Concept
Lending Premises or Instrumentalities
Liability for harm caused by another: directing, permitting, ratifying, and agents' conduct
Lending Premises or Instrumentalities
An owner who lends his car to a friend he knows will drive it drunk has not ordered the drive or urged it on. The law still faults him, because he supplied the means. Clause (c) of Restatement (Second) of Torts § 877 states the rule: a defendant is liable for harm resulting from another’s tortious conduct if he “permits the other to act upon his premises or with his instrumentalities, knowing or having reason to know that the other is acting or will act tortiously.”1
Instrumentalities are the tools, vehicles, and equipment that a defendant owns or controls and that the other person uses to act. The clause has two parts, and liability needs both. The first describes what the defendant did: he allowed the other to use his land or his thing. The second describes what he knew: the other was acting tortiously or was about to. An owner who hands over the means of a wrong he can see coming falls inside the clause. An owner whose property merely happened to be what a wrongdoer used does not.
Clause (a), the ground just covered, requires that the defendant order or induce the conduct and that he know or should know of circumstances that would make it tortious if it were his own.2 Clause (c) requires no order and no inducement. A landowner who never suggests the act, never encourages it, and privately disapproves of it still answers under clause (c) if he lets the actor proceed on his land while aware of what the actor is doing or will do. His contribution is the access he allows. Access counts as fault because the owner of premises or equipment decides who may use them, and he is the one person who can refuse. The injured third party had no say in who received the keys, and the actor often could not have acted without them. When an owner grants access knowing it will be used tortiously, his permission supplies the means of the harm, and the decision to supply them was his.
Each element answers a different concern. Permission explains why the owner, and not some bystander, is the defendant: it presupposes a power to refuse, so an owner whose car is taken without his consent has permitted nothing. Knowledge keeps the clause from becoming insurance. Almost any borrower might someday misuse a car or a tool, and if that possibility were enough, every owner would answer for every misuse of his property, which would penalize ordinary generosity and ordinary commerce. Requiring knowledge or reason to know confines liability to owners who held the information that made permission unreasonable and who could have acted on it by saying no.
Reason to know covers the ground between actual knowledge and a bare possibility. It asks what a reasonable person holding the defendant’s information would infer about the actor’s conduct, so an owner who ignores repeated warning signs cannot plead ignorance. The inference must concern this actor. Warnings about borrowers in general, or about the risks of lending at all, do not tell the owner that the person standing in front of him is acting or will act tortiously.
Both lenders gave the same permission; the difference is what each knew when the keys changed hands. When a fact pattern mentions a loan of a car or a building but not what the owner knew, the missing fact is the one that decides the case. Ask what the owner knew or had reason to know when he granted or continued the permission.
Negligent entrustment applies the same structure to a chattel. A person who supplies a thing to someone he knows or should know to be unfit to use it safely answers for the harm that follows, because the fault is his own in supplying it. The cases include a car given to an unlicensed fifteen-year-old in Ardinger v. Hummell and a car lent to a driver whose bad record the defendant knew about in Swicegood v. Cooper.3 Courts ordinarily ask whether the defendant could control the chattel, not merely whether he owned it, in line with Restatement (Second) of Torts § 308.4 That requirement tracks the permission element, because an owner who could not control access had nothing to permit. Some courts applying the doctrine demand actual knowledge of the entrustee’s intoxication or other disability at the time of entrustment, a stricter test than ordinary negligence would yield, although clause (c) itself reaches reason to know as well.5
The knowledge must concern the particular actor, and two firearm cases show the line. In Kitchen v. K-Mart Corp., a seller who let an intoxicated buyer walk off with a gun faced possible liability to a woman the buyer shot. In Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., by contrast, the court refused to apply negligent entrustment to handgun manufacturers whose marketing allegedly facilitated illegal use, because they had entrusted guns to a class of persons who were perhaps dangerous as a class, not to specific individuals known to be dangerous.6 Both cases arise under negligent entrustment rather than § 877(c) itself, but they mark the same boundary. A buyer visibly intoxicated at the counter presents a present, individual danger; a statistical risk spread across a class of customers does not.
Respondeat superior reaches only torts committed within the scope of employment, so an employer escapes it when an employee injures someone on a personal errand. Vicarious liability rests on a different logic from clause (c). The rules that impute one person’s negligence to another all reflect an effort, sometimes declared by the court and more often assumed, to find a financially responsible defendant for a plaintiff whose life may be ruined if he goes uncompensated.7 Those rules ask whose pocket should pay. Clause (c) asks what the defendant himself permitted and what he knew. The employer can still answer for its own fault, and Restatement (Second) of Torts § 317 shows how.
Section 317 requires a master to use reasonable care to control a servant who is acting outside the scope of employment, so as to prevent the servant from intentionally harming others or creating an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to them. Two sets of conditions must be met. The servant must be on premises in the master’s possession (or premises the servant may enter only as a servant) or be using the master’s chattel. And the master must know or have reason to know that he can control the servant, and must know or should know of the necessity and opportunity for exercising that control.8 The first condition is the permission fact in employment dress: the servant is on the land or holding the thing because of the job, so the master controls access just as the owner does under clause (c). The second set is the counterpart of the knowledge element. The duty presumably rests on the benefit the employer draws from the employee’s activity, and the employer is often uniquely positioned to prevent the harm.9
An owner sued under clause (c) will often answer that the borrower’s own wrongful act, especially a deliberate or criminal one, cut off the owner’s responsibility. Defendants make this argument in many proximate-cause cases: even if they were negligent, they say, a later act supersedes the negligence and “breaks the causal chain.”10 The argument fails when the later act is the one the owner had reason to expect. Under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 449, “[i]f the likelihood that a third person may act in a particular manner is the hazard or one of the hazards which makes the actor negligent, such an act whether innocent, negligent, intentionally tortious, or criminal does not prevent the actor from being liable for harm caused thereby.”11 The reasoning follows from the knowledge element. The owner’s reason to know of the borrower’s tendency is what made the permission unreasonable, so the later misconduct is that hazard coming to pass. Treating it as an independent cause would let the owner profit from the very fact that made him negligent.
The result differs when the intervening act has no connection to the risk. A court held that a lessor who supplied a car with a defective trunk lid was not liable to a lessee who, stopped to repair the trunk, was struck by another driver, because the later act was divorced from the foreseeable risk of a defective lid.12
The same two questions, access and knowledge, separate clause (c) from the clause that follows. Clause (c) reaches an owner who had no authority over how the actor behaved once access was granted, because his fault is the lending. Clause (d) turns on control: it reaches a defendant who “controls, or has a duty to use care to control, the conduct of the other, who is likely to do harm if not controlled, and fails to exercise care in the control.”13 A car owner who lends to a known drunk driver is a clause (c) defendant because of what he allowed. A custodian who has taken charge of a person known to be dangerous belongs under clause (d) because of the control he held and failed to use. Section 317 sits between the two, joining the premises-or-chattel fact of permission to the master’s ability to control.