Concept
Why Entrant Status Matters
Possessor of land and entrant status
Possessors and Entrant Status
Why Entrant Status Matters
Two people hurt by the same hazard on the same land can meet opposite fates in court, and the difference often has nothing to do with how careless the landowner was. It lies in who each person was to the land. The Restatement (Second) of Torts sorts entrants into three categories and defines each by the entrant's relationship to the possessor. A trespasser enters or remains without a privilege created by the possessor's consent or otherwise.1 A licensee is privileged to enter or remain only by virtue of the possessor's consent.2 An invitee is either a public invitee or a business visitor.3 Where the traditional approach governs, the category sets the limits of the possessor's duty, so a premises case begins with the label before anyone asks whether the possessor was negligent.4
Samantha, who rarely uses her backyard, hosts a picnic. A yellow-jacket nest lies hidden in the ground; a careful inspection of the yard would have found it, but Samantha has no idea it is there. Her friend Jeremy steps on it and is stung repeatedly. Jeremy has Samantha's consent to be on the land and nothing more, which makes him a licensee.5 The traditional rules limit a possessor's duty to take affirmative precautions for entrants like him, and they did not require Samantha to inspect the yard on his behalf, so his claim fails.6 Suppose instead that the swarm had attacked Jack, the young man who routinely mows her lawn. Jack could recover, because Jack is an invitee.7 The nest, the yard, Samantha's ignorance, and the stings are identical in both versions. Only the entrant's status differs.
The result looks backward, since Samantha asked Jeremy to come and merely pays Jack to work. But the law does not use “invitee” to mean anyone who was asked. The traditional line separated persons who enter by invitation for business purposes, or enter premises open to the public, from persons who enter for nonbusiness purposes, with or without permission, and a picnic guest falls on the second side.8 Today the primary distinction is drawn elsewhere: between entrants who come by invitation, permission, or privilege and entrants who come without consent or other privilege, that is, trespassers.9 The sections that follow take up the traditional categories first, and the last section returns to jurisdictions that have changed them.
The special premises rules are limits on liability, not a separate kind of liability. In the main, they restrict the duty of landowners and occupiers to take affirmative precautions for the safety of people who enter the land.10 Nor do they push toward strict liability. Compensating the injured matters in tort law, but judges have not generally treated compensation as more important than justice or made strict liability the norm, and fault remains the most common basis of tort liability.11 Entrant status works inside that fault framework by telling the court how far the possessor's duty to take precautions extends.
The least protected category invites a tempting but wrong explanation: that a trespasser is a wrongdoer whom the law declines to help. A trespasser injured on the land by the negligence of anyone other than the possessor is not barred from recovering. The possessor's protection is instead a special privilege that the occupier holds solely by reason of the right to exclusive possession and control of the premises.12 Status therefore measures a person's relationship to the possessor, not the person's moral standing.
A court could have asked the ordinary negligence question of every visitor. The traditional law chose instead a few rigid categories with fixed limits on duty, and two explanations are commonly offered for that choice. Both describe how the rules arose without endorsing them. The first is historical: land held a high place in English and American thought, the landowning class dominated England during the period when the rules took shape, and the heritage of feudalism lingered. The California Supreme Court recited this account in Rowland v. Christian.13
The second explanation concerns who decides. Judges feared that juries would sympathize with an injured visitor rather than with the landowner and would unfairly favor the plaintiff under an open-ended reasonable-care standard. Restrictive rules let judges rule for possessors as a matter of law and keep the cases from juries.14
Fixed categories are also efficient, and that efficiency is tolerable, even desirable, as long as the three sets of duties reflect widespread agreement about the rights of entrants and the obligations of owners. When commonly held norms and rigid categories coincide, the system works. Once that social and moral consensus breaks down, rules set at a high level of generality often produce inaccurate or undesirable outcomes.15 The sections on reform jurisdictions return to this point.
Every category is defined relative to the possessor's consent or invitation, so classification presupposes a possessor. The Restatement identifies the possessor through three situations. The first is a person in occupation of the land with intent to control it.16 The second is a person who has been in occupation with intent to control it, if no one else has since occupied it with that intent.17 The third is a person entitled to immediate occupation, if no one is in possession under the first two.18 A defendant who does not fit one of the categories to which the special rules apply is liable or not under the usual rules of tort law.19
A misclassification at step two carries through the rest of the analysis, because the wrong duty is then applied. Jurisdictions that have departed from the traditional categories alter this sequence, and the last section of this chapter takes them up.