Concept
Section 318 in Practice
Duty to control the conduct of others on one's land or chattels
Section 318 in Practice
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 318 asks the same questions whenever a possessor is accused of failing to control someone the possessor allowed to use the property. Did the actor permit a third person, other than a servant, to use land or chattels in the actor's possession, and was the actor present?1 Did the actor know or have reason to know of the ability to control that person?2 Did the actor know, or should the actor have known, of the necessity and opportunity for exercising that control?3 If so, the actor owes reasonable care to keep the user from intentionally harming others or from creating an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to them.4
The questions never change; the facts do, and with them the element that carries the dispute. In a family home, possession and presence are seldom contested, and the fight is over what the possessor knew about the power to remove the danger and the reason to expect it. At a party, the strain falls on fit and on causation: whether a host's duty reaches a guest's later driving, and whether the host's inaction caused the crash. With a lent chattel, the doubt is whether the possessor held a practical lever over the user and was present to pull it. Each setting below applies elements already taught and adds none, so when a court hesitates to impose liability, ask which element is under strain and why.
Dangerous Household Members
The family home is where § 318 does its most familiar work. A possessor who lets an adult live in the home and keep property there fits the section's description: the possessor permits a third person, otherwise than as a servant, to use land and chattels in the possessor's possession, and the duty then turns on presence and the two knowledge conditions.5 In Volpe v. Gallagher, a mother let her adult son, who showed symptoms of delusional and paranoid mental illness, live with her and keep weapons in her home, and he used a shotgun to shoot a neighbor.6 At the moment of the shooting she was reading a newspaper in the living room, oblivious to the fact that her son was outside stalking the neighbor with a loaded shotgun.7
The court explained that her obliviousness at that instant did not preclude liability. She was present in the house while her son engaged in dangerous gun-possession activity and displayed those symptoms, so she had a duty to use reasonable care to prevent the activity if she knew or should have known that she could control him in that respect by causing the guns to be removed from the premises.8 The case runs through every element of the section, which makes it easiest to learn by taking its facts through those elements in order.
In a household the first two steps seldom decide the case, because the possessor lives in the home and the member lives there by consent. The contest comes at the third and fourth steps, where the question is what the possessor knew. That placement explains why Volpe does not make every parent of a troubled adult liable. Living with a dangerous person is not itself a breach, and the duty arises only where the possessor knew or should have known of both the power and the need. A possessor whose household member keeps a lawful firearm and shows no sign of disturbance ordinarily has no reason to know that control is necessary. A possessor who sees symptoms of delusional illness in a house with guns in it faces more. The opinion's footnotes quote a Restatement comment (§ 364) saying that a possessor who permits an activity that is highly dangerous unless great care is taken may be required to exercise constant vigilance, so as to be able to control the third person when the occasion arises.14
The household setting fits § 318 because possession of the home supplies both the power to prevent the harm and the information needed to see it coming. A neighbor cannot enter the house to remove the guns, and public authorities cannot watch every home, but the possessor can carry the guns out of her own house at little cost, and living there lets her see both the weapons and the warning signs. That is the usual reason duties of this kind fall on the person holding the lever. The power also comes from the house itself. Because the son was an adult, the duty a parent owes toward a minor child was not in play, and the mother's authority over him rested on her possession of the premises.15
Barmore v. Elmore shows how a household-danger claim can be framed on a different footing. The plaintiff there argued that the defendants, as landowners, were negligent in failing to protect him from a dangerous condition on their premises, namely their son, who had a history of mental illness.16 That is a premises theory, with the son cast as the condition. Section 318 organizes the same facts around other questions: who possessed the premises, whom the possessor permitted to use them, where the possessor was, what power the possessor held over the use, and what the possessor knew about the need to use it. The excerpt gives only the plaintiff's framing, so Barmore is useful here for the choice of theory and not as a § 318 holding. A careful answer names which theory it is applying and tests the elements of that theory.
An exam stem will often pair a Volpe-style home with a parent who looks similar from a distance, and the question that separates them is whether the parent holds the premises where the danger sits.
That result tracks the general view that a parent is unlikely to be held responsible for a dangerous adult child's misconduct without some unusual element of control, and that financial support of such a child is probably insufficient.17 In Courtney v. Courtney, a mother who provided drugs and alcohol to her grown, married son, knowing that these substances made him violent, was held subject to liability to his abused wife.18 The mother there did more than send money: she personally furnished substances she knew would make her son violent, and that added element separates her from a parent who only supports an adult child. If the daughter in the example above had instead moved into her father's house and kept the handgun in her room, the father would hold the same lever the mother held in Volpe, and the analysis would turn on what he knew.
Intoxicated Guests
Injured motorists and pedestrians sometimes sue the host of a party where the driver who hit them had been drinking, and § 318 is one of the theories offered to support the claim. The section's text supplies the hook: an actor who permits a third person to use land or chattels in the actor's possession, otherwise than as a servant, is, if present, under a duty to exercise reasonable care to control that person so as to prevent intentional harm to others or conduct creating an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to them.21 A host who opens a house to guests has permitted them to use land in the host's possession, and a host at his own party is present, so the argument runs that reasonable care required him to keep a visibly drunk guest from creating the risk of a crash. How far that argument carries is contested. Courts are divided on social host liability generally, and many are cautious, so this section uses the claim to show how a duty can be assumed and liability still be denied.
The caution has reasons that can be read from the structure of the claim. A duty to police guests' drinking would reach ordinary hospitality, since nearly every dinner party and holiday gathering involves a host, guests, and alcohol, and the text of § 318 offers no obvious place to stop. Decisions about whom to serve and how much also involve line-drawing that a legislature is better placed to do than a single court deciding a single case. The fit with the text is uneven as well. Section 318 speaks of use of land or chattels in the possessor's possession, while the dangerous conduct in a drunk-driving case usually occurs on a public road in the guest's own car, so a plaintiff must cast the drinking on the premises as the dangerous use. Where the guest supplies the alcohol and drinks it unaided, as in a Massachusetts decision, Juliano v. Simpson, a duty seems even less likely.22
A court can take the plaintiff's argument at full strength and still reject the claim. In Ritchie v. Goodman, the Missouri Court of Appeals reasoned that even if § 318 created a duty in a landowner to control guests' intoxicated driving, existing precedent defeated the victims' claims because it treats the driving drinker, and not the host, as the proximate cause of the harm.23 Proximate cause is the legal test for whether the defendant's conduct is close enough to the harm to make the defendant answerable for it. The reasoning is that the guest's own decisions to keep drinking and then to drive stand between the host's inaction and the crash, and those decisions are treated as the cause the law recognizes. Ritchie shows the structure of such a loss: duty and causation are separate elements, and a plaintiff who clears the first can still fail on the second.
The courts do not speak with one voice. Some have recognized host liability, among them Kelly v. Gwinnell, a New Jersey decision involving an adult guest that a statute later superseded in part, and Hart v. Ivey, a North Carolina decision involving a minor drinker in which ordinary negligence principles applied.24 Others, such as the Washington court in Burkhart v. Harrod, reasoned that if social host liability is to be imposed, the legislature should impose it, and a number of statutes already draw lines of their own, such as the line between minor and adult drinkers.25 Because the decisions split, an answer should not assert that § 318 generally supports social host liability. Of these decisions, the one that deals with § 318 is Ritchie, and it ends against the plaintiff.
Chattels and Entrustment
Section 318 reaches an actor who permits a third person to use “land or chattels in his possession,” so the possessor's duty to control a permitted user is not confined to real property.27 A chattel is an item of movable personal property, such as a vehicle, a boat, a power tool, or a firearm, and the section treats it exactly as it treats land. The same conditions apply: the actor permits the use otherwise than as a servant, is present, knows or has reason to know of the ability to control the user, and knows or should know of the necessity and opportunity for exercising that control.28 Volpe v. Gallagher already combined both categories: the son lived on the mother's land and kept chattels, the guns, there, and the lever the court identified was removing those guns from the premises.29
What changes with a chattel is the form the possessor's power takes. Over land, the levers are forbidding an activity, demanding that a dangerous object be removed, and ending the permission to be there. Over a chattel, the same levers become physical and immediate: taking back the keys, switching the machine off, unloading and removing the weapon, or demanding the item's return. Each lever comes from possessing the thing, because the person who holds it can reach it, and presence for a chattel means being with the item while the third person uses it. A possessor who stands in the garage while a friend runs a saw is positioned to pull these levers, and a possessor who is miles away is not.
Ownership and possession are different things, and § 318 is written in terms of possession. An owner who has rented a chattel out for a season, or parked it with someone else for a long period, may hold title while lacking any practical power to stop what is done with it on a given day. The duty follows the power to prevent harm, and a bare owner who cannot retrieve or restrict the chattel stands in the same position as a stranger. Asking about possession and the ability to control, and not about title, keeps liability attached to the person who could actually have acted.30 The usual exam temptation is a stem that says only that the defendant owned the item. Ownership answers none of the section's questions, which are who possessed the chattel, who permitted the use, where the possessor was, and what lever the possessor held.
Negligent entrustment is a neighboring theory, and the two are easy to blur because both involve putting a dangerous chattel in someone else's hands. Entrustment looks at the moment of handing over. The defendant's fault lies in the decision to supply a chattel to someone whose unfitness made the supply dangerous, as in Kitchen v. K-Mart Corp., where a seller of a firearm to an intoxicated buyer may be liable to the woman the buyer shot, and in Sanders v. Walden, where a car was lent to a man who could not reach the brake pedals and had a bad driving record.31 Section 318 looks at a later moment. It asks what a possessor who is present with a permitted user does while the use is under way, given the lever the possessor holds and the notice the possessor has of the need to act. Because the theories attach to different moments, different facts decide them: entrustment turns on the handover decision, and § 318 turns on presence, the practical power to control, and knowledge that control is needed.
The two theories can overlap on a single set of facts. A possessor who hands a chattel to an obviously unfit user and then stays present while the user misuses it may face both a claim about the handover and a claim about the failure to control during the use, and an answer should name and test each one separately because their elements differ. A third duty is also distinct from both. When a person in control of a chattel supplies it to another for a use that benefits the supplier, control and benefit together impose a duty to provide a safe chattel.32 That duty concerns the condition of the thing supplied, so a lent vehicle with failing brakes belongs there, while a lent vehicle in the hands of a reckless driver belongs under entrustment or § 318.