Concept
Possessor of Land
Possessor of land and entrant status
Possessor of Land
Every entrant category in this chapter is measured against one person, the possessor of land, and Restatement (Second) of Torts § 328E defines that person through three clauses.1 The first names a person in occupation of the land with intent to control it.2 The second names a person who was in occupation with that intent, so long as no one else has since occupied the land with intent to control it.3 The third names a person entitled to immediate occupation, but only if no one is in possession under the first two clauses.4
The clauses form a ladder. Each later rung comes into play only when the earlier ones leave no possessor, so the first rung that names someone settles the question.
The ladder runs on occupation and control, not on title. The special premises rules may be invoked only by or against the possessor, who is the person occupying the land or, if the land is unoccupied, its owner, who is deemed to be in possession.5 A defendant who conducts an activity or creates a condition on land without fitting one of the categories those rules cover escapes them and is liable, or not, under the usual rules of tort law,6 where fault remains the most common basis for liability.7
Control is the idea running through all three clauses. A person who occupies and runs land can inspect it, repair it, warn visitors, and decide who comes in, and a duty to keep land safe makes sense when it falls on someone able to do those things. The later clauses supply fallbacks so that land nobody currently occupies still has a possessor. The paradigm, though, is the present occupant who intends to control the land, and it comes first.
Occupant With Intent to Control
The first clause makes a possessor of a person who is “in occupation of the land with intent to control it.”8 A person must satisfy both elements. Occupation is the factual one: the person is actually using and holding the land. Intent to control is the mental one: the person means to decide who may enter, how the land is kept, and what goes on there. Each element screens out a different group, so test them separately.
Occupation gives a person practical access to the land, but presence alone does not show who runs the place. Jack mows Samantha’s lawn every week and spends hours there, yet Samantha, who hired him, directs the work and decides who else may be in her yard. Jack occupies the lawn physically without intending to control it. The intent element separates the person who runs the premises from the guests, workers, and trespassers who are merely present.
The clause therefore yields a two-question screen. Is the person actually occupying the land? Does the person intend to control it? Visitors and workers drop out at the second question, and a person is a possessor under this clause only if both answers are yes. Look to the later clauses only when no one passes.
The tenant is the standard case. A tenant who lives in the rented house and decides who comes in occupies with intent to control, so the tenant, not the landlord, is the possessor and usually bears the normal tort duties that occupiers owe to invitees, licensees, trespassers, and others. A guest hurt by the physical condition of the premises can look to the tenant.9
The facts of Rowland v. Christian show the same alignment from the guest’s side. The plaintiff, a social guest, asked to use the bathroom in the defendant’s apartment and was injured when a cracked faucet handle on the basin broke and severed tendons and nerves in his right hand. The defendant had known of the crack for two weeks and had complained to the building manager, but she had not told him. His suit ran against the occupant of the apartment, and he appealed to the California Supreme Court from a summary judgment in her favor.10
Title to the land does not decide possession. When Grangerford leases a field to Farmer, Farmer has full control while the lease runs, so Farmer is “in occupancy of land with intent to control it,” the same formula the Second Restatement uses in § 157 to decide who is “in possession” and may sue a trespasser.11 Grangerford holds only a reversion, the right to possession at some later date and not presently,12 and an owner counts as the possessor only when the land is unoccupied.13
Whether a landlord who has surrendered possession owes a tenant’s guest any duty is a separate question from who the possessor is, and it is the question in Borders v. Roseberry. A court asked to depart from the general duty of care weighs the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the certainty that the plaintiff was injured, the closeness of the connection between the conduct and the injury, the moral blame attached to the conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, the burden on the defendant and the consequences for the community, and the availability and cost of insurance.14 None of that changes the definition of possessor. The landlord who gave up possession and control stays outside it.
Former Occupant Without Successor
The second clause lets a possessor keep that status after leaving the land. It reaches “a person who has been in occupation of land with intent to control it, if no other person has subsequently occupied it with intent to control it.”16 Two things must be true. The person once occupied the land with intent to control it, and no one has since taken up that position by occupying with the same intent.
The first clause speaks of a person who “is in occupation,” so it stops fitting an occupant the day that occupant moves out. The second clause carries the status forward. Without it, the status would end at departure even though no one else had taken over. The clause also ranks ahead of the final fallback, which applies only when no one is in possession under the first two clauses,17 so a person who is merely entitled to occupy cannot displace a former occupant who still qualifies. When the departed occupant also owns the land, as when a homeowner moves out of his own house, the clause and the rule that the owner of unoccupied land is deemed in possession name the same person.18
Each part of the clause does its own work. The history requirement confines the clause to people who actually held the position of control. Jack, who mowed Samantha’s lawn, was on her land every week but never occupied it with intent to control it, so he does not become a possessor of her yard when he drives away. The no-successor condition rests on the same ground as the possessor concept generally: the duty attaches to whoever can inspect the land, repair it, and decide who comes in. A homeowner who has locked up a vacant house still holds the keys and can check the property, fix a rotted porch, or board up a window. Once another person moves in intending to control the house, that ability has passed to the newcomer, and leaving the duty with the former occupant would give an entrant two candidates for possessor.
The hiker and the squatter both enter a house its former occupant has left, and the clause separates them. A successor ends the former occupant’s status only by meeting the paradigm itself, which means occupation together with intent to control.19 The rule is sensible. If any entry at all displaced the former occupant, possessor status would pass to each stray visitor and vanish when the visitor left. Requiring real control means the status moves only when the ability to inspect, repair, and exclude moves with it. For the same reason, the former occupant’s own conduct changes nothing. Locking up, leaving town, and letting months pass are all consistent with the clause, which sets no deadline and names a single condition that ends the status.
A fact pattern about a vacant house therefore tests one variable: has anyone else taken control since the former occupant left? If not, the former occupant is the possessor and the entrant’s status is measured against that person. If someone has moved in intending to run the place, the newcomer is the possessor, and the former occupant drops out. Possessor status identifies the defendant, and the entrant’s category, taken up in the sections that follow, determines what that defendant owes. Where neither the first clause nor the second names anyone, the third clause is the last fallback.
Entitled to Immediate Occupation
The third clause reaches “a person who is entitled to immediate occupation of the land, if no other person is in possession under Clauses (a) and (b).”21 Two phrases carry it. “Immediate” means the right to occupy exists now, so a right that arrives at some later date does not qualify. The “if” condition makes the clause a fallback that operates only when the first two clauses have produced no possessor.
The law needs this fallback because unoccupied land can still injure people. A vacant lot can hold a hidden pit or a rotting fence, and entrants still arrive. The person with the present right to take possession is the one positioned to secure the lot, so the premises rules attach to that person. The ordering follows the same logic: someone actually controlling the land, or a former occupant whom no one has replaced, is better placed to act than a person who merely holds a right to occupy. In the ordinary case the person entitled to immediate occupation is the owner, which matches the rule that the owner of unoccupied land is deemed to be in possession.22
An owner who has leased the land stands elsewhere, and two independent reasons remove that owner from the ladder. The first is that the lease takes away the present right to occupy. Grangerford, who leased his field to Farmer, holds a reversion, which is the right to possession at some later date and not presently,23 and the clause asks about a right to occupy now. The second comes from the clause’s own condition. A tenant who moves in and decides who may enter and how the premises are kept is in occupation with intent to control, which makes the tenant the possessor under the first clause. The third clause applies only if no one is in possession under the first two, so the tenant’s presence shuts it off no matter what rights the owner retains.24 A guest hurt by a defect inside leased premises therefore looks to the tenant, who is the one usually subject to the occupier’s duties.25
A fact pattern that stresses the deed, the tax bills, and the owner’s name invites the conclusion that the owner is the possessor. Ask first who occupies the land with intent to control it, and reach the owner’s title only if the first two rungs are empty.
The three clauses now form a single ladder. To find the possessor, climb it in order and stop at the first rung that names someone.
From here on in this chapter, “possessor” means whoever the ladder selects, and the sections that follow classify each entrant as a trespasser, licensee, or invitee relative to that person.