See Wells v. Tallahassee Memorial Regional Medical Center (credit limited to economic damages, with the settlement apportioned between economic and noneconomic loss in the proportion of the jury’s award).
Satisfaction of Judgment
A satisfaction or discharge of a judgment against one tortfeasor terminates the claim against the others.29 A judgment is satisfied when it has been paid, so the rule turns on payment and not on the entry of judgment. Read together, the three rules track what the plaintiff has received: a release frees only those it names, a partial payment reduces what the others owe, and full payment ends the claim.
Each jointly liable tortfeasor answers for the whole loss, but the plaintiff is entitled to only one satisfaction for that loss, so an unsatisfied judgment against one tortfeasor does not bar a later action against another.30 If three defendants are found liable and the plaintiff’s damages are $100,000, the plaintiff receives judgment against each for $100,000 and may collect from one or more of them in any amounts the plaintiff likes, so long as total collections do not exceed $100,000.31 One illustration shows both halves of the principle. Thatcher could collect $60,000 from either of two defendants, but if she collected it from one she could not seek any more from the other, and once her judgment was satisfied she had no further rights against either tortfeasor.32
An unpaid judgment has compensated no one. Suppose a plaintiff wins a $50,000 judgment against a tortfeasor who is insolvent and pays nothing. The judgment is unsatisfied, so the plaintiff may sue a second tortfeasor for the same injury, although total collections can never exceed the damages as assessed. Between an unpaid judgment and a fully paid one lies partial payment. A plaintiff holding a $16,000 judgment who has collected $7,000 may still look to the other tortfeasor for the $9,000 balance, because the claim ends only when the loss has been paid in full.33
Early common law drew the line in a different place. A judgment against one tortfeasor barred suit against the others, on the theory that a tort claim was a single cause of action that, once sued upon, was extinguished and replaced by the judgment.34 The consequence was harsh: a plaintiff who sued the one tortfeasor without money and won was left holding a paper judgment. Courts later replaced the rule with one allowing a second action against another responsible party so long as the prior judgment had not been fully satisfied, and Section 3(e) of the Uniform Act codifies that approach.35 The recovery of a judgment against one tortfeasor, the Act says, “does not of itself discharge the other tortfeasors from liability for the injury or wrongful death unless the judgment is satisfied.”36
The satisfaction defense appears in Bundt v. Embro, a suit by five passengers in two colliding cars against the owners and drivers and a contractor who had negligently obstructed the view of a stop sign. The plaintiffs had recovered a judgment for the same injuries against the State of New York in the Court of Claims, and that judgment had been satisfied. The defendants moved to amend their answers to plead discharge and satisfaction.37 The motion invoked the rule just described, under which payment of a judgment for the same injuries leaves nothing further to collect from anyone else.
The trucking company has not simply lost its money. A tortfeasor who pays more than his pro rata share can recover the excess from the others through contribution, but the right arises only on payment, not on a finding of liability: the difference between incurring a judgment and paying it is “the difference between a bird in the hand and a bird in the bush.”38 That claim runs among the defendants and leaves the plaintiff out of it, which is why the plaintiff’s claim can end while the defendants’ accounts with one another stay open.
The rule presupposes a judgment that compensates the whole injury, which is the premise of joint and several liability. Where defendants are only severally liable, each judgment covers a defendant’s own share, so paying one share leaves the other shares unpaid and the injury partly uncompensated.39 Satisfaction of a judgment is the event that marks the point at which the plaintiff may pursue no one further, however many defendants were liable for the whole.