Concept
Status in Reform Jurisdictions
Possessor of land and entrant status
Status in Reform Jurisdictions
Duty in negligence has always depended on the relationship between plaintiff and defendant: early English and American courts held that no action could rest on the breach of a duty owed to someone other than the plaintiff.1 For land possessors, the entrant categories turned that relationship into three labels. Within the past generation, almost exactly half of American jurisdictions have discarded the trichotomy and apply reasonable care to claims by invitees and licensees alike, so the label that did all the work earlier in this chapter does less, or nothing, across a large part of the country.2
The decision that did most to start that movement is Rowland v. Christian. James Rowland, a social guest, asked to use the defendant's bathroom and was badly hurt when a cracked cold-water faucet handle broke and severed tendons and nerves in his right hand. The defendant had known of the crack for two weeks, had complained to the building manager, and had said nothing to Rowland.3 The California Supreme Court reversed a summary judgment for the defendant. It declined to follow the rigid classifications and held that the proper test is whether the possessor, in managing the property, acted as a reasonable person in view of the probability of injury to others, with the entrant's status bearing on liability but not determining it.4 Under the traditional scheme a social guest is a licensee, privileged to enter by the possessor's consent, and that label would have fixed the possessor's duty before anyone asked whether she had been careless.5 Under the court's test the label became one fact among several, and Rowland's claim went forward.
The court's reasoning is the argument for reform in compact form. It treated any departure from the general principle that people answer for carelessness as a matter of balancing: the foreseeability of harm, the certainty of injury, the closeness of the connection between conduct and injury, the moral blame attached to the conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, the burden on the defendant and the consequences to the community of imposing a duty, and the availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance.6 Set that list beside the traditional labels. Each label is defined by the entrant's relationship to the possessor: entry without privilege, entry by the possessor's consent, or entry for a purpose connected with business dealings between them.7 None turns on how likely the harm was or how costly a precaution would have been. A label can stand in for those factors only while the two tend to line up.
The categories always offered a trade. Fixed duties give comparatively high predictability of outcome and comparatively low adjudication costs, which is tolerable, even desirable, as long as the tripartite set of duties reflects widespread agreement about what entrants may expect and what owners owe. When that social and moral consensus breaks down, rules set at that level of generality often produce inaccurate or undesirable outcomes.8 The more restrictive rules also let judges rule for possessors as a matter of law and keep cases from juries.9 A reasonable-care standard gives up that shortcut in return for results that follow the facts, and whether the exchange is worth making depends on how often the label gives the wrong answer.
The result is a patchwork, and its pieces differ in kind. Some jurisdictions changed the rule by statute. Illinois abolished the common law distinction between invitees and licensees and imposed a duty of reasonable care under the circumstances.10 Connecticut, in 2012, superseded the majority opinion in Laube v. Stevenson with a statute requiring the same standard of care for a social invitee as for a business invitee.11 Others changed the rule by decision: West Virginia, in Mallet v. Pickens, abandoned the invitee and licensee distinction while preserving the traditional common law rules for trespassers.12 A few states go further and apply reasonable care under all the circumstances even to trespassers.13 Even so, most courts still begin by classifying the entrant under the traditional categories, though a substantial number have held that ordinary care extends to licensees or even trespassers.14
Most reform jurisdictions still treat trespassers separately. A substantial majority of the courts that apply a unitary reasonable-care standard to invitees and licensees continue to require a trespasser to prove intentional or willful, wanton, and reckless misconduct.15 Mallet summarized the authority in a passage from Minnesota's Peterson v. Balach: burglars and vandals are trespassers, there often is good reason to distinguish a trespasser from a social guest, and there is little or no reason to distinguish a social guest from a business invitee.16 The justification is not that a trespasser is a wrongdoer whom the law refuses to help, since a trespasser injured on the land by someone other than the possessor is not barred from recovering. The rule is best understood as a special privilege the occupier holds by reason of the right to exclusive possession and control of the premises.17 The Restatement (Third) of Torts rests the reduced standard on the same ground, the possessor's privilege to exclude persons in protection of property rights.18
That Restatement offers the moderate version of reform by splitting trespassers in two. Sections 51 and 52 would owe an ordinary trespasser reasonable care, and would owe a flagrant trespasser only a duty not to cause physical harm intentionally, willfully, or wantonly.19 Everyone but the flagrant trespasser is therefore owed reasonable care, and the lesser duty yields for imperiled and helpless trespassers, who are still owed reasonable care.20 The bifurcation has been controversial, and some states have passed legislation preserving the no-duty rule, so even this moderate proposal has not produced uniformity.21 Nevada's Supreme Court adopted the provision in Foster v. Costco Wholesale Corp. when it addressed open and obvious dangers.22
Even where status no longer fixes the duty, it does not vanish from the analysis. Reasonable care does not require a possessor to warn or protect visitors whose coming is not known or reasonably foreseeable, and trespassers and licensees are often unforeseeable visitors, so a reasonable-care standard will not often produce liability that the old categories would have denied.23 Courts therefore say that status remains relevant to foreseeability and to the possessor's reasonable expectations, which is shorthand for the point that the facts establishing status matter even though the label does not.24
Rowland itself turned on facts about knowledge. The court assumed the defendant knew the handle was cracked and dangerous, that the defect was not obvious, and that the plaintiff was about to use the basin. When an occupier knows of a concealed condition posing an unreasonable risk and knows that a person is about to come into contact with it, the court reasoned, a trier of fact can find that failing to warn or repair was negligence.25 A guest may or may not be entitled to expect a host to make the premises safer on his account, but he can reasonably rely on a warning and take precautions of his own.26 Knowledge of the danger and of the entrant is what the old labels partly stood in for, and it still carries the case after the labels stop deciding it.
What reform leaves in place is the identity of the defendant. Rowland frames its test as the possessor's conduct in managing the property,27 and the possessor is still the person identified earlier in this chapter: one who is in occupation of the land with intent to control it;28 one who has been in occupation with intent to control it, if no other person has subsequently occupied it with that intent;29 or, if no one is in possession under those two clauses, one who is entitled to immediate occupation.30 A guest hurt at a rented house therefore looks first to the tenant who lives there and controls who enters, because abolishing the entrant categories changes the standard of care and leaves untouched the question of who holds possession.