Concept
Known Trespassers
Duty owed to adult trespassers
Known Trespassers
Discovery changes what a possessor owes a trespasser without changing what the trespasser is. The baseline rule of Restatement (Second) of Torts § 333 relieves a possessor of any duty of reasonable care to trespassers, whether to put the land in a reasonably safe condition or to carry on his activities so as not to endanger them, “except as stated in §§ 334-339.”1 Three of those exceptions share a single trigger: the possessor knows or has reason to know that a trespasser is on the land. Section 336 then governs his activities,2 § 337 governs dangerous artificial conditions,3 and § 338 governs forces under his immediate control.4
Most states hold that a discovered trespasser is owed ordinary care. Once the landowner learns of the trespasser's presence in circumstances suggesting that he may meet danger, the landowner must use ordinary care.5 Almost all traditional jurisdictions have adopted special rules for discovered trespassers, and those rules impose liability for ordinary negligence and not merely for reckless misconduct.6 The reasoning resembles the reasoning that supports liability to constant intruders, in sharper form. Once the possessor knows of a particular trespasser, that person's presence is a known fact and no longer a foreseeable possibility, and the burden of protecting him centers on one individual in one situation.7
The duty is limited in kind, however. A discovered trespasser is not owed premises made reasonably safe. The possessor owes a reasonable warning of a danger the trespasser is unlikely to see and, for active operations, care in conducting or controlling them when a warning would not be enough.8 The first subsection below defines the shared trigger. The next three apply it to activities, artificial conditions, and forces, and the last marks the outer limits of the duty and adds a corollary for trespassers who are trapped.
Discovering the Trespasser
Each known-trespasser duty begins with the same question: what did the possessor know, or have reason to know, about the trespasser's presence? Section 336 makes a possessor who “knows or has reason to know of the presence of another who is trespassing on the land” liable for physical harm thereafter caused to the trespasser by a failure to carry on his activities with reasonable care for the trespasser's safety.9 Sections 337 and 338 add a proximity requirement, so the possessor must know or have reason to know that the trespasser is in dangerous proximity to the condition or the force.10 The word “thereafter” fixes when the duty starts. It runs forward from the moment of knowledge, and harm done earlier stays under the no-duty rule of § 333. The entrant is a trespasser on both sides of that line, and knowledge alone moves him from the undiscovered category into the discovered one.
Actual knowledge needs little explanation: an engineer who watches a person step onto the track ahead knows that a trespasser is present. “Reason to know” is a term of art with a narrower meaning than its words suggest. Under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 12, a person has reason to know a fact when he has information from which a reasonable person would infer that the fact exists, which differs from recognizing a risk or probability that it exists.11 A signal, a report, a sound, or a glimpse can supply that information. A possessor who knows only that trespassers sometimes come has a general expectation and no inference about this person. On the Second Restatement's view, foreseeability of a trespasser is not enough; the landowner must know or have reason to know that the trespasser is actually present.12
Tying the duty to information keeps it tied to what the possessor can act on. A possessor can adjust his conduct only for someone he has information about, and a trigger based on probability would reach every possessor who knows that trespass sometimes happens, which would turn § 333 into an ordinary negligence rule. Because the definition looks to information the possessor already holds, it does not charge him with whatever an inspection would have revealed, and it imposes no duty to look for trespassers.
Frederick v. Philadelphia Rapid Transit Co. shows the line. A passenger fell from a subway platform onto the track, a “tripper” stopped the train automatically, and the crew drove on without making an adequate inspection.13 The automatic stop gave the crew information from which it could infer that a person was on the track, so the possessor owed care without anyone's having seen the passenger.
Examiners test the trigger by asking what the possessor had in hand when the harm began, and two engineers on different lines show how the answer divides.
The second engineer's position is the mere foreseeability that the Second Restatement treats as insufficient. For an entrant nobody has noticed, the only route to a duty is the constant-intrusion rule, in which the possessor's knowledge concerns a place and not a particular person.14
For conditions and forces, the trigger has a second element. The possessor owes reasonable care once he knows or has notice of both the trespasser's presence and the danger the trespasser is about to encounter.15 A possessor who knows that a hiker is crossing a far pasture owes nothing on that information about a live wire at the opposite edge of the property, because nothing he knows connects the hiker to the wire.
The second step usually decides the problem. The facts rarely deny that the hazard was dangerous, and they often leave open whether the possessor's information amounted to an inference about a person or only to a general expectation.
Courts disagree about how to classify the duty, and the disagreement explains why the same facts can be pleaded in two vocabularies. Some regard it as an exception to the rule that a possessor answers to a trespasser only for willful and wanton misconduct. Others treat it as an application of that rule, on the view that failing to use ordinary care after discovering a human being in danger is itself willful and wanton misconduct.16 The second view has a historical root, since the rule against intentional injury to a trespasser grew into a rule against willful and wanton misconduct toward a discovered trespasser.17 Under either label, the possessor owes reasonable care once he is on notice of the presence and the danger.
The label matters only in states that keep the willful-and-wanton limit. The great majority of courts have discarded it and apply ordinary care to active operations once the trespasser's presence is discovered.18 In a state that retains the limit, the question is how the court defines wanton. A definition requiring conscious disregard of a known high risk excludes negligent inattention after discovery, and a definition that includes a failure of ordinary care after discovery admits it.
The Second Restatement's insistence on information about actual presence has also met resistance. Some courts treat a foreseeable trespasser as a known one, so that a possessor owes reasonable care whenever a trespasser's presence and encounter with danger is reasonably foreseeable.19 In Lee v. Chicago Transit Authority, a man was electrocuted on a third rail, and the court treated foreseeability as equivalent to reason to know, so the plaintiff did not have to show that the defendant foresaw anyone about to encounter the danger.20 The second engineer above would face a very different case in such a court if people were reasonably foreseeable on her track, while in a Second Restatement jurisdiction the same facts end the inquiry. The first move on a fact pattern is therefore to identify which approach the jurisdiction follows, and the closing section of this chapter returns to these departures.
Active Operations
Section 336 requires a possessor who knows or has reason to know of a trespasser to carry on his activities with reasonable care for the trespasser's safety, and it makes him liable for physical harm thereafter caused by a failure to do so.22 The duty attaches to conduct, whether the possessor is driving a vehicle, running a machine, moving goods, or operating a train, and not to the condition of the land. It is the discovered-trespasser counterpart of § 333(b), which excuses any care in carrying on activities toward trespassers no one has noticed.23
The duty begins at discovery because reasonable care in conducting an activity means fitting it to the people it might hit, by slowing, steering around, sounding a horn, or stopping, and each of those steps depends on information that someone is there. Before the possessor has that information, § 333(b) spares him the guesswork. Conduct after discovery falls under § 336, and conduct before it stays under the no-duty rule. Even then the duty stays modest. It does not require the possessor to make the premises safe or to look for trespassers; it requires him to adjust the operation he is already conducting once he has been put on notice, and the burden of doing so centers on one person in one situation.24
Most courts apply ordinary care. The great majority have discarded the older limit that allowed recovery only for willful or wanton misconduct, and the duty extends to controlling operating forces, such as machinery already in motion, or to warning against them.25
What reasonable care requires depends on what the trespasser already knows. When the possessor has reason to believe that a discovered trespasser is unaware of a danger from his operations, reasonable care means a warning, and when it is apparent that a warning is not enough, it means conducting or controlling the operation so as not to injure the trespasser.26 A trespasser who is asleep, pinned, or unable to hear is the usual case in which a shout accomplishes nothing and the operation itself has to change. The plaintiff keeps the burden of proving that the possessor failed to act as a reasonable person would, and in many cases a warning that the trespasser is about to walk into danger satisfies the duty.27 Warnings are favored because they cost little and put the trespasser in a position to avoid the harm, and the measure of an adequate one is whether it is reasonably adequate to enable the trespasser to protect himself.28 A general “No Trespassing” sign falls short of that measure. It tells a person already on the land that the possessor wants him gone and says nothing about the operation or the risk it creates.
An essay on this rule turns on two facts: what the possessor knew when the harmful conduct began, and what he did with that knowledge. The first scene above is decided by the first fact, since a driver with no information about the stranger is governed by the default rule. The second and third scenes are decided by the second, since both drivers knew and only one used care. Two errors cost points here. The first is treating a posted “No Trespassing” sign as the required warning, when the warning must address the danger from the operation. The second is treating the possessor's general awareness that trespassers sometimes appear as discovery, when the trigger requires information that a particular person is present.
Section 336 reaches conduct generally. The next two subsections turn to the two hazards that the Restatement treats separately, dangerous artificial conditions under § 337 and forces under immediate control under § 338.
Dangerous Artificial Conditions
Section 337 applies the known-trespasser trigger to what the possessor keeps on his land. A possessor who maintains an artificial condition involving a risk of death or serious bodily harm to persons coming in contact with it is liable for bodily harm to trespassers caused by his failure to use reasonable care to warn them of it, if two further requirements are met.30 Section 336 governs what the possessor does on the land, and § 337 governs what he leaves there, such as an uncovered pit, a live wire, or a cistern hidden under a tarp. For a condition, the one precaution a discovered trespasser lacks is a warning, and the duty ends there.
The first requirement is knowledge: the possessor must know or have reason to know of the trespasser's presence in dangerous proximity to the condition.31 Reason to know carries the meaning developed above, so a general awareness that people sometimes wander onto the land does not satisfy it. Proximity adds a second link, because a warning helps only a person about to meet the hazard. A possessor who sees a hiker on a distant ridge has no information connecting that hiker to a pit on the other side of the property, and the clause does not ask him to search the land to find out.
The second requirement concerns what the trespasser will perceive. The condition must be of such a nature that the possessor has reason to believe the trespasser will not discover it or realize the risk involved.32 A warning adds information in two ways, since a trespasser may fail to see the hazard at all or may see it and misjudge it. A walker who notices a boxy steel cabinet in a field and leans on it to rest has discovered the cabinet but not the exposed high-voltage equipment inside, and the words “realize the risk” cover that case. They also mark a point where § 337 reaches slightly further than § 335, whose corresponding requirement asks only whether trespassers will discover the condition.33
The limit runs the other way as well. One court has put it this way: a trespasser's awareness of the peril is an absolute bar to recovery, because the occupier's liability arises out of the want of due care to warn the trespasser of the concealed danger.34 The text of § 337 builds in the same logic. A trespasser who will see and understand the danger gains nothing from a warning, and where the danger is one the trespasser could reasonably be expected to see and avoid, even a warning may not be required.35
Section 337 asks much less about the pattern of entry than § 335 does. Section 335 requires the possessor to know of constant intrusion upon a limited area because, without a known trespasser, only a habit of the public makes arrivals predictable.36 Under § 337 no pattern needs to be shown, since the possessor already knows or has reason to know that a particular person is near the hazard. A plaintiff who tries to prove constant intrusion under § 337 is proving something the section does not ask for, and a plaintiff who proves only that trespassers were foreseeable has not proved what it does.
The duty this knowledge creates is a duty to warn and nothing more. The possessor need not make the premises reasonably safe for the trespasser; he must use reasonable care to warn of proximate dangerous conditions.37 A shout from the porch or a sign at the pit satisfies it, and a claim that the possessor should have fenced, covered, or filled the hazard asks for a precaution the section does not include. The plaintiff must still show that the possessor failed to act as a reasonable person would, and in many cases a warning that the trespasser is about to walk into danger meets the duty.38 A general “No Trespassing” sign does not qualify, because it tells a person already on the land nothing about the condition or the risk.
The warning duty is a modern rule. Courts once held that a possessor had no duty to warn a trespasser he saw walking into a concealed danger, and that position has apparently given way to a rule that he must at least warn.39 The older rule fell because of what a warning costs. Once the possessor sees the trespasser heading toward the hazard, a shout or a sign costs almost nothing and may prevent a death, while silence at that moment rewards passivity when only the possessor can prevent the harm. The duty stops at a warning because the trespasser has no claim to have the premises made safe, which would restore the burden of precautions that the no-duty rule exists to prevent.
Each requirement can fail independently, and a plaintiff who loses on one does not recover however clearly the others are met.
Some courts relax the knowledge element. In Webster v. Culbertson, the court relied in part on § 337 for known trespassers but applied it, in line with § 335, to a trespasser who was merely foreseeable.40 In such a court the third owner's claim could survive if the trespasser's presence was reasonably foreseeable, whereas in a Second Restatement jurisdiction it ends at the knowledge element. The first move on a fact pattern is therefore to identify which approach the jurisdiction follows, and the closing section of this chapter returns to these departures.
Forces Under Immediate Control
Section 338 applies the known-trespasser trigger to a third kind of danger, a force the possessor is operating at that moment. A possessor who is in immediate control of a force, and who knows or has reason to know of trespassers in dangerous proximity to it, is liable for physical harm thereby caused to them by his failure to use reasonable care either to control the force so as to prevent harm or to give a warning reasonably adequate to enable them to protect themselves.42 The knowledge half of that sentence is the trigger already developed. Section 338 adds a second feature of the possessor's position, immediate control, and a duty that offers a choice between two precautions.
A force in this setting is something already moving under the possessor's hand, and the standard example is machinery already in motion.43 A train under power, a crane whose boom is swinging, and a conveyor that is running all qualify, because each carries energy that will injure whoever is in its path unless someone intervenes. Immediate control means that the possessor, or an operator acting for him, can start, slow, stop, or redirect the force right now. Control makes the duty reasonable to impose on someone who owes strangers little else, since the person at the controls is the only one positioned to stop the harm in time, and stopping or slowing costs little once he knows that someone is in the way. In Frederick, the crew held a train under power, and after an automatic stop signaled that a passenger had fallen onto the track, they drove on without an adequate inspection.44 The harm came from a machine the crew was operating, and a pause to look would have cost them very little.
Sections 336 and 338 overlap, and the standard in both is reasonable care once the trespasser has been discovered. A crane operator who keeps swinging a load toward a person he can see is carrying on an activity and is also controlling a force. The two sections are usually cited for one proposition: when the possessor has reason to believe that a discovered trespasser is unaware of a danger from active operations, he must warn of it, and when it is apparent that a warning is not enough, he must conduct or control the operation so as not to injure the trespasser.45 Section 338 names the choice outright, which makes it the natural section for harm from a machine or vehicle in motion in the possessor's own hands.
The two precautions are joined by “or,” so a possessor who takes either one meets the duty. To control the force is to manage it so that it does not reach the trespasser, by stopping the boom, braking the train, or cutting the power. The alternative is a warning reasonably adequate to enable the trespassers to protect themselves.46 The law gives the possessor the choice because the cheaper precaution should be available whenever it will work. A shout or a horn costs almost nothing, leaves the operation running, and lets the trespasser step clear. The choice exists only while the warning can do that job, and adequacy is measured from the trespasser's position, by whether the warning can be perceived, understood, and acted on in the time and space that remain. A trespasser who is asleep, unconscious, pinned, or hemmed in by machinery cannot respond to a shout, and where it is apparent that a warning is not enough, the duty becomes a duty to control the force, because only the possessor can prevent the injury.47 A general “No Trespassing” sign never meets the standard, since it speaks to staying off the land and says nothing about the force or how to avoid it.
An essay on this rule turns on three facts: whether the possessor was at the controls, what information he held about where the trespasser was, and whether a warning could have worked. A candidate who writes that a warning always satisfies the duty overlooks the adequacy requirement, and a candidate who writes that the possessor must always stop the force overlooks the “or” that makes a warning an acceptable alternative.
Scope of the Duty and Rescue
The duties that discovery creates under §§ 336 through 338 are narrower than the phrase “reasonable care” suggests, and the text of each section marks the edge. Section 337 makes the possessor answerable for failing to use “reasonable care to warn them of the condition,” and nothing in it requires him to repair, fence, or fill the hazard.49 Section 338 lets the possessor in control of a force choose between controlling it and giving a warning “reasonably adequate to enable them to protect themselves.”50 Section 336 concerns only how the possessor carries on his activities.51 Read together, the three sections never ask a possessor to make the premises reasonably safe for a trespasser, even one he has seen.52
The duty stops at a warning or an adjustment of conduct because of what discovery adds. Knowledge makes some precautions cheap, such as a shout, a sign, or a slower machine, and the law asks for those. It does nothing to cheapen repair, which costs the same whether or not a trespasser turns up, and a duty to make the premises safe would restore the burden the general no-duty rule exists to avoid. The possessor's obligation is therefore reasonable care to warn of proximate dangerous conditions and, for active operations, to conduct or control them when it is apparent that a warning is insufficient.53
Even where the duty exists, the plaintiff must prove breach, meaning that the possessor failed to act as a reasonable person would under the circumstances. In many cases a warning that the trespasser is about to walk into danger satisfies the duty, and where the danger is one the trespasser could reasonably be expected to see and avoid, even a warning may not be required.54 Establishing the duty is therefore only the first half of a discovered trespasser's claim.
The duties above look forward, to a hazard the trespasser has not yet met. They leave open what a possessor must do when the trespasser is already trapped, injured, or helpless. A corollary rule answers that question: a possessor may have a duty to use reasonable care to rescue or aid a trespasser who is injured or in peril on the premises, even though the possessor is not legally responsible for the trespasser's condition.56 If the landowner has breached no duty to the trespasser but discovers that the trespasser is trapped, or injured and helpless, he must exercise reasonable care to provide affirmative assistance. The result follows a rule found in other settings, where a defendant whose instrumentality innocently causes harm must still use reasonable care afterward.57 Treatises list the trapped trespasser in peril as a separate exception to the no-duty rule, and Pridgen is the usual citation.58
The leading illustration is Pridgen v. Boston Housing Authority. A boy climbed into an elevator shaft, slipped off the elevator roof, and became trapped. His mother learned of his predicament and asked an authority employee to turn off the power, but the employee failed to do so in time, and the moving elevator crushed the boy's legs. The Massachusetts court found it unthinkable to hold the authority liable if an employee had pushed the elevator's “go” button while knowing the boy was trapped in the shaft, but not if the employee, being reasonably able to do so, knowingly failed or refused to turn off the power to the same elevator.59 The first employee's conduct is an active operation that the possessor must carry on with care once the trespasser is discovered, and the second employee's conduct is an omission. The victim, the machine, and the switch are the same in both. A rule that punished the push and excused the refusal would reward the possessor for passivity at the one moment when only he could prevent the harm.
The corollary has limits that keep it from becoming a general duty to protect trespassers. Liability reaches only the harm that results from the possessor's negligent failure to provide assistance, so the possessor does not answer for the original peril, only for the added injury that reasonable aid would have prevented. Rhodes v. Illinois Cent. Gulf R.R. marks a second limit: an intoxicated person was injured on the premises, but the injury did not result from the landowner's premises or acts, and the court found no duty.60 Knowledge is the trigger here as well. A possessor who has no information that anyone is trapped has nothing to respond to, just as a possessor with no information about a trespasser's presence owes nothing under the known-trespasser rules.
Two errors recur on essays. The first is to treat a trespasser's mere presence on the land as triggering a duty to rescue, when the possessor must know that the trespasser is trapped, injured, or helpless. The second is to treat the duty as making the possessor answerable for the original injury, when it reaches only the harm that follows from the failure to aid.